Gardens of Forking Paths: Notes on Architecture’s Ingenious Destruction and Recreation of Time

Donald Kunze

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Prologue. The style of this essay tries to simulate the atmosphere of Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, “Garden of the Forking Paths.” In the beginning at least, each idea gets a three-part review, followed by a commentary that elaborates the idea and its resistances. Then, I try to provide some scholarly, historical, or philosophical context to the idea. No commentary pretends to be exhaustive, so each “point” could sprout multiple other branches that must be grafted in the mind of the reader. Borges’ short story tries out the thesis that Positivism’s idea of time as a series of dendritic choices inadvertently accomplishes Hegel’s phenomenon of Aufheben, a “preservation through cancellation” that puts every forsaken possibility into an existential deep-freezer. We live not just in the positivities we imagine we choose consciously, but alongside the negatives we generate with laughable perfection. Aufheben applies to this essay no less than to life, so by the end of the tour de farce the characters of the dream return to stand, in a final circular haunting, to mock the rational intent. Isn’t this the ultimate example of “recursion,” the mathematical function that returns the irrational residual to the heart of a new calculation? On one hand, recursion gives us the Golden Rectangle; on the other, the blobs of parametric procedures. “In for a penny, in for a pound.” It’s time to take on the consequences of architectural conditions that engage seriously dialectical issues; to play, seriously and carefully, the jeu de siècle that the philosopher Jacques Ellul called our death game of the technological idea until, as Aldous Huxley put it, “time must have a stop.”

§1: Position One: Architecture is the “hero” of space. Time (erosion, decay, death) embodies the Heraclitan flux, against which permanence, and hence meaning, attempts to establish a feeble rampart. Buildings resist, and even though they sooner or later fail at this, their resistance is often compared to human resistance to death, a refusal to go gently into the Good Night. But, (Position Two) the case for architecture as a marker and ally of time could be the exception that proves the rule.

Commentary: Weathering tears down buildings bit by bit, “repurposing” violates an originally intended use, and city growth recontextualizes old buildings to the extent that their scale and style become ridiculous. But, when architecture is winning its war with time, monuments retain their power of reminder, quotations of other buildings, places, and styles re-imagine each present out of fantasized historical parts, and even pulverized ruins have
the power to evoke ghosts of places past. Sorting out these complex issues in terms of some imagined abstract definitions of time and space is futile. The media of space and time, considered in isolation or as activated by our senses, resist and mock paraphrase. As Augustine said, they are like the air we breathe.

**Context:** See Aldo Rossi’s poignant description in *The Architecture of the City* of the successive, “unsympathetic” adaptations of Palladio’s famous Palazzo della Ragione in Vicenza.¹ But, in his *Scientific Autobiography*, Rossi describes the way the exposed interiors of bombed apartments in post-war Italy evoked anguished memories of a lost domestic past. Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow take up the position that time-based processes add to, rather than war against, architectural meaning in *On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in Time*.²

§2: Normally, one thinks of buildings as slowing down or stopping the flow of time, but buildings can also speed up the landscape, bringing purposefulness or just frenetic activity to the previously tranquil landscape.

**Commentary:** Without architecture how could there be traffic bustle, steaming utilities, noise? Fast or slow, architecture’s principal talent seems to be a confrontation of the temporal. It can speed up or slow down any given tempo. In this sense, architecture’s job in general is to be “out of synch,” to never match the speed of its context. Walk into a church or museum; the decorum of the space demands a change of pace; walking damps into processional. On the other end of space’s speedometer, think of the Futurists’ depictions of an architecture dedicated to movement and transaction, of Ernst Kirchner’s Berlin street scenes or the frenetic circling scenes of the British Vorticists.³

In Zeno’s famous paradoxes, the point is not that the swift Achilles or target-bound arrow could somehow be frozen if they were “asked to think about their motion,” but that Achilles and the tortoise could never occupy the same time, the arrow’s dynamic space could never be resolved with the target’s static space. Slavoj Žižek comments: “What we have here is thus the relationship of the subject to the object experienced by every one of us in a dream: the subject, faster than the object, gets closer and closer to it and yet can never attain it — the dream paradox of a continuous approach to an object that nevertheless preserves a constant distance. The crucial feature of this inaccessibility of the object was nicely indicated by [Jacques] Lacan when he stressed that the point is not that Achilles could not overtake Hector (or the tortoise) — since he is faster than Hector he can easily leave him behind — but rather that he cannot attain him; Hector is always too fast or too slow. . . . In short, the topology of this paradox of Zeno is the paradoxical topology of the object of desire that eludes our grasp no matter what we do to attain it.”⁴
**Context:** Žižek continues to say that what Zeno prohibits is the dimension of *fantasy*, which allows the subject access to the “impossible object.” It is important to take him at his *word*, namely the word “dimension,” which covers both the lack created by the subject’s presence in a world that no longer belongs to him/her and the means of leaping over the gap that materializes this lack. It is not for nothing that the tradition of fool-play includes the *sotie*, a special form of farce which literally incorporates leaping (cf. *sauter*), or that sacred fools in both Islamic and Christian traditions were credited with the power to jump great distances or levitate. See, for an account of the relation of folly to leaping, Enid Welsford’s classic study, *The Fool: His Social and Literary History.* The creation of a gulf between subject and object, here and there, is an important but mostly misunderstood aspect of Freud’s theory of absence. In the story about the child who, after the mother has left, plays with a spool of yarn in a game of “*fort/da*” (here-and-there), many readers take Freud to mean that the child simulates the mother’s going and coming. Lacan, however, perceptively notes that the child experiments with his own ability to master the adult’s “magic” of being in two places at once, and “plays at leaping.” It is clear that Freud’s child was simulating the mother’s going and coming, but he achieved mastery over the situation by simulating his own disappearance and reappearance as well. In a parallel game, the child used a mirror whose bottom edge did not quite reach the floor to stage a peek-a-boo game. Lacan, likewise, grasps this double meaning and builds it into his own central idea of the mirror stage. Encountering his/her own mirror image, the child is able to realize his body as a coordinated unity, but it is a unity bestowed by the Other, and the child must also concede that this unity is symbolic and imposed. The illusion of mastery comes at the price of a lost center, a forfeit of one’s identity to an external point of view.

**§3:** Zeno’s space-time puzzles stem from space’s metaphoric power to represent time, to give it a face, a symbolic presence. Whether time is seen as a line or a circle, the idea is a spatial, not a temporal one. Does time get a chance to take revenge on space?

**Commentary:** The corresponding reverse case comes immediately to mind. If time is seen as a circle, line, or spiral, what about the spatial shapes themselves? Don’t they have a corresponding temporal sense, awarded “retroactively” in exchange for lending their form to time? This is not just a question about symbolic representation. Didn’t Sigfried Giedion, for example, make this argument in *Space, Time, and Architecture* (1967)? Wasn’t the Baroque awareness of the spiral a temporal (and theological) rather than a spatial idea of infinity? Wasn’t the form of the ancient Greek temple itself, whose name derived from *TEM* in the spatial sense of “to divide,” a place for the particularly TEMporal event of sacrifice?

Clearly, the dynamic exchange between temporality and spatiality is complex. It undermines any discussions of time and space as separate Cartesian identities. Space can be dynamic, just as time cannot escape the metaphors of space or the compromisingly static idea of
eternity placed inside the idea of change. When, as in the case of the TEMple, a gap is implicated, and it seems to make no difference whether the gap is discussed in temporal or spatial terms: the question of bridging involves both simultaneously.

Architecture’s problematic relations with time point to a general defect in causality itself. It is as if, using the standard cliché of billiard-balls colliding to model causality’s “if-then” rule, the slate table itself had been given a curvature or even some Möbius-band twists. As in the case of Achilles and the tortoise, it is the space of causes and the space effects that are incommensurable. We do not misjudge the effects in our search for the true cause; we misjudge the structure of causality itself. Between cause and effect, just as between other domains whose “perfect match” we presume (as if to say that the matched pairs such as true-false, here-there, inside-outside, life-death take up all the space of possibilities), there is actually a gap, a small gap. Where did this gap, this defect, come from? There are two productive modes of answering this question. One is “anthropological” and concerns the origins of human thought and culture. In short, it identifies the point at which the human separates off from the “talented animal” precisely with the event when the gap appears in both phenomenological and behavioral terms. It is, in these terms, impossible to discern whether the gap is on the side of the subject (language, thought, culture, etc.) or the object (perception, neurology, genetics, etc.). What is clear is that the “difference,” the gap undermining all symmetrical relationships, is durable and independent of both geographical and historical contingencies. Diverse human groups everywhere display the same fundamental pathology invented to deal with the gap.

The other approach is more portable, because it is personal and subjective, experienced by anyone, anywhere, as a fundamental human condition. In some sense, credit for the approach must be given to Freud, who in his early essay on the uncanny, studied the idea of the uncanny found in contemporary literature and experience. When Freud later focused more on hysteria, his commentators forgot about this early interest in the uncanny, but Freud preserved the uncanny inside such topics as collective memory, language errors, the structure of jokes, and the literary evidence of pathology. When Lacan “rescued” Freud from his followers in the 1950s by returning to key ideas, he rediscovered the uncanny’s topological presence in Freudian inside-outside situations. And, when Lacan’s “uncanny” was rescued by Mladen Dolar, it became evident that the uncanny was one of the main psychoanalytical structures underlying the everyday life and popular culture.

Context: René Girard, in his reflection on the origins of myth and ritual in the book, Violence and the Sacred (1977), focuses on the problem of priority. Did myths (stories about gods with fixed identities) grow out of ritual practices, or did the gods come first? “Ritual practices,” chez Girard, means murder: a murder that arises out of the conflict of mimesis, of semblance, of misrecognition of the different for the same. This conflict can be
represented as a historical or personal origin. Girard notes that when the child learns to see the other as an “alter ego,” he simultaneously conceives of another self inside his/her own. When this happens on the cultural level, it precipitates a potentially violent crisis of mimesis, which can, alternatively, be bridged imperfectly by ritual (when it is historical and collective) or fantasy (when the unit of perception is the individual). The bridge, like other “metaphors” of time, is simultaneously spatial and temporal, just as the gap it leaps over is simultaneously spatial and temporal.

§4: In symmetries of cause (cause-effect, true-false, inside-outside, etc.) there is no place for the subject, who disrupts the positivity of the “chain of being.” Yet, it is the defective rather than the perfect symmetry that is capable of providing architecture with its generative models. When the subject is added to this positivity, it is like the opening scene of Chaplin’s film City Lights, where the tramp is found sleeping in the arms of a statue just being unveiled in an inaugural civic ceremony. Amidst the positivity of the speakers, bands, and patriotic crowds, the tramp sticks out as a “scandal” in the smooth operation of ideological self-representation.

Commentary: All cultures, in various ways and degrees, employ circular models of time. This is a way of planting the idea of eternity even in secular contexts. Repetition (holidays, birthdays, regular calendar events) return things to a zero point, allowing the possibility of a slight opening, a hierophany, as Mircea Eliade called the appearance of the sacred in the midst of participatory repetitive celebrations. Some schemes are larger, more comprehensive, and surprisingly accurate in their coordination with cosmic clocks such as the synodic lunar month (the length of time between new moons), the sidereal lunar month (the length of time it takes the moon to return to a given start in the sky), or the 25,920 year precession of the equinoxes (the slow rotation period of the earth’s tilt). The most accurate is the Mayan calendar, which, some say, began its “long count” (13 “baktuns” — a baktun is a period of just over 5,125 years) around 550 BCE, the end of which is scheduled to occur on December 21, 2012 — an Armageddon-style gap of time we will soon be able to test.12

Often gaps in time were celebrated with social reversals. The Roman Saturnalia required masters to serve their slaves. Medieval church traditions involved electing boy bishops to preside over masses said backwards, often riding into church on “Baalam’s Ass,” the animal who had the power to see angels and speak.13 The fool stood for a direct and divine connection to genius, bypassing normative intelligence. Kings maintained court fools not just to avoid the envious evil eye, which could level any ambitious accumulations of fortune, but to maintain the ancient tradition that fools, dwarfs, hunchbacks, etc. were blessed by being blighted. Theoretical accounts of wit emerging from the Middle Ages took this demonic quality of folly into account, particularly in Baltasar Gracián’s idea of agudeza (“sharp
thought”), which combined the traditions of melancholy and demonic possession into a theory of how topics might be invented by teaching thought to “jump around.”

The connection between gaps in time and gaps in normative intelligence led not just to the rule of folly during breaks in the calendar year but to the associative meanings that we know from carnivals, amusement parks, resort environments, and vacation landscapes, as well as the furniture of fun, particularly the carousel (cf. Fortuna’s wheel) and freak show (cf. teratology as fortune telling). Monstrosity was the puzzled form whose “answer” could be discovered only by wit. Critically, as in the case of Œdipus at the gates of Thebes, entry into the city and the lore of portals in general was connected to the witty answer able to penetrate the “paratactic” logic of the monster’s riddle and body. The answer to the monster is also a password, which shows how the labyrinth itself puts the problem of defective symmetry in terms of physical passage, an emblem of universal knowledge.

Defective symmetry-causality is central in Lacan’s famous account of subjectivity’s first moments, the mirror stage. Here, we see how the “perfect symmetry” that should hold between an image and its reflection is opened up by a gap that, in this case, initiates consciousness. In this widely misinterpreted anecdote, the young child immediately attains a sense of unity (and, hence, mastery) through an encounter with his/her mirror image. Unity/mastery is gained but the subject is disadvantaged in two ways. First, the mirror image is a stereo reversal of what the Other sees. A wedge is pounded between the subject’s knowledge gained by sight and knowledge gained by the touch. The mirror image preserves the relation of touch through its right-to-right, left-to-left parallels; the mirror image is reverse from the “real image” accessible only from a point of view different from the subject’s. The subject gains the illusion of subjective unity and mastery but pays for it by losing control of the point of view that frames his/her subjective image.

The subject’s image stamps the currency of the subject’s value in social networks, where the subject as a visual person will be the unit of obligations, duties, demands. At the same time, the subject does not know what the Other wants. The aim of the subject’s efforts lacks a goal, so aim must circle around on itself, returning always to the same empty point of demand. Like the slogan, “Coke is IT!,” the object of desire both belongs to someone else and is unspecifiable.

Lacan intended both meanings of the term “stage”: as an event in time and also as a theatrical structure. As a member of the audience, the subject is immobilized and silenced. Reality is flattened into an image by the stage’s thin architecture. The subject is a passive observer; reality’s validation is subjected to the structures of reception; characters are masked (misrecognized), and temporality is rounded by the conventions of narrative.
The benefit of the mirror stage (the illusion of unity) does not equal the costs (loss of control of the point of view, separation of touch-knowledge from sight-knowledge). As Marx would put it, the “use value” (the direct utility) is overcharged by the “exchange value,” which has become a “fetish” whose real value fluctuates in a secret market controlled by the imagined Other. Thus, subjectivity as a commodity cannot be seen simply as something useful but something that is determined by a magical power.15 The subject is told to enjoy but not given an instruction manual.

**Context:** The connection between time-as-gap and architecture as that which must occupy this gap and “map” its Real space through sacrifice, cosmic calculation, and ritual observances makes the clearest case for architecture as a *concrete* ”cancellation/refutation” of (conventional) time. The advertising campaign of the ”Marlboro Man” was invented by the Chicago firm of Leo Burnett in 1954, targeted for desk-bound veterans of World War II. Ads featured a self-employed cowboy, free to range across a wild landscape and shoot whatever needed to be shot. The Marlboro Man enacted the Other’s ambiguous demand to enjoy and showed just how quickly, and for what untraceable purposes, an architecture, landscape, and even a cosmos can spring from the mirror stage’s alienation of the goal from the aim, or as Marx would say, utility from exchange. Both yield the gapped circle and its numerous embodiments.

The well known multiple functions of Mayan ritual centers show a pattern of conflation that comes with the gapped circle, ancient or modern: university centers with prominent ceremonial displays and close connections with military, economic, scientific, medical, and theological power centers [Fig. 1]. Chichen Itza? Harvard? In some ways it would be hard to tell the difference. The gap is the *place* where causality’s defect and that defect’s relation to the subject find the strongest metaphors in a symmetry that is puzzled, disrupted, or delayed. The discovery trip or quest, where the some object of value justifies movement across a landscape, gives the subject an itinerary appropriate to the idea of motion without a goal — i.e. a labyrinth.

A linear graph or arrow might represent the subject’s “empirical” and “representational” relation to the object, a diagram of the “natural attitude” that is embedded in language and uncritical thought [Fig. 2]. The subject lacks knowledge of the central core of the truth of the object, but represents external effects of the object on various representational “screens” — language, images, maps, models, etc. The screen divides the arrow into subjective and objective parts. The closer the screen is to
the object, the more "objective" the representation, as in Borges’ joke anecdote about the country that mapped its territory with 1:1 scale maps, destroying the country by covering it completely with maps. The closer the screen is to the subject, the more the map is useful, through compromises that sacrifice accuracy for subject-related conveniences. The smallest map? Perhaps this would be one that fits on a ring or, better yet, inside the head, or a poem, or a word.

In this model, the object resists empirical penetration of this subject-to-object arrow representing knowledge. The subject’s technical and epistemological tools fall short, the object retreats as knowledge approaches it asymptotically. Slavoj Žižek asserts a counter-possibility: “In . . . a fully constituted, positive ‘chain of being’, there is, of course, no place for the subject, so the dimension of subjectivity can only be conceived of as something which is strictly codependent with the epistemological misrecognition of the true positivity of being. Consequently . . . there is ‘reality’ only insofar as there is an ontological gap, a crack, in [reality’s] very heart.” In other words: the subject, outlawed by the continuous “chain of being,” is restored once reality itself reflects the subject’s own hollow nature. Where Girard paints a positive and necessarily violent picture of mimetic exchange, where the subject sees itself in the other and the other is inscribed within the self, Žižek would emphasize the ontological incompleteness of reality itself as a context against which human symptoms appear. A slip of the tongue doesn’t constitute an error that can be corrected against a “template” of proper functionality. Rather, it is something constructed to fill a gap in the template itself. The name of this gap, Žižek notes, is the death drive, and it is the site and context for fantasy. Fantasy, which doesn’t belong to the objective order (it is rather a product of the subject’s imagination) is also not reducible to the subject’s consciously experienced intuitions. “Fantasy,” Žižek argues, “belongs to the ‘bizarre category of the objectively subjective — the way things actually, objectively seem to you even if they don’t seem that way to you’.” [emphasis mine]

§5: A famous anecdote captures the idea of objective subjectivity in terms that explain its visual protocols: the contest between the “master painters of antiquity,” Zeuxis and Parrhasios.

Commentary: Lacan and many others quote this story to, among other things, clarify the relationship of the gaze to fantasy. Lacan, unlike Foucault or Derrida, used the idea of the
gaze to indicate the *limit* of the subject’s illusion of mastery. In the story of Zeuxis and Parrhasios, we see a contrast between two strategies of fictional looking, one that cultivates the pleasure of the *trompe-l’œil* illusion, another that deploys the gaze in its negative role. In the contest, Zeuxis, as a master of the *trompe-l’œil*, was favored. When the time came for the murals to be revealed to the judges, Zeuxis pulled the curtain covering his entry aside to reveal a breathtakingly realistic depiction of a bowl of fruit. In one account, a bird mistook the painted fruit for the real thing and flew into the wall, breaking its neck and convincing the judges that nature itself had been fooled by the artist’s mastery. Moving to Parrhasios’s section of the wall, Parrhasios did not pull back the curtain. When prompted by the impatient judges, Parrhasios took pleasure in informing them that for his entry he had painted the curtain. The adjacency of Zeuxis’s “accurate image of reality” to Parrhasios’s even more accurate image of the process (and object) of concealment is a relationship of the competing ideas of (1) the “master template” and (2) the “apparatus of fantasy.” The former fits with the (Kevin) Lynchian idea of the mental map, where scientists undertake to find what is “subjectively objective” (i.e. a realistic painting); whereas the latter corresponds to the uncanny idea of what is “objectively subjective” (a deconstruction of the “situation” of looking at painting). The apparatus of fantasy operates effectively in deploying the dimension of representation (the sagittal line connecting the viewer to the viewed) so that it circled back on to the viewers, who in their ideologically conditioned role as judges were invisible (= “objective”). Parrhasios converted what they held to be a projective line (like Zeno’s arrow) into a boomerang that bit them on their proverbial rears, to put it bluntly but accurately. In Zeuxis’s case knowledge that the painting was a fiction was suspended by the conventional ideological “master-signifiers” of painting (the wall, the frame, the curtain, the subject matter, the reference to the painting-as-window, etc.). In Parrhasios’s case knowledge was activated by the desire of the judges, a desire which, when formed into a tangible dimension, circled back to them *in their location*, but in an inverted sense (hence, “in the rear”), implicating both their role and their position as *objectively subjective*.

**Context:** Lacan’s laconic comment on this anecdote was: “[T]he ... example of Parrhasios makes it clear that if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it. . . . The picture does not compete with appearance, it competes with what Plato designates for us beyond appearance as being the Idea.” With idea we have “a moving image of Eternity” — Time — rather than the solid model from which Zeuxis simply subtracted one dimension to produce the flat image.\(^ {19} \) Similarly, with the mental map, we have a picture of ideology (cause plus subjective defects) but not the subject (cause as itself dysfunctional).

§6. What’s behind the curtain? Since architecture’s principal “business” is the creation of curtains, this is a critical issue.\(^ {20} \) The implication is that the Lacanian “barred subject” (the subject interpellated by the demands of the Other\(^ {21} \)) is behind the curtain; that, namely, the
curtain instigates a future expectation, but an expectation of something having already accomplished — the verb tense known as the "future anterior."

Commentary: The curtain painted by Parrhasios is thus a precise inverse of the mirror stage, akin to Réne Magritte’s painting of a subject seeing a mirror image of the back of his head (“Not to Be Reproduced,” 1937). In the mirror stage, the subject acquires an illusion of unity: all organs in place, all identity “re-gifted” as an image in the eye of the Other, all value based on the networks of symbolic relationships established by the imagined Other. In the situation of Parrhasios’s curtain, we have the condition duplicated with great precision by the scene in Victor Fleming’s The Wizard of Oz (1939), where Dorothy and her magic companions discover, during an audience with the Wizard, that the real Wizard is not the imagined demon projected on theatrical smoke but, rather, a short bumbler frantically manipulating buttons and levers behind a flimsy curtain. Where the mirror stage projects a false mastery, the “curtain stage” shows a subject characterized precisely by limitations.

Limitation is the latent image of the mirror stage, of course; it is the stereo-reversed quality of the reflected image that robs the subject of his/her own image. Limitation is the anamorphic component within the mirror stage’s reflection, but in The Wizard of Oz, this anamorph is embodied fully as an absentminded professor.

A dynamic map of the Parrhasios curtain would recall another favorite Lacanian example, Holbein’s well-known portrait of The Ambassadors (1533). This painting appears to be a straightforward depiction of two wealthy gentlemen, one well known (Jean de Dintville) and the less positively identified George de Selve. The date given on the reverse of the canvas is spookily precise: April 11, 1533, 4 p.m. Because of this temporal marker, the painting could be regarded as a diagram of the fantasy needed to hold together the clues of its catastrophe. The unusual extra information specifies that the painting was completed not only on Good Friday — and a day widely believed because of its numerical qualities to be the day of the Apocalypse — but at 4 p.m., when the sun was exactly 27º above the horizon at London, where the portrait was painted. This angle is duplicated by the triangles that
connect the horizon, some of the instruments displayed behind the ambassadors (in key positions), the anamorphic skull that appears as a blur beneath the ambassadors’ feet, and the crucifix nearly hidden by the curtain forming the painting’s backcloth — a detail often trimmed away in duplications of this painting [Fig. 3]. The combination of the present precision with the memento mori directed at all mankind is softened by the obvious: that if the painting has survived, it has disproved the apocalypse thesis, that the set of multiples of three (3x500, 3x11, and 3x3x3) is, for us at least, not cosmically lethal.

Taken together, Holbein’s curtain and the Wizard’s curtain emphasize the theme of subjective limitation. Both, however, additionally point to an interval past the first death, yet another Lacanian theme, that of “between the two deaths.” This interval, its relation to the gap (= fantasy), and the circularity of motion under the condition of an absent or unknown goal explain the frequent motif of travel and, in particular, the labyrinth as a template of human motion, particularly motion of the soul.

The death drive was yet another Freudian idea rescued by Lacan and brought into a wider context of the subject and its vicissitudes. All cultures celebrate the interval between a biological death and a final, symbolically established time when the soul ends its journey through the underworld. Freud’s “death drive” was the reverse of what many interpreters first construed. Rather than a desire for death itself, the death drive was a kind of perpetual motion machine, the persistent zombie lumbering on, unaware of its own death. “Between the two deaths” describes the subject of the post-mirror, post-curtain stage — the subject in a fantasy with defective causality, but the curtain stage makes this more evident and lays out the prospectus more clearly. Like the scene in The Wizard of Oz, the subjects realize that their work has come to naught. The quest for the broomstick of the Wicked Witch of the West has no real effect. The Witch was destroyed by mere water; her army awarded Dorothy the broomstick without a fight.

Gratuitous condemnations and trials emphasize that the repetition-compulsion of the interval between the two deaths, at many points, has the comic potential common to dreams. Of course, Dorothy and her companions were not immediately amused by the discovery that the Wizard was “just a man from Kansas,” but the sufferers were consoled by a ceremony awarding gratuitous but appreciated prizes: a college degree in “thinkology,” an alarm clock for a heart, and a medal to prove the lion’s courage retroactively. These awards, too, come in the tense of the “future anterior,” a terminal point recognizing an alternative line of credit, anamorphically concealed within what seemed to be the actual one. The Wizard promises to take Dorothy back to Kansas when he himself returns, but she misses the balloon to rescue Toto. Nonetheless, Dorothy learns that her ruby slippers are and have always been capable of taking her home at any time. The implication is that she never left.
Indeed, the farm hands were doubles of her magic companions; the whole fantasy was the compressed delusional dream following a concussion. How disappointing!

Yet, here, too we have an example of one of Zeno’s arrows or racers, who cannot achieve the goal because of the dimension of desire and the flaw in causality that has produced the “objectively subjective.” Dorothy and her companions are really close to what they want but they cannot get to it. Dorothy’s escape from the Gaze of the legalistic Miss Gulch through a fantasy has shown us that fantasy is the subject’s only recourse to the limitations encountered once the mirror stage informs us that we are subject to the undisclosed desires of Others. The “Gulch” or gap must be bridged, even if the means of conveyance is a tornado. The fantasy in Dorothy’s case has replaced the ideological “master signifier” (Kansas, designated in Lacanian terms as $S_1$) with an alternative quest for knowledge ($S_2$). Just as Zeuxis’s painting was pure ideology of representation, specifying the subject’s one position by the flatness of the perspective, Parrhasios’s curtain put the subject behind the curtain, just as did Holbein — in crucified form, hanging “on the wall.” The dire temporal specification of the Holbein, the compressed dream time of Dorothy’s concussion, and the Parrhasios’s delay (don’t forget Duchamp’s clever use of this term) point past the stereo division of the self into a L/R, R/L monster to a stereo-gnosis: where we are in a place where space is time and time is all times — not a single time chosen that banishes others not taken, but a gallery of time, conserved and ordered within our own round clock.

**Context:** An op-ed contributor to the New York Times recently used the “forking paths” metaphor to speculate about how she might have caught a missed train “If only I’d taken a shorter shower or walked a little faster or crossed against the light . . .” The forking paths model portrays temporality as a forward motion through successive banks of alternatives. One makes a choice, follows a path, comes to the next bank, makes a choice, and so on. Each unchosen alternative vanishes into non-existence. Although this seems to be a commonsensical account, it has its absurd limit. Žižek relays Michel Pêcheux’s story of the little girl who says, “Daddy was born in Manchester, Mummy in Bristol, and I in London: strange that the three of us should have met!” The girl forsakes the normal logic of social coupling for a forking paths model, discarding futures as she goes through a simulation of random travel through the towns of England. Here, the practice of using space to model time reaches its vicious extreme. As Lacan says, “the letter always reaches its destination,” if only for the reason that, as Barbara Johnston notes, “A letter always arrives at its destination since its destination is wherever it arrives.” The back-projection of fate makes the destination what it is — seemingly predetermined by prior events. This privileges the function of the terminus of a signifying series, which works, as Lacan says, in the tense of future anterior verb. Meaning is determined by what *will have happened* by some point, and from this rather simple terminal flip of time we see how many other complex ideas
(anamorphosis, the death drive, the so-called “return of the Real,” and the apparati of fantasy) come into play.\textsuperscript{27}

Jorge Luis Borges, who wrote a story entitled, “The Garden of the Forking Paths,” offers an alternative that now may seem plausible.\textsuperscript{28} His narrator, Yu Tsun, is an English teacher living in England, who is also spying for the Germans. He spies not for his love of Germany, but to prove that a “man of his race” can achieve superior things. He knows he is being pursued and is about to be captured, so he must devise a means of communicating his secret, the locations of a munitions plant, to his German handlers. He decides to seek a document written by an ancestor, Ts’ui Pen, translated by a British Sinologist, Dr. Stephen Albert. Albert reveals that Ts’ui Pen, who claimed to write a novel and devise an “infinite labyrinth,” had incorporated the labyrinth into the book. Ts’ui Pen had left behind a text with confused, jumbled episodes. History had judged it to be unfinished, cut short by the author’s tragic murder. Albert has discovered, however, that the technique of confusion was intentional. In contrast to plots where characters choose certain actions and the alternatives evaporate into an anonymous past, the maze of plot lines allowed all possible outcomes to occur simultaneously. Each outcome led to others, proliferating the possibilities infinitely. Yu kills Albert, precipitating his immediate arrest by the British Agent who had been following him. The newspaper report of the murder reveals to Yu’s German masters that the town he wished to identify was Albert; murder of a man named Albert was his only means of conveying the secret information.\textsuperscript{29}

Such a solution was not simply a fantasy construct, but a serious project undertaken at various times by impressive thinkers. Ramón Llull (1232-1315) proposed a memory machine composed of concentric circles, triangles, and squares that was capable of supporting the then-popular practice of artificial memory. The classic Roman and Greek practice advocated the memorization of empirical spaces as containers for memorendi, to be placed in the windows, corridors, rooms, and other features of the space and recalled as the user performed a standard mental walk through the space. Llull drew on the discoveries that the more abstract memory spaces were significantly more efficient. Metrodorus of Scesperis had been able to remember the names of all the men in his army using just a wheel segmented into 360 parts. Llull’s concentric forms allowed for permutations and combination. Later, when Giulio Camillo adopted Llull’s idea to design a theater of memory, by placing images and texts into compartments of a semi-circular auditorium around a small stage.\textsuperscript{30}

Modern experiments stick to the same strategy of combinations and purposeful confusions: Julio Cortázar’s combinatorial novel, Rayuela (Hopscotch); projects of the Oulipo Group (Raymond Queneau, Georges Pérec, Italo Calvino, and others). With less instruction about how the reader is to move about, Joyce’s Finnegans Wake provides Borgesian readers with the circular text whose gap flows “a way a lone a last a loved a long the riverrun . . . by a
commodius vicus. Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1966 film, Blowup, lives up to the forking-paths theme by eroding the sense-certainty of a murder captured on a frame of film taken in a London park. One is reminded of Bernard Tschumi’s interest in murder mysteries “inscribed” into the archaeology of Manhattan, echoing the theme of murder traditional to city foundation rites. The gap, the boundary, comes with an automatic sacrifice kit to handle the mimetic ambiguity that each boundary, being in all cases a kind of mirror, seems to generate.

§7. Although Borges and others convert the spatial garden to the temporal elaborations of the hopscotch plot, don’t the examples of Llull, Camillo, Joyce, and (possibly) Tschumi resist this conversion with reminders that circles and their variations constitute a spatial key for how fantasy crosses that gap?

Commentary: The literal mind will forever insist on the simply constructed distinction, staged as a contest in which the winner will trump or even vanquish the loser. The case for architectural time does not yield to this forced fit. Like the case with flawed causality’s objective subjectivity, the monster — and the gap that generates the monster — will not go away. Time will always be spatial, space will always be temporal. But, we do have popular culture’s endless elaborations of the genre of the fantastic in fiction, film, cuisine, recreation practices, and so on. This is not to forego the work of scholarship that should find, within this playground of the fantastic, the carefully placed wires holding together the fragile substructures. There are a few avenues to pursue that promise to show how, should architecture sober up from the party of computer-generated extravaganzas, one can actually plan a work of art. Plans require tools, and tools in this case are versions of the tricky thought-turning ploys of rhetoric.

The anacoluthon: In the work of Pavel Florensky (Iconostasis, 1996) may be found reference to a curiously Lacanian idea. The dreamer begins an elaborate story, with many twists and turns, characters that appear then dissolve, some long periods of delay, and then suddenly a catastrophic end! Just as the alarm bell sounds! — Or, just as the guillotine falls on the unfortunate dreamer’s neck! Realization that the alarm clock ringing or the framed picture falling from the wall has been, in fact, the first and generative event of the dream, the analyst faces the puzzle — how did such a seemingly long dream get condensed in the fraction of a second when the “final” event awakened the dreamer? The Lacanian structure for this is the anacoluthon (Lacan did not use this rhetorical term, one should note, but referred instead to the verb tense of the future anterior). The anacoluthon is a figure that substitutes an expected ending for an unexpected — often incorrect or ungrammatical — one. The effect is to back-generate an alternative interpretation for the preceding sequence, one whose “coincidental” connections with the already-accepted meanings seems miraculous. The anacoluthon has a spatial structure. A line progresses towards an expected
goal, meets an obstacle that deflects it at a right angle (signifying that the deflection is independent of the main line of travel), toward a point that had been hidden from the perspective of the normal road. This new point opens up a reverse line of view that, if followed, retraces the events of the past but ends in an alternative starting point that, when connected to the first, reveals its status as a twin — separated at birth, as the cliché goes. The relation between the two lines is chiastic, chiasmus being another rhetorical figure used to manage parallel realities and backwards time travel.

**Extimity:** If the anacoluthon could be regarded as a structural diagram for how fantasy constructs a chiastic bridge across the canyon created by flawed causality, the towns on either side of the canyon would immediately be restored to "business as usual." What business? — The "extimity" business. Whereas a boundary operating in a perfectly rational space would create perfectly symmetrical divisions between true and false, visible and invisible, inside and outside, dead and alive, the extimity business would create hybrid cases by blurring the margin of certain division. A more accurate description would be that, where rationality shuts the main gate, extimity opens the back door. Lacan invented the term extimité to describe the effects of objective subjectivity: the "neither dead nor alive" condition experienced between the two deaths, the unstable condition of signifiers as they slide between alternative meanings, the conflicting messages of the Other that keep the subject guessing. Extimity is the counterpart of intimate, but it's done outdoors, often in public. Extimity as a category opens up the wealth of practices, phenomena, and objects associated with the uncanny. The extimate concerns objects that mark the edge of our perceived mastery as subjects. When Greeks explored the known œcumene, they described the outer limits in terms of beings that were part human, part animal; deformed or monstrous; possessed of supernatural powers; cannibals; or all of the above. These were literally "partial beings," to stretch the Lacanian idea of partial object a bit. Lacanian partial objects are: the gaze, shit, the breast, the voice. They constitute elements of the various drives but also mark the radical limit of the subject’s mastery. Beyond these markers, quite literally "all Hell breaks loose." In the Coen Brothers’ film, *Barton Fink* (1991), the writer-hero finds himself in a hotel room where the wallpaper begins to ooze a mysterious viscous substance. Beyond the wall, we feel, some demonic, dark realm is closing in. Attempts to deal practically with partial objects do not succeed. Repairs only cause new ruptures; the boundary of the creepy forces on the other side advances bit by bit.

**Saturn and melancholy:** The ancient humor of black bile was described in philosophical detail as early as the Fifth Century BCE (Aristotle’s famous *Problemata* XXX.1). Where the other humors (choler, blood, white bile) were more related to physical health, black bile was the stuff of psychosis: depression, suicide, manic creativity, "divine inspiration." The master work on this is *Saturn and Melancholy*. Written just before World War II by Irwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, and Raymond Klibansky, the galleys were smuggled out of the Warburg Library at
night to the Warburg’s new future location in London. The war and its aftermath prevented the book from getting the reception it deserved. The relation of melancholy to the extimate, the uncanny, and other themes of the gap have to do with its relation to satire and folly. As the most psychopathic of the humors, it was allied with the idea of the fool-world, the *Verkehrte Welt* (upside-down world) described by Hegel in his *Phenomenology*, the dark literary genres of irony and satire. Here, time takes a break, literally. Winter’s stasis offers cultures the opportunity to sit in the dark and tell tales, so the connection between the supernatural as a popular culture enterprise naturally abounds in melancholy tradition. The relation to Saturn comes from ancient astrological/astronomical lore. Saturn was the first god to be kicked out of Elysium, but he landed in a spot that was, paradoxically, the most remote. Eventually, Saturn becomes the model for the Christian Satan, trapped in ice in the inverted position from which he fell, or rather was pushed, from heaven.

**Magic, amateur and professional:** The 1945 British film, *Dead of Night*, is a catalog of both the uncanny and Saturnine melancholy. The film begins with a *déjà vu* experience of an architect, Walter Craig, who is called to look over a house restoration project and arrives in the middle of a weekend house-party. He remembers all the guests from his dream, even a Dutch psychoanalyst who tries to explain away his experience as a “normal” aberration. The guests disagree, and each offers a personal story to counter the doctor’s positivism. A former race-car driver had avoided a fatal accident by seeing a hearse-driver who, later, was the conductor on the ill-fated bus he had started to board. A young guest recounts her experience at a Twelfth-Night fancy-dress party, where she had encountered a boy ghost she mistook for a costumed fellow guest in a hidden room in the attic. A socialite told about a Chippendale mirror she had bought her fiancé that continued to reflect the room of its previous, homicidal owner. Finally, the psychiatrist himself, still a skeptic, offers his own chilling tale about a ventriloquist whose mind was taken over by his dummy.

In each story, the anacoluthic bridge is built across divides established by convention or science; in each case the bridge affords some almost pharmaceutical cure of evil (except in the ventriloquist story, where evil wins completely) and we are reminded of the ancient function of the *pharmakon*, a magic being with the powers of curing or killing. Asklepius, the fabled son of Apollo and ancestor to all physicians, established his successful practice on blood taken from Medusa. Blood from the right side of her body could raise the dead to life; that from the left was lethal poison. Again, we have the reference to the stereo-*gnosis* (as the origins of medicine!) that made its formal modern appearance in the psychology of the mirror stage.

Although *Dead of Night* is barely more than a popular spook tale, it does point to the broad and ancient foundation of magic practices that were the source of the traditions of the uncanny and, hence, the broad public acquaintance with the estimate in all its details. A
study of magic should include the architecturally specific “cosmograms” installed by Yoruba
slaves in the homes of their owners, diagrams marked with concealed amulets, special
substances, and charms to set up a field inside a house where the adept practitioner could
make best uses of curses and blessings by knowing the “sweet spots” of the invisible
diagram.  

Magic offers a double advantage. Because magic practices of all cultures can be divided
clearly into those using “contagious” methods (an object has to be in literal contact with the
person or thing to be affected) and “sympathetic” methods that make use of semblance (the
popular “voodoo doll”), magic perfectly matches the study of aphasia, with its clear division
between contiguity aphasia (inability to recognize relationships of adjacency) and semblance
aphasia (inability to recognize faces, resemblances in form). Because the famous structural
linguist, Roman Jakobson, and many others took the structure of aphasia into their accounts
of “metaphoric” (semblance-based) and “metonymic” (contiguity-based) powers of
language, the theory of language is, in part, a theory of magic — except where, however,
linguistics does not “get it right” and flubs the spell, as it were. Mladen Dolar, in A Voice and
Nothing More (2006) has shown how the partial object of the voice has eluded the structural
logic of phonemic linguistics and preserved language’s very magic capabilities.

Films and other popular culture devices: Any architectural study of the precise
exchanges between time and space should use film study as its ground base. The film’s
combination of montage, doubles, and back-flashes constitute a kind of Olympics for the
architectural time artist. Think, for example, of David Lynch’s practice of using one actor to
play two parts and two actors to play one part. But, the almost opposite films of Charlie
Chaplin and Alfred Hitchcock — the former intimate and messy, the later cool and
mechanically detached — are clearly the encyclopedia of the subject “time and space” from
which architecture can draw its paradigms. As Hitchcock argued, the point of film is feeling
— in his case, the feeling of fright. Intellectual tricks were employed only to refine and
heighten the audience’s pleasure in encountering of what they, in conscious life, would avoid
at all costs. Are we all hysterics in the darkened auditorium? Here is another question for
Lacan, perhaps, but even Borges knew how to play his audience. The title idea of the
“Gardens of the Forking Paths” was taken from the Borges short story, but an equally
appropriate title would have been “A New Refutation of Time,” an essay Borges wrote to give
his genre of the fantastic a suitably philosophical pedigree. But, actually Borges wrote two
essays, an original in 1944 and a revised version in 1946. Instead of letting the revision
supersede its predecessor, he combined the two texts and added a prologue “to facilitate an
analogous reading.” The details of this are significant, since the reading of the essay is a
part of the essay’s insistence on being an actual experience of temporality rather than a
logical proof per se. The irony of refuting time logically while providing an experiential
confirmation of a key effect of repetition produced striking results. The two accounts create
an anamorphic effect, a mental blurring. Borges’ combination of the two very similar essays puts us in the realm of the esthetic instead of the “ethical” space of logical argumentation. Is that where we should be in the case of any discussion of architectural temporality? Or, do I run the risk of repeating myself?

1. Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City*, trans. Diane Ghirardo and Joan Ockman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982). In Rossi’s review, it seems that the Palazzo, though “insulted” by some of the lesser uses of its magisterial spaces (it was a prison), is able to refine its grandeur through a stoic resistance to its humiliations.


8. Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 75-81. The mirror stage (which for Lacan was both a temporal event and an architectural structure) is perhaps the most widely misinterpreted component of Lacan’s thought. Delivered as a talk in 1949 to the Sixteenth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Zurich, two years prior to the initiation of the seminars that developed his full theories, it was, for example, completely reversed by film
theorists who, in the 60s and 70s, mistook the gaze as the embodiment rather than the limit of the subject’s attempt at mastery. This reversal “Foucault-ed” Lacan, as Joan Copjec claimed, leading many to reject what had come to be Lacan’s central position in a theory that was geometrically opposite his views. Ironically, anti-theorists restored many Lacanian ideas simply by correcting what they thought was “Lacanian theory.” See Todd McGowan, *The Real Gaze, Film Theory after Lacan* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 1-8.

9. Giambattista Vico and James Joyce come closest to making the case that the human mind begins with a misunderstood word, a “slip of the cosmic tongue,” so to speak, in the thunder’s booming articulation of nonsense syllables. For a summary of both positions and their relations, see Donald Phillip Verene, *Knowledge of Things Human and Divine: Vico’s New Science and Finnegans Wake* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).


18. Ibid., 113.

20. Architecture’s sheltering and concealment of interior space is coupled with the creation of façades and framing spaces that, to varying degrees, obscure or express the literal or idealized contents within. The curtain can be opaque or transparent; the line between inside and outside can be definite and restrictive or blurred and permeable.


23. Usually, this interval corresponds to the time it takes for the corpse to rot into a stable form, and we are reminded that the word “sarcophagus” means, literally, “eater of flesh.” When cremation hastened this process, it was for Roman families the duty of the first son to pull a bone from the funeral fire and proclaim that the deceased was now a god. Not surprisingly, the emblematic form given to the soul’s journey in the underworld is the labyrinth, a mathematically “recursive” figure with fractals embedded in concentric layers. See Donald Kunze, “Hearths and Doors,” in Architecture and the Culinary Arts, ed. P. Singley and J. Horwitz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).


27. Anyone familiar with the series of stories by Marcel Pagnol, *Jean le Floret* and *Manon of the Spring*, will know how this works. An old villager schemes to undermine a newcomer who buys land he wants to come to his family. The newcomer, a hunchback, dies trying to find water. The old villager’s nephew is unsuccessful in wooing the newcomer’s daughter and commits suicide. The beautiful daughter plans revenge and restores the farmland, freeing the spring that the villager had blocked. The old villager receives a letter from a relative that had been delayed by fate that reveals that the newcomer had been none other than his own son from an early romance that he had abandoned. The letter is the single “clue” (Lacan: “master signifier”) that allows all of the details to take their proper place in the finished design.


29. Yu’s trick, in Marxist terms, was to conflate the “exchange” component with the “utility” component, that is, to de-fetishize the element of exchange and return it to its literal form. This can be more readily illustrated by the well-known joke about the smuggler who crossed the border each morning with a load of hay strapped to the back of his bicycle. Customs guards would search the hay carefully each time but could never find any contraband. Years later, when a retired guard met the also-retired smuggler, he implored him to divulge his secret. “Say, we always knew you were a smuggler but we could never figure out what you were smuggling. Can you tell me, now that we’re both retired?” The old smuggler replied, “Bicycles.” Yu committed the murder to reduce the murdered man’s name to that of a password that, deprived of its conventional role as a name, allowed the passage of secret information.

30. Readers should beware of following all of the conclusions made by Frances Yates in her otherwise admirable *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). Yates was assigned this project without much preparation by the Warburg Library’s director, the positivist Ernst Gombrich. Her research was impressive, but her lack of knowledge of Renaissance associations of magic and memory caused her to overlook key elements where traditions overlapped and doctrines referred to esoteric lore.

31. The reference to Giambattista Vico’s *The New Science* in *commodius vicus* (a convenient small street) is a token of the Joycean version of the infinite labyrinth in which all contingencies are preserved by Vico’s formula of three ages which correspond in the main to Lacan’s three mental domains of the imaginary (myth), symbolic (heroic), and Real (modern/psychotic). Knowing how distance (fantasy) is managed within each of these domains was Joyce’s particular knack, for he had rehearsed the labyrinth of *Finnegans Wake* in his earlier novel, *Ulysses*, where Dublin (a pun on the double theme),
enacts fantasies à la Oz from Greek antiquity, answering Girard’s question of whether myth (narratives of the gods) or ritual (actions to cover the gap of mimesis) came first. As with Borges’ answer, the temporal story is the same as the spatial garden of forking paths, and its confusions are intentionally placed to use the reader as the primary “victim”; myth and ritual are the same.
