

Motion in Poe: Anagnorisis, Chiaroscuro, and Anacoluthon

In questions of architecture's and landscape's function as a medium of transformation, two adjustments are required. First, the idea of transformation should be positioned to appreciate the "pre-Surrealist" status of Poe's works. Here, transformation takes a simultaneously ultra-modern and ancient quality. In Aristotle, the question of truth is linked to the dramatic moment known as *anagnorisis* — "discovery" — where complexity is compressed from its narrative original into a "spatial" simultaneity.¹ Poe's activation of discovery is accompanied into a motion towards a framing situation where light becomes the illumination of discovery and the contingent details of the setting become the frame or screen to which objects or images are brought to reveal their secrets. This kind of chiaroscuro is like the use of chiaroscuro in painting, but it is diversified, as any motion to a frame or screen, virtual or actual, where some discovery transforms identity. "Anacoluthon," the process where by a final, often ungrammatical or out-of-place element retroactively revises the original meaning of the first element, also applies to this process, and the three terms, anagnorisis, chiaroscuro, and anacoluthon could be considered as equivalent: anagnorisis as specific to the spatial condensation of discovery, anacoluthon to the dynamics of narrative sequences, chiaroscuro to the dynamic element to fundamentally visual circumstances.



Fig. 1. The Table of Cebes, 1592. Jacob Matham (1571 - 1631). British Museum, London.

The case of motion, when the three terms are brought in to qualify the difference between everyday movements and motion that is associated with discovery, is refined as correlative to the discovery that marks its terminus. This is a common trope, which has been around since antiquity. The polyglot text known as *Cebes' Table*, though not authored by the Cebes of Socratic fame, was typically accompanied by publisher's insertion of a supplementary image.

Like the emblem books which flourished with the growth of printing, *Cebes' Table* provided an image that functioned partly as a puzzle to be decoded as well as the illustration of a story which, in this case, was a story *about* the interpretation of an image.² The dire consequences of the image of *Cebes' Table* (that those who looked at it would either be blessed by wisdom or cursed with madness) corresponds to the use of motion in relation to anagnorisis, anacoluthon, and chiaroscuro. What comes out of the shadows or mist into view is, almost by definition, something important and potentially transforming. The fashioning of those shadows or mists can be constructed easily in architecture and landscape, as Poe's tales of Arnheim's cottage and gardens confirm.

Arnheim, in German, refers to the "home of eagles," and because eagles are carrion birds, and because both the house and grounds of the Arnheim estate are depopulated at the time of the visits, the status of these stories as death narratives must be considered. In the case of Roussel's fantastic perceptual journeys through the impossibly small aperture of an ink-stand ornament or a label on a bottle of mineral water, the eye must leave the body behind and represent the soul as in a dream.³ In dreams, the dead and the living intermingle; the dead do not know they are dead and represent what Lacan famously called the period "between the two deaths."⁴ Death narratives provide the maximum effect of horror-surprise for authors of suspense. Readers initially assume that the writer-narrator or a character used as a point-of-view is alive at the time of writing. In David Lynch's *Mulholland Drive*, for example, we learn only later in the film that one of the point-of-view characters, Betty/Diane, has committed suicide, and we are left to sort out which of the film's several narratives is the product of her last few minutes of consciousness. In "The Snows of Kilimanjaro," Ernest Hemingway extends the life of his narrator beyond the moment of death to describe an escape to the beyond in the form of the cloud-enshrouded peaks of the famous mountain. In James Joyce's *Ulysses*, readers barely notice the moment when Bloom trips over a parapet wall and doesn't get up. The text at this point could possibly be the last fantasies of consciousness — a case of Hegelian *Aufhebung*, where cancellation involves preservation at another level of reality.⁵

Because the image seems to have a long half-life, the eye is most frequently cited as the organ that survives the death of the body.⁶ The death-narrative dimension compounds the surreal effect of an eye moving, disembodied, across a landscape or through the chambers of a building. The effect of floating can be converted into a cause of uncanny suspense and eeriness when the text itself uses imagery, language, and grammatical structures that simulate the sense of flow. In Vladimir Nabokov's *The Eye*, the narrator attempts suicide, and the flow of his chatty, inconsequential speech pushes the reader past the point where it is possible to tell whether or not he succeeded at killing himself. The suicide is simply too concerned with trivialities to notice that he's died. Using the ego as a preoccupied magpie creates a comic effect. Poe, in contrast, disembodies his narrators in other ways that provide them with wings to glide over objects, through rooms, across landscapes, etc. in the same

way that movie cameras were later to exploit tracking and boom shots. Here, the effect and cause switch places. We experience the effect, the cause pops into being retroactively.

In the death-narrative and dream, the economy of darkness and light become a part of equation of revelation. As in painting technique, chiaroscuro can be used to show how a local light source — candle or lantern — can become synonymous with discovery. Alternatively, a frame is constructed around a scene that introduces a space to mediate between the viewer and the ultimate scene shown further into the background. The darkness of the frame indicates that this is a “painting in a painting.” Just as the death-narrative uses the inertia of the image to allow us to ignore the first, actual death, the device of chiaroscuro is easily overlooked. The eye moves quickly past the frame inside the frame; the illumination of an internal light source can be seen as nothing more than a commonplace instance of portraying a portable or local light source.

It is easy to show that artists and authors have both been aware of the complex potentiality of chiaroscuro and connected it to the highest order of thinking. In the painting of “St. Jerome in His Study,” by Antonello da Messina, a frame is constructed around the saint’s study that can be attributed only to a higher-order architecture than the study itself can boast. This window, in fact, is a deployment of the *oculus caeli*, the Eye of Heaven, through which God is observing Jerome at his lectern, in the act of translating the Bible. Objects on the sill of this window have been documented and their story explained by the art historian Penny Howell Jolly, who demonstrates that the seemingly out-of-place partridge (partridges were viewed as lascivious birds in the Middle Ages) conceals a theological subtlety.⁷ The only way to separate Jerome’s act from ordinary translation is to portray the Bible as the breath of God, which, as an *afflatus divinus*, impregnated the saint so that his words could give birth to the truth. The chiaroscuro of the painting and its externalized/localized source of light involves, therefore, a kind of rebus, where the out-of-place partridge initiates a two-step transition, a kind of right-angled rotation of meaning, through the non-sense of the partridge on the sill of the divine to the higher meaning of breath and its relation to impregnation, and truth seen as impregnation.

The new formula resulting from this amalgamation of the roles of light, motion, revelation, framing, and momentum is, in diagrammatic terms, the *erasure of the distinction between the line and the circle, or turn*. This erasure is, in formalistic terms, both idiotic and impossible — but on that account, Real in Lacanian terms.⁸ Consider, for example, the theological conflict expressed directly by the Mosque at Cordoba (Figure 2), where a cruciform cathedral is inserted directly into the metonymical grid structure of the mosque. The evenly spaced columns of the mosque support the view in Islam that each worshiper establishes a center at which orientation to Mecca is the only spatial issue. The synecdochic structure of the cathedral, in contrast, is designed to emphasize the role of the processional moving through concentric circles of increasing divine significance.⁹ The circle or orientation implied by the mosque and the line of procession imposed by the cathedral are not only different, they seem

to represent polar opposition — two wholly separate kinds of motion that, when employed architecturally, support two wholly separate kinds of religious devotion.



Fig. 2. Mosque-Cathedral, Cordoba, Spain.

The motion of the death-narrative, chiaroscuro, and anagnorisis/anacoluthon cancel this neat division. In the same sense that Giordano Bruno and others connected the so-called “squaring of the circle” with the hope for reconciling the three world religions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, a geometry of impossibility is again the focus of cosmic concerns. The problem of squaring of the circle involves the problem of the square root of pi, $\sqrt{\pi}$. It is not an irrational number but, rather, a “transcendental.” Curiously, the same kind of impossibility exists in the psychoanalytical domain, and similar “historical effects” can be attributed to it. Jacques Lacan compared the unconscious to an automaton, where the contingent circumstances of conscious experience and mental activity were transformed by underlying “rules of form” (our expression, not Lacan’s). In explaining this, Lacan’s translator, Bruce Fink, simplifies an example of a tossed coin, substituting ‘0’ for tails and ‘1’ for heads. A sequence of

1001011010100011110110 seems reasonably random. But, assigning each case of 11 as a '1', a 01 or 10 as a '2', and 00 as a '3' yields a pattern where there are always an even number of 2's between any instance of 1 or 3 or any recurrence of 1 or 3.¹⁰ This kind of "universality in the face of contingency" combines to show how the experiential difference between *demand* (how we symbolize our need to others) and *desire* (what we actually but unconsciously wish for as a by-product of our symbolized demand) produces a circular motion that returns to a constant *gap*, an *aporia* or missing bridge produced by the inability to combine demand and desire. Animals without language do not experience this gap. But, for humans, it creates a dividing line that forbids desire's objects from crossing the line into symbolic thought without the consequence of donning a costume of contradiction and impossibility. Lacan called the objects that appear as aliens "partial objects," "partial" in the sense that they cannot be completed or completely inspected, as can symbolic objects. An example would be the classical monster, a combination of forms from different animals, or the two-faced god Janus. Partial objects were, in Freud's theories, objects that represented complex, irrational relationships between inside and outside — a situation Lacan re-cast in the term *extimité*, Anglicized as *extimacy*, the "intimate external" or "external intimate."

Whether this illicit boundary crossing by an object or being that "does not belong in this world" is explained numerically or through cultural imagery, the term "monster" and "automaton," which in popular culture merge in images of aliens, psychopaths, Golems, and zombies, seem to be the essence of Poe-style imagination. The temptation to group these pop-cultural icons using the standard devices of art history or image typologies should be postponed in favor of a return to the issue of the automaton and its function in the unconscious, where the diagram of straight=curved (cancellation of the difference between the line and the circle) constitute a fundamental "architecture" or, more accurately, "unconscious of architecture." The compact form of this architecture or unconscious is the Möbius band, the strip that is twisted and joined to create a single surface and single edge. The "straight" component is imagined by traveling along the surface of the Möbius band. This at first seems to resemble the experience of the camper lost in the woods who, thinking his travel to be outward in a constant direction, finds himself back at his starting point. But, there is a double perplexity in the Möbius band. It is as if the camper discovers a "demonic" property of his travel: it has "always and already" been perverted; any given motion returns him to the "same" spot, but no spot is "identical to itself."¹¹ This situation is identical, Slavoj Žižek has demonstrated, to the famous paradoxes of Zeno, where trained athletes cannot overtake phlegmatic tortoises and where arrows cannot reach their targets.¹² The answers typically given, such as "the arrow must cover half the distance before it can cover the rest," and so on, obscure the fact that the arrow and the target, and Achilles and the tortoise, occupy different *spaces* that are different in that they are both the same and different. This paradox goes back, directly, to the ambiguous claim that Hegel exposed in the problem of identity, $A=A$.¹³ Treated as an attribute, A is immediately

disinherited from itself and cannot “live within itself.” The attribute is external, identity is internal; self-identity is extimate — a topological freak.

We know other topological freaks, who fall from the sky, land in space ships, thaw out from an ice-encased tomb, or are assembled from diverse corpses. These partial objects are metonymy-on-a-stick: a consumable form of non-existence, effects out of which causes are brought into being retroactively. How do they constitute an architecture? It is somewhat confusing that architecture in the usual sense (buildings that, without thinking about it, we see as everyday objects, photograph with ease, and occupy) is rife with the forensic evidence of partiality as a consequence of historic and cultural development. The issue of proportion, raised by Vitruvius to the elegance of music, raised further by Renaissance glosses on Vitruvius to the elegance of philosophy and theology, is a case in point. Out of the “automaton” of numbers doubled (1, 2, 4, 8 ... then 3, 6, 12, 24, etc.) comes Nichomachus of Garasa’s arithmetic sequences that yield, in combination, all three of the different forms of the mean — arithmetic, geometric, harmonic.¹⁴ With this compact set of numbers and their relationships, whole buildings can be constructed in accordance with the rules that determine the music of the cosmic spheres as well as the simple lyre. The proportionality of the classical orders drew from this robotic form, even when its appliers knew nothing of the collateral relations with religion and poetry.

More direct applications, though more historically obscure, demonstrate the Möbius-band relationship between the unconscious and architecture beyond any reasonable doubt. Ben Nicholson’s research in the Laurentian Library of Michaelangelo revealed a labyrinth concealed in the geometric puzzles of the tiles placed beneath the feet of scholars who, walking in a circle during contemplation, encountered a series of systematic imperfections.¹⁵ Most likely drawing from Plato’s *Timaeus*, Michaelangelo saw the circuit as a way of creating a Möbius band without turning scholars upside-down. Instead, their minds were turned inside out at the same time they were empowered to see the world as mind, true to the invocations of Plato. The *world thought them* at the same time they thought about the world; the reversal was afforded by the automatism of geometry, not in its function as a set of signifiers but, rather, in its dysfunctions, its internal errors, its diversification of the problem of \sqrt{n} .

The Laurentian Library circle of tiles brings us back to the issue of travel, and in particularly the travel of the disembodied point of view, the floating eye, the death narrative of the soul that continues to travel out of momentum although the body has met its end. Hasn’t this been the intention of meditative practices around the world, in all cultures and traditions, since time immemorial? The point of this question is to lay to rest the issue of the novelty of these proposed connections; rather it is the case that these relationships “have been around for a long time,” and only academia is slow to respond, with its Enlightenment scaffolding. Rather than imagine a continuous occult lore spread by international conspiracies, however, it would be more reasonable to recognize the self-evident nature of these connections, which are

continually rediscovered and re-deployed, in various media and cultural conditions. The idea of an “architectural unconscious” seems strange only if we presume that the two terms should be separate in the first place, that architecture is not the natural outcome of the unconscious, or that the unconscious is not the implicit kernel that makes architecture what it is, a self-identical though self-cancelling “organ without a body,” a partial object, even when it appears to be, among all other objects, complete and indicative of its uses, intentions, and significations.

There can be no photographs of this architecture, by definition. But, we can have (only) material encounters of the Real that architecture-as-partial-object constitutes. Aldo Rossi cited a typical horror of post-war Europe:

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Two Places at the Same Time

Pablo Picasso initiated a revolution in the visual arts with his landmark painting, “Les Femmes d’Alger (O.J.)” (1911-12). What is not often noted about this painting is that it is a combination of two painterly tropes: (1) the guide who opens a curtain on to a scene, usually a room containing paintings; and (2) an self-reference to the painting as artifact (“iconicity”), or comparison of three-dimensional life to a painting that can be rolled up, torn, or folded within the projected space of the present painting. In one of the examples of the second trope, Giotto shows, in the Arena Chapel depiction of the Apocalypse, an angel rolling up the scroll of human space and time. Max Nännny and Olga Fischer have documented the wide-spread and diverse use of this trope, from paintings within paintings (a return to the type one trope) to treatments of the surface of representation as, itself, represented.¹⁶ It is well known that Picasso was a keen student of what Michel Foucault called a “metapainting,” Diego Velázquez’s “Las Meninas” (1656), which also contains the trope of a curtain-parting guide (though the connection is a “triangulation” based on the fact that the painter and the *apostador* shown at the rear of the painting share the same name) and the trope of treating the painting as such, the status of “Las Meninas” as a self-portrait. In “Las Meninas,” it is clear that the issue of “here” — the point of origin to which the eye returns after its triangular journey from the main frame view, to the mirror at the back of the room, to a speculation on the contents of the canvas turned away from us, back to the frame POV, which must have, at one time, have been occupied by both King Filipe and Queen Mariana and the painter himself — is radically destabilized. There is not one here, but several; and not one POV but several; each “here” with its POV undermining the others. The *comédie humaine* is punctuated, appropriately, by the two court “fools” who, with a dog, traditional guardian of boundaries, make this also a *memento mori* device.

The ancient tradition of the royal fool includes the lore of the fool's ability to fly. This has been preserved somewhat by the tradition of the fool play, the Medieval French *soti* ("jumps"), where acrobatics and slapstick were mixed.

Jumping is the suture that makes possible the conjecture that the two masked figures both shown in the process of opening curtains in "Les Desmoiselles" are the same person. Separated by the straight line of representational projection, they are "curved" into identity by the trope of iconicity. We see the outside of the curtain in front, the inside of the curtain in back. The back curtain is blue, with puffy white clouds painted on it — or is this the sky itself, pierced by some surrealist's fourth dimension? A mirror relationship identifying the two curtain-holders as one would make it possible that the front curtain is, on its other side, also a "sky" — that Picasso has split the sky and separated the "inside" (or would it be "outside"?) into a front and back. The impossible remainder, a gap in multiple senses of the term, is guarded by the two female figures (prostitutes, as nearly all interpreters conclude?). The figure triangulating this couple is clearly identifiable from the emblem books: Melancholia, seated, with head on hand, a "darkened visage" scowling in vexation, poisoned with black bile which is simultaneously the elixir of genius.

In the same way "Las Meninas" takes a space marked as internal (spectator space) by the act of externalizing the view of the royal couple, presumed subjects of a portrait being painted, and splitting it in two; "Les Desmoiselles" notes how this externality can be split and splayed, and how the result relates to the 2500-year traditions of melancholy. Outside made inside (or *vice versa*, it hardly matters) is a case of extimity *par excellence*. The markers of this split-and-splay, the curtain-holders, bend the straight line of projection into a gapped circle of desire. As if to put a clairvoyantly fine point on the matter, Picasso shows a space of desire, a brothel, and has in early studies the curtain-holder played by a medical student, sometimes accompanied by a small dog. Dr. Lacan, the clinician, has only to post a few sticky-notes here and there, onto a canvas that is already his theory of desire, including a mirror-stage component, put in a nutshell.

The Möbius logic of travel is present in this painting and its precursor, "Las Meninas." At this point it is necessary to ask, what theory of travel can return us to the landscapes and mystery houses of Poe without sacrificing any richness of detail or skimping on our Lacanian checklist? In 1978 the philosopher of argumentation, Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., contributed to a locally published collection of essays on the subject of categories.¹⁷ In this brief essay, Johnstone asserted a difference between authentic travel and various degenerate forms, such as running errands or vacations spent entirely inside motels. Categories, he suggested, were created by the distinctions made in travel between authenticity and degeneration; and he further suggested that all of the essential categories could be found in the example of travel provided by Homer's *Odyssey*.

The ideal of Johnstonian travel is not far from Poe's deployment of chiaroscuro. The goal, the discovery of truth or essence, embodied in the experience of *anagnorisis*, is the same. Odysseus, unlike his shipmates, is out to learn. He is not detained by the allure of the lotus blossoms, not pulled into ecstasy by the Sirens, and not outfoxed by the Cyclops. While each of these challenges to authenticity involves different demands and different escape plans, all involve the underlying logic of the anacoluthon: an understanding of the value of retro-action and the relationship of metonymy to metaphor. In some cases, the literary allusions to the latter are specific, as when Odysseus sneaks his men out of the Cyclops' cave beneath the bodies of sheep, metonymical artifacts hanging on to — but unmeasured as — the sheep daily set out to pasture. Equally literary is Odysseus's use of *antinomasia*, insisting that the Cyclops know who among the Greeks was brave enough to blind him: "Nobody." Fitting these rhetorical tricks within the general framework of *anagnorisis* has a sometimes large payoff. With the Nobody trick we nearly hit upon the Lacanian metonymical "subject in pieces." To keep from being no more than a migrant, Odysseus exercises the Johnstonian category of Solitude: travel, although it can be done with companions, is not shareable. It is a unique defining act of the subject. Travel has no "extrinsic features," no attributes as such outside of its identification with the subject-in-motion. Motion, it is clear, is the defining aspect of the subject, almost a tautology. Here, the subject's implicit connection to chiaroscuro as a motion towards a screen or source of light is the point being demonstrated, the Q.E.D.

Johnstone's categories are presented sequentially, linked only by their placement within *The Odyssey* as a narrative source. Viewed with an eye to overlaps and differences among the categories, a curious structure begins to reveal itself. The key to authenticity in travel is the completion of travel as an idea. In terms of chiaroscuro, this is the full arrival of the subject and its doubles/objects to the frame/light. In "Desmoiselle," this is the symmetry of inside and outside that binds the whole as an extimate puzzle: time as space. The demand for completion can degenerate. It can be too controlling, too manipulative. It can try to fix the contingencies of reading and looking or under-represent the contingencies of the represented object. Velázquez avoids this by creating the sense of a snapshot: the subjects are caught in the middle of a gesture, the painting interrupts a conversation, captures a secret sign, holds the reflections in a mirror for an instant. The triangulation of "Las Meninas" is akin to the front-to-back suture of "Desmoiselles." Completion has been achieved by considering the viewer and the space of the viewer as a part of the representation's most intimate interior.

The other threat to authenticity has to do with the possibility of saturation. If contingency runs uncontrolled, we have the case of "the sourcerer's apprentice," who finds the potions but not the antidotes, the on but not the offswitch. The gapped circle is set in motion but the only result is the return of the Real of compulsion.¹⁸ This is what Johnstone calls Saturation: the point where travel is inundated by the consequences of its own risk-taking. Without giving up some control, travel cannot sufficiently expose itself to contingency; but, too much

contingency can swamp travel with too much chance. As Herman Melville once satirized this condition, it is nothing more than "One Damned Thing after Another" (ODTAA). A gap, a "surplus-remainder" of travel, typically an object that serves as a memory device reconnecting the traveler to his/her origin point, is required. Only then can the opposed categories of Suffering (negation, which gives rise to the categories of Reflection and Solitude) and Curiosity (an "anamorphic" process of discovering, within things and images, concealed content, raise the need for a Guide (Johnstone's "Personal") who must, like Virgil in the case of Dante, left behind.

The status of travel as the act activating architecture's unconscious is evident in a negative form: the dynamic quality of the former has separated, in discourse as well as ontology, from the latter's static simultaneity. Space has been the container, motion the contained, in critical literature that depends on architecture's passive, objective status. Similarly, the landscape, although it contains dynamic elements and processes, and changes from second to second, is portrayed as pictorial "ground" to the "figures" — both objects and subjects — placed in it.

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1. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Truth, *Anagnorisis*, and Argument," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 16 (1983): 1-15. In his attachment of the issue of silence, Johnstone addresses the (Lacanian) issue of the impossible-Real."
 2. The story of Cebes' Table involves a group of pilgrims passing by a temple dedicated to Saturn (this planet is significant to the story). They notice an image at the back of the temple and ask the attending priest to explain its significance. He warns that it is an image of wisdom, but those who look upon it and do not understand it will be struck by madness. The theme of *aut dues aut dæmon* was a common trope in Classical literature: a discovery of such intensity that it will either make the discoverer god-like or destroy him. Goethe developed a similar theme with *Mephistopholes*.
 3. Roussel employed a consistent method using systematic variations, the *procédé*. Mark Ford, *Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
 4. The interval between actual death and symbolic death is a cultural commonplace that, typically, marks the duration of the period of mourning. Literature has embellished this as the *katabasis*, the hero's journey to the underworld, but in consideration of the etymology of "hero" (originally it designated, simply, anyone dead), the only difference is that in the *katabasis* the hero "does not know he is dead" in the sense that he returns to "tell the tale" and go on to future adventures.
 5. Charles David Bertolini, "---"
 6. There are some good reasons to consider how the phenomenon of image after-effect, commonly called the "phi phenomenon" but more accurately designated as the "beta phenomenon," compounds evidence from neurophysiology to the practice of artists and authors. The latent image, which reverses the color content of an image when the eye has stared at something and then looked away, combines the chemistry of the retina with neural activity to "cancel but preserve," in true Hegelian spirit of *Aufhebung*, the image after its causal object has been removed. Memory, in terms of the preservation of images, has a tradition of relying on the latent properties of images, and has even developed the function of negation to exploit the rebus-like quality of emblems during 16c. "theaters of memory" constructed as encyclopedias of occult wisdom. Giulio Camillo, *L'Idea del Teatro* (Firenze: Torrentino, 1550).
 7. Penny Howell Jolly, *Saint Jerome, Scholar and Ascetic* (Saratoga Springs, NY: Skidmore College, 1983). Jolly emphasizes that Jerome's own theory of inspiration involved a remarkably carnal component of eroticism, akin to the pleasure-pain experienced by Santa Teresa in Bernini's famous sculptural depiction of that saint.
 8. It is on this account that the Lacanian "gapped circle," the diagram of desire, where demand, "believing itself" to be projected as a straight line, the most economical distance connecting need and satisfaction, is curved by the by-product of demand, the *petit objet a*, or object-cause of desire, which

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- cannot be symbolized and thus must operate as an independent vector hinged to demand as a kind of invisible gravity deflecting demand into a circle that returns to the impasse, the gap of desire.
9. Demand requires a synecdochic structure because of its symbolization of the relationship between need and satisfaction as a distance, the length of which corresponds to the difficulty of satisfying the demand and the sequential segments of which correspond to the stages of "solving the problem" of the need. Metonymy, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is connected closely to the "subject in pieces" retroactively generated at the mirror stage, where the viewer is thrown into competition by the appearance of the more masterful reflected image. Rotation's relation to metonymy has to do with the "stereognostic" quality of the mirror situation (its reversal of left-right as well as its creation of a "stereo pair" in visual and epistemological terms). The subject diagrammatically turns from a vector accounting for objects outside the mirror to a vector of displayed reflections — metaphorically "the reflected world." The right angle symbolizing this relationship is, in its orthogonality, also the incommensurability separating the symbolic and imaginary realm of reflections from the Real of the subject, reduced to "organs without a body" retroactively by the premature success of the reflected image in achieving mastery.
 10. Lacan's analogy seems to have anticipated the demonstrations of the physicist, Stephen Wolfram, who demonstrated that even the most randomly generated set of conditions set in motion by "automatons" (sets of adjacency conditions) resulted eventually in fractal-like regular geometric patterns. Stephen Wolfram, *A New Kind of Science* (Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002).
 11. The paradoxical point of (always-already) return is descended from the subject who, in the Lacanian mirror stage, finds him/herself to be, retroactively, a "subject in pieces," 'm', metonymized by the competition of the well-turned-out image of the metaphorical self (M). The rotational or orthogonal relationship between M and m, metaphor and metonymy, raises further issues of a neurophysiological nature. In the pioneering work of Gelb and Goldstein, brain lesions of World War I veterans indicated two primary mental functions: contiguity, dominated by metonymy, and semblance, governed by metaphor. Each was able to "work around" losses or deficiencies in the other. This connection of hard science to poetics led linguists such as Roman Jakobson to posit metaphor and metonymy as absolute and mutually exclusive categories, but this overstated the case. Lacan, in his progressive articulation of the mirror stage over twenty years, showed that the interrelation linking metaphor and metonymy were both complex and historically embellished.
 12. Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry, an Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991).
 13. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1977).
 14. Jay Kappraff, "The Arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa and its Applications to Systems of Proportion," *Nexus Network Journal, Architecture and Mathematics Online* (<http://www.emis.de/journals/NNJ/Kappraff.html>), last accessed December 5, 2009.
 15. "In 1774, a portentous accident occurred in the Reading Room of the Laurentian Library, designed by Michelangelo. The shelf of desk 74, over laden with books, gave way and broke. During the course of its repair, workmen found a red and white terra cotta pavement hidden for nearly 200 years beneath the floorboards. The librarian had trapdoors, still operable today, built into the floor so future generations could view these unusual pavements. In 1928 another mishap resulted in the exposure of the entire pavement, which allowed photographs to be made of the fifteen panels on the West side of the library before the wooden floor was replaced. Overall the pavement consists of two side aisles and a figurative center aisle. Each measuring about 8'-6" square and composed of a different design, the fifteen panels mirror each other's form but differ by a very small degree and in subtle ways. When juxtaposed in a series, the fifteen pairs of panels appear to tell a story about the essentials of geometry and numbers. Each panel settles upon a theme: the tetractys (panel 5); Brunés' star and the Sacred Cut (panels 7 and 11); Plato's lambda (panel 14); the Golden Mean (Panel 13). When assembled together they form an encyclopedia of the essential principles handed down from ancient geometers. Although they are hidden from view today, Nicholson believes that the panels were laid according to a plan for a furniture layout that would have exposed them, but that this plan was changed after the panels had been made. He suggests that the original intention was to infuse the spectator with the foundations of ancient geometry as he walked through the Reading Room of the Laurentian Library, the geometry being a perfect complement for the 3000 classical texts chosen to reveal the body of ancient and modern living." Ben Nicholson, Jay Kappraff, and Saori Hisano, "The Hidden Pavement Designs of the Laurentian Library," <http://www.leonet.it/culture/nexus/98/nicholson.html> (last accessed December 5, 2009).
 16. Max Nänny and Olga Fischer, *Form, Mime, Meaning: Iconicity in Language and Literature* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1999).

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17. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Odysseus as Traveller," in Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., ed., *Categories: A Colloquium* (University Park, PA: Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 1978), pp. 103-199.
 18. Appropriately, Hal Foster, in *The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century*, an October Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), has noted this danger as well as the fixes discovered by masters of the genre, such as Andy Warhol.