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ATLAS OF THE OBVERSE

DONALD KUNZE
0.0 / Idea of the Atlas

Miguel Cervantes’ ingenious account of the origins of the text of *Don Quixote* set an impossibly high standard for all self-effacing authors to follow. Lost, found, bartered, translated, re-translated — it would be hard to think of anything more Cervantes could have done to the text to establish unreliability for the literary ploy of the “unreliable narrator.” But, of course, one would say that Cervantes was unreliable in the same way that Cézanne failed to capture Mont Saint-Victoire. Great works depend on such failures, especially when the outcome has been a curious autonomy of the work that allows it to survive on its own wits. What happens, however, when failure is really failure; when the apology is not a ploy or literary device? Like Groucho Marx’s warning about his client, who talks and acts like an idiot but actually an idiot for all that, in some cases modesty is not a ploy! The admission must be made at once that the purpose of the aphoristic essays and illustrations to follow has been strategic and personal, with only a secondary altruistic motive to communicate, persuade, and enlighten — goals that would have gotten in the way of the book’s intended function as an experiment in time. The author, whoever this entity may be for you by the time you finish this book, apologizes.

The idea has been to employ the theme of the obverse: to look at cases of it as well as to endure, as consciously as possible, the restrictions imposed on such looking. By pairing one-page observations with a page of diagrams and pictures, I aspired to not just the style but the idea of an atlas. I wanted both to understand the ordinary atlas in terms of its native obversity as well as use the structure of the atlas as a self-imposed limitation. A book wants to be closed at the end, and in the act of closing, judged by the reader. Just as words steal being from the things they name, and in that theft create a retroactive desire for something that never existed, a book creates a tornado that sucks thought up into a vortex. As we know from Dorothy’s trip to Oz, the tornado is somewhat gratuitous. Oz is both the same and different from Kansas. We have to take seriously the possibility that the more the text empties out its subject, the more we risk having our thoughts returned to zero. Still, there is something refreshing in having to start over, just as there is something really insightful in Roger O. Thornhill’s response to Eve Kendall’s question after looking at the monogram on his customized matches, in Hitchcock’s *North by Northwest*:

—What does the ‘O’ stand for?
—Nothing.

This is the role played by the obverse, the role that makes *The Atlas’s* conflicting desires, for both completion and continuation, worth the effort. Facing the need to tie up some theoretical debts, I had to construct a practical means of moving thought along in certain directions that would force confrontation with new material. Thinking can at some point “think for itself” in a way that can compel the laziest of authors to get up and keep the project moving when the odds are against it. By purging the desire to create a book “about something,” I entered the Borgesian territory of the manuscript that has been faked, lost, unfinished, or otherwise abused. Even under the rules of manuscript abuse, I found myself in better company than I deserved. The idea of the *mi-dire*, the “half-speech,” which Jacques Lacan discovered when he encountered the paranoia of the Papin sisters, led him to the momentous discovery of the broad employment of “speaking by halves” in history and psychoanalysis. In effect, the audience, and the division of space, as a “mentality,” between a field occupied by the work of art on one side and
the audience, virtual or actual, on the other is in fact essential for any possible idea to happen. There are halves even when the intention is to make a whole. There is a screen between the halves even when its presence is imaginary or explained away as a technical feature. Surprisingly, very few artists have tipped their hat in the direction of the screen, which makes John Donne, in “To Mrs. M. H.,” sound like a bit of a looney:

Mad paper stay, and grudge not here to burne
With all those sonnes whom my braine did create,
At lest lye hid with mee, till thou returne
To rags againe, which is thy native state.

This dedication could be allowed to rest with other conceits as a quaint hangover of the encomium, the ancient rhetoricians’ party joke of selecting a humble object, such as a head of lettuce, to be honored in a way traditionally reserved for funerals and political speeches. Today Donne’s advice to the paper he writes on still rings a bell. The material basis of perception, sometimes an imagined rather than a literal screen or paper page, retains a certain magic. Love letters are kept because the bundles themselves retain a curious magic. Books as physical objects are considered as hallowed and powerful — consider the use of the Bible or Koran as a customary means of swearing in witnesses. Lexomancy uses randomly opened pages to divine the future. When someone violates the law flagrantly, we “throw the book at them.” Actors are “stars of the stage and screen” — i.e. the physical things upon which they appear, not the artworks in which they appear. Metonymy tells a story.

To connect these coincidental figures of speech to the weird logic of mi-dire calls for more than a topographical survey. It demands that the means of presentation also become a means of investigation, even a means of actualizing the subject in question. The Atlas is a book that, intentionally or unintentionally, serves as a grimoire. It is a book that, drawn from reality, aspires to shape that reality through its geometric regularities and textual refinements. Who could forget Saul Steinberg’s clever cartoons that turned space and time into type-faces, numbers, and other objects? The grimoire distills this kind of joke. It reverse-engineers its own writing. It turns the conventions of representing reality into a means of calling forth reality. Therefore, any book (any object, scene, being, or work, really) is capable of becoming a medium — literally — of real-ization. The attempt, in Part 2, to activate The Atlas as a grimoire, is not meant as New Age fluff. Any book is a grimoire if it’s expected to perform; maps and other framed fields are, if anything, performative. They imply movement, position, point of view, desire, strategies of completion, strategies of continuation … even a theology of life and death if you look closely. The Argentine author Jorge Luis Borges provided us with the ideal epitome of this in his fake report from the explorer Suárez Miranda (“On Exactitude in Science,” Museum, 1946). It is up to us not to tarry in the surreal moment between the evisceration of the correspondence theory of truth and the theory’s actual death but, rather, to realize the sublime service of the map as a lamella, a thin membrane that is neither dead nor alive, but which, in presenting itself as a suitable shroud for the Real, both creates a dimensionality (“fantasy”) and collapses dimensions when we uncover the still-alive, “exquisite corpse.”

In the process of thinking through this problem, I have run up a large debt to the vocabulary and thought of Jacques Lacan. The bill has been slammed with a surcharge imposed on amateurs who attempt to savor morsels without having undergone the regime of a complete diet. Slavoj Žižek and his colleagues (Alenka Zupančič, Eric San-
ner, and Mladen Dolar, to name a few) have established Lacan’s significance to popular culture, philosophy, history, and political science, and these ports have made it easy for the poorly assimilated immigrant to set up a modest import-export business. Real Lacanians may regard these speculations in a dim light if they regard them at all. There is no defense, except to say that even making mistakes in engaging Lacan’s ideas leads to interesting discoveries. *The Atlas* is not intended to add anything to Lacanian scholarship but to create a special kind of symptom. I would compare this to Kinbote’s abduction of his neighbor’s poem in Vladimir Nabokov’s *Pale Fire*. If there is anything to be gained, it is through a kind of triangulation. Fortunately, Lacan is more interested in the limits of mastery than pretenses to mastery. And, I am not the first to use “the Kinbote method.” Apostacy, as Borges’ Judas demonstrated, is a sometimes useful way to think about divinity.

In the case of boundaries, one can say that they “have their own language,” in the sense that, as Lacan puts it, “the unconscious is structured like a language.” This does not mean that boundaries, or any other object for that matter, can be decoded as one would parse grammar or look up words in a dictionary. Rather, the matter has to do with the way the external world seems to develop its own “unconscious” through a process that Lacan famously tied to enunciation. Hence, my interest in the performative and the “spells of magic” are tied to enunciation’s use of *extimité*, the topology of inside-out, the violation of boundary rules that separate subjects from objects in everyday parlance. Thus, as Agent Fox Mulder of *The X-Files* gets quoted frequently by Žižek, “the truth is out there.” The truth of extimité rests on the topological lock binding the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real — a “non-lock” that Lacan liked to illustrate with the Borromean knot, whose three rings lie on top of each other but cannot be separated as long as the last ring lies under rather than over the first. This is also the Möbius-band condition, the secret to the tiles of the Alhambra, the void at the edge of the Platonic Cave, and, I would argue, much more: poetry, literature, architecture, painting, counterpoint in music; and, of course, maps and their atlases.

The extimate can be found in what has been claimed to be Lacan’s first idea, the so-called Mirror Stage. It is the key to how topological conversion of inside to outside occurs, as an “unconscious,” in everyday life, as the truth that is “out there.” It is not a theory of language, behavior, or politics. It is an edge, a razor’s edge as *per* Somerset Maugham rather than Occam. Because of the radical materiality of the extimate, Hegel’s help is required — more Hegel than I am officially licensed to use, so I will limit myself to phrases from my tourist guide. The account of the master and the slave, the basis of much of Lacan’s theory of discourse, is a reliable base. Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures on Hegel fascinated Lacan and so many of his colleagues, is an interesting, if provocative, guide. Also, Hegel was interested in skulls and Golgotha as an end of history in ways that would have excited Hans Holbein, whose portrait of *The Ambassadors* (1533) seems to have left no Hegelian stone unturned. Had Lacan been able to enjoy the discoveries of John North, who bothered to turn the portrait over to discover an essential clue, I believe that he would have made the same connections I have tried to make.

Lacking the proper papers to practice in all the fields touched on by *The Atlas*, I have had to accept that resulting text will necessarily be “macaronic.” I am grateful to Marco Frascari for noting that this style of thinking relates to a style of cooking, for it is at the hearth that this kind of thinking came into being. The wife and daughters, who were also employed as priestesses of Hestia as they labored making the family meals, engaged in parallel magic practices of making things appear and disappear. Elaborate customs
evolved in all cultures connecting the hearth with concealment and, by extension, to blindness and invisibility. Euripides’ play, *Alcestis*, has yet to give up all its secrets on the matter. At the hearth, negation and sexuation merge in a puzzle about paternity.

Macaroni, a failure of officially correct speech, nonetheless has to be learned. Sometimes, failure requires art, and I cite as proofs James Gleason’s 1947 performance as Sylvester, an ice-skating cab driver in Henry Koster’s film *The Bishop’s Wife*; or Charlie Chaplin’s ballet-like catastrophe on the assembly line in *Modern Times* (1936). Academia promotes mastery as kind of ideology, with lists of authors, artists, etc. cited to put a shine on the resumés of those who explain them. This gives failure a bad name and makes it difficult to show how fault lines running through nearly every work of art open up fissures from which the sybil deciphers the silent language of the dead, something that would have seemed normal in the days of Jane Harrison, Gertrude Levy, Mario Praz, or Octavio Paz. Even if it proves to be impossible to call back ghosts, we may through some effort find out where they, following Prospero, “drowned their books.”

This was the goal of my earlier study, of the “place philosophy” of Giambattista Vico (1986). In terms of mastery-centered academia, Vico always comes up short. His originality, flashes of insight, and uncanny artfulness are customarily set on a balance opposite his repetitions, lapses, flawed scholarship, and inconsistencies. Rarely are the negatives mined for gems. Like the invisible paradams of René Daumal’s mountain climbers in *Mount Analogue* (1952), Vico’s most valuable truths are invisible to those who disregard the secret dimension of entry. Among the passwords are Vico’s calculated misrepresentations of dates and names in his *Autobiography*; his joke about being able to measure the talent of poets by the number of steps down to their prison cells (when members of the Inquisition were in the audience); and his apocryphal account of how he came to insert two clearly Rosicrucian images in the last edition of his major work, *The New Science*. Writing in tough times, Vico found a way to get his message out to those who had, synesthetically, “ears to see” and “eyes to hear.” How is it true that Vico’s evident Rosicrucian connections have never been seriously considered? Only a few scholars have studied his pattern of errors, omissions, and lies.

Such stuff would have been intriguing to Lacan, who seems to have broadcast some brainwaves back into the past, to a Vico who would have been in any event a most eager apprentice of psychoanalysis. Vico’s idea of a “common mental dictionary” outstrips any other concept of an unconscious over the two hundred years separating him from Freud and Lacan. His idea of an “ideal eternal history” is spicier in many respects than Freud’s *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), and it out-thinks the modern advocates of “meta-” style categorizations of science, politics, history, and literature (Stephen Pepper, Karl Mannheim, Hayden White, Northrop Frye). His enigmatic motto, *verum ipsum

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1 The full quote from Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* is instructive:

```plaintext
Have I made shake, and by the spurs pluck’d up
The pine and cedar. Graves at my command,
Have wak’d their sleepers, op’d, and let ’em forth,
By my so potent art. But this rough magic
I here abjure; and, when I have requir’d
Some heavenly music — which even now I do, —
To work mine end upon their senses that
This airy charm is for, I’ll break my staff,
Bury it certain fathoms in the earth,
And, deeper than did ever plummet sound,
I’ll drown my book.
```
factum ("humans may in theory know what they themselves have made"), has encountered varied interpretations, most of which fall short of understanding what exactly Vico intended by either the true or the made. Clearly, it was not simply a comparison of human knowledge of culture with God’s "knowledge" of nature, on the grounds of authorship. It comes closer to Eric Santner’s portmanteau concept of “creatureliness,” which has allowed him to fuse theology and psychoanalysis in a very Vichian way to link the enunciation of prophecy with the creation of actual sites based on exception.

That Vico anticipated Lacan has received almost no attention from scholars. Even the possibility of a connection has been actively suppressed. Lacan knew Vico to some extent, possibly because of James Joyce’s clear and documented interest in Vico’s New Science. Lacan must have taken seriously Vico’s real inspirational powers and not limited them to the disparaging remarks most Vico scholars cite, that Joyce was “out to use” all he could of Vico but did not care much for his overall theory. This cynical view, projected unfairly onto Joyce, overlooks what Lacan would have insisted on: Joyce and Vico’s proximity to psychosis and their understanding of psychosis’s relation to language. Where Joyce seems to have suffered from this proximity in a literally clinical sense, Vico kept psychosis at a distance by mapping it onto human culture. He adeptly employed the idea of (Lacanian) extimacy in his vivid fable about the origins of culture in the “primal word” of the thunder, and enacted Lacan’s idea of the mirror stage by creating a mirror stage inside The New Science itself, the point where a fundamental recognition enables the science becomes a New Science proper.

There has never been such a case of intellectual time travel as the telepathy that connects Lacan to Vico, as a version of Castor-and-Pollux twinship. Where Lacan articulated a theory of incompleteness in his use and explanation of mi-dire, half speech, Vico (more cleverly in my view) turned his writing over to mi-dire by asking the reader to complete it, not through perfect sympathy but by facing directly the abjection of the text and its "errors." If it is true that, according to Žižek and his Ljubljana colleagues, the highest truths of the human mind can be found in the “lowest” regions of popular culture, they have erred only in failing to recognize their true master, Giambattista Vico. This oversight has not seemed to limit them in any way. But, it has reserved a small corner of their impressive intellectual movement for the shadow of a dead giant who, like the statues in Giorgio De Chirico’s spooky streetscapes, looms from behind a corner.

I must take a risk that the “geographical” approach implied by the atlas as a conceit might be too limiting. After all, I’m a geographer, not a psychoanalyst. I use the metaphor of the atlas to allow writing to, literally, stumble along between one-page aphorisms and one-page images or sets of diagrams. From the emblem tradition of the late Renaissance to comic books and graphic novels of the present, image and text have a history of sublime as well as tawdry relations. The slums of this mode derive from the (mostly academic) use of text as caption, and the reciprocal reduction of the image to a “mere illustration.” To avoid this kind of didactic preaching, I employ another idea, also via Marco Frascari, that of hopscotch. True, Frascari did not, as did Julio Cortázar in his novel Rayuela, actually employ this method in writing. And, neither did Cortázar go past more than an Oulipo-level deployment of the method that owes its biggest debt to the Spanish mystic, Ramón Llull (1232–1315). Llull used not only a hopscotch method of composing, but he invented diagrams and intended his books to be used as grimoires. Not for nothing did the Jesuits ban Lullism at the University of Paris, where it had achieved the status of an underground cult. Hopscotch is not a random scrambling technique; it is a discipline of, literally, opening the mind to self-generated ciphers that
accumulate into stochastic patterns that can, of their own accord and independent of conscious recognition, provoke action. This is a call-and-response method designed to put writing at risk whenever it makes a gesture towards mastery. In other words, one cannot try to fail, one has to (really) attempt some goal while recognizing the fantasy structure that surrounds that goal. To “give up the ghost” one must have a ghost in the first place.

The reader is advised to undertake a standard front-to-back reading. The appendix on hopscotch adopts Lull’s method, and Lull’s “secret device,” the ancient Arabic zairja, to turn the text itself into a kind of geographical site, analogous to the cosmograms of the Yoruba, where meaning is eclipsed and only certainty is left. The reader will learn that this is not an form of off-handed neglect but, rather, a means of paying attention to the two forms of causality Aristotle proposed in his Physics: automaton and tuchē. The former is natural chance, but the idea of pure accident is also connected to processes that, once set in motion, seem to proceed on their own. This fate-like chance is complemented by tuchē, human opportunity, affordance, or coincidence offered by conditions of adjacency. The appendix gives some advice on differently ordered reading, mimicking Julio Cortázar’s advice in Hopscotch. Such performative uses of a text turn any ordinary book into a grimoire. This is not an attempt to assert any special powers for this book but, rather, to see how any and all books can serve as “sites of exception” (Santner), where the condition of over-determination and semantic overloading create a future that fulfills Freud’s famous motto: Wo es war, soll ich werden — “Where it was, there I shall be.” What “it” and “I” are — the id and ego? — may be viewed as questions pried slightly open by the atlas-as-method.

The structure of The Atlas was, actually, an attempt to create the effect of an atlas while not creating one in the literal sense. The forced restriction of one-page essays beside one-page “maps” in most cases renounces ambitions to explain. This may inflame the usual tensions between readers and the writer, so that when the essay stops short, the readers are forced to finish the thought alone. The “free radical” at the bottom of the page could, in effect, connect to any other ideas readers might bring to the table. Such was Vico’s trick, intentionally playing the part of the defective or unreliable narrator. As Groucho Marx might put it, the author looks unreliable and writes unreliable, but don’t be deceived — he is unreliable!

My point is to give the reader a list of things, an “action list,” and to have that list generate an (un-)consciousness that, because it remains ready in the background, is more effective and efficient when it is called into consciousness, insert into a “diagetic” space and time, to effect what can only be properly designated as an “idea.”

The list has minimal coherence but optimal redundancy — i.e. just to the point of annoyance, where the author can be regarded as “defective.” At this point it is possible to turn the resistance of the reader into a white noise that serves to amplify the signal that refers to the signifying process itself, i.e. “signalizing.” The stochastic process of adjusting noise levels is the mundane subject matter of all the examples on the list, although in most cases no scholars have before noted this. Yet, it is the single most effective technique of shamans, magicians, rhetoricians, and charismatics from ancient times to present. It is the enigmatic voice of the other, that is the presence of ideology and cause of the void in the ideological subject. This voice must be eclipsed by noise, its enigma must be contained within diagrams and other signs that flatten, that remove its vital sagittal (interpellating) dimension. The flatness of the diagram and page of text as well
afford the subject an Iris Murdochian “flight from the enchanter,” the goal of theory. The
defective writer, the list, and the quiet removal of the key dimension: this is the aim of
the writing of The Atlas of the Obverse.

Normally, in the process of introducing a book, there are many people to thank. I am
indebted to an unusually large number of unusually talented people, most of whom
were not aware of how they were helping me think through the various problems I have
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to review or approve. It is not enough to credit them for the accomplishments while
absolving them from the flaws. The flaws — intentionally or unintentionally — serve
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Simone Osthoff
Stranger on a Train
Susan Pitts
Don Schule
Vernon Shogren
Massud Taj
Richard Taransky
Donald Phillip Verene
Wesley Wei
Thomas Wilson
Kevin Wixted
1.00

Curvature of the Earth

When the blackbird flew out of sight,
It marked the edge
Of one of many circles.

—Wallace Stevens, "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" (1917)
He had bought a large map representing the sea,
Without the least vestige of land:
And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be
A map they could all understand.

―Lewis Carroll, "Fit the Second—The Bellman’s Speech," *The Hunting of the Snark* (1874)
1.01 / The Problem of the Atlas

The atlas presents a sequence of map projections in an order that must respect the contiguity of adjacent mapped spaces without becoming a model of the space it maps. The atlas of the earth, for example, cannot be a globe; it must remain a book. Any map is, of necessity, one page among many. The issue seems at first to be one of use. A globe can decorate a library, but it cannot be a part of the collection of books; it cannot be abridged or reduced; it cannot show maps of the same spaces thematized to reveal layers of facts that exist at the same time. It cannot include "non-map" materials alongside maps, such as an index, a table of contents, supplementary materials, or essays. To pay for these advantages, the atlas must begin at what may seem to be an arbitrary point, and inevitably this point and the sequence that follows creates an order that does not exist on the globe. The first map and the last map must confess, at the end, that they were adjacent in the first place. This confession might be postponed by showing the first map along with its neighboring region, but at some point a "back door" has to be set, where the atlas heads off in one direction, leaving the other areas behind.

Does this problem of a gap between globe's direct representation of the reality of curvature and the atlas's representational strategies offer insight into the problem of temporality itself, where the "line" of sequenced experiences allows a number of advantages, and where some "globe" of reality, though suppressed, is always present as a kind of ghost? At the scale of the whole, this is the curvature of time that, like that of the globe, reminds us that any beginning or end is arbitrary; that a choice will necessitate a "return" that reveals some adjacency that, thought to be arbitrary at the time, now signals the completion of the project. This return of the end to the beginning finds lost material. It may seem that this is a one-time event associated with the opening and closing of the whole, but it is actually evident at a micro-scale, as the factor of curvature, the pull of some force invisible and irrational to the mentality of the individual map. The map can never rid itself of the idea of the atlas, and the atlas can never rid itself of the idea of time, which it has outlawed in the process of defining itself as a tiled array.

J. J. Callahan, "The Curvature of Space in a Finite Universe," Scientific American. Callahan shows how the historical positions of Leibniz and Newton, the former arguing for the infinity, or at least boundlessness, of the universe, the latter countering that an infinite universe would gravitationally collapse on itself and therefore the universe must be finite, created the conditions that had been anticipated by Pascal in his definition of God as "an infinite sphere, whose circumference is nowhere and center everywhere" and Einstein's comparable thesis in his notion of a closed, curved space. Callahan demonstrates that this cosmic issue is not abstract, but precipitates at the level of the individual map and its relation to other maps and, eventually, to the problem of the atlas, which is in effect the problem of space's continuity and curvature: "In being finite the world must have a limiting boundary, such as Aristotle's outermost sphere. That is impossible, because a boundary can only separate one part of space from another. This objection was put forward by the Greeks, [and] reappeared in the scientific skepticism of the early Renaissance .... If one accepts the objection, one must conclude that the universe is infinite." (90)

Jorge Luis Borges, "On Exactitude in Science." Borges' fictional explorer, Suárez Miranda, has been taken for real, demonstrating another kind of ghost lurking in the machine, in this case the machine of empirical social science. The blind spot that allows such inadvertent scandals amounts to an "unconscious" that shows how the unconscious works in other situations, namely as curvature. Roger M. Downs and David Stea, eds., Image and Environment: Cognitive Mapping and Spatial Behavior. Contrast the employment of the idea of the mental map by cognitivists and philosophers, as in the case of Fredric Jameson's idea of a political unconscious (Nelson and Grossbe, eds. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture).

The troubling outcome of the map's obligations to the atlas and vice versa is that there is a reversal in the function of representation. This is evident in the use of the map as a metaphor for thought or conceptualization. The usual interpretation of the idea of the "mental map" is that some schema analogous to the map is constructed in the heads of subjects who, in turn refer to such maps in their experience, memory, and intended uses of the environment. It is the subject who uses the construct, and the map which is the best analogy of that kind of construct. However, the map's resistance to representation, vis à vis its obligations to the form of the atlas, reverse the roles of the subject and object. The representation becomes the "desiring subject," the thing with a consciousness, by virtue of its internal structure. It is the map that thinks the subject rather than the subject that thinks the map."
The Mercator Projection was designed to make it possible to determine the exact direction of a line connecting any two points. Travel along this line would, however, be a curve on the curved surface of the globe.

A flight from Buenos Aires, Argentina, to Athens, Greece, taking a constant bearing calculated against the orthogonal latitude and longitude lines would not be the shortest route. The shortest distance would be a "great circle route," where navigation requires a constant change of compass direction. The characterization, "constantly turning" is an artifact produced by the constantly changing relative position of the magnetic pole. Holding the magnetic bearing constant would, it is easy to demonstrate, bend the traveler’s "straight" path (curved only in relation to Cartesian flatness).

The "anomaly" of traveling in a "straight" line through continuous adjustments to magnetic bearing is a variation on the Coriolis effect of apparent curvature due to the rotation of the earth. Like the atlas, where the radically exterior relates to the radically interior, the journey across the surface of the earth is a case where the exterior, "cosmic" properties of the globe impact the micro-adjustments of "straight" travel.
1.02 / The Binding of the Atlas

The globe’s curvature cannot be represented directly in the map except by errors — or rather a *pattern* of errors — that balance shape, size, and direction. A shape may be shown in an approximately correct way, but only at the expense of other properties of the curved surface. This problem is epitomized by the Mercator Map, which shows lines of longitude as parallel. This greatly enlarges the northern and southern regions, resulting in giantized Greenland, Siberia, and northern Canada. The convenience of the Mercator, showing some travel directions in a consistent way, leads to misconceptions about such other basics as the shortest distance between any two points (the “great circle route”). Add to this representational problem the fact that the earth rotates on its axis, making the motions made within that temporal context appear to be paradoxical, such as the Coriolis “effect,” the strange symptom of flows to take a clockwise (northern hemisphere) or counter-clockwise (southern hemisphere) direction.

The symptom always appears as an anomaly that is “inexplicable” until some frame of reference is discovered. The frame, lying outside of the initial field of observation, takes into account the position and role of the observer. This becomes the “artifact” (*factum*) that, by broadening the frame of consideration, makes the symptom make sense. In the classic study of workers at the Hawthorne Works, a Western Electric factory near Chicago, researchers sought to test the relationship between light levels and productivity. Their adjustments, however, were perceived by the workers as evidence that management cared about them, and productivity went up whenever a change was made. The “Hawthorne Effect” has come to stand for artifacts in general: the existence of an outside frame of reference, a primary form of reality, that operates *inside* some field as a negative form of reality — an anomaly, a gap between rationality and experience. Thus, the binding of the Atlas is both a material detail of the construction of the literal book and a metaphorical “pull” at the radical center of each map representation that makes the consequences of flattening a curved surface appear as an anomaly. This direct relationship between what is outermost, what is innermost, and what appears as a symptom of the unconscious leads us to an important clue.

Jorge Luis Borges offers some tantalizing insights. In his fantasy on the possibility of an infinite library we find a book with a single binding at the center of a spherical arrangements of pages. Borges has thought through this problem of the atlas, apparently, and forced the book to concede to the globe. This literal form-change materializes what could be regarded as a perennial imposition on every text. The curve of the globe’s smooth surface creates the error and incompleteness of every line that every word attempts to draw between signifier and signified. Looking closely, we always find these lines to be slightly off the mark. “Marginalia,” present in some form in every text, occupy the space between the body of the text and the edge of the page; but in every sense they are the flight instructions for the reader going between the idea and the ink. This journey is, Borges says elsewhere, is like the minimum labyrinth, which has only one line and only one doubt.

*Henry A. Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited.*

*Jorge Luis Borges, “The Library of Babel.”*
Map 1.03

The Planet of the Idiots is small enough that one ruler might aspire to dominate all of it. There are no large mountain ranges or wide oceans to hamper a continuous annex of adjacent lands, defended by an increasingly massive circular stone wall. The problem that will develop has to do with the masons’ work schedules. As the kingdom expands during Phase I, more stones are required. The amount of new stones seems to decrease when the project gets past this first stage. A troubling situation develops as they pass the half-way mark, the globe’s equator. As each new wall is installed to enclose more territory during Phase II, there are stones left over. A metaphysical condition arises when the masons face the last bit of foreign territory, a walled garden from which they are, after their massive efforts and dedication, excluded.

Phase One of the Project
During the early phases of expansion, the order for new stone seems in line with what is expected: more territory, longer wall, more stones

Phase Two of the Project
In the second half of the project of world domination, the masons find that they had created a walled garden from which they were (radically) excluded

What Really Happened, in terms of “Vectors”

Behind appearances is a “vector” of the artifacts — material and other conditions that support the phenomenal experiences we credit as reality.

These two diagrams illustrate a process of “contamination,” by which something that had been invisible — curvature — becomes manifest in a surprising way (the paradox of a “bigger” wall using fewer stones to construct). The vertical vector occupies a zone of invisibility/denial. The “causes” are concealed behind the perceivable effects. With contamination, indicated by the rotation of the artifact’s vector, cause and effect reverse roles. The “normal” site (masons building a wall) becomes a “site of exception” (the wall confounds the masons), where it becomes impossible to say what is inside and what is outside.
1.03 / Planet of the Idiots

Marcel Duchamp used the “Flatland strategy” to explain the logic of his major work, “The Large Glass.” Fundamentally, this involves constructing a fable about the surprise that beings existing in a two-dimensional reality would experience were they to discover the solid three-dimensional world and then transferring the surprise and its context to the surprise three-dimensional beings might experience in hypothetical encounters with the fourth dimension. This strategy is limited in the sense that it presumes that the relation of dimensions is additive and that the “steps” can be compared. It becomes more problematic where the fourth dimension is isolated by its metaphorical status. This presumes a domain of normalcy, where the fourth dimension can intrude only as an outsider, an exception. It does not consider the very condition it seems to seek to establish: a world in which the properties associated with the metaphor of the fourth dimension in fact constitute an “inner basis,” a formative principle, a kernel of intensely irrational being. In this case, the fourth dimension is not something we seek in romantic fantasies about other worlds and restorations of magic; it may be something we continually flee, in fear that its status as Real will explode our carefully constructed, albeit neurotic world. In this model, the threat of this intrusion of the (psychotic) Real is ever-present. For artists and poets, who see the Real lurking beneath every surface and around every corner so to speak, the danger is particularly imminent.

On an imaginary small planet with a uniform, dry surface, a king imagines that he will expand his kingdom. He has no rivals, no mountain ranges, no wild tribes to tame. His perfectly circular wall is dismantled, and a new one constructed some miles further out. More stones are required. His desire extends this project of expansion until the equator of the small planet is reached. At this point, something strange happens, as would happen to any inhabitant of a curved surface who thinks it to be flat. The kingdom grows, but the wall requires fewer stones to achieve the expansion. As the king becomes increasingly more anxious about what is going on, the final condition nears: the kingdom surrounds a small, resistant exterior. The foreign is annihilated just as, with the removal of the last stone, the kingdom loses its defining symbol.

This idiocy is easy to diagnose from a viewpoint external to the planet, where the observer is able to take in the facts of curvature, equator, and complementary shrinkage of the wall that once expanded. On the planet however life is reduced to idiocy because the momentum of cause and effect does not recognize the equator that will reverse the equation of material cause to formal cause. The situation can be explained only by reference to “paradox,” “perversion,” and “negation.” In terms of the visible phenomena — construction, ordering more stones, then taking stones away, etc. — the “artifacts” include not just the construction methods but the curved surface of the planet. As construction reaches the equator, the artifact contaminates the surface that had formerly lent itself to an untroubled representation, the flat map that could be used to measure the domain by consistently applying the principle of scale. Once contamination occurs, space not only refuses to obey this principle, it turns inside out. It is no longer possible to say what contains — or is contained by — what.

Gloria Moure, Marcel Duchamp: Works, Writings, Interviews.
Edwin Abbott, Flatland.
Remarkably, the skull works as a sextant, establishing the first 27° line that intersects the horizon connecting Jean de Dinteville’s hand holding the dagger, the position of his estate in England, and the sound hole of the lute. A second 27° line connects this intersection to the half-hidden crucifix positioned behind the green curtain.

The other “pointers” include eyes, instruments, and of course the date on the back of the oak planks. The numerology of the work revolves around the 3s that figure in the 27° angle, the set of three epochs of 500 years, and the age of Christ at the time of his death, 33. The number 11 also figures as a number of completion. North demonstrates that Holbein specified the exact minute of Apocalypse, not as an abstract clue but with a set of ideas arranged to form a picture of the cosmos of finitude. Golgotha, “the place of the skull,” becomes a geometric “cosmogram” anamorphically embedded within the image. It identifies the crucifixion and the lower point of view as the base of the isosceles triangle but also the base of time. Time and space are continually conjoined, through instruments that rely on the calculated curvature of the earth to determine position based on the time of day, or the division of the earth based on celestial observation.

One thesis was that Jean de Dinteville had hung this painting at the top of a stair, so that guests, ascending to bed after elaborate banquets, would see the skull in its corrected version and be reminded of their own mortality. This seems to be too easy an interpretation. This painting, if anything, creates what Plato’s *Timaeus* called “a moving image of eternity,” a kind of “hyper-cube” of the Surrealists and 20th-century mystics who sought to combine dynamics and universality. Whatever our belated observations might be, *The Ambassadors* demonstrates the active presence of a sophisticated combination of critical thinking, philosophy, and artistic formation in the 1500s. We must take seriously not just the fact of combination of these diverse themes but the specific form, i.e. the “anamorphic triangle,” that Holbein used to create his cosmogram. What the eye sees literally conceals within it an anamorphic cipher that is true in a higher sense than the logic of true and false.

The lute may refer to the theology of the plucked string, the series of ratios defined by multiples of 2’s and 3’s that were conjoined by the “lambda” that guided architects and masons of antiquity. Music and architecture were simultaneously informed by this compact guide to forming the different kinds of means “centered” on the number 12: 6-12-24, 9-12-16, 8-12-18 (Jay Kappraff, “The Arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa and its Applications to Systems of Proportion,” *Nexus Network Journal*).
Duchamp anticipated the Planet of the Idiots problem through his idea of delay. Like curvature, the continuously revised heading on a “least distance” trip, delay miniaturized the cosmic condition of a gap. Like Lacan, Duchamp realized that the gap had to do with the nature of desire. It was the small difference, a kink in reality. Notably, in all who have come upon this idea, the gap and desire are inevitably associated with the point of view. In the broad range of phenomena of “anamorphosis,” for example, the idea of delay, gap, and desire converge to make a perfect storm. Lacan’s headquarters for anamorphosis was Hans Holbein’s painting, *The Ambassadors* (1533), where a blur across the canvas can be seen as a skull if viewed from either of two points close to the canvas surface. The two points lie along a line lying 27º from the horizon passing through the sound hole of the lute, one of the many objects on display.

For his version of Duchampian delay, Holbein has elaborated a full formula: navigation, obversion, temporal termination, visual anamorphosis, curvature. Again, the coincidence of opposites: the “outermost” terminal boundary of the Apocalypse is inscribed into the inside frame of the skull, which anamorphically obverts the visual and biographical contents of the portrait. The quick flip between extremes has its own psychoanalytical pedigree in Lacan’s idea of “extimacy” (*extimité*), the “intimate exterior” or, obversely, the alien interior. In Freudian terms, this kernel of obversion is the antipode of the subject’s own inside frame, the void that is established by the desire of the Other. As a means of moving through the successive stages of development (oral, anal, phallic, etc.), the developing subject comes to term with the mother’s relation to the Real, the father’s relation to reality (primarily though the device of the name), through the recognition of a symbolic ego made present in the “mirror stage.” This equipment of extimacy combines with that of anamorphosis and Duchampian delay to constitute a broad encyclopedia that Mladen Dolar has situated within the (Freudian) uncanny. Not only is extimacy uncanny in the casual sense of being strange; it is the uncanny, structurally, historically, ethnographically, and psychologically.

John North has domesticated this complex of symptoms within the history of the painting. Holbein recorded a strangely over-specific date of completion: April 11 (Good Friday), 1533, 4 p.m. By indicating such a particular time on the verso, Holbein confirmed references to Golgotha on the painting’s *recto*. The crucifix nearly covered by the curtain completes the isosceles triangle containing the right triangle with the anamorphic skull. The navigation instruments shown on the table behind the two ambassadors, plus the lute’s reference to cosmic harmony indicate that Holbein favored the theory that 3’s lay at the heart of multiple mysteries, including that of time (1533 = 3 x 500 + 3 x 11). The angle of the sun above the horizon of London, where the portrait (as well as life on earth) was to have been “completed” at 4 p.m.? Twenty-seven degrees, of course. Overdetermination never had it so good.

Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry*.  
Miller, Jacques-Alain, “Extimacy.”  
The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries abounded in hand-printed books of emblems with captions to amuse the wealthy readers who could afford them. Wit was required to guess the relationship between the image and the text, with the idea that each contained only half of what might be needed, but that the halves often required a considerable learning to discover their connection. One such emblem embodied an early-modern version of delay with the common saying, "Make haste slowly" (festina lente). Unlike the other common depictions of this sentiment, a butterfly shown with a crab, the dolphin entwining the anchor was naturally a chias tic fish. It lived in water but needed air to breathe, like whales. Its sinuous form allowed it to do an S-curve around the rigid anchor. The French king-to-be was called the dolphin, dauphin, according to a similar chiasmus. He was a child among men and a man among children, a rule among subjects and subject to the adults he would soon dominate. Like the dolphin, he had to "make haste slowly" in order to preserve the structures of power that would eventually serve him but, at the present, were delaying his ascension to the throne. Only a fish accustomed to such "negations of negations" could represent this situation.

The multiple uses and histories of the dolphin complicate any attempt to explain why a dolphin, chias tic or otherwise, comes to represent the motto festina lente. Dauphiné is also a former province in South-Eastern France, independent until 1457. Somehow the chiasmus theme creeps into each incarnation, particularly the geographic. The province lies at the crossroads of mountains, plains, and the sea. Why Count Guigues IV of Albon (c.1095–1142) adopted it for his standard is not known, or when the anchor was added on behalf of the motto is unclear. The dolphin is indeed a "sliding signifier," slipping in and out of conditions arranged to amuse the "Lady Mondegreen," the phenomenon of homophon ic confusion altering the meaning of the original (Lady Mondegreen = "laid him on the green").

The dolphin-anchor emblem offers the occasion to cite mi-dire, "half speech," and its central role in Lacanian linguistics. Fascinated by the scandalous murder case of the 1930s, when Christine and Lea Papin, working as domestics, murdered their employers. Diagnosed as paranoids, the sisters spoke to each other in a curious "half speech." The sisters referred to themselves as "I" rather than "we." Lacan saw this speech in relation to the prophetic speech of the ancient Sibyl and adopted it as his own preferred style of communication, admitting that the choice was between being inconsistent but incomplete or being complete but inconsistent. He chose the former. The "Gödelian" choice also implied a temporality, as with the emblem of festina lente: "What is nice about what I tell you — don’t you agree? — is that it’s always the same thing. Not that I repeat myself, that’s not the point. It’s that what I said before takes on meaning afterward“ (Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, XX, 36, emphasis mine). As if to confirm this later use of delay, the emblem tradition had already adopted this attitude. Emblems were presented along with text, each of which was regarded as a puzzle, an enigma that could be solved only by combining them in some clever way. By delaying meaning, a space opens up, a gap between signifier and signified that undermines language’s conventionality.
1.05 / Funny Lines in Word and Image

The plight of the human as “the speaking animal” is this: language “says too little” while it simultaneously “says too much.” That is, while the subject believes that language falls short of his or her full measure of intention to express, language actually at the same time reveals an excess of unconscious meaning and potential. It doesn’t take much to see that the two margins, the two kinds of dysfunctions, are connected. And, it is precisely this connection that Freud used to construct the modern idea of the unconscious, accessible only through the errors of substitution, insertion, or omission that could be detected during psychoanalysis. The position of the analyst and analysand, the structure of the examining room as an acoustic “device,” and even the analysand’s confusion of the psychoanalysts clinic for his/her own home (so that the analysand, upon approaching the door of the clinic, often reaches into his/her pocket for a latchkey) begins to explain the series of folds and twists that spatialize language on behalf of its “acousmatic” secret margins.

It would be wrong, therefore, to use the practice of emblem books to contrast word and image as two separate “logics,” the former narrative and linear, the second as “simultaneous and visual,” without mentioning this inner bond. Horace’s dictum of ut pictura poiesis, thanks to the function of inflection in Latin, says both that the poem should be like the painting and that the painting should be like the poem. Thus, the classical emblem books that proliferated from the 1500s through the late 1700s coupled images and texts through riddles that considered each as an incomplete key to the other. Riddling the relationship was a pastime for educated readers, and the “what am I?” riddle form required the reader’s show of wit. Alexander Pope’s “a wit with dunces and a dunce with wits” gave away a key strategy in this game. The image contained what the text did not, but the lack itself was the ground of the inner idea.

Chiasmus, the x-form of Pope’s funny line, could be considered the signature of Hades, in the sense that three x’s are commonly used to open up a portal to the dead, to call forth their voice to give advice, offer blessings, etc. Here, the ‘x’ is not a symbol but more of a diagram related to the triple bending or folding that is required for this connection. The number 3 in the history of languages is frequently connected with the ultimate, as in the French trés. To do something three times, as in the mathematics of the fairy tale, is to do something effectively, even if — or especially if — the first two times were completely off track. Aristotle’s idea of tuchē, the kind of human-based chance that operates as affordance, opportunity, and coincidence, and the non-human chance of “automaton” complete the triangle. First, a mistaken choice; then, a choice that the mistake allowed us to see for the first time; finally a shot to the bull’s eye. In his major novel, The Master and Margarita (1928-1940), Mikhail Bulgakov plays out Christ’s trip to Jerusalem in just such triadic terms, a “wrong turn,” an affordance, then a masterful synthetic coincidence of previously contradictory terms. Bulgakov’s Christ is a marvelous analysand whose unconscious becomes evident through his errors and excesses of speech, realized quite unexpectedly by Pilot. The interrogation scene would have been something that Holbein would have claimed to have already painted.

Alexander Pope, The Dunciad (1728-1743), Book 4, line 90. Pope praises the effective unconscious of chiasmus directly: “The gathering number, as it moves along, /Involves a vast involuntary throng, /Who gently drawn, and struggling less and less, /Roll in her Vortex, and her pow’r confess.”

Offerings left at tombs show that the practice of “opening a gateway to the underworld” by inscribing three x’s on the surface of a tomb seems to knowingly involve the negation magic of chiasmus. The three X’s constitute the portal to which the dead spirit is invited to give prophecy. Coincidentally, three twists structure the Thesean labyrinth, model of the tortured pathways of the underworld, which insulate the living from the dead.

Unmarked tomb, St. Louis Cemetery No. 2 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Photograph by author. At this site, the most frequently consulted tombs were those no longer identifiable. The loss of the name is significant, since burial itself, as Lacan remarks, is based on the idea that an otherwise negligible collection of decayed matter has a relationship to an order established by genealogy: the names of the father.

Three X’s call forth the dead, St. Louis Cemetery No. 2 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Photograph by author. The connection of a graphic indicating both negation and crossing seem to fit other general eschatological practices relating to “rites of passage.”
1.06 / The Curtain and the Voice

Pythagoras was one of the first cult leaders to achieve permanent philosophical respectability, but his stagecraft retained certain key tricks of the Sophists’ trade. He positioned himself behind a curtain when speaking to his followers. Only a small inner circle had direct access to the fully visible philosopher. “So it is said,” since most of our information about Pythagoras is based on hear-say and romanticizations of his life in Croton during the late Sixth Century BCE. The curtain is famous in the service of “truth that is created out of the conception of the listener who believes him/herself to be detached from the truth.” Thus, the Wizard in Victor Fleming’s The Wizard of Oz (1939) does not fully lose his powers when the dog (the traditional animal for protecting boundaries) de-XXxs his control room where the sound-and-light show is produced to frighten all visitors. Rather, he becomes ethically obliged to restore the missing piece that has been imagined by Dorothy’s magical companions to be their bar to full humanity: thought/consciousness, love/compassion, and courage/self-control. The Wizard notes, when he “confers” these powers that they were already present but unrecognized, invisible.

The curtain in modern times figures as the central prop in the “Turing test,” the experiment where a subject is paired with either a computer or another human and instructed to try to tell which by asking a series of questions. Curiously, the issue of the automaton and tuchê — the main ingredients of Mikhail Bulgakov’s reconstruction of Pilot’s interview of Christ in The Master and Margarita — come to the fore. The unconscious that emerges from such exchanges does not have a specific subjective owner. Its place is the “non-place” of dislocation as a temporal process. The unconscious is a wanderer, a soul in Hades (literally, “the invisible”). The classic emblem of this wandering, the Thesean labyrinth, thus has three folds, akin to the three questions asked by all monsters of the margin. Sometimes, as in the case of the Sphinx interrogating Œdipus, the answer has three parts as well: man as infant; man as adult; man as old. Is this not also the three-part psyche, id, ego, super-ego? Wo Es war soll Ich werden: Where “it” was, so shall the “I” be — the “evil” of desire makes way for the “good” of the ethical subject. From Thebes to Vienna, the three-part subject is the Geist, the guest, someone who is by a strange etymological combination both a dead spirit and a “guest away from home,” displaced, wandering, who answers to the call of three, the XXX — which is at the same time the map and name of its own displacement — and is chastiously disposed to answering great questions.

The curtain that is cracked open to reveal the crucifix in Holbein’s The Ambassadors combines the theme of three with the secret of the anamorphosis: an “unconscious” and a “collective memory” whose “time has come.” No more wandering. Guest and host have met. Hostility and hospitality have resolved their differences and returned to their etymological home, the g/host. The place of the skull is a “no-place” that resists all attempts to place it, all instrumentality, but is a function of curvature and (so sayeth the lute that directs the horizon line and gives the first ∂ angle) displaced sound as a sign of truth, the offstage “acousmatic voice.” The harmonics of the lute’s plucked strings engages the idea of the Platonic ratios, 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, etc. These could be arranged in an order of ascending double and triple multiples, the “lambda,” the figure relating twos and threeses, by which an architect could construct the essential relationships of any building. In a painting where two ambassadors are shown amidst a coronation of triplets, nothing could be better.

The frontispiece of Vico’s 1744 edition of The New Science, called the dipintura, was influenced by Rosicrucians steeped in the emblem book tradition of visual puzzles. Homer, the triangle-in-circle divine eye of God, and Metafisica standing on the globe of the cosmos (not the earth), which is in turn balanced precariously on an altar erected by the first humans in a clearing in the primal forest of antiquity, are locked in the main triangulation. Objects representing human institutions (marriage, burial, navigation, writing, trade, power of the state, etc.) are arranged in the foreground. Homer gazes at the final object, the only one not mentioned in Vico’s description of the image: the helmet of Hermes. Homer, the blind poet, seems to “see” the invisible helmet, and through this we are able to identify this as the objet petit a, by which the desire of the image is put in the form of an anamorphic condition.

Consider that the dipintura was intended to be viewed in a shadow-box whose eyehole at the divine eye aimed the viewer toward a mirror reflecting the engraving pasted on the side nearest the viewer. The image would in this construction literally look back at the viewer. The reverse angle would directly demonstrate Vico’s main dictum, that the New Science was to be understood as emanating from the unconscious of the reader, who realized in the order of his/her own ideas the same pattern of “ideal eternal history” encountered in the sequence of institutions and stages followed by all cultures in their development from mythic to conceptual stages of thought. The shadow-box view would connect the blind spot of the helmet of Hermes to the reader’s own blind spot, his/her collaboration in the creation of this strange text. It is the reader who becomes the creator of The New Science, looking through the eye piece that is, on the reverse side, represented as the eye of God. But, the point is also that the reader mis-recognizes his/her role, is a psyche separated from the body, a wandering soul subject to the laws of authentic(ating) travel. This period of anonymity, in which the reader is like the Hitchcock hero who is wrongly accused of some crime and forced into flight, a journey of learning, where disguise plays many roles.

The dipintura contains the secret of Vico’s most famous dictum, stated in Ancient Wisdom of the Italians: verum ipsum factum (est). Normally, this is translated as “humans may know that which they have made themselves.” The ambiguity of Latin allows for other meanings, including the one that anticipates Claude Lévi-Strauss’s idea of bricolage as a means of “thinking through things.” Even the more commonly accepted meaning, where human knowledge is compared to God’s knowledge through creation, allows for theological ambiguity within God’s knowledge, as a knowledge not maintained as a manual of operations or rule-book but as a dynamic time experiment requiring the initial alienation of the world as Other. God’s creation “knows without knowing.” In this somewhat Manichaean view, God creates the world as chiaroscuro — contrasting light and dark forces — and then sets it in motion. This speculation is grounded in Vico’s own elaborate and particular use of shadow references, and his uncontested emphasis on blindness and invisibility in the dipintura. When Vico, in his Autobiography, describes his personality as both choleric and melancholy, the “dry line” connecting seasons corresponding to these two humors establishes a cardus, a north-south line that, connecting angels with demons, resonates throughout his account of genius, which drew on the late Mannerist theory that wit combined the fire of heroic madness and the cold reason of melancholy.
Vico described his major work, The New Science, as a merger of the interests of philosophy and philology. What does this mean? Philosophy has retained its meaning into the modern era. What Plato did 2500 years ago is recognizable and its methods and ideas are as contemporary now as then. Philology, now associated with the comparative study of languages and their literatures, not so long ago included ethnography, folklore, eschatology, and speculative etymology, such as Vico undertook in his work On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. The larger idea of philology included customs, cultural institutions, and the history of concepts themselves, to the extent that these could be reflected in human speech and writing. Vico’s Big Idea was to see an even closer relationship, a dialectic connecting the ideality of ideas — a self-developing pattern of evolution — with the seemingly contingent or random circumstances of human cultures, as material responses to highly variable geographical and historical conditions. Vico argued that variability, or even randomness, was required for the perfection of the process he called the “ideal eternal history,” a sequence of stages carrying culture from the mentality of myth to the rationality of modernity. Vico however asserted that the historical sequence was evident not just in the development of the human individual but in the structure of any process or experience whatsoever. This connection of the macro- with micro-levels of events and things focused instead on the pure exchange that was simultaneous or even prior to the components it related. That is to say, accident is not accident until something contrasts with it as cause, form is not form without the formless.

This sentiment was not uncommon and possibly can be traced to Heraklitus’s slogan, panta rei (everything flows). More specifically, it is an issue of scale, an insistence on looking to the fine-grained levels of time and space, the small, seemingly minor inconsistencies and errors that, instead of being exceptions to be ignored, are the keys to the structure of the whole. After all, such is the nature of Freud’s concept of the unconscious, or at least our access to it. Looking at slips of the tongue, denials, substitutions, errors, and omissions, psychoanalysis additionally specified that speaking and listening constituted the medium of discovery. The surface of the psyche was indeed curved, but every snapshot seemed to pledge allegiance to the frame that isolated it as a finite, representative “view.” The quadratic frame was simultaneously an artifact of the evolution of the page as a material basis of printing, the development of painting on pieces of wood or canvas that could be detached from the walls that displayed them, and a reference to the cosmic system of winds, the “four quarters” that bounded the sensible universe and separated it from the ideal Empyrean realm. Each side of the snapshots of reality, even those made in language, refers to a journey made to the limits encountered at the north, south, east, and west of experience and sense perception. Without a doubt, these are not unconnected but linked, even if only a metaphor can approximate the situation. The River Okeanos bound not just the visible world but visibility itself, and the four directions of any frame were linked to the problematic combination of circle and square.

Giambattista Vico, Ancient Wisdom of the Italians (1710). Vico was one of the first to combine “chance and necessity” in such a way that Aristotle’s themes of causality could be linked to modern science’s Darwin-based formula. Tuché, human affordance/opportunity could, in the context of “blind nature” (Aristotle’s automaton), give rise to ideal formal designs that replicated a single logic across scales and environmental spectrums. But, following a theo-psychological model rather than an objective one, Vico used enunciation — the first word of Jove, embodied by the thunder, as his first cause. This in effect “out-Darwined” science by grounding universality in a theory of the subject.

———, New Science.
———, Autobiography.
Map 1.08

The oblique view, made at a slight, odd angle, brings forth depth, out of its hiding place within the sagittal line connecting subject and object. This is a “two-in-one” act, since the original single point of view is not disestablished but, rather, is required for the oblique to reveal the secret of depth. It is neither single nor double, but parallax. This sideways stratagem has several properties that are suggestive in connecting the condition of the map to other kinds of representation.

- **Lateral motion:** the point of view acquires a “sideways twin.”
- **Rotation:** the sideways shift to an oblique point of view is not restricted to one direction; it is a radius defining a range of possible points, which collectively define a circle. Parallax complements the orthogonal sagittal line of sight with a cone, within which lie any number potential supplementary lines; the depth perceived by any two lines is a “sample,” the cone defines the range of a full set of “depths” that could be taken by displacement of δ.
- **Orthogonal:** the traditional angle of view in relation to a frame (90º) is given another meaning by this “rotation” of a supplementary POV to achieve parallax, an oblique angle (δ) that “penetrates into the invisible.”
- **Displacement of the rotating POV adds the dimension of depth,** the “rotation” implied by the individual map’s perimeter aims at completion; the former involves a logic of semblance (added depth), the latter a logic of contiguity (added completion); these reflect the two “capacities” of the mind’s neurology, revealed through aphasia diagnoses (Goldstein, *The Organism*).

The initial optical achievement of the parallax view can be connected, by the idea of rotation, to the epistemological potentiality of the map. The oblique angle taken to the “side” of the sagittal dimension gives rise to the perception of depth. This rotation is “built in” to the orthogonal dimension, mirrored by the idea that the map is representative of the series of representations that exhaust the possibilities of mappable space (and time). Hence, the atlas is inherent in the idea of the parallax view, and vice versa. The individual map appears to be flat, thanks to the suppression of the folds, tears, layers, etc. that, in the completion of the full project of the atlas, will return in the form of a topology associated with the “Real” of represented space.

A corollary of the idea of the formula, parallax + oblique = atlas, re-organizes α and δ as vectors that are functionally independent (Γ) but connected to a common origin. This accounts for the association of depth, α, with artifact, also with Aristotle’s “automata” (natural chance) and δ, the oblique, which itself is related to the Aristotelian concept of tuchē (human affordance). Delta, δ, establishes a parallax relationship to the represented, which is to say that it expands the functionality of the frame, 2-D to 3-D so to speak, to allow for a difference that perceives a hidden depth. Depth remains hidden (dotted line, second figure) in that it is never directly represented except through difference. Its independence, as rotation, simultaneously rotates its vectorial counterpart, α, into the field of the representation, giving it a visible presence that requires an “inside frame” — some indication of the radical paradox of this inclusion of anomalous element.
1.08 / Myths of Adjacency

The seemingly tranquil surface suggested by the literal map is in fact thin, torn, folded, worm-holed, and moth-eaten. The illusion of adjacency is just that. In war with the opportunities afforded by simple proximity are the barriers that, graphically expressed, lie within the sagittal "line of sight" already employed by the map user. A mountain range’s heights and river valley’s depths, for example, cannot be appreciated unless the two-dimensional map be converted into a stereographic view, where the viewer’s brain can re-envision the vertical using its own depth perceptors. I use this strange way of talking to emphasize that the only fact that creates the sense of three-dimensionality is the difference between two separate views, a difference that "gives rise to," so to speak, the realization of depth and distance. Figuratively, a wall or cultural boundary does the same thing as a mountain range. Two points seem to be close but are in effect completely insulated. A ghetto, prison, or even private house may refuse to "lie in the same space" as adjacent features. Yet, within such reserves, some other means of communication may link the space with others a great distance away.

No examples are needed for the reader to imagine how the map’s pleasant white paper is tattered by the sagittal. The results are "cheesy" — the graphic image is overconfident and inspires overconfidence in the viewer. It is easy to see that overconfidence is a desire that is at odds with the δ, the difference that relates to parallax. The depth-view that gives some hint about the ferocious barriers to the opportunity of adjacency is, in contrast to the "orthogonal" point of view, slightly "oblique." Its offset angle corresponds to the δ of difference between the stereo pairs. The oblique view begins to take into account the processes, the artifacts, the presence of the frame as a not-so-neutral force in the field of the visible.

To model this oblique point of view is tricky. Like René Magritte’s Ceci n’est pas une pipe, it is hard to say just what ceci indicates — the image? the actual pipe? the statement? In language, one might say that there are two dominant “directions.” Towards metaphor and poetics, language employs internal “mimetic” gestures such as onomatopoeia, rhyme, the musical use of tones and phrasing. In a more scientific mood, language uses indicative functions that attempt to frame precisely what is the subject at hand. Mimetic and indicative structures provide different roles for irony. The mimetic tends to extend and preserve the spell it creates in simulated scenes. The indicative creates a sharper boundary between what is the subject and what is the expression, and thus is is more vulnerable to ridicule when the boundaries are contested. As with the Magritte example, the attempt to frame some content easily leads to "left-overs" that muddy the attempt. The oblique point of view sees the frame as well as the framed; it is the basis of the critical mentality, which takes the frame, and the motives that go into constructing it, more seriously than the content that is framed.

Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe.
The oblique involves an "orthogonal" relationship both to the field of representation, which it "flattens" by appropriating the sagittal dimension for its line of sight, and to elements it suppresses in the act of flattening. Because $\alpha$ is a corollary of $\partial$, its relationship is also "in-line" as well as orthogonal. This means that when the point of view is "rotated" to achieve a parallax view, the suppressed content of $\alpha$ "comes into view," although it must be constrained or qualified by an "inside frame" that distinguishes it from surrounding content. In effect, it is an anomalous presence, a "forbidden" operator that is nonetheless within the same field of visibility as other "ordinary" objects.

The relations of the oblique, the orthogonal, rotation, and the inclusion of suppressed content are all non-noteworthy aspects of the relationships among maps, atlases, and represented content. The optics of map projection, the curvature of the map surface, and the requirements for completion in an atlas apply to the local and global scales of mapping. Even Eratosthenes (c. 276 BCE – c. 195 BCE), who calculated the circumference of the earth using a gnomon and the known distance from a city lying on the Tropic of Cancer, was aware of the "double function" of the $\alpha/\partial$ relationship. His "inside frame" was the knowledge that the distance to Syene was in fact a curved line, which he necessarily had to represent as a straight in order to calculate the distance to the center of the earth by triangulation.

If the earth were a closed, curved surface, then $\alpha$ was required to be a center, although a perpendicular measurement taken from two separate locations would require two different $\alpha$'s. With $\alpha$ as a center, the distance between the two points of view would necessarily be curved. Eratosthenes' "parallax view" included the knowledge that the oblique would itself become circular.

The "not-fully-final" rotated position of the $\alpha/\partial$ orthogonal angle reveals the true epistemological relationship of parallax to quadrata (quadrated representations), such as maps and paintings. The gap created by the $\alpha$ is the "inside frame" condition by which the (formerly repressed, $-\alpha$) elements associated with the Real of curvature return, as represented-Real, $+\alpha$. The distortion imposed by the flattening of representation (the "screen condition"), $+\partial$, is associated with the point of view, the "oblique" POV that gives rise to parallax. It's empty position, left behind in the process of rotation, is negated. Its residual, $-\partial$, is perceived as a defect, an inconsistency.

We generally associate "reality" with two kinds of conditions. In the first ($R_1$), reality encloses and "lies beyond" the immediate illusions of the perceptual realm. Our proximity prevents us from gaining a full perspective. The second kind of reality consists in discovering a defect, $R_2$, that points to this higher-order of truth. The local defect, like the curvature or loss of time in Einstein's Theory of Relativity, is seen to be a symptom of our limited conceptual and perceptual powers to see how things really are. $R_1$ is a case of "objective subjectivity," in that objectivity, as Real, is imaginable only because of our defectiveness as subjects. $R_2$ is the reversed condition of "subjective objectivity," where an object’s reality is realized through a consideration of our (imperfect) subjective relation to it. Delta places $R_1$ while $\partial$ locates $R_2$. Both are constructed as "gaps."
In Stanley Kubrick’s 1980 psychological horror film, The Shining, we have the issues of the atlas, map, and the anamorphic function of “spaces inside of spaces” brought together in the most rigorous “Lacanian” way imaginable. It is first necessary to look at how there is, in plainest terms, the formula of two fathers. The “natural father” is an obscene, murderous father who will, by the end of the film, attack his own wife and children. The other father is the protective the African-American chef, Dick Hallorann (Scatman Crothers), who is able to comfort the son, Danny, by communicating with him telepathically. The way Hallorann does this explains how the relation between the “symbolic father,” who threatens castration, and the “imaginary father,” who provides fantastic cover for this trauma of the Real, are related within the function of a universal anamorphy of space. Hallorann is showing the family around the large hotel, and when he arrives at the kitchen he turns to Danny while an “afterimage effect” records his position in “reality.” The father-who-turns 90° to address Danny telepathically is the imaginary, protective father, giving Danny relief from the anxiety he feels in the new setting.

We know from Lacan’s famous but easily misunderstood mathemes of sexuation about these two fathers. The obscene father who rapes and kills his children on a whim is the “necessary” exception to the very law he establishes. All the sons must obey the law of (symbolic) castration, ∀x·Φx (“All are subjected to the law of castration, Φx). The exception is the symbolic father, who violates the law, ∃x·Φx (“There is at least one ‘x’ who is an exception to the law of castration”). This contradictory combination of rule-and-exception is for the masculine, i.e. for “anyone who wishes to call themselves ‘man’, including any woman.” (In Lacanese, you get to choose your sexuation condition, which is different from identification with gender in the cultural-sexual sense.)

What is obviously different in Lacan’s system, and what has important consequences for carrying the issue of sexuation into the fields of language and phenomenal experience, is the connection of the masculine rule to space and time. In short, the illogical lock that binds the benevolent, protective father who offers ice-cream and a fantasy of security to the obscene child-raping-and-killing father is nothing less than the orthogonal operator that “inscribes” an invisible element into a visible one, an “artifact” into a “representation,” so that the two contradictory elements may co-exist by means of a rule of silence and invisibility. Double inscription means that the two fathers constitute an “anamorph.” On a dramatic level, this can be as straightforward as the theme of rivalry. Nice Mr. Chef is the first victim of Bad Dad. But, thanks to the complicated workings of negation in anamorphy, Hegel’s three forms of negation, denial (Verneinung), repudiation (Verleugnung), and foreclosure (Verwerfung) are combined. The subject is admitted to the conspiratorial “club” of symbolically castrated/denied sons by the Nice Father who says, “Yes, this is awful, but have some ice-cream.” One thinks of Roberto Benigni’s protection of his son in the concentration camp in Life is Beautiful. The Bad Father is repudiated, excluded by the family who, in The Shining, locks him out of their apartment. Foreclosure happens both diagrammatically and spatially, when the two dimensions of the Γ collapse together in the contamination of reality by the Real, without the imaginary shield of fantasy. The anamorph has allowed the imaginary and the symbolic a minimal distance, kept open a gap, a dimensionality of exception and prophecy.

Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry.
Slavoj Žižek, “The Superego and the Act.”
The not-fully-rotated position of the $\alpha/\partial$ orthogonal angle shows how two gaps, associated with objective subjectivity ($R_1$) and subjective objectivity ($R_2$), work in the “real lives” of representations and maps. With Holbein’s *Ambassadors* as a reference point, $R_2$ is easily identified as the anamorphic image of the skull, the blur that appears to mar the otherwise “orthogonal” view of two gentlemen and their worldly possessions. The other gap, $R_1$, is protected by the “inside frame” of the curtain. Its objective subjectivity is identified with the artifact, the literal painting of the work, completed on 4 p.m., April 11, 1533, a “subjective” date that is revealed as an ultimate objectivity, namely the Apocalypse. The painting’s completion is equated with a perfection in the same way that time is “perfected” by its complete collapse with the passing of the last minute of the last day.

Holbein organizes the process of the “parallax Real” as a process of triangulation, which we have portrayed as a rotation of the $\alpha/\partial$ orthogonal angle, two “points” rotated to create three “positions.” The role for the “empty location” ($-\partial$, the *memento mori*; $-\alpha$, the obverse date) suggests that triangulation involves, thanks to rotation of two elements, four opportunities — $\partial$, $-\partial$, $\alpha$, $-\alpha$ — by which error and invisibility may be incorporated within a representational “screen.”
1.10 / Subjects and Objects in Chiasmus

Negation and the conflicting rule of two fathers, one nice, one nasty, creates the condition of two types of reality, held in an anamorphic tension. Ed Pluth: “There are two versions of the real in Lacan’s work. ... Real1 [R₁] sounds like a typically ‘realist’ notion: the real consists of stuff ‘out there’ that language tries to symbolize. Real2 [R₂], however, is not outside the symbolic, as Real₁ seems to be. This second-order real ‘is characterized by impasses and impossibilities’ that occur in the symbolic order itself.” R₁ is the Empyrean realm depicted in the strange 1888 engraving of Camille Flammarion, *L’Atmosphere: Meteorologie Populaire*, where a seeker of truth is shown to penetrate beyond layers of the visible universe to a starry firmament lying beyond. This is partly an Enlightenment fantasy. One peels back layers of illusion until at last the truth can be seen, which had been hidden as “invisible.” The complementary R₂ version is the reality the subject encounters in the everyday that functions as an anamorph, a possibility, inscribed as a space inside ordinary space: something that resists explanation or repair, an inconsistency whose only signature is its resistance to domestication.

The skull in the Holbein portrait literally points to an R₂ location, the point from which the subject is able to see the anamorphic skull in corrected perspective, only to fall under the vertiginous line that connects to R₁. From the two fathers, the secular and sacred ambassador, the transportation to from denial and renunciation to the foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) completes the Hegelian triad of negations and adds a father: the original Elohim-style god of creation. *The Zohar* provides an interesting twist on the Biblical divine methodology of enunciation, where word call objects into being. God “makes room for” the created by contracting, by removing what seems to be meaning from objects and subjects’ relation to objects: *zimzum*. Presumably, contraction-as-negation is what is reversed at the point of Apocalypse, which amounts to a sudden tsunami-style Return of the Real, a flooding of signifiers that overloads meaning in a retroaction of coincidence and recognition — over-determination. Meaning of the Real had been eclipsed by the (multiple, polysemous, secular) meanings of reality. Once the fully obverse geometry of foreclosure is brought to bear, the invisibility and silence of symbolic reality and imaginary fantasy conclude.

The point of view in the formal geometry of *The Ambassadors* lies outside of the representational field. It allows for the two quarter-turns, one down to the hypothetical position of the “corrected” skull image at R₂, the other up to the partly concealed crucifix at R₁. The point of view on the right is already in the plane of the image. One more 90º rotation brings the viewer to the obverse inscription of the date. The painting is foreclosed.

Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject*, 27.
Map 1.11

Holbein’s cosmogram was not the first to give explicit information about the orthogonal, rotated structure of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ in the service of “opening up a gateway to the underworld.” Leonardo da Vinci’s painting of the Annunciation (1472–1475) and Albrecht Dürer’s engraving of an “Artist and Model in the Studio” (1525) suggest that the idea was already available for experiment. Holbein’s over-determined meanings involved anamorphosis, theology, and numerology. Dürer’s and Leonardo’s used some other tricks and themes, but the idea of the inside frame was just as mysterious.

Leonardo adds the element of “acousmatic” voice: the Angel Gabriel’s announcement is the act of impregnation, something that speaks through the Bible text Mary is reading on the lectern. Her ear, as the ear in psychoanalysis, plays the role of a womb in which the word is made flesh. This scene has been rotated in the sense that we see, thanks to the “oblique” view, the normally invisible presence of the angel, whose own presence in the scene is oblique. The angel is internally framed by the lectern, which can be said to frame both/either the “artist or model” in the Dürer engraving.
1.11 / Oblique View, Inside Frame

Some very famous paintings have been example of what the scholars Max Nänny and Olga Fischer have called iconicity. This is the case where the work refers to itself, its status as an artifact. In Dürer’s *Artist and Model in the Studio* and Leonardo’s *Annunciation*, the key lies in the elongation of the field of view, more suited to two eyes than one and, in many other respects, involving a different sort of parallax and different kind of revealed depth. The inside frame is obvious in the case of Dürer’s instructional engraving (it was a part of a draftsman’s handbook). The framed wire grid known as the lucinda divided the visible scene into squares that the artist could then transfer to a similarly gridded drawing surface. Our oblique view is nearly 90º to the lucinda. The “depth” of the scene is methodological. In Leonardo’s *Annunciation*, the depth is theological. It is not as obvious that we are taking the oblique view, unless we consider that the Angel Gabriel is not a customary part of the visible scene and is included with his own protective inside frame: the garb and physiology of a celestial being. He is not a ghost but a fully present object within the perceptual field. Except for the wings and halo (which Mary also has) we might take him for just a respectful visitor. The rotation by which we and Mary experience a commonalty is one of reception. Her ear, thanks to the Bible on the lectern, becomes the womb where the word will be incarnated. It is an organ-out-of-place, a reorganization of the idea of maternity, a truly “hysterical” condition. The subject is the agent, which in this case means the nexus of the Γ structure that joins α and β. The oblique view sets the angel, lectern, and virgin into a left-right sequence. In Lacanian terms, the signifying chain has on its left a “master signifier” and on its right an organ out of place, dislocated into position as the organ of divine pleasure, α. Our question is ... is it possible to go further and see this acousmatic element as an automaton, who takes up the full span including both Aristotelian natural chance and the modern notion of automation? Is the acousmatic voice going to be “delayed,” forced to gestate and mature?

It seems a relief to go back to the Dürer, but is that case really any simpler? We have a more obvious geometrical case of rotation and a means of understanding the oblique as, in this case, revealing a depth that is both ironic and still instructional. Rather than see the model as passive, it is possible to put her in the position of the angel in the Annunciation and see the two windows as inside frames. The lucinda divides the scene into pages; the artist reads and translates. The obelisk that fixes the position of his eye is like the pointers used to read sacred texts. They angulate (Γ) the relationship between the content surplus to the literal text, α, and the fractures, excesses, or gaps that serve as ciphers. Once the password is discovered, the order of pages is recovered. The pitcher and topiary plant, marginal to the main image, and the inkwell marginal to the gridded drawing, like all passwords take up their place at the border crossing.

Max Nänny and Olga Fischer, eds., *The Motivated Sign*.
Antonello da Messina’s St. Jerome in His Study is, like Dürer’s engraving of the Artist and Model in the Studio, a "long shot" whose windows embrace two contrasting landscapes. There are multiple internal margins, including a step up to the carrel where Jerome is reading and a step into the scene itself, a part of the porta cœli that opens the view to the idealized gaze of God, looking down on the saintly translator of the Vulgate Bible from the same position we use to view the painting.

The acousmatic theme is even more evident in the case of Jerome, for whom the act of translation was compared to impregnation.
1.12 / The Real of Translation

Antonello da Messina’s painting of Saint Jerome in His Study (1460-1475) serves to triangulate the relationship between Dürer’s Artist and Model in the Studio and Leonardo’s Annunciation by providing clues about the use of the inside frame. The frame is sometimes literally shown, as with the lucinda or lectern that are oblique to our line of view in the Dürer and Leonardo, at other times it is a theoretical condition. In Antonello’s painting it is both, thanks to the Saint’s role as translator of the Latin Vulgate Bible from multiple texts in Aramaic, Greek, Hebrew, etc. The problem of translation and focus on language provides a new field for understanding the role of the inside frame, its literal representations and its figurative rotation of the α/∂ orthogonal relationship (Γ) within the context of the picture/map plane (“quadrata”) and the viewer’s POV.

The art historian Penny Howell Jolly has provided a key for most of the locks in this painting. To cut the long story short, the painting is a 9 x 9 tiled puzzle that centers on the “inappropriate” association of the partridge with the holy project of Bible translation. Because it was believed that the partridge could be impregnated by the wind, however, this out of place sign is able to serve as a password, taking us into the painting with the idea that it is a womb rather than a secular space. Because we are standing in the position of God before this porta coeli (remember that “gate of God” was the original meaning of the Tower of Babel), we can see the value of this password, to fill space with a magic meaning related to the impregnation of Mary by the word, and the hysterical move of the womb to the ear and, of course, the opening of the ear to the vagina, geometrically idealized by the vesica piscis (later related to ∞, ◊, and <>). Because this model of translation leads to this consistent iconography and reference to the passwords across the inside frame, it is important to note its principal association to the “extimate,” the inside-out relationship that, in Lacan’s schema, engages the logic of his theory of enunciation. In other words, the “acousmatic” (the surplus element of language related to the gap created by the dissonance between demand and desire) becomes not just one more means of expanding the understanding of maps, paintings, and quadrated spaces in general but, more fundamentally, the “original speech” (cf. Vico’s vera narratio) by which these artifacts have been conceived and later articulated in different forms.

Penny Howell Jolly, “Antonello da Messina’s St. Jerome in His Study: An Iconographic Analysis.”
Eugenio Battisti, Antonello, il teatro sacro, gli spazi, la donna.
Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More.
Giambattista Vico, The New Science: Vico claimed that the first humans saw the world, perceptually, as a “true speech of the gods,” that this vero narratio (automaton in the purest sense) had a hieroglyphic character, which was in fact the basis of the first sacred writing, invented for the purposes of divination. Ancient hieroglyphics testify to the poetic-metaphysical nature of this language. The hieroglyph simultaneously presents a diagram of a condition and involves a “fable in brief” to narrate the origins of the relationship. Because the artifact (the world as created) becomes the basis of a poetic-metaphysical truth, it is further evidence of the “rotation” of α to the plane of appearances. In the field of quadrata, such as maps, cities, and graphic representations, the α requires inside framing. For example, the signs sought by the procedures of divination require an altar, purification of participants, and sacrifice — all of which serve to separate and frame the ritual space for a particularly “acousmatic” use.
Map 1.13

Parallax can be considered in terms of a set of differences, $\partial$, between two otherwise stable representations that are sufficient to lie in a flat field, for example the two photos of a “stereo pair.” The $\partial$ arises because effects of depth and curvature, $\alpha$, have been suppressed or unsensed, as is the cases of the retina or the map projection, respectively. The vector of $\partial$ is perpendicular/orthogonal to the imagined restoration of depth, $\alpha$, and it is this orthogonality that makes the creation of the dimension a corollary of lateral difference. Lateral difference defines a flat field, theoretically or materially, but this field, too, can be imagined as a vector in cases where dimensionality is “subtracted” from a two-dimensional quadratum using anamorphosis. This reconfigures the process of depth construction to create a kind of “radar” for locating point positions (“interpolation”). After all, doesn’t Holbein seem to be encouraging us to use instrumentation to calculate angles and their ability to relate space and time?

Parallax adds back what has been at first subtracted or repressed. The retina flattens the scene but the neurological difference between the sensations of the separate eyes restores depth as a dimension. Depth can also be restored as a vector when the flat field of representation becomes the field of anamorphosis and inside framing.

When the orthogonal pair is rotated, $\alpha$ joins a dimensional plane but $\partial$ becomes a directional vector. The “system” then becomes predictive and divinatory, making the inside frame into a “mouth” that resonates with the exchange between the viewer and the viewed. The three x’s indicate a gateway that is structured by the three aspects of time, linear, cyclical, and eternal.

In Holbein’s “Ambassadors system,” the anamorphic skull subtracted a dimension from the 2-dimensional graphic field. As a vector, $\partial$ became $-\alpha$, a vector with an angular (27º) relation to the horizon line. With the crucifix as a reference, a new orthogonal relation could be set up with the horizon to terminate $-\alpha$ and create the triangle, which must be said also to involve a “second rotation,” to the obverse of the painting where the date and time, April 11, 1533, 4 p.m., was inscribed.
1.13 / Cosmograms in Strange Places

We first considered the map in terms of the Aristotelian contrast between natural chance, $\alpha$, and human affordance/opportunity, $\partial$. By representing these as vectors, we were able to show how the map was able to subtract curvature, at the expense of introducing error but advantage of increasing utility. The orthogonal relationship between $\alpha$ and $\partial$ is, however, “rotated” in the process, making possible the (more normal) appearance of topographical anomaly or the (more spectacular) conditions of the “inside frame,” where discontinuities are imagined by various cultures in terms of poetic-religious conditions.

In mundane terms, the two separate views of the left and right eyes create a set of differences that stimulates the cognitive re-construction of depth. We can compare this to the Aristotelian $\alpha$, the sum of natural chance conditions. To understand this, compare the point of view of a subject standing before a stage with flat props. A move of the head or body quickly dispels the illusion that the flat props are real. The freedom to move our POV gains access to nature’s three-dimensionality and is directly connected to nature’s “disinterest” in our position in its midst. Nature’s candid, objective quality comes from this ability to walk through it in almost anyway. Our relation to nature in this mode is always “oblique,” because it does not call upon nature to “look” one way or another. It “takes nature as it finds it.” We are allowed to discover nature’s authenticity because its face is turned slightly away.

With divination, the situation is much the same, but an act of inside framing is required to segregate the qualities of $\alpha$ that constitute a “true speech,” an acousmatic representation, a vera narratio. Divination rituals across all cultures specify detailed means by which the inside frame must resist contamination and purify the chance element that makes $\alpha$ function as sacred text. In this sense, Holbein’s The Ambassadors functions as a “cosmogram,” the diagrams constructed by Yoruba magicians to amplify the power of curses and blessings. Objects concealed within a building or space would form a figure with mnemonic functions and cosmic relationships. When the subject to be cursed or blessed stepped into this concealed geometry, the enunciation of the curse/blessing would be particularly effective. Holbein has invited two gentlemen into just such a space, but it may be that the geometry was intended, like other reminders of mortality, to protect against the evil eye. Geometric structures, particularly those involving circles and turnings (“curse” after all is derived from the word cursus, turn), we used to contain or call forth divine forces and agents.

Whether or not we may be permitted to call Holbein’s doubly-curved geometric figure a cosmogram, we must consider how all “quadrata,” as we generally call representations whose frame presumes both scalability and contingent extension, can appear to be “random slices of reality” and at the same time ideal centers, places geometrically structured for rituals and cosmic interventions. The ubiquity of these within diverse cultures suggests that this is not an exception or accident but an intended situation.

Robert Farris Thompson, Flash of the Spirit.
The Yoruba “master cosmogram” purified the condition of boundary crossing by distinguishing the spaces of God, the dead, and the living. The schema followed the general pattern of the theory of humors, air, earth, fire, and water, with the two “wet” substances, blood and phlegm, arranged opposite each other to form a watery horizontal boundary. In this way, the “scientific” arrangement of the humors (Empedocles’ schema of hot/cold/wet/dry) yielded to the order that corresponded to seasons: sanguine spring, caloric summer, phlegmatic fall, and melancholy winter.

A more common and informal version of the Kongo cosmogram are the varied diagrams of hopscotch, whose cosmic aspirations are revealed in the names: the castle, paradise, witch’s house, dragon, tower, bed, swamp, village, etc. The aim is to use a specialized kind of motion that mimics flying to recover a “lost object” (stone, mara, marelle) escape a trap and defeat the evil embodied in the drawn diagram. It is easy to see this figured movement in terms of the interval between the two deaths, $D_a$, since the patterns constitute variations on the labyrinth. It is also easy to see the relationship between the arbitrary rules of the game and the role of the automaton, that structures opportunity and chance by means of graphic frames.
1.14 / Cosmograms in Sheep’s Clothing

The Yoruba cosmogram is an effective means of practicing medicine or providing security. It is a positional strategy, like the placement of players in baseball or soccer (football). Correct position compensates for slight variations and maximizes the affordance aspect of *tuchē*, so that one could say that the cosmogram is the pure form of *tuchē*, a geometrical idealization of the general idea. The use of plan geometries to optimize affordances are clear when the functional aim is realized. The destruction of Jericho by ritualized musical encirclement, the use of labyrinth pavement designs in Medieval churches as a means of doing penance, folk practices employing circles and other geometric designs are among the more obvious. Triangulation, encircling, and the theme of threes are so consistently used that when we encounter them in other forms of quadrata, such as paintings and cities, narratives and poems, we are not required to leap very far to make connections to the new media.

The Leonardo and Dürer examples show what the Holbein had established conclusively: that the “cosmogram” provides the opportunity for just the kind of over-determination that allows for a “magical” and not just interpretive use of the image. By the word “magical” there is no intention to make a case for the supernatural as opposed to scientific causation, but rather to refer to the beliefs about such relations and to find, in such beliefs, evidence of the psyche’s adjustment to a world that does not easily abide within rational explanation or moral law, a world that is, in short, “uncanny.” Magic belief is about exception and exceptionalism; hence, the Aristotelian framework of automaton, natural chance, and *tuchē*, human affordance/opportunity, offers a useful connection to the standard rational approach to causality (the “classic” four cases of formal, final, material, and efficient cause) as well as to the folk practices and religious/mythical beliefs about the exceptional. In other words, of those who drink from a well, some may believe that the water has good effects that can be explained, and others benefit from a belief that the water may go beyond what can be explained. In the end, it may be the power of the placebo effect of belief that plays the greatest role, and the structure of this belief may provide the key to why this can happen.

Automaton takes the placebo effect one step further.

Vitruvius, *De Architectura*.

Aristotle, *Physics*. 
Map 1.15

The map as cosmogram requires that we see quadrature in general as the creation of the subjectively objective — an activation of the framing actions that, formerly neutralized as pure artifacts of the process of observation, cognition, etc., set forth a relationship between the map and the map user that aims at conversion or, rather, obversion of the distances that normally relate subjects to objects. The subject’s freedom to inspect, to encounter the full “automata” of natural chance, $\alpha$, allows for a displacement, $\partial$, of the fixed, single point of view, but for this to be fully “obverse” and, hence, for this $\partial$ to have the power to uncover the fully acousmatic inside frame that speaks of the unconscious of the external world, this $\partial$ must take an attitude of “triangulation” or “interpolation” that delays access. Bruce Chatwin has romanticized this through his study of Aboriginal “song-lines” required to maintain the reality of the Australian landscape, and despite the romance the idea still applies. The terms *cursus* or *curve*, *trope* or *turn*, and verse/conversion point to the same conclusions about the use of framed externalities as organs of understanding. The collapse of dimensions as constructed by Desargues-style objectification is the necessary prelude to the reconstruction of dimensions by the “oblique” or “obverse” view.

Desargues’ diagram has been used as an emblem of the detachment of the “instrumental attitude,” the alignment of perspective theory with the Enlightenment’s increasing positivistic isolation of subjects from objects. What is invisible in the illustration of three armed noblemen pulling strings from the vertices of squares drawn on the ground has a subtle but important relationship to two of Desargues’ famous discoveries, the “Desargues Graph” and the “Desargues Theorem.” The Graph (left) is constructed entirely of equal “strings, tied together so that any vertex is linked to any other, and any edge to any other edge. It is defined as a distance-transitive cubic graph with 20 vertices and 30 edges. It has been used in chemistry to describe molecular transitions, as opposed to using them as pictures of molecules. It is is the only known non-planar cubic partial cube, predecessor of the modernists’ hypercube. The illustration on the right relates this cube to the case of perspective. A single cone of vision that exactly aligns the vertices of two triangles will define a line called the “axis of perspectivity.” The theorem states: “Two triangles are in perspective axially if and only if they are in perspective centrally.” Provocatively, this means that the point of view is tied to an external line, and that there is, in the flat representation, the means of embodying the logic of the hypercube. Desargues’ two most famous discoveries formalize the two principal variables of the Atlas, $\partial$ and $\alpha$, the metric indicators of the internal and external Real. The Theorem provides an interesting variation on Pascal’s description of God as an infinite sphere whose circumference is nowhere and center everywhere. It is a triangle with a twin, with a single POV that defines a distant horizon, not an edge but a line of travel.
The Unconscious in Practice

The map has four lines before it has any mark on paper: its edges. The principle by which it is joined to adjacent maps and their spaces, and the rectilinear means of their joining (which allies the map and the book), creates a quadrature in advance of any representative mark. Within the representational surface, marks must establish their independence from this quadration, to show that the frame is an artifact and "nothing more." But, the truth is that the frame relates the representation to the reader, and the imagined point of view to the scene captured by the frame. When the map has a use, it is literally "in the hands" of the reader, and the hands’ capacity for gesture is related to the frame that extends this relationship to the permanently quadrated map. The two fundamental gestures, indicative and mimetic, are also the basis for the two "logics" of magical practice, contagion and sympathy. This is no accident. Magical traditions are concerned with effectiveness, not belief per se. Folk belief about effectiveness, particularly when it is embodied in graphical form, reveals directly the negotiations between the unconscious and the uncanny. The unconscious is not an inaccessible repository within the brain of the individual, but rather the means by which external objects and domains may play the role of the unconscious. The frame facilitates this special role when the initial independence/accident of framing is converted into an occasion for the framed (and therefore externalized) material to act as an unconscious. This was clearly the case with Holbein’s portrait of The Ambassadors, and Antonello’s portrait of St. Jerome in His Study. The frame of the work, the initial act of quadration, gives rise to the important internal “inside frame” and its occasion of revelation. None of this can take place at the level of conscious, assigned symbolization, although symbols may be intimately involved. Rather, the pattern of associations must work through the kind of resonance associated with the unconscious, and the involvement of the two (Aristotelian) types of chance, $\alpha$ and $\partial$, justifies calling this "stochastic resonance."

Comparing this kind of use of framing to the quadrations made by traditional cultures to effect curses and blessings through magic, ritual, and song confirms that judgments made through customs that have evolved over centuries also involve their own form of "unconscious," although the risk is that a romanticized interpretation might creep in. This is not the "collective unconscious" of Jung, although it perhaps should have been had Jung followed Freud on the matter of the death drive. The unconscious is inherently collective in the sense that it is, as Lacan would say, “structured like a language.” Operating through a logic by which externalities are the medium of transactions of resonance rather than the presumed assigned meanings, it is not language’s phonemic or lexical functions but, rather, its acousmatic and grammatical functions that are at stake. The logic of the rebus, the joke, and the slip of tongue have more to say than a dictionary about the matter.

The map that is also a kind of cosmogram, even when it looks like any other scientific documentation of external facts, obverts the pose by which Desargues set Enlightenment man at a fixed distance from the objects of his interest. But, as often as this image has been used to demonstrate the instrumentality of the "Cartesian" mind-set, it refers subtly to Desargues’ more famous contributions, the Desargues Graph, a figure constructed of equal segments, borrowed by biologists to describe the performance rather than shape of molecules, and the Desargues Theorem, which relates a common point of view to a distant line of travel. As Mario Praz said, all times and ideas are present, in some form, in every age.
Map 1.16

The plan of the Vernon Hotel duplicates the left-to-right logic of the Aristotelian "mathemes" — efficient and final causes on the left, as masters, and formal and material causes on the right, as servants. The accidentally "dropped-out" waiter becomes the α that calls for the intervention of Father Brown, who is given the vestibule inside the cloak-room to complete his official forms. The passageway is the place where he detects the fast-slow footsteps, ∂, and deduces that the thief Flambeau is a "waiter among guests" and a "guest among waiters." Flambeau, Father Brown decides by not having Flambeau arrested, is also a chiasmus, a "good soul" in a bad man's body. Here the Freudian unconscious is given a wiring diagram that presages Lacan's notion of mi-dire, "half speech," the cipher of incomplete, fragmented, and puzzling speech that makes sense only within the full diagram of the crossing paths of consciousness and the unconscious. Everyone is a double; everyone has a psyche that calls out, in the language of the mi-dire, to those who have ears to hear: a password that prevents escape of the "bad" body but frees the "good" soul.

![Diagram of the Vernon Hotel plan](image)

(The plan of the hotel has been schematized to emphasize the role of the footsteps.)

This coupling of architecture and acousmatics may be generalized to all quadrata, four-square creations, where adjacency, ∂, begins its sequence of opportunism with the formal framing of the point of view. The map "drops out" the heavenly observer who, from the clouds, looks down and forgets the curvature of the surface. This absent observer, like the dead waiter, makes a place for the chiasmic waiter-guest, who on map would just as easily effect a difference, ∂, along the cardus of north and south or decumanus of east-west. The result is well known: the castrum quadratum of the Roman encampment, derived from the Roma Quadrata itself, derived in turn from the ritual undertaken by twins to plow a boundary that called forth the dead (manes) and at the same time defended against unwanted spiritual and physical attacks: a shield.
1.16 / The Queer Feet

G. K. Chesterton’s remarkable story, “The Queer Feet,” is evidence of the ease by which anamorphosis may be translated into acousmatics, or, more accurately, the stochastic resonance of the (spiritualized) voice. It is a story about an annual banquet held at the Vernon Hotel in London. The exclusive club, “The Twelve True Fishermen,” dons its best formal clothes and makes ritual use of an set of bejeweled fish-knives. Before the event, Father Brown is called to give last rites to a dying Italian waiter and sits in a small vestibule off the cloakroom to complete the death certificate when he begins to notice a strange pattern of footsteps. The same pair of squeaking shoes walks quickly in one direction, the slowly in the other. In a few minutes, Brown has solved the puzzle. He allows himself to be mis-recognized as the coat-checker and apprehends a man in formal dress as he is about to exit with his pockets full of stolen fish-knives. At this moment he persuades the thief that it is not the knives he wishes to save, but the soul of one whose mind could clearly be dedicated as easily (and profitably) to good as to evil. “Flambeau,” the master thief, then becomes Father Brown’s life-long friend and colleague.

The central cipher of the mystery is the subject who is split acoustically, who does not appear directly, who leaves two sets of contrasting tracks. Both guests and waiters wear tuxedos, so Flambeau has devised a chiasmus whereby he will appear to be a guest when seen by the waiters and a waiter when visible to the guests. Each group, servant and master, will think that he is the Other. Flambeau uses the inside frame to personify the Lacanian extimate, the outsider who is an insider and vice versa. This clever manipulation of the point of view not only shows the empirical usefulness of chiasmus. It involves acoustics to show how la voix acousmatique sets itself against language’s phonemic mainstream. By analogy, the squeaky shoes are the phonemic element, but the different cadence of squeaks, ∂, is the acousmatic element. Like other parts of language that say more than their speaker intends, an “unconscious” is made available to Brown, who, sitting in the tiny room adjacent to the hallway, resembles nothing so much as an attentive psychoanalyst, listening for the slightest slip of the tongue or unplanned sigh. The acousmatic is not just the mouth of this other concealed organ, the unconscious; it is the suppressed double of the thief who, against his master’s wishes, wants to join the forces of good. Its SOS, somehow aware that there is a rescue at hand, is its secret cipher, the ∂ between slow and fast steps, a natural consequence, α, of walking among two contrasting groups of men in formal attire.


The contrasting footstep sounds remind us of the function of the password that Lacan cites as general throughout language: the password in conventional context has an innocuous meaning but, as a password, it allows the speaker to be identified and given special privileges. Lacan focuses on passage in another key idea, “the passe,” the test by which an analysand demonstrates that his/her analysis has been completed. The analysand gives his account to two independent analysands, who in turn relay the account it to a committee of judges, who make the final decision. The passe process is a triangulation akin to analysis itself, in that it is not the literal content but rather the “acousmatic” continuity that constitutes the proof.

Compare Chesterton’s footsteps with Michel Chion’s idea of the off-stage voice, la voix acousmetrique, in The Voice in Cinema.
Map 1.17

The suspension of "depth" (the Real) in the monocular view of the map of the Vernon Hotel is recovered with the acoustic difference, $\partial$, detected by the priest in the cloak-room vestibule. In this story we have a clear picture of the relation of the boundary, as a horizon, to the field of the visible and the invisible element that, in this story, has a thief in the role of Edgar Allan Poe's famous purloined letter: something visible in a technical sense remains invisible to all for "ideological reasons" that ally the image to the cultural functioning of enjoyment. The "depth" is actually the intransitive (lateral) relationship between the left-to-right and right-to-left paths of the footsteps.

While the $\partial$, the difference in the sounds of the footsteps, remains in the "field of the visible" where Flambeau remains concealed, his presence is like that of the letter in Poe's "The Purloined Letter." The imaginary cannot represent the role of desire played by the waiters and guests, which so permeates the visible that Flambeau can remain "under the radar." In contrast, the priest is interested primarily in the $\alpha$ and understands that the suppression of this objet petit a is related to the project of saving Flambeau's soul.

The imaginary "rotation" of vectors aligns the invisible element — which allowed Flambeau to remain in "full sight" without being detected — to materialize as a space of encounter. Flambeau is trapped because Flambeau himself cannot see that the coat-check clerk is really a Catholic priest. Flambeau has, as a cynic, also invested in the imaginary even though he has used it as a manipulative trick.

The rotation makes the role of the "base line horizon" more understandable. It is the means by which the fictional construct of the image can be accepted "by virtue of" the concealment of the functioning of $\alpha$, the key to the full but fictional consumption of the scene, the visible face plus all the hidden sides, so to speak.

The transaction in the space of the cloak-room, which itself is a miniature proscenium stage, is akin to the actor of a film stepping out into the reality of the auditorium, as in Woody Allen's The Purple Rose of Cairo. The action is a "call," an invocation, in the sense that it is an acousmatic breach in the otherwise seamless illusion of the image. It is a re-enactment of St. Paul's conversion at Tarsus, where themes of blindness, voice, and spiritual revolution were also combined.
“The Queer Feet” rotates difference, $\partial$, to the position of the automaton, $\alpha$, and in so doing shifts this term’s function of natural accident to its other sense, that of the automaton, the robotic, the unconscious symptom. It becomes the basis of the transformation of the master thief to the master detective, and Brown, the priest, has recognized that one has always been contained inside the other, as unconscious. Symptoms constitute an invisible landscape hidden within the obvious one, and here the map and atlas offer an analogy. From above we cannot see the vertical dimension, held within the sagittal and our single point of view. Without constructing a parallax position, $\partial$, the hills and valleys appear to be on a single flat plane, and the motions taken by the inhabitants of the mapped space to move around or within these highs and lows seem wasteful from the view above. The invisible $\alpha$ is the unconscious of the landscape, its automating feature.

The parallax view shifts focus by recognizing the $\partial$ that, in the case of “The Queer Feet,” is an acousmatic difference. This would be just a difference without Father Brown’s realization of the stochastic resonance, the noise that amplifies the weak signal and locates the distant source with precision. We must realize the symmetry of magical blessings in this story. Father Brown has been called in to attend to the dying Italian waiter. Chiastically, the “last rites” come first, echoed at the end by the confession he hears that saves the soul of the thief. The rituals have encircled the story; the dying waiter has “made way for” the reborn waiter-guest whose symptoms have made others mis-recognize him. The automaton has been “rotated,” so to speak, to the position where the stochastic difference $\partial$ has become susceptible to the acousmatic voice, the voice of blessing, the benediction of the priest. The tuchē which has given Flambeau access to the silver knives functioned on behalf of the difference, $\partial$, that made him a human anamorph, a composite “monster” of waiter-guest. The real monster, evidenced by the structure of the blessing, was the Italian waiter and the fake waiter, twins who live in alternation, one living while the other resides in Paradise. Like The Ambassadors, we see two rotations, one to remind us of inevitable death, another to the ideal geometry that ends not just one person’s time but time itself, XXX. We have the Angel Gabriel’s two functions, the announcer of the (re-)birth of man and also the end of time, and a new answer to the old riddle about the “gate of horn (κέρας),” door of true (κραίνω) dreams, in relation to the “gate of ivory (ἐλέφας),” door of false (ἐλεφαίρομαι) dreams. The boundary metaphor perhaps obscured the fact that the horn was blown and heard, that it was both a revelation and a password; or the puns with the nearly homophonic words connecting horn with fulfil and ivory with deceive may have been an insider’s joke. The idea that dreams involved an economy with possible cheating or buyer satisfaction is in itself the interesting option.

G. K. Chesterton, ”The Queer Feet.”
Map 1.18

Over-determination stands in opposition to the positivistic idea of knowledge that must forever beg the question of “why there is anything at all.” Existence for over-determination is a surplus, a loss of dimensionality, a Real in which there can be no perspective, no clear face. All such attempts (the cone of vision, the screen, the picture plane) are \textit{ad hoc} last-ditch efforts, not to create meaning as much as to clear away meaning. Lacan’s series of “sliding signifiers” assures that, once language as such is discovered, the problem is not too little meaning but too much. Even in the womb, the child hears things that cannot be forgotten, that will determine his/her fate with or without being understood, but which will, like floating ciphers, continually haunt subjective being.

With anamnesis, the past cannot be escaped. It comes through, speaking through multiple channels. This is perhaps why the phenomenon of “stochastic resonance” provides such an apt metaphor. Even in silence and noise, the form is present. \textit{La Tempesta} forces the issue by presenting the crash of thunder with visual silence, the equilibrium of the anomalous elements revealed for a brief second. The image has the classic qualities of the standard mnemonic image: clarity, anomaly, monstrosity.

Antonio Giorgione, \textit{La Tempesta} (1506–1508), Gallerie dell’Accademia, Venice, Italy.

Giorgione coupled the condition of surplus meaning with a radical construction of temporality in this scene illuminated by the flash of lightning seen in the sky at the back. Are we to consider that the anomalous objects (cf. the fourth type of virtuality) were, seconds earlier, isolated in darkness, like the objects in the studio of Evgen Bavcar, the blind Turkish photographer whose spooky photographs convey a sense of surprise on the “faces” of the objects captured by his flash-guns. The conjunction of the “too much” of signifiers and the “too little” of our visual access creates precisely the condition of quilting that, Lacan argued, was required by continual sliding of signifiers past each other. This quilting can be done ideologically, through the process where master signifiers exchange causes for effects. Or, as in \textit{La Tempesta}, it can be a direct presentation of the raw materials of surplus and lack, revealing their fundamental identity.
1.18 / Sometimes the Bear Eats You

"The Queer Feet" translates ∂ as a "lateral difference" between the tempo of the same footsteps. Towards the guests, they quicken; towards the hosts (waiters) they slow. The chiasmus demonstrates the ease with which the usually visual concept of anamorphosis can be translated into acoustic form, but it also reveals the means by which other properties of the margin (password, mi-dire, quadrata, etc.) to the point where we are willing to see nearly any component in terms of what is literally "deeper meaning," the α of depth that, collapsed in the map-projection process, is directly linked with the POV's search for verification in the oblique view. One term seems to shoot through the others, evoking in them a similar confession of depth and, at the deeper level, new systems of lateral adjacency. For example, Father Brown's intervention, effective because it, like Flambeau's trick, used the function of misrepresentation chiastically, relates at a deeper level to the matter of swearing oaths across margins, the ancient use of crossroads ("herms") for the silent exchange of goods left to be claimed by strangers, and the importance of the templum in ancient cities and camps to shield the settlement from harm and gain advance knowledge of future dangers. The important point in this rich exchange under the table of appearances is to allow the errant, seemingly irrelevant, details back into the fold. The name for this study method is "over-determination": the over-presence of meaning, presumed from the start as an axiom of research. The tables are turned. In contrast to the process of searching for clues of things hidden in darkness, the project is to attempt ways of constructing distances, dimensions, voids in fact that will allow the knower to gain some distance on the known. It is the known that is pursuing the knower, in fact, not the other way around. The hunt is in reverse. As the stranger in the cowboy hat at the bowling alley bar of Coen Brothers film The Big Lebowski (1998) says, "Sometimes you eat the bear, sometimes the bear eats you."

This axiom of inversion calls for the construction of openings, even if only temporary, to allow for the processes of representation, thematization, narration, and explanation. Even if these prove to be only fictions created for a momentary view, and even if the insights they allow are visible only in a lightning flash akin to Giorgione's nanosecond scene in La Tempesta, what is seen in this underground exploration provides vivid, if ephemeral, proof of concept. Unlike the positivistic/phenomenological project of gradual accumulation and testing, where every thesis is set up only to be knocked down with the discovery of new data, the subterranean study method is proven by the high improbability of the singular, the unique, the hapax legomenon. Once the impossible occurs, the truth is given. Over-determination succeeds in obscuring this truth through a continual translation process, where signifiers slide over and across each other in a highly Lacanian fashion, dissolving meanings and images barely before they are fully formed.

If the chase of traditional scholarship sought to uncover facts, the inverted scholarship of over-determination seeks to escape them, at least momentarily. One of its most useful metaphors is the contrast between slow and fast, indicated by the metronomic pace of the master-thief Flambeau. In terms of over-determination, the aims of the scholar and Father Brown are identical: to create a space where intervention becomes possible. Sometimes this involves focusing directly on the role of the Ø function, the glue that stitches together the static scenes that, when running in fast sequence, appear to be actually moving themselves.

For an important distinction between Ø, β, and "after-image" functions, see Joseph and Barbara Anderson, "The Myth of Persistence of Vision Revisited" (1974).
Map 1.19

The operator connecting vectors of difference ($\partial$) and automaton ($\alpha$) is able to specify the four primary conditions of virtuality: (1) contiguous virtuality, (2) attached virtuality, (3) detached virtuality, and (4) anomalous virtuality. Contiguous virtuality is the space of the other side of the object that can be revealed through rotation or moving the point of view. Attached virtuality is known primarily through the violation of the rules that connect visible bodies with their shadows, reflections, etc. The case of the “organ without a body” (Žižek: partial object) or the hand or eye considered as the ruling aspect of an artist or craftsman, belongs to this class. Detached virtuality is about the functional connection between incommensurable states, such as dreaming and waking, the conscious and unconscious, language/art and ideological or genre frameworks. Finally, anomalous virtuality is about the sudden appearance of the $\alpha$ element in the field of the imaginary/visible, a virtuality that comes to haunt ordinary being, as in the sudden appearance of the flying saucer in Robert Wise’s 1951 film, *The Day the Earth Stood Still*.

**Contiguous Virtuality:**
- Virtuality can be made visible through a change in the viewpoint, rotation, etc.

**Attached Virtuality:**
- "Ghost" effect
- Solid, living object
- Typical feature: the robot-like, zombie qualities of beings who "return from the dead"

**Detached Virtuality:**
- Dreaming/unconscious
- Ideology/structural patterns
- Formal appearance and material cause are put in an orthogonal relationship; one affords the presence/appearance of the other. But, like dreams that vanish upon awaking, there is a barrier preventing translation of one to the other. This requires a procedure of "learning by doing."

**Anomalous Virtuality:**
- The sudden miraculous appearance of an incongruous, "incommensurable" object or being becomes the basis for a prophetic revelation, such as St. Paul’s conversion or Joyce’s epiphanies.

Anomalous appearance retroactively reveals the ordinary world to have been defective, illusory, sinful, etc. The rotation of the $\alpha$ vector into the field of the visible is thematized as a miraculous passage or journey, a “trip from outer space,” a resurrection.
1.19 / Formalizing the Types of Virtuality

“The Queer Feet” affords the atlas a formal breathing space, a pause during which it is possible to speculate on the formal types of virtuality that may be explained by the simple operator (Γ) that connects but holds in functional independence the two vectors, one associated with opportunity (tuchē) and contiguity, and the defect and dysfunction that can be encountered in that field/plane (∂); the other associated with automaton (α) in its two aspects, Aristotelian “natural chance” and “blind mechanism.” The most commonly cited form of virtuality is the phenomenon of the hidden side. This virtuality can be liquidated if an object is rotated or the point of view position changed. This virtuality is directly aligned with the model of the sensible perceived world as three-dimensional, with temporal functions associated with the “overcoming” of the flat perception of the world through screen-related representations. Attached/detached forms of virtuality spring directly from the double aspect of the operator — the fact that it both connects and holds apart two opposed vectors, one associated with opportunity and adjacency (∂), the other with natural chance/variability and mechanism (α). Detached virtuality includes aspects of experience that are incommensurable with each other: dreams and waking life, fictional stories, predictions, etc. The spaces dedicated to these, such as theaters and art museums, formalize the theme of detachment to emphasize the dangers of contamination of reality by non-realities. Attached virtuality, most commonly mirror reflections and shadows, lie within the field of the visible but can, metaphorically, break off. This accounts for the prominent role in magic and folklore played by shadows and reflections and the proliferation of types of “sympathetic magic” where mimesis is used to gain power over living subjects. To the extent that portraits and photographs can be regarded as “true images,” these too can be used in a “detached mode” to effect a certain magic-at-a-distance.

Anomalous virtuality is the sudden appearance of something that sets up a direct conflict with the existing order of the ordinary visible world. This is the virtuality of the epiphany or prophecy, something that reveals a fundamental defect or limitation within the visible that must be addressed. The temporality of anomalous virtuality is the future anterior, often put as a warning: “Unless you fix this problem, the world will collapse!” As in the visit of the space-ship that lands on the Washington Mall in the 1951 film, The Day the Earth Stood Still, the alien visitor is thoroughly a: a monstrum combining the functionalities of a robot and the perfect knowledge of a subject-supposed-to-know.


The idea of chance and mechanism are frequently regarded as interchangeable, despite the evident contingency of the former and the elimination of contingency of the latter. See, for example, the film by Krzysztof Kieślowski, Blind Chance (1981), where a series of outcomes develop from choices, some of them which appear to be rather insignificant at the time. From each choice, a mechanism branches out to engage characters, events, and unexpected connections to effect strikingly unique outcomes.

Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry.

Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies.

André Nusselder, Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology.
The operator $\partial/\alpha$ allows invisibility to work within visibility, just as depth is taken over by the "sagittal dimension" that, because it can be seen as a line only from a sideways or oblique view that simultaneously takes in the viewer and the viewed (Dürer's engraving of the "Artist and Model"), is necessarily diminished to a point from the POV angle. This invisible dimension structures the visible field as it viewed through a screen, even if a literal screen is not involved. Even three-dimensional spaces can operate as a screen, in that they constitute portals to an experience that transcends that of ordinary space. The screen is the result of the construction of space between the viewer and the viewed along the sagittal line of sight. Compression along this dimension allows the screen to function as a representational medium and mediator between the viewer and what "lies beyond." The distance gained is directly balanced by the flatness implied by the screen; the screen is a product of the triangulated desire (the subject's desire can only be constructed as the desire of the Other). As $\alpha$, this desire appears as a point or is enlarged as a defect, blur, or stain on the screen. If the dimension of the $\alpha$ is "rotated" into the plane of the visible, it must be cast in the role of a magical being or exceptional *hapax* event. In this way, the map/representation desires, as a representation of the (unrepresentable) desire of the Other, to represent what is behind it. It wishes to falsify and even conceal what is behind it, at the same time it promises to show it in full, because the desire of the other can never exceed the value of the point, except through fantasy. Fantasy strives to make the viewer *blind to the blind spot*. In this way the subject projects the map/screen in order to "disavow" his/her desire, in order to triangulate desire with the Other as mediator. It is the map/screen that desires, that embodies desire, and in some instances creates desire. We know this from the Borges story about the fictional explorer, Suárez Miranda, who discovers the country that is covered with maps made at the scale of 1:1.

![Image of a map with notes on visibility and invisibility.](image_url)

Without the construction of dimensions to separate/articulate subjects and objects, the subject is not able to form itself through the distancing of a point of view, which is then complemented by the "occultation" of the object, whose hidden sides and inner aspects are concealed and only indirectly represented through the mediating screen.
1.20 / The Desire of the Screen

When words like “unconscious” or “desire” or used, a problem arises when they are attributed in too direct a way to an agent or even attributed to the wrong agent. We say that the subject “has” an unconscious, but in many ways this is too directly a statement of ownership. Dreams cannot be said to be possessed in a way that the dreamer has access to them; in fact the reverse is true. In Lacan’s famous dictum about desire (“desire is the desire of the Other”), the process by which the subject desires something is permeated with experiences that have enabled the developing subject to transcend the stages of oral, anal, and phallic dominance. At every stage, something has “stuck” to the subject, and neurotic symptoms remain that configure each subject’s particular relationship to feces, the breast, and phallus. Even the absence of these has considerable influence on the subject’s view of the world, to the extent that we cannot simplify desire as a simple wish to overcome a lack. Lack is itself constructed, by the network of symbolic relationships that situate the subject at the price of mis-identification as well as by the imaginary and its basis in the image, particularly the reflected image of the subject.

In the case of the map and other two-dimensional representations, flattening comes at the cost of setting up a screen to give the subject some distance from the Real that would otherwise make all distinctions impossible. On behalf of the subject’s ego-idea of self, space is made and time required to traverse it. The screen cannot represent the Real of what it covers and frames, it can only indicate the negative traces: blurs, stains, imperfections, folds, gaps … and to this extent we may speak of a “desire of the map” or screen in a way that belongs to the map/screen itself, not the represented reality the map or picture pretends to “lie beyond.” In order to authenticate the point of view where the subject takes up a position in order to get a reliable view of the world, the plane of representation must look back at the subject, and this gaze back must always be a gaze of desire, negative or positive. In this sense, the automaton, α, must be preserved as the negative component of the scene that is afforded by the act of framing. Associated with the loss of depth (the sagittal dimension), the representation makes things visible at the cost of making depth invisible, and the cost of conflating a range of things (hidden sides, unknown, the future, etc.) with this invisible dimension. In this way the map loses its neutrality, its disinterest. It intends to show something lying beyond. The position of its frame is “no accident,” even though the frame could be moved to new positions. The blind point resists visibility, refuses all representation; in compensation, its metaphysically defined position (it is always at the center, the heart) allows it to be the point of an acoustamic voice, a point at which centering takes on a “cosmic” or “magic” function.

At this point, the oblique option is given. Like the Dürer engraving, where we may see just a bit of the lucinda that serves the artist in his representing procedures, and like the Holbein portrait, where two circuits are connected to situate the flat image within the broader context of the destruction of all creation, an entry, a portal is left over. We are forbidden to make any record of this passage, but passage is nonetheless an option. This is the shape of the (negative) desire of the screen, picture, map, atlas: the desire of desire itself (ipsum).

Map 1.21

What makes ideology hard to understand is that it compels us to be blind to the blind spot that, as the Lacanian objet petit a, functions as a blur or stain within the field of the visible and often serves as the site of the acousmatic voice coming from “behind the curtain.” We must represent our desire as the “desire of the Other,” and this blind spot location organizes the space of that desire. To understand this fully, however, we must retrace our steps to imagine the conditions before this use of representation to materialize desire through dimensionality. If there is an almost complete overlap of the subject and the world, there is no possibility of representing or being aware of desire. Only through the imagination of a distance can desire be associated with the visible/sensible world, where we attempt to represent desire’s “triangulation” (we desire something but it is not we who desire directly; rather, we respond to the desire of the Other for us to desire some object). The map, and the atlas that relates a map to other maps, is thus about this “transitivity,” this transfer of the Other’s desire to our representation of desire, i.e. the map as a distancing mechanism. “The desire of the map” is, literally, what the map desires us to see, and what the map desires us to desire, which is put at a distance and separated by a flat screen that represents objects behind it.

In an imagined state preceding a properly human mentality, the “pre-subject” does not yet realize an independent, conscious point of view, nor is the world more than minimally animated by “spiritualized matter” that may at times demonstrate such “subjective” properties as voice, intentionality, deviousness, etc. This is the “magic” condition of human mentality, where dimensionality has not yet forced the illusion of stable representations and relations.

Formal relations between subject and world are afforded by the construction of spatial and temporal dimensions that allow for “distantiation” between the subject and other objects and subjects in the world, so that the subject might “hold the world at a distance.” An imaginary screen is required, and this screen can be represented as a field upon which the functions of desire can be represented, as correlative to the project of distantiation. The representations may be direct but also “problematic” — i.e. blurs, folds, tears, stains.

Classic formalizations of this space have been, typically, thematized in religious, poetic, or metaphysical terms, but by connecting it with the Lacanian project of the “triangulation” of desire, which manages the “transitive” transfer of the subject’s properties to the object/world and compensates for the “illicit” appearances of one field in the domain of the other through “intransitive” conditions through the terms and traditions of the “extimate,” whose examples can be found in abundance in mythology, ritual, folklore, and the popular culture of painting, film, and architecture. Again, the theme of two interlocking circular process is evident. Lacan could be said to employ these in each of the three relations connecting the imaginary, the symbolic and the Real.
1.21 / Triangulation of Desire

Todd McGowan has argued compellingly that contemporary culture has shifted from a society of prohibition, where Law operated to distance subjects from objects of desire but where pleasure was nonetheless accessible, to a society of enjoyment, where we are commanded to enjoy ourselves through a plenitude of images. Despite the inconsistency of this mandate (we are not told what or how to enjoy), ideology has based its power on the design and distribution of images that obscure the punctum sæcum, the blind spot, the point at which the image gazes back at us. This is the point that operationalizes the desire of the image. It is key to the development of the subject, since it is the means by which the ego appears first as a masterful Doppelgänger, an ideal ego that becomes the passport of our life within the network of symbolic relationships, “under the guise of a mistaken identity.” By obscuring the blind spot of this image, where our gaze is returned and where the subject discovers a delay in desire that allows the psyche to triangulate the space and time connecting it to the network of symbolic relationships, ideology gains a “direct line” from image to subject.

We can see in geometric terms what is at stake in this transition from prohibition to enjoyment. Triangulation allows prohibition its margins, played out temporally in terms of (Duchampian) delay that favors ambiguity and semantic distance. Patrice Laconte’s 1996 film Ridicule recounts the age of wit, propelled by Shakespeare, Cervantes, and the poetic theories of Gongorá, where irony and double-entendres were widespread. Narrative, the central strategy of delay, developed elaborate forms involving the uncanny: doubles, travel through time, stories in stories, and the contamination of reality by dreams. After the French Revolution, these devices were accounted as counterweights to the rise of rationality, but this belies their deep history. Rationality simply prepared the way for the rise of the image, which could dominate through its protocols of presence the former ploys of narrative that domesticated the imposition of prohibition through traditions of wit and rhetoric.

The image strives to remove its blind spots through an emphasis on simulation and transformation, but this ideological move — most evident in fields that use digital media — touch on only one form of virtuality, the virtuality of contiguity. Attached and detached virtuality, and the sudden discontinuities of anomalous virtuality, are ignored or denied. Diagrams of these (their α/∂ relations expressed by the Γ operator) show what is being ignored in the move from prohibition’s narratives to enjoyment in the image. The protocols of depth, including the rotations that embody the invisible and materialize “dimensionality itself” are impossible once the punctum sæcum is denied. These permitted the subject to “triangulate” the desire (=desire of the Other) to distinguish fantasy from image. In Italian, fantasia occupies an entirely different tradition from the operations of imaginare. Vico emphasized the former in order to show how the human mind could, in a series of stages, develop distinctive cultural forms with fictionalized elements. The recursive constructions, such as the “fantastic universal” and “heroic universal,” used triangulation to obscure the human role in the creation of natural autonomy, α, the desire perceived by the first humans in the form of the crash of thunder.

Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction?
Map 1.22

What Lacan calls transitivity (the transfer/switch that takes place between agents and their objects, between causes and effects, between conscious and unconscious) is, in the field of the visible/sensible, *in*-transitivity. This in short is when a condition calling for equality results in inequality. A>B>C should cause A>C, but if C>A, the condition is intransitive. Other examples are more anecdotal. The two halves of a round-trip journey often seem different. Each sides of a human face can display strikingly different emotions at the same time. The spatial map differs from the temporal journal in that a return re-sets the system to its original spatial value, but the time sequence can never collapse repetition into such a perfect reset.

Creating the transitive/intransitive condition is a matter of pulling apart the (apparently) single boundary into its two component parts. Each, so to speak, deals with one-way travel, in or out respectively. The space in between sets up the conditions for triangulation, and has been recognized by various traditions as the “uncanny” space of the gap or in-between that is able, like anamnesis, to pull full-blown memories out of thin air. Mechanical repetition (a/b/a/b/a/b/…) is the α that serves both as automaton and natural chance. As automaton (think of the game of Freud's grandson, *Fort and Da*), repetition opens up the space of triangulation by which the trauma of the mother's absence may be rehearsed and tolerated. As natural chance, it is the obverse figure of over-determination that establishes the manic, absolute symmetries that have figured prominently in historic images of this gap, which is a return affording anamnesis: collective memory.

The famous memory theater of Giulio Camillo (1551) involved two circles, not the one traditionally drawn by historians such as Frances Yates. Camillo's handbook, *L'Idea del Theatro*, relies on the model of the Kabbalistic three-part soul. His small stage for the mnemonicist is not the simple center of the circle divided into seven segments to hold images and writings but the psychic antipode of the circle that centers on the "out of place" element of Apollo, displaced from its proper position in the first row of planets to the level of the Banquet. As Macrobius demonstrates in his *Commentary on The Dream of Scipio*, the place of this banquet was the Tropic of Capricorn and Apollo's movement related to the "analemma" movement of the sun's nadir across the equator line. Cosmography and mnemonics agree on the question of how two circles might generate the full range of potentiality for both the physical seasons and the collective mind.
1.22 / Transitive and Intransitive

The triangulation that permits narrative to "domesticate" the impossible demands of the Law and nonetheless allow illicit access to enjoyment is a function of two strategies of symmetry. In the phenomenon of (in)transitivity, what happens on one side of a boundary is attributed to the value or contents lying on the other side. This is a frequent occurrence of childhood development. A young boy hits another and says "He hit me!" The cause and effect switch places, thanks to the redefined meaning of the line drawn between. Like Freud’s example of his young grandson playing a game of Fort! and Da! with a spindle thrown and drawn back, the experimentation of contradiction tests the commitment of the boundary to its inner logical switch. Transitivity provokes a new aspect of the boundary: its inability to fully return exchanges to their initial values. "You can’t go home again." Your return will be separated by a small gap or margin that disallows identity. Søren Kierkegaard ridiculed the efforts of the young suitor in Repetition who seeks comfort in the same. The boundary, simultaneously spatial and temporal, builds in a triangle that displaces the return from itself, endorsing a Heraklitan view, that all is constant flux.

The intransitive is not the opposite of transitivity, but a variation. The two parts of a round-trip journey never seem equal. Our idea of uniform space mandates their equal length but this is contradicted by experience. Memory shortens (usually) the return trip by relating points passed with the same points first encountered in reverse order. But, anamnesis has the even greater effect of setting up a triangular condition by which one element within the travel field will serve as a "metonymy of itself" and, working as an internal defect in the homogeneous field of adjacent elements, separates itself as an "anomalous virtuality." It breaks out of the system ordering elements within the experiential frame. It is this mnemonic element that brings into being a prior history that "must have come before." This self-metonymy pulls this discovered history out of the shadows. It finds its lost relative. It digs up the foundation stone.

This makes no sense in terms of the rules of two-dimensional representation, where all elements are forced to lie on the same plane, but such a discovery of a "lost history" is a common narrative theme. An understanding of this has been complicated by the psychopathological study of "false memories" induced by unscrupulous psychologists during therapy. The ease by which subjects perceive fictional memories as profoundly real points to the efficacy of anamnesis as a device of the professional story-teller whose fully developed fantasies offered collective therapy for audiences in all cultures. The concept of katharsis, the relief after suffering sympathetically the catastrophe of actors on the stage, as been well known for over 2500 years for its unique medical benefits. Anamnesis, both constructed and collective, offers societies of prohibition their principal public strategies of triangulating the image through liminality, inversion, and obversion, where delay and discomfort predictably produce relief from the pains of alienation. The subject accepts misrecognition as the price of social membership. Freud’s symbolic castration, the prerequisite for membership in society, is really "castration by symbols," imposed by the collective Law.

Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition: A Venture in Experimental Psychology.
Map 1.23

The linearity of time is its most dominant spatial attribute, but once space is adopted as the preferred, metaphorical basis of describing and conceiving time, figures other than the simple line naturally intrude to suggest exceptions to time’s single-minded progress from past to future. Parallel lines introduce the possibility of layering — the co-existence of multiple times or kinds of times. The circle and spiral introduce the notion of repetition. Spatial figures suggest that the map and the journal, though they never resolve their fundamental antipathy, easily and frequently enjoy exchanges that threaten their integrity as independent media. Once space is allowed to stand in as the “form” of time, the full range of spatial possibilities becomes available to the temporal imagination.

The spatialization of time, however, is not a transitive exchange, where influences cross the border in either direction freely. In a more problematic sense, space is “temporalized” through the temporal paradox of retroaction. Retroaction qualifies the past through a future in a way that avoids logical circularity and contradiction. In effect, it is a topology that permits folds and twists that prevent time or space from being “ironed flat by logic.” This is a minimal description of retroaction.

An event at A immediately "sends" the past off in its spatially reversed direction, towards events that can be regarded as causal or foundational. At the same time, a future point, B, is envisioned as a possible outcome of causal forces that proceed forward from the event, consequences of the "new action" that now make B one possible outcome. The interval (dotted line) allows for the possibility that many things may or may not happen, making B as yet an unknown. But, from the future point, B, a new set of conditions will dominate. Just as A had been formed by its antecedent causes, B will be the original generative point of the new conditions. It will be a past, and what came before it will in some sense constitute its essential prehistory.

B, as a future that will be, by virtue of being a terminus of converging lines of influence, retroactively conditions A. Its incompleteness, its vague and indeterminate “search for origins,” is given temporal authority. Its "might have been" is converted to a "must have been." B seems to demonstrate clearly the kind of temporal structuring that can be attributed to A, as a form and determinacy that was "there all the time." Some languages, notably Hebrew and Russian, carry this perplexity into verb tenses where it becomes difficult to distinguish a description of the past from a prediction of the future.

The future anterior’s perplexity centers on the temporality of its anticipated future condition, where the normal temporal direction of experience will face the past as if it were a future. Thus, the past is "opened up" as if it were full of the same potentialities and variabilities, although this transformation has been presented as a promised goal, a fulfillment and reward, not a new beginning. The beginning, as such, has merged with the idea of the end, the "alpha” and "omega” are revealed as identical. Visions of this condition in literature and painting focus on the extreme conditions of the Apocalypse, where the mass resurrection of the dead is materialized as a reverse-order burial, a de-mortification of skeletons with new, astral flesh. That this ultimate moment “has a future” is perplexing, no less so than because the future is put into the geometrical conditions of judgment and paradise.
1.23 / The Circularity of Desire

In Lacan’s physics, desire is triangulated. It is not mapped by a line connecting the subject with a need to a resource that supplies that need. Rather, desire is built into the object itself. The object of desire “wishes to be wished for.” The context of this reversed desire is the Other, the imaginary being or structure that validates the desire, that wants the subject to desire, but is itself unconscious of this and clarify the terms of desire. Because the subject arrives at the network of symbolic relationships after it has been formed, after a place has been “made for the subject,” at the cost of a symbolic castration, desire combines the past tense of this situation with its future-facing anticipation of a time when desire will be satisfied. What is desire, after all, if not a specification of a future condition? But, this is not the simple outward radiation of some force from the subject to that future condition. Desire, which was already in place before the subject knew about it, meets the forward-directed anticipation of the subject, who pushes towards a point of satisfaction through a landscape where the structures and meanings that support the desire are eclipsed. In other words, the condition of desire is obversion.

Two kinds of perplexity are generated by this condition. “Transitivity” is the switch of cause and effect, mapped on to a space where each occupies adjacent zones. In effect, one country invades its neighbor but claims that the neighbor has invaded it. “Intransitivity” is the re-temporalization of what had been originally spatial. The pronouncement of Thomas Wolfe’s famous novel title, You Can’t Go Home Again (1940) draws on the commonly observed experience of the native who returns to find it impossible to re-establish life as it was before. Kierkegaard elaborated this demand philosophically in his account of the young friend who attempts to reduce his beloved to a temporally reliable point of reference. The return to an “empty condition” retroactively demands a conversion of identity: the lover becomes the enemy, the home becomes unhomely, hospitality converts to hostility.

Both transitive and intransitive types of problems point to the centrality of the triangulation of desire as an underlying structure. In desire, there are not one but two actions, an exchange of agent/agency, often associated with adjacency, and an inversion or negation of identity. In Freud’s famous analysis of the famous case of the paranoiac, Judge Paul Schreber, he emphasized that it was necessary for Schreber both to (1) convert love to hate and (2) switch himself with his psychoanalyst, Dr. Paul Flechsig. This double action was required by Schreber’s gender conversion from man to woman. For Flechsig to desire him would require contradicting Schreber’s identity as a man. Schreber’s own desire necessarily took the form of a demand in two “conversion procedures.” With transitivity, agency was passed to Flechsig; with intransitivity, love was converted to hate. Schreber was able to convert “I love Flechsig” to “Flechsig hates me!” Desire’s invention of a point of origin, to which it must return, involves the two circular logics, one transitive, the other intransitive. In combination, they insure that desire will do “what it really wants to do,” i.e. insure its indestructible continuation.

Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition: A Venture in Experimental Psychology.
Sigmund Freud, The Schreber Case.
Retroaction and over-determination are no less graphic than transitivity and intransitivity. The starting point by which a given artifact may be parsed (in the case of Giambattista Vico’s dipintura/ frontispiece to The New Science and Hans Holbein’s double portrait, The Ambassadors) is the classic device of negation, the curtain. In the dipintura, the curtain is made of clouds; in The Ambassadors, it’s the more normal stuff of cloth. In both cases, what is revealed is something already defined in terms of its absence. Just like Parrhasius’s curtain (see 2.31), the withdrawal discloses another form of itself. Holbein has filled in the diagram for us, anticipating the three forms of negation and their corresponding quarter turns that would specify the moment of anagnorisis: revelation of the moment of Apocalypse, April 11, 1533, 4 p.m. Vico’s elongated dipintura sets the helmet of Hermes in the position of Holbein’s virtual skull. It, too, is “performative,” calling on the reader to take up the writing of The New Science. Early cultures used fire to clear swiddens, which were originally places of sacrifice, divination, and ritual. 16c. cultures mastered the art of charting the position of the sun as a means of global navigation; from Prometheus to present, two figures stand out: the ancient Pandora, revenge of the gods for the theft of fire; and Christ, the redeemer whose absence will revert to presence at the Apocalypse and the return to a “natural history.”

If (1) hysteria is about the displacement of organs and (2) an organ is by definition a mediation of inside and outside, then “organs without bodies” — i.e. objective subjects extimated as “subjective objects” — become sites of Freudian cathexis (Besetzung, “sitting in, occupying”), an investment that endows a site and its configuration with a function analogous to the one it had enjoyed inside the body. In dreams of flying, the lungs inside the body are extimated to the body floating in air. The key is the dreamer’s feeling that flying is natural (Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 208). An entire landscape is added to the sensation of floating, to “fill in the gaps” required by the feeling. This elaboration is, in the case of hysteria, a literal case of the uncanny as unheimlich, “away from home.” What does “away” constitute? Simply an extra-version? Or, is are the gestural and corporal unities of the body also transported? These two diagrams argue that the negation of extimity is filled out at multiple levels and in multiple languages whose “Rosetta stone” can be tracked through diagrammatic structures relating the forms of negation to such things as negation, sexualization, cultural-historical genesis, and “psychothe- ology” (Eric Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life).
1.24 / Retroaction and Over-determination

Retroaction is the *post hoc* realization ("Real-ization") of cause or prior necessity. "Thank God that it was this way and not some other" not only credits divine guidance with some important outcome, but it brings into being the whole idea of God, without whom the occasion of thanking Him would be unthinkable. In Vico's account of the imaginative universal, the fear of the thunder installs the idea of Jove, who has *already created* the world — in which his chosen people have been alienated and deserving of corrective punishment and instructions about the future — in the single, loud sound. Within that sound, as James Joyce has speculated in his use of the word of the thunder to embody a full set of phonemics comprising the roots of all languages, a complementary phenomenon is set up. This is the one-to-many logic of over-determination, which inverts the logic of cause and effect by having a single effect be the result of not one but many causes. Where the effective agent in retroaction is its automatic generation of a past, even though the past logically must have been the result of an event that preceded it, the effective agent in over-determination is also its generation of a past, but a past that is structured like a future. The image of the "garden of the forking paths," evoked by Borges in the story of the same name, spatializes time as a series of choices of one course of action from an array of possibilities. The path not taken is lost forever with the choice of its rival. — Who knows what would have happened if the Titanic's navigator had steered two feet to the south of the iceberg, etc. The extrapolation of what would have been done extends far beyond the restored lives of those who drowned; it would have removed from popular imagination a metaphor of considerable influence. Retroaction uses the "unprovable logic of the negative instance" (whereby it is impossible to conjecture about the effect of something that didn't exist, *as non-existent*) in a way that preserves negation, a tree turned upside down so to speak, with the un-chosen alternatives co-existing alongside the "actual" effective cause.

If retroaction clears a space in the past for a particular kind of future to develop, over-determination seems to take the view that the idea of a single cause is laughable. In practice, choices are made in contexts where the chosen path is valued because the paths not chosen give it comparative prominence and positive value. The role of the negative is to "land" the Big Fish of the positive choice, but without the negative, contextualizing opportunities, there would be no Big Fish. In this way the negative is "cancelled and preserved" (the meaning of the Hegelian term *aufheben*). If the negative can be revisited, if the past can be opened up in the same "format" as our perception of the future, this multiplicity of causes and the function of negation can be realized. If the future anterior "makes the future into a kind of past," retroaction and over-determination "make the past into a kind of future." Clearly, the two logics are one and the same topology that Lacan identified with *extimité*, which is seen here in its temporal aspect but which can be taken on, with equally vivid results, as mapped terrain.
Florensky’s dream logic shows how over-determination, retroaction, transitivity, and intransitivity combine to form a comprehensive “physics” of the extimate. This physics must be parsed carefully to leave room for Florensky’s subsequent discussion of the artistic image and, later, the religious icon, both of which make use of the motion across a boundary from a lower to a higher realm. Florensky’s dream-world is equivalent to the Freudian unconscious, in that it has a mandate to communicate in imaginary and symbolic modes. And, like Schreber’s paranoia, this communication involves various forms of negation. He emphasizes that the dream is “nothing — nihil visible, yes nihil, but visible nothing, visible and perceptible ...,” “pure meaning wrapped in the thinnest membrane of materality.” The diagrams below begin a series that connects the phenomenon of the map to the dream, the dream to the thin but navigable screen, and these to the idea of the journey between life and death. This sequence owes much to, but should be taken seriously apart from, Florensky’s spiritualism. Florensky provides a bridge between mystic traditions and a secular praxis of boundary dynamics, a version of Vico’s verum ipsum factum, which reveals the fundamental topology of psychoanalytic extimacy (verum) through the ethnographic and popular culture elaborations of the uncanny (factum).

Map 1.25

Florensky’s account involves a chiasmus where waking time and dream time are connected at a point, but where time runs “forward” in reality but “backward” in dreams. The connection to the a/∂ “operator,” where the vector of depth is related to the vector of curvature, affords comparison to map conditions as well as the types of virtuality.

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Florensky’s two realms are paradoxical. They are not separate spaces but fields separated by a boundary that can be inhabited. This “thin zone” is compared to the veil of materiality that is the minimal support needed to embody the “pure meaning of the dream.”

Motion into the invisible spiritual realm has a Dionysian quality, while the reverse descent back into the realm of images is Apollonian in its combination of appearance with the Real. Hence, the icon is able to open up direct communication with the spiritual: XXX.
1.25 / The Temporality of Dreams

Pavel Florensky, the Russian mystic and monk whose essays on dreams and temporality could be taken for a Surrealist manifesto, focused with clarity and philosophical reserve on this single feature of dream logic. In a dream, the sleeper, in the guise of a French Girondist during the early days of the Revolution, encounters a series of events stretching over a year that lead in and out of danger. Finally he cannot elude capture imprisonment, interrogation, and sentencing. With the anguish that naturally accompanies thoughts of death, he exchanges sentiments with inmates, and composes last wishes, before being led on an ignoble cart with other victims through tumultuous, jeering crowds. The place of execution is decorated with festoons and flags; the sinister guillotine stands ready, and guards line the prisoners up to be killed. Finally, the dreamer’s turn arrives and he is roughly escorted to the wooden plank, positioned, and secured. He hears the acceleration of the heavy blade as it rushes downward towards his neck. In the moment of absolute terror, he actually senses the metal on his neck! At this point he wakes up to find that a piece of his bed’s metal frame has fallen down and hit his neck. The contact of the brass with his skin was the first event, in waking time. From it, branching out in a backward direct towards the past was the series of contingent events that, reconstructed in the “correct” temporal direction, led to the dreamed execution.

The striking effectiveness of this retroaction (construction of a past to explain or justify the present), coupled with over-determination (the contingency of this prior past; the elaborate array of choices made and alternatives discarded), owes much to the coupling of retroaction with over-determination and the dependence of both logics on the topologies of transitivity and intransitivity that are the basis of the estimate. Florensky’s dream logic demonstrates how the necessary bonds linking time and space are contained completely within the uncanny conversions/inversions/obversions of extimacy’s ability to give a positive status to the negative. The “path not taken,” so to speak, continues its influence and is all the more powerful and permanent because, unlike the positive path that was taken, it cannot be eradicated. Its negativity constitutes an immunity not just from conscious thoughts and actions, which can always re-define or re-contextualize any positive phenomenon, but from the unconscious as well, where it enjoys immortality.

At this point it may become more obvious how the (initially) suppressed element, the $\alpha$, which we have localized in the phenomenon of depth and fashioned into the invisible sagittal element of the map or representational screen, is related to the unconscious of the map. This is not the map as a representation of internal mental constructs of the subject but the necessarily external basis of the unconscious, the “subjective object” whose extimacy turns it into a “thinking machine.” In this sense, all maps are “mental maps,” and all domains that are subject to mapping are also candidates for subjective appropriation as a means of “thinking through the world.” The communication of the automata of these domains with conscious thought, barred from the start any direct access to symbolic form and allowed imaginary expression with the severe caveat that requires the inclusion of a punctum sæculum to reverse the gaze (and subjective causality) of this “thinking machine,” is, as it has always been demonstrated through history, a matter of divination.

Map 1.26

Florensky's potentially confusing discussion combining the upward/downward motion of the soul, the double function of the face, the contrast of mask and countenance, inebriation and sobriety, image and likeness, etc., is actually in close correspondence with the ancient "humoristic" system that allowed ancient Greeks and Romans to theorize incarnation and death as twinned movements through the planetary zones. Gods themselves bore the trials of a double nature, and the half human, half divine hero was also traditionally plagued by bouts of drunkenness (excessive moisture) in contrast to "choleric" (hot/dry) accomplishment. The boundary itself is the site of melancholy, which, though dry, is cold, i.e. alienated from union with the spiritual and confined within the "uncanny" category of "between the two deaths," noted here as $D_A$, the dead being unable to die the second, symbolic death. This melancholy ghost must see the imaginary in terms of the symbolic, both of which can represent the Real only in negative forms.

Florensky's model of rise and descent suggests that the apogee, a moment of motionless suspension, is self-impregnated with meaning and is able to combine opposites — "real appearances" — into what Florensky calls a "super-reality." This is a Janus-like point, able to point in all directions at once. Florensky, after articulating the rise-and-fall model, uses the oxymoron of time-space as an antidote to polar contrasts (prelast- repentance, inebriation-sobriety, mask-countenance). The face (litzo) that overcomes opposition by identifying with the boundary. Thus, Janus is the face and the face is naturally "Janusian." In the Greek classical tradition, derived from Sumerian astrology, the first step of the soul into the zone of Saturn is "inebriating" because of the first encounter with material being. Subsequent layers alternate between sobriety and drunkenness as the gods struggle between their spiritual and material natures. Florensky's thick-thin boundary between the upper and lower realms are inhabited by spirits wishing to entangle the traveler in "seductions of spiritual intoxication." Sobriety, in contrast, is the realization that material limits operate as a kind of divine fate, what Florensky calls time-space.

The uncanny's "polar/chiastic anchors" (following Jentsch) are the conditions of: (1) the living being fatally drawn to his/her inevitable end, $A_D$, and (2) the dead being who "refuses to die," i.e. Lacan's state of "between the two deaths," $D_A$. These conditions establish the "directionality" of Florensky's Dionysian ascent and Apollonian descent.

The boundary (face) is thus made portable as an internal defect ($R_2$) able to "transcend" and connect to the higher-order Real, $R_1$. In Florensky's versions of the Freudian ego-ideal ("image") and ideal ego ("likeness"), we see anticipation of the chiasmus of the uncanny, the dead thing that "refuses to die" ($D_A$) and the living thing with an element of fate leading it to its end ($A_D$). The face is the chiasmus connecting $A_0$ to $D_A$. In the contrast of image and likeness, we see Platonic elements debate in The Republic, between representation and true Form.

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Florinsky declares that the time of dreams is turned inside out. In keeping with our idea of the intransitive as a (spatialized) temporality returned to an explicitly spatial form, he adds that the dream is a “visible nothing” — nothingness made visible, nothingness revealed as pure meaning “wrapped in the thinnest membrane of materiality.” It is best not to regard this membrane as a casual metaphor but to take it seriously. It is all too easy to say that the map (or the drawing, the screen, and so on) is flat in some technical sense. Flatness is a quality the someone like Florensky could appreciate in its full spiritual aspect. With the same magic as the tribal mask, which is not a projection of the wearer’s personality or even the wearer’s assumed identity as a mythical character. The mask, in a way that parallels the temporal retroaction of the dream event, “back projects” the full being of the god it represents. In fact, it is this curious combination of back projection and forward projection that is the essential phenomenon of masks in relation to rituals and dances. They “re-present” in a strikingly effective, spiritual sense: they make something present as a return, a recurrence — a hierophany (Mircea Eliade) in ways that are consistent with the fourth form of virtuality, where the α element returns into the midst of the “profane” domain of quotidian reality.

The icon of the Eastern Orthodox Church maintains its power and mystery by minimizing its function as a representation. Facial features are stylized, perspective is forbidden, gold leaf and jewels decorate elements so that the icon singly or collectively — the iconostasis — emphasize the function of the screen as the “thinnest membrane of materiality” to be dissolved in the passage to a fully spiritual Real. In this thinness, the kind of mortification occurs that, in one direction, marks the body’s desiccation into the stable state of dry bones. In the other direction, witness the resurrection of the body on the day of the Last Judgment, the date specified by Holbein in his double portrait of 1533. The thinness of the membrane, analogous to the skin of the body, is thus the marker of what Lacan called the phenomenon of “between the two deaths.” The first death is the physical event of biological failure; the second is the symbolic death, celebrated by all cultures and connected in most of them to the de-materialization of skin or flesh into bones. The moisture that maintains the membrane can be read in terms of the lore of the four humors: as warm, it is the moisture of youth and vitality; as cold, it is the substance of phlegmatic old age. The dry humors tell the full story. Choler sacrifices moisture for the dryness of wit and ruthlessness of courage. Melancholy is dryness with only the benefit of genius and irony. As a dry soul, the deceased wanders Hades, faces exile and torture, is faced with puzzles and impossible labors. The equation can be read backwards to see that the image of this “between the two deaths” is the labyrinth, spatialized nothingness. The thinness of the mask (the map, the screen, etc.) is not zero except in the sense that the negative has “one last chance,” one remaining option. This is the option of rebirth, where α may re-appear in some new form, some hapax legomenon.

Pavel Florensky, Iconostasis, 44-59.
Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return.
Florensky’s virtual is based on the conversion of the linear vertical relationship between lower and upper (spiritual) worlds. Florensky’s “tell” is his explanation of the word iconostasis, which in normal usage is the image-filled screen in Eastern Orthodox churches. Florensky says that “The wall that separates two world is an iconostasis” and, later, “Iconostasis is a manifestation of saints and angels — angelophania.” But, in the next sentence he makes the radical conversion: “Iconostasis is the saints themselves.” This collapses the function of the screen as representational surface and thickens it as a zone of spiritual experience.

In three steps, Florensky converts the wall as the boundary between lower and higher realms, to a screen upon which saints and angels are made manifest, to “the saints themselves.” This thickening of the screen into passage makes the passage into a vectorial “operator” whose orthogonality is also a spiritual “rectitude.” The virtuality of the higher realm is the zone behind the wall/screen projected from the point of view of the lower but “rectified” in the stage when the wall (negative boundary) becomes the saints themselves (anomalous virtuality).

The possibility of spiritual failure, “prelest” (cf. Hegel’s “beautiful soul”), confirms the orthogonal transformation, since the failed spiritual journey mistakes simple absence for spirituality and “is held by the spirits who inhabit the boundary and who are, then, nourished by the soul’s own troubled, unsatisfied passions” (Iconostasis, 48). Prelest is the fallen component of the anamorph that defines the thickened boundary, whose one dimension (cf. the Thesean labyrinth) retains a virtual memory of the orthogonal (i.e. plan view).

Florensky generalizes the spiritual condition of iconostasis to the dream, the work of art, and the icon — all of which are variations on the theme of a passage from “one sphere to another.” The linear model of ascent and returning descent keeps to its single dimension until the theme of transitivity is raised. As “rectitude,” the self-righteous spiritualist can mistake the negativity of the boundary for spirituality but be headed in the wrong direction from the “orthogonal” transformation of the wall into iconostasis, “the saints themselves.” This effects the “anomalous virtuality” of $\partial$, the object that has become subject.
1.27 / Florensky’s Virtuality

Florensky’s virtuality develops in three steps, from a linear vertical relationship between two zones, to a vectorial “operator” subordinating the material cause to the final cause, to an instance of the “anomalous virtual,” where the materiality of the wall separating upper from lower becomes the site of the disappearance of the subject (aphanisis) as the Other — for Florensky, the collective band of saints and angels — eclipse subjectivity entirely through their celestial order of symbolic relations. Aphanisis, which in Freudian terms was the disappearance of desire through castration (the price of admission to the network of symbolic social relationships), is in Lacanian terms the more complex notion of symbolic castration — castration by symbols. Florensky’s use of virtuality helps expand this idea by, so to speak, casting symbolic castration in a bright light.

The king’s power is symbolized by the crown, but in effect the crown becomes more potent than the king. If the king loses his crown, he is an ordinary mortal. Being king involves barred subjectivity, an eclipse of desire by means of a symbol, more generally by the symbolic as a whole. Florensky’s spiritualized virtual puts a positive spin on this castration, using the symbolic network of saints and angels — the perfect symmetry of heaven, so to speak — as a form of meta-iconicity, by which the subject is completely spiritualized. His linkage of this disappearance with the false spirituality of prelest, where the negative (materiality) of the icon/wall/screen is mistaken for true spirituality creates the anamorphic condition by which the boundary is “thickened” into a one-dimensional labyrinth. As a meander and not a maze, all true labyrinths are in fact one-dimensional. The “successful” motion is that which retains the “orthogonal” relationship to the virtuality of the saintly order — the “view from above,” so to speak — while the failed motion fails to make the correct (“ortho”) distinction between the material and the spiritual. Florensky himself (Iconostasis, 36) has raised the relation to causal linkages in the context of the denouement, which relates prior events in a logic of “predetermination” (the uncanny’s category of the fated subject, A). We see the final effect, iconostasis, as an orthogonality relating material cause (the wall/screen) to final cause, spiritual union of the subject with heaven. As Florensky emphasizes, this is a return trip, a “descent,” in which the “artist” returns/descends to the visible realm with an “Apollonian perspective” that “incarnates in real images the experience of the highest realm ... a super-reality” (Iconostasis, 45).

Florensky’s final step shows how aphanisis is related to the “anomalous virtuality” by which the repressed or dropped-out element is brought into the realm of visibility. It is heaven that is repressed, and in that very repression it acquires its cosmic symmetry and particularity. As repressed, it is a-symbolic — jouissance in its purely negative form. With the return to visibility, however, a transformation of materiality allows the metonymy of the wall to “become a metonymy of itself” and restore the virtuality it had repressed. The subject, eclipsed/castrated by the symbolic is “taken up in to” the order of the impossible-Real celestial. The subject, in terms of the uncanny, is both “fated” (A) and “immortalized” (D).

Ernst Jentsch, “Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen.”
The term lamella designates a modern biological idea — cells resisting the dying process — but, surprisingly, relates to the general psychoanalytical phenomenon of the death drive. Both lamella and the death drive concepts were preceded by ancient folk beliefs about the interval “between the two deaths,” the momentum of the soul after the first (natural) death of the body. But, this interval’s logic occurs at an even more fundamental level. Where perception itself creates a phenomenal screen, the resulting condition of a thinness that resists being fully two-dimensional provides space with a permanently spiritual potentiality. It is in a sense the a stage set whose props accommodate any number and type of performances, by cultures, literatures, rituals, and folk beliefs who adapt the sagittal dimension of depth and the thinness-thickness of the screen to eschatology, time travel, dream travel, rituals of purification, foundation rites, agricultural magic, demonology, and so on. The human impulse to spirituality, as shown by Florensky, can be described as an interaction of vectors of perception; and these in turn can be found in the relations of the map to the atlas.

The map locally suppresses $\partial$, depth, lost/flattened by taking any distant point of view. Depth can be indirectly perceived by $\partial$, the imaginary or actual lateral movement of the POV. Lateral movement (parallax) is functionally tied to but independent of the sagittal dimension of depth.

Compare Lacan’s “hommelette,” the feminized man, who “doesn’t exist, he insists.” Žižek: this is Lacan’s “lamella,” a “partial object” that is a dead thing able to live outside of the body.

The parallel-contour mapping, an undulating surface globally fixes the point of view as a function of terrain. This substitutes $\partial$ for $\partial$, depth for the actual or symbolic lateral motion of the point of view. Local depth is retained only within the single frame of any single point of view.

An atlas of the surface of the earth combines the constraint of the POV, converting $\partial$ into $\partial$, while preserving the independent “operator” of depth representation at the local map level. The atlas necessarily combines the “local” logic of the parallax relation of $\partial/\partial$ ($\Gamma$) with the contrasting “global logic” of parallel-contour mapping.

The combination of contrasting global and local relationships of depth/POV create the condition of the fourth type of virtuality, the “anomalous” appearance of the (suppressed) element in the place of, or “in the midst of,” the range of the freely navigable field of the visible. The condition of “anomalous” virtuality “thickens” the surface of representation, converting it into the uncanny’s category of $D_A$, the dead thing (object-surface), into something revelational, prophetic, alive.
1.28 / Lamella

The instance of “between the two deaths” in Lacan’s thinking was related to the issue of the tissue known as the “lamella.” Physically thin, the lamella is also thin in its status as neither fully dead nor alive. The lamella reveals the truth of Freud’s “death drive.” It was not, as many thought, an impulse towards suicide but the reverse, a resistance against all hope. This resistance could be measured in the self-replicating, eternally returning doggedly linear space of the labyrinth. This space could be imagined as an extrapolation of the simple gapped circle, where desire forces the subject back to the same spot, the same empty void, the same dissatisfaction. Circularity, return, and persistence in the face of the “impossible-Real,” this is the stuff of both physiological examples of the lamella, such as the famous ever-dividing, still living “HeLa” cancer cells of Henrietta Lacks, who died in 1951. Coincidentally, Lacan’s lamella was also due to a “lack,” as easily symbolized as a surplus, that curved the vector of demand into its circular path. This lack was structural. The subject, trapped by the mandates of the system of symbolic relations (“Other”), is required to Enjoy! but not told what or how to enjoy by the Other who also does not know. This transitivity (the subject’s desire is really the Other’s desire) pulls demand into a curve because it is continually taking into account the “missing command.”

The standard direction of discussion about the lamella is towards the biological aspect of this thin membrane. But, there are many reasons to use Florensky’s idea of the icon to return the optical functionality of the screen and representational surface to the issue of “between the two deaths.” The ambiguity of the veil and the mask is that they create authentic identity retroactively. Their subtraction of appearance affords not just a simulation of the divine but an actual presence, an immediate event. This view is antithetical to “projective” religious views that fantasize a literal domain of heaven and hell; but, tellingly, it is a common, required component of all of performance-intensive practices, such as Voudoun and other practices based in West African religions, Sufi, Zuni, etc. These emphasize ritual and event over belief and discourage romanticizations that emphasize personal belief over the collective experiences constructed through ritual.

The lamella’s relation to the katabasis, the theme of travel to Hades, is direct. It is both a screen and a mask/veil, a thin surface that materializes the void of desire by providing the means to elaborate, through actions, relations between the viewer and the viewed, the living and the dead, in circumstances where the status of each is called into question. As a boundary, the lamella condenses all of the cosmic and ethnographical potential of the extimate. It is the essence of the α, the suppressed Real.

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 197-198: “It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents.” The lamella is Lacan’s generalization of the idea of the “partial object,” whose original specific forms (breast, excrement, penis) stem from the Freudian stages of oral, anal, and phallic development. The gaze and the voice and partial objects (added by Lacan) have more mobility and “cover” in popular culture and the arts, where they circulate as potentially magic functions/objects.

The automaton’s “magic work” means that we can transfer our own efforts to external agents. For example, we can say that a library collection is “doing our reading for us.” The project of completion (the atlas idea) will suppress our own reading, setting in motion the return/curve (desire for the library to be complete) that will reach an empty point, where reading will be presented to us as if from an alien source. The completion supplies the satisfaction that was sacrificed, to have “books that we have never read” be pleasurable for that very reason.
Florensky’s map of the dream, representational art, the icon, and spiritual transcendence is derived from the single insight that perception itself involves a pocket (poché) in which what appears to be virtual may be “rotated” into an orthogonal, one dimensional space-time charged with chiastic polarities. The orthographic relationship equates the right angle with the “moralized” backward and forward motion of the labyrinth. With the dream, these are the contrasting directionalities of time that allow the dream to be generated by its terminal moment. With art, they are the contrast between the “psychic effluvia,” the castoffs of the everyday that cannot find a place in the higher virtual order, and the “experiences of mystical life crystallized out on the boundary of the two world” (Iconostasis, 45). The icon creates a virtual space that contains the entire, symmetrical totality of saints and angels, set opposite the phantoms that populate the Enchanted Wood of delusional prelest. With this iconic condition, spiritual transcendence is given its characteristic binary quality. Out of this one-dimensional simplicity new spatial and temporal effects become possible. The effects of dimensional subtraction are best known in modern times through Edward Abbott’s Flatland (1884), a fantasy about the social life of geometric figures. Florensky and other Flatlanders, like Dante, combine traditions of folkloric eschatology and religious tradition, to return the dimensions they subtract with ones empowered with poetic and ethical potentialities. Less leads to more.

Like Abbott, Florensky subtracts dimensions in order to add them back for symbolic/religious functions, but Florensky is more insightful in seeing the one-dimensional boundary space as charged by the power of negation and dialectic. The “depth” of the motion into this space (like map depth, $\partial$) is not simply a visual symmetry but the theophany of saints and angels, akin to what Dante sees in the final vision reflected in Beatrice’s eyes, created, literally, retroactively by his (defective) motion through the Dark Wood, the Inferno and Purgatory.

Florensky has given us the map of the lamella, the interval between the two deaths, allowing his theological account to mesh with the ancient lore of the labyrinth as a travel space where detached virtuality (the actualization of the dream) leads to anomalous virtuality (epiphany, hierophany, hapax).

The inhabitable boundary is fundamentally anamorphic. The optics of the interior duplicates the $\downarrow\partial = \Gamma$ logic of the whole. $R_2$, the interior defect, condenses this condition into the role played by the cipher in discovering an escape to $R_1$, the exterior Real, or second (symbolic) death. The cipher is not a code simply translated, but a meaning that emerges out of the combination of terms.
1.29 / The Chiastic Uncanny

Every map, in its presumption of the existence of an atlas, structures itself as an act of “parallel contouring,” which follows the (imagined-to-be-flattened) surface of its object. This contouring creates a bond between the point of view and the mapped object that is like the “contamination of reality by the dream,” the reference by which Florensky expands his account of dream chiasmus to the mask, the icon, and the spiritual journey — all summarized by the time-space concept of iconostasis and related to the Lacanian notion of the lamella. This contamination can be explained by the general “physics” of the uncanny, whose fundamental condition of DA, the organ-object that resists death, even when separated from the body or context that normally gives it life and meaning. This physics can now proclaim itself as the general logic of all “partial objects” — objects that are at first suppressed, like depth in the case of the map projection, but which later serve as potential grounds for a “spiritualization fantasy” of space-time by means of relationships that can be described through vectors. This spiritualization is “fictional” only in the sense that it offers a wealth of resources to fictional traditions. It contrasts with a geometricized view of space and time that forbids any cross-contamination of object and subject, a prohibition that is so frequently violated by experience that it is more accurate to say of the geometricized view that it is “uncanny in that it insists on remaining silent about the omnipresence of the uncanny.”

The idea that the uncanny is the rule rather than the exception is at the basis of Vico’s (and, later, Cassirer’s) conception of mythic thought as contrasting with abstract thought but required in order that conceptual-objectivizing thought could later develop. Freud’s famous account of the uncanny does not realize this, but it does confirm that the uncanny constitutes a tight, recursive logical system. Ernst Jentsch, in his essay published a few years before Freud’s, proposed a central “operator” for this system, based on the boundary between life and death. Rather than an absolute, logical separation, he held that there was a chiastic criss-cross that established the two foundational states of the uncanny as it was developed in folklore, ritual, and religious belief: the thing (D) that resisted death had this resistance, A, inscribed at its heart: DA. In a complementary role, the living subject who has an “appointment in Samarra” with death, D, has this fate inscribed at its kernel: AD.

Death, the central feature of the uncanny, is both an absolute and leaky boundary. Just as Florensky’s iconic screen generated the full array of saints and angels behind it, the reification of death’s threshold elaborates the full symmetry of a “Hades” (“invisible”) in an imaginary space-time beyond it, but compresses this into the orthogonal one-dimensional space of the boundary itself, charged with the “false imagery” of prelest, the evil twin of the forward moving, linear temporality of Hades as journey-trial. This “partial space” is the domain of the “partial object,” the subjectivized object that refuses to die, DA. The only real difference between DA and its chiastic counterpart, AD, the “subject destined to meet fate/death at a future, unavoidable time,” is in the style of narrative. It is not clear whether the goal of DA, escape, and that of AD, death, are not both kinds of re-birth, the same story told from two different points of view.

Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
Map 1.30

This image of the mons delectus (mountain of choices) in Otto Vænius's *Theatro Moral de la Vida Humana* (1701) was created to accompany Cebes' Table, a famous polyglot text attributed falsely to Cebes, the friend of Plato. The table told the story of pilgrims passing a Temple of Saturn who caught glimpse of this image hanging on the wall. Inquiring about its meaning, the attending priest warned them that those who understood its meaning would be instantly blessed with wisdom, those who failed would be cursed with madness. The image itself shows a procession of infants entering life, portrayed as a mountain offering many opportunities with both good and bad outcomes. Only the persistent pilgrim can make it to the top, where, above the clouds, is perched a temple of wisdom.

The mons delectus thematizes the linear, polarized journey as a pyramidal labyrinth of good and bad choices. The ascent described by Florensky, where the flotsam of the illusory world is shed, describes the detailed pitfalls and diversions of this magic mountain. The crystalline virtual world surmounting this labyrinth is the ideally symmetrical temple with its collection of angels and saints. This image is the prototype of all death narratives.
1.30 / Dreams of Death, Dreams in Dreams

If the journey is entirely inside the boundary, its illusion exists in the fact that the right-angled turn into the boundary creates or allows the illusion that the traveler has passed from one zone into another. Thus, in Ernest Hemmingway’s short story, “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” (1936), the writer-adventurer Harry narrates his thoughts as he lies suffering from a severe infection. An airplane arrives to take him to a hospital; he is bundled in. The plane flies into the clouds towards the peak of Kilimanjaro, and the reader becomes aware that no airplane has arrived. Harry is having a “death dream.” The momentum of memory has carried him past the moment of actual death into the zone between the two deaths, the lamella. Other fiction is more ambiguous and ambitious. Vladimir Nabokov’s short novel, *The Eye* (1930) describes the failed attempt of suicide of its main character, but after the narrator drifts through a dream-like world whose mysterious scoundrel turns out to be no one less than himself, we realize that this series of masks and charades is the dream of the suicide who has “successfully” died. David Lynch’s film, *Mulholland Drive* (2001) also begins with a suicide, leaving it open as to which parts of the subsequent action are “diagnostic” reality or Diane Selwyn’s death dream.

*The Eye* is most faithful to the Florenskian model. The mysterious scoundrel whom the narrator pursues is actually the narrator himself. This pursuit constitutes a “left- and right-hand version,” so to speak: stereognosis. The polarized space inside the boundary operates within the illusory field of social life of Russian expatriates in Berlin. Their puzzled symmetry is a clue to the fact that meanings have crystallized entirely on/in the boundary, death, itself. *Mulholland Drive* puts the house of the producer, Adam Kesher, on top of its Kilimanjaro, and exchanges a limousine for the rescue airplane, but the logic is the same. Dialectic is played out in the films many doubles and pairs: Betty/Diane, Rita/Camilla, two pairs of hit men, two Mafiosi, two narrative orders mediated by Mr. Roque and his messenger, the Cowboy, who appears twice. As in Alfred Hitchcock’s *Shadow of a Doubt* (1943), where niece and visiting uncle share a name but are moral opposites, the boundary zone is the scene of a charged struggle between forces of light and dark. The ideal California town, though an actual place, acquires the symmetry of angels and saints as the family sits around the dinner table. Two detectives, two Charlie’s, two siblings. The symmetrical temple above the clouds seems to float above the labyrinth, but in fact they are one and the same.
Map 1.31

The subject exists in two spaces and two times at once. These space-times are related by a "hinge" that affords the creation of dimensionality to insulate one time and space from the other or, in the appearance of the Real, the sudden collapse of dimensionality. The collapse is not complete. A minimal opening, a small, resistant kernel, affords a passageway and, in popular culture terms, is most often represented as a narrow passageway, concealed entry, trap door, a false panel, etc. The relation to birth and initiation rituals suggests that scale dysfunction (the impossibly small passage) is a token of the extimité by which the collapse of dimensionality leads to an expanded (liminal) dimensionality. Because of the flip of the entire field of affordance (tuchē), the subjective domain of propriocept can adopt a "hysterical" logic of organs without bodies (partial objects).

Subject is excluded from the field of perceptions and actions for which it serves as an efficient cause. This exclusion automates desire within the field, as an absence that cannot be resolved without the obversion of a "site of exception" connecting \( \partial \) to \( \alpha \). While the stereognostic field optimizes strategies of continuation, the proprioceptive (hysterical) subject counters with strategies of completion.

The "flipped field" is sometimes literalized in works of art. Akira Kurosawa's *High and Low* (see 2.05) divides into two parts, the first the story about a kidnapping and recovery, the second a "police procedural" about the search for the kidnapper. Because the second half involves a literally gridding-off of Yokohama, the "synesthetic" technique of collating clues about sounds, sun-angles, and other sense data works like a warped gravitational field that progressively tilts toward the kidnapper’s hide-out. The function of the anamorph, \( \omega \), as a cipher makes the flipped field work as a game-board where pursuers and pursued constitute the vectors of internal distances created ad hoc. The two halves of the film employ the chiastic logic of halves, so evident in the story of Simonides were each element "divides by two" (wrestlers, twin gods, half-paid fee, two strangers waiting outside). The mi-dire code of chiasmus is coupled with the logic of exception. Simonides is the only survivor of the collapsed banquet hall; in *High and Low*, the exception is the ruined industrialist, Gondo, an "Endymion" eclipsed (aphanisis) by opportunism (tuchē), avenged by the automaton of the police search field.

In "chiastic narratives" clearly divided into two parts, the entire field of tuchē is "flipped" to create, around the now-objective subject, a set of determinations that convert the "opportunities" of tuchē into lines converging on a single terminus. This is akin to Vico/Lacan’s idea of the single effect that is the result of multiple causes, of the uncanny’s primary condition of \( \omega \). The anamorphic element mediating strategies of continuation and completion, \( \omega \), takes on the role of a cipher that allows for a polysemous ambiguity between meaning relating to both fields at the same time. The initial appearance of the field of contingent affordances is itself afforded by the exclusion of the element \( \alpha, \Gamma \), which in the "second act" is the unnamed center of focus as well as the automating force that sucks time and space "backward" into its origin.
1.31 / Stereognosis and Propriocept

The human body regulates itself and its relation to the world using two interlinked systems. "Propriocept" is the ability of the brain to recruit the proper muscle groups needed to counteract any outside force. This is the body's "knowledge" of itself. "Stereognosis," the ability to identify objects through texture, size, temperature, spatial position, etc., is the body's knowledge of the world through the left-right logic of touch. Propriocept relates to the δ of perceiver, his/her ability to organize a point of view and to assure the degree of freedom needed to recognize and respond to three-dimensional depth. Stereognosis is the sum of sense experiences that add up to the direct perception of depth, α. They put the senses "on the side of the object," so to speak, forcing perception to make a detailed account of depth, roundness, texture, etc. Propriocept is known through its breakdowns: hysteria, where the womb's location is considered to be a variable; the uncanny ability of an organ to persist functioning outside the body; any "partial object" that, isolated from its supportive context, resists defeat and death. Stereognosis, too, is known through its negative cases, particularly those that subtract dimensions in order to return them with magical powers.

The negative instances of stereognosis and propriocept demonstrate even more effectively the tight bonds between the body's "knowledge" of itself and the body's knowledge of its place in a world of other subjects and objects. In effect, the breakdowns of stereognosis and propriocept are seemingly coordinated by literature, art, folklore, ritual, and possibly the dream and psychosis into a system that bridges from neurobiological realities of the body to the outermost reaches of the imagination. Just as the lamella is both cells in a Petri dish, the contour relation of map and atlas, and the basis of spiritual transformation through the icon, stereognosis and propriocept allow us to apply the physics of their relationship in one sphere to cases in distant regions of the human domain.

The logic of these paired terms begins within the thin/thick boundary of the lamella itself, with the polarization of directionality that constitutes the two choices of the labyrinth. This is the logic of the imagined ascent that is really the right-angle turn into the medium of the threshold. Immediately, the stereognostic binary "moral choices" of the lamella-like boundary become the means of conceiving the grand illusion of symmetrical wisdom, like the temple surmounting the mons delectus. Consider the gesture of the pointing finger. The index finger is extended to take the place of α, depth. The other fingers curl, signs of the attenuated reaching toward objects now lost in an abstract space mapped by the sagittal line of the pointing finger. A paradise lost of immediacy, of directly possessing reality, is retroactively conceived. The hand that points now puts the eye in a place, a point of view, and this now is a conical prison made portable by legs. It converts the world to a theater, a box whose fourth wall admits the Other, the voyeur, the stranger, waiting outside, the Lacanian “subject supposed to know.” The mind now must doubt where the body is and how it fares (propriocept). It is compensated by the comfort of four-square walls and steady steps; chairs made into thrones; windows, gates, and doors that steady and domesticate motion.
The lamella has never been more precisely defined than by the anecdote of Simonides, where the map issues of curvature and flatness are compounded into the more social activities of banqueting and speech-making. The story of the invention of artificial memory is itself the secret of artificial memory. As such, it should be taken up into the history of artificial intelligence, for its chiasmus is — in ways that Poe would recognize (see 3.06, 3.12) — a perfect chiastic cipher. In this early model of the unconscious, the lamella becomes the thin-thick gap across which a spark will enervate recognition connecting a place with a name. This (ap)proximation of the name is nothing less than the logic by which cemeteries are given the shape of cities; or, the token by which cities domesticate the invisible Hades through their own superficially practical geometries.

A concatenation of the basic chiastic folds were shaped into the “cosmic” form of the planetary spheres, a series of layers through which the soul passed in the process of birth, acquiring from each planet a quality or flaw that would shape the personality in life and determine its fate. This astrological application was more practically applied in the use of the shape of the theater’s auditorium, where each row constituted a puzzle in relation to the previous row, R2, and the mnemonicist’s progress from appearances (top row) to elemental substances (bottom row) aimed to discover the key, R1, of the pattern of cycles and reverses. The conversion of defect, ∂, R2, to consciousness/discovery/R1 depends on a very mechanical principle whereby absence and negation, rather than any positive content, releases contents that were “repressed” by conscious, thematic reason. In this sense, the automaton (natural chance) α operates as a literal automaton.
The indicative gesture’s creation of sagittal distance involves a “body memory” created retroactively. *Begriff*, the German word for “concept,” originally meant “grasp.” But, certainly grasping is no more a kind knowledge than carrying bricks is a mastery of architecture. It is rather the case that the last meaning wishes to “restore” a first meaning as a lost ideal, even though this has never really existed and had to be created retroactively. The distance of the indicative translates the loss into the ideal, but its reality is even more powerful than the literal reality it has dressed up retroactively. Body memory is reorganized, given a symmetrical arrangement, a charm. Its orderliness is also its power, its ability to bring about magic results. Most important, its order becomes transferable, just as the cosmic order of the stars and planets could, in the cosmograms of the Yoruba, be brought to earth, inserted into the lamella of architecture, and there, from a position within floorboards, doorjambs, and other pochés, do good or ill to those who stood in the right place.

In Giulio Camillo’s totalizing theater of memory, described in his book, *L’Idea del Theatro* (1550), two intersecting “circles” of topics combined in a 7 x 7 grid fashioned after the auditorium of an inverted theater whose stage was occupied by the single user. This fourth wall offered the mnemonicist’s mind a restricted entry into a stereognostic array of stored images and writings whose lamella concealed an interior defect, R₂, to serve as a key to the extimate of an R₁, universal knowledge, the virtual temple contained within the labyrinth as an anamorphic resonant pattern.

The R₂ was known to mnemonicists working in the esoteric tradition of memory space, operating in secret beneath the practical instruction in the “method of places,” a standard rhetoric school course. The secret of the R₂ is not hard to find, however. It is given in Cicero’s and others’ transcription of the story of Simonides, inventor of the method of memory places. Simonides, hired to recite a poem celebrating the victory of Scopas, a local politician and amateur wrestler, is refused half his fee for including, to his host’s annoyance, a passage honoring the twin gods, the Dioscuri. Midway through the banquet, Simonides is given a note saying that two strangers wait to see him outside, but when he goes out to the street they are not to be found. Before he turns to go back in, the banquet hall collapses, killing all inside. Relatives rush to the scene but are horrified to find they cannot identify the crushed corpses to give them proper burial. Simonides, however, has memorized the names of each guest using their seating order, and obligingly restores their identity, including that of Scopas, who had told Simonides to “go to the gods” for his fee (i.e. “go to hell”) but went there himself instead.

The story, a perfect chiasmus combining halves of fees, spaces, names, and charms, turns the banquet hall into a symmetrical hall of the heavens. Its “ascent” is the call outside (by the twin gods themselves?), and its “descent” is the return to the “scene of the crime.” Place for name, name for place. In Lacanian, the name is always the name of the father. In the atlas, the place is always the topic (*topos*), the *loci*, both thought and place. The memory of the memory theater is not the recollection of the specific mortal user who stands on the small stage, but the memory of the theater itself, the automaton who returns wisdom from behind a curtain, behind a screen.

Lu Beery Wenneker, “An Examination of L’Idea del Theatro of Giulio Camillo.”
Map 1.33

Hinge, flip, twist, gap; trapdoor, narrow passageway, secret panel, shortcut, short circuit, back way, hidden entry. The subject can "signalize" but not say directly how it is possible to be in two spaces and times at once, thanks to the orthogonal operator that divides symbolic expressions into enunciated (énoncé) and enunciating components. Enunciating both resists symbolization and is excluded from the field of affordance where it appears, symbolically, as a full subject. As in the example of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, however, the only way of affirming one’s humanity is to say, paradoxically, “I am a replicant.” The field of affordance, of subjective appearance, masks any possible awareness of replicant status, and so all its residents perform their full subjectivity.

A ⊃ B ⊃ C ⊃ A

The orthogonal relationship between δ and α converts vertical motion into a combinatorial loop whose main analog is the Möbius band. The extimacy produced by the twist of the Möbius is, in turn, analogous to the overlap of the vesica pisces, also related historically to falls and resolutions.

Why is vertigo the key motif of this topological condition, extimacy? Why, furthermore, is it the middle space connecting, like a cipher, the twinned points of a running narrative?

And why does this extimacy have a magic function in the creation of cos-mograms, which often draw directly and literally from the geometry of the doubly inscribed circle? If Joyce is correct (Finnegans Wake), the answer will have to do with three things: negation, sexuality, and patriarchy. The signature of “folded space/time,” Γ, relate these primarily visual instances to the structurally divided nature of énoncé/enunciation: the split of the subject in every symbolic act and thought.

DENIAL (Verneinung)
RENUNCIATION (Verwerfung)
FORECLOSURE (Verleugnung)

[exception]

The three (Hegelian) forms of negation are sequential, from the “weakest” (denial), to the “strongest” (foreclosure), the form of negation associated with psychosis. Foreclosure affords a “short circuit” that connects an interior Real, R₂, with the “exterior Real,” R₁, of exclusion, δ→α. Thus, negation as a series is also a negation of negation.

DENIAL (Verneinung)
RENUNCIATION (Verwerfung)
FORECLOSURE (Verleugnung)

[exception]

The well-known story of the borrowed kettle illustrates the progressively self-canceling action of the three forms of negation. The excluded term operates as an ideological pre-condition, which is to say that the borrower never had any intention of taking responsibility for damaging the kettle. Modern cases, such as the invasion of Iraq, ostensibly to find WMDs, or the refutation of global warming that eventually acknowledges, the facts of climate change but denies any human role, show that the position of subjective enunciation can be recognized only in negative ways: paradox, inversion, obversion, idiocy, folly, etc. The intransitive order of A->B->C->A, requiring a Möbius-band twist shows that internality/externality can be generated from a progressive sequence of negations.

NEGATION AND ITS RELIABILITIES

Robert Pfaller notes that negation creates a series of unique conditions relating the subject to truth. This is not only important for the “clinical” situations of psychoanalysis but also for the constitution of the civic realm, art, and philosophy, where conditions of negation are materialized and, because materialized, diversified. Pfaller’s propositions are: (1) that there is a pravity of negation over positive representation; (2) that what negation tells is necessarily true; (3) that (in general) there exist things which can only be represented negatively, by negation; and (4) that (in particular) there exists, represented by negation, a true, empty subjectivity beyond imaginary “full” subjectivity. Pfaller’s points seem to allow for sequencing. Condition 1 cites the existence of instances in the field of enunciating that resist positive representation ("exceptions," δ). Condition 2 establishes a truth function native to these “sites of exception.” Condition 3 works from the idea that there exist, prior to any field of enunciation, objects that will be permanently resistant, and, Condition 4, that there is an empty subjectivity lying beyond this field, which is inferentially related to the objects that a priori resist representation and location with the field of affordances. Pfaller points to the location of the "exception" at both ends of the sequences of negation, as an a priori condition and as the final result of ideological cancellations.

66
1.33 / Inside Out

The picture of inside out is always some combination whose geometrical representation refers to what was done and what will or must be done — a cue to the performative aspect of extimacy and, also, the future anterior aspect of performance. The intersecting circles of the vesica piscis emphasize the internal structure of mirroring as an interaction. The right angle of the orthogonal “operator” of representation and artifact emphasizes independence coupled with hinged attachment. The Möbius band emphasizes the element of surprise in confronting the disbelief that there is only one surface where it seems obvious that there are clearly two. *The mons delectus* superimposes temple and labyrinth to show how the labor of the negative is the substance of and not just the preparation for wisdom. The messages are the same: doing it is the truth of it.

The turn/trope is a *cursus* (“turn”), a curse, an oath, a singing, a spell. It transfers the internal change into the external effect, but at the same time it turns the effect into the cause, the multiple causes of the single effect (over-determination), the tree-logic of time moving in the other direction (Borges: “The Garden of the Forking Paths”), as a fate ending in the same point, most commonly treated as death — in any event, a narrow passage, a small stage. The living subject aims at this “appointment in Samarra” with precision, $A_0$. The map showing its location is inscribed as a stochastic noise resonating at every level of detail. Shake the tree, break the stick, kill the stranger ... nothing can destroy its logic or inevitability because shaking the tree, breaking the stick, and killing the stranger are its effective causes. Negation/denial, the Hegelian dialectic in full battle armor, guarantees success of the $A_0$ passage. This pole of the uncanny and its antipode, $D_\Lambda$ (the lamella, the partial object, the organ without a body), lie within the thin/thick skin of the lamella itself, the light twin warring with the dark twin. Knowledge through retroaction is memory, Plato’s anamnesis, requiring that the scientist be a mnemonicist who will enact the perfect symmetry of Simonides’ fallen corpses. Trophy/trope/tropic: retroaction reverses cause and effect, makes the passive into the active agent (automaton). Simonides re-members them, restoring their eternal rest by placing their names among the *manes* (ancestral spirits) of the heavens: the array of saints and angels. The names of the fathers and the musical geometries of the night sky, basis of the *templum*, the empty cross (╬) that is equally edge and center.

Lacan would add that every enunciation is, in effect, a *mi-dire*, a saying by half, in that the performative component lies in reserve, in the reception required to complete it. The orators of antiquity unconsciously uncovered the logic of the master signifier, equally useful to ideology and poetry. The enthymeme, the “rhetorical syllogism” has its middle term turned in two directions ($A:B::B:C$; therefore $B\supseteq B$, $\Gamma$, a compact version of the intransitive sequence of negations that constitute the “forced choice” of ideology), toward the audience and the orator, specifying the relationship perfectly because of its silence, its purely negative status. The speaker can say what s/he will, the audience decides on the basis of the authenticity of the *voice*, which is the minimal element of ventriloquism that, from the kernel of the speaker, lets the truth out with or without the speaker’s awareness or consent. It is this voice that makes Freud’s discovery of psychoanalysis able to bridge between modern pathology and the uncanny practices of the past.

Robert Phaller, “Negation and its Reliabilities.”
2.00
The Atlas and the Grimoire

“...I began to feel that something colored was emerging from the white pages. After staring at it and screwing up my eyes I was convinced that it was a picture — and a picture that was not flat but three-dimensional like a box. Through the lines on the paper I could see a light burning and inside the box those same characters in the novel were moving about. It was a delightful game and more than once I regretted that my cat was dead and there was no one to whom I could show these people moving about in that tiny little room.”

— Mikhail Bulgakov, *Black Snow*, 54
Map 2.0

"This design for an amulet comes from the Black Pullet grimoire. Embroider it upon black satin, and say ‘Nades, Suradis, Maniner’, and a djinn is supposed to appear; tell the djinn ‘Sader, Prostas, Solaster’, and the djinn will bring you your true love. Say ‘Mammes, Laher’ when you tire of her."

— *Wikipedia*, "Grimoire"
2.00 / Atlas as Grimoire

The magic book known as grimoire (the term may have originally applied to any book written in Latin) have existed at least since ancient Egypt and, more likely, since the first book ever written, since writing originally had a ritual and magic role, as in the case of early Chinese characters used for divination. The map cannot claim this axiomatic antiquity, but since early maps often had strong diagrammatic elements, attributing special powers to the cardinal directions, for example, one could claim that, like the book, the map has a natural history that leads back to magic. The grimoire, which traditionally contains both text and diagrams, embodies the notion of a common, magic origin.

The literal grimoire was almost always a fraud, concocted to attract the gullible believer in occult practices. Would-be wizards have never been particularly critical consumers. Almost any text with spells, charms, and diagrams works as long as it is forbidden. In this case prohibition leads to privation, and privation drives up demand — and prices. Apart from these specialized texts, any book can be used as a grimoire. In the practice of lexomancy, a book is opened to a random page; with eyes shut, the reader lands a finger on a random line. The chosen text is then taken as prophecy. Some texts work better than others. Books that are already “holy” and therefore in touch with unseen powers are innately adopted for use as grimoires. Books whose authors were regarded as religious, wise, or simply famous are also good choices.

The key is use. If a book is used as a grimoire it is a grimoire. So, what is this use? If the ultimate goal is described in terms of end-effects (the death of an enemy, the salvation of a friend or relative, wealth, power, etc.) the variety of contexts that are the media for these effects prevents the discovery of any common features, apart from the tautologies that extend hate, love, fear, and desire to almost any object and condition. The functional basis that ties all these uses to a single set of principles is the boundary — the “ultimate” boundary of life and death, one could say — that is evident in the traditional call made to the underworld’s representatives, XXX. The three crosses — three for the effect of completeness and finality conferred on this number — aspire to completion, as is evident in the formulae of prayers, which include references to air, earth, fire, and water; the high and the low; the transcendental eternity that includes all times; the “everlasting,” etc. The idea of movement and completion must be combined to overcome this boundary of boundaries. That is, motion must not simply be a change of position; it must be an inclusion, a return, a summation.

This combination of independent strategies and goals eventually leads from the arcane practices of the grimoire and its analogies to the phenomenon of “enunciation.” In English, the logic of this is not apparent, but French distinguishes between the idea of an act (énonciation) and the literal content of the words (énoncé, “statement”). As Joyce would put it, the letter is the litter, the “literal,” the cast-aside and suppressed materiality of the word. It is only through the lens of the negative that this “buried content” can be exumed, its grave opened, its crime scene a place of eternal return. This section deals with refuse of one kind or another; articulates it within the common language of the “operator,” whose vectors balance the interests of internal error (∂) with all-enclosing frames that map the contents of one field to another. Eventually the meaning of the call, always in some way a call to the dead, makes sense in terms of the frozen times (maps, pictures, screens) and frozen spaces (places, landscapes, prisons) that epitomize the conditions of the frame.
Nick Paumgarten reports, in The New Yorker, January 2, 2012: “John Mainstone is a scientist who has overseen The Pitch Drop Experiment, the longest-running lab experiment in history since 1961. Begun in 1927 with a suspension of pitch in a glass funnel, Mainstone has been waiting for the ninth drop of pitch since that time. He commented on the observation of extreme viscosity (each of the eight observed drops has taken about ten years): 'The pitch drop doesn’t accommodate countdowns. I've been around long enough that I see just time before and time after. It's only when the drop has happened that what has gone before makes sense in the flow of time. That is, I don’t become aware of what was going on just before the drop until after the drop occurs.' What is the site of exception, the treasure map? Is it a spatial field where burial of stolen goods can be found by excavation? Or, is it like ‘The Purloined Letter,’ Edgar Allan Poe’s clever essay on the perdurable poché of ‘ordinary space,’ where the contraction of visibility is performed by the interpellated subject? The zimzum of contraction and recovery, ⇌, is a the same time a concealing bend in a space that allows the subject to split into enunciating and enunciated (énoncé). Therefore, the treasure map is in a permanent state of anamorphosis, ω, of serving as a codex recounting the story of origins or the apocalyptic end of time. XXX = 3x500 + 33 at 4 p.m. The gateway to invisible Hades, necromancy as prophecy, is like the dream where the first thing to happen (the bed frame falling on the neck of the sleeper) is the last thing in the dream, the guillotine ending the life of a count captured by revolutionaries (Alfred Maury, Le sommeil et les rêves, Paris: Didier, 1865).
2.01 / Maps of Buried Treasure

In a surprisingly accurate way, the imagination substitutes objects, projects values, and narrates events that, like the silicon that replaced living tissue of trees "petrified" by water and wind, creates a "perdurably" system of coherent explanations out of what have been initially the most ephemeral and accidental effects. This converts the effect into a cause, turns it backward, so that retroactively what is missing becomes what has been withheld, taken away, made invisible — buried.

The motif of buried treasures and the maps that lead to them is remarkably stable across cultures and history. The treasure is, generically, the invisible within the visible field. Access to it is based, again generically, on the map-as-cipher, which defines a set of reliable coordinates and cues leading to the treasure's recovery. The map and buried treasure are, in this critically intimate relationship, reciprocally and dialectically define each other's essence. All maps therefore are, in their purest forms, "maps of buried treasure." All buried treasures are indistinguishable from the maps that keep them accessible in the face of required invisibility from the Other. The atlas, as a "sum or totality of the logic of the map," is not simply an extension of the single treasure map; it demonstrates the correlation between value, burial/invisibility, and ciphering. The invisibility of value (translated into the popular culture image of buried treasure) can be recovered through a cipher (translated into the popular culture idea of the treasure map).

The treasure map is an instance of the logic of the future anterior, the "dream logic" by which the first thing must be perceived as the last, using a physics of retroaction and over-determination. "Buried," the past participle, embeds intentionality in what is otherwise simply invisible, missing, unknown (privation). As opposed to treasure on ships lost at sea, this adjective argues that few treasures are accidentally concealed under ground and, therefore, require maps. The privation of the senses (thematized most effectively as blindness) becomes the prohibition of some Other's willful intent. This intentionality is perdurable: the Other is not aware of it, and is in essence unable to alter or cancel it. It is an intentionality "acting on its own," built into the idea of the Other as Other. The kernel of the Other is the mechanism (automaton) that can be perceived by the subject only in the negative, as a command to enjoy, to desire.

At the cosmic level, this is the Jewish mystical tradition that God had to contract in order to make room for creation (zimzum). Privation (the need to make room) can be understood only as an intentional act of prohibition: mankind shall not enjoy the earth as Adam enjoyed Eden for a brief time. Eden will be "concealed" rather than "lost" within the Wilderness; the place of origin will be forbidden territory, a permanent void. Eden demonstrates the equation, privation=prohibition, and explains how the super-ego (God's unconsciousness and, hence, inability to change His mind on the subject) maintains the invisibility of value.

Harold Bloom

Lacan, on the prison game example (invisibility of desire).
Lacan’s system of psychic systems, the Symbolic (the network of social relations and their signs of status), the Imaginary (creation of relations within the sensible realm which, coupled with fantasy, allow some relations with the unbearable enigmas of the Real), and the Real (about which one should not say anything!) is fundamentally a series known as a “sorites,” a group that is sustained without any representative members. In the classic philosophy school example, grains are removed from a pile of sand until the concept of a pile is challenged (five? six?). The question is a radical one, worthy of the attention of the lunatic-genius Lewis Carroll, who devised complex sorites involving series of statements that, properly analyzed, could reveal a relationship concealed within them. Analysis by Boolean Logic is slow and tedious. George Spencer-Brown sped up the process by employing a one-term, two axiom, non-numerical calculus able to ferret out the remainders that, when combined would provide the concealed subject and predicate. This process was not unlike his famous Cheshire Cat reduction; in fact this cat able to subsist as only a smile is the essence of sorites and, further, the key to the Borromeo knot that Lacan used to characterize psychic organization. The smile is a “partial object,” a case of the uncanny’s category of DA (“between the two deaths”), the quality that can outlast its material substrate. So, it seems, is the sorites.

Sorites is a list of container-contained relationships (“predications”) that can be symbolized as framed spaces (and, hence, miniatures of the division of subjectivity into enunciating and énoncé. The action results in a frame around the enunciated, particularizing and materializing it.

The only animals in this house are cats; 
Every animal is suitable for a pet, that loves to gaze at the moon; 
When I detest an animal, I avoid it; 
No animals are carnivorous, unless they prowl at night; 
No cat fails to kill mice; 
No animals ever take to me, except what are in this house; 
Kangaroos are not suitable for pets; 
None but carnivora kill mice; 
I detest animals that do not take to me; 
Animals, that prowl at night, always love to gaze at the moon.

The solution lies in finding the two terms, each of which appears only once (all others appear twice). One remaining term will be an inferior term, the other a superior term. The answer will take the inferior term as the subset and the superior term as the containing set. "Kangaroo" appears only once, as an inferior term. "Avoided by me" appears only once, as a superior term. The answer is "Kangaroos are avoided by me." Other terms cancel out because they appear once as a superior and once as an inferior term. Note that negative statements, such as "Kangaroos are not suitable for pets," turn the superior term ("suitable for pets") into an inferior term (= "not suitable for pets"). In light of Lacan’s Borromeo knot, the sorites could be regarded as a "sinthome" — an "outstanding example" that internalizes the formerly "external" combination of cases ("kangaroos and "avoided by me"). This, in other words, creates a condition of objective internality out of a case of subjective externality, which we now see to be the condition of all sorites. When any statement involving a presupposition is made ("Why do the English go out in the noon-day sun?") an objectification is made, but in a "partial" way that suspends the process. The exterior is silenced, but the silence is only temporary. It will return as an “inside frame,” a objective subjectivity radically internal to the set that has been topologically bound together as a result of the sinthome.
Lacan’s system of three interlocking modes of human thought and experience follow
the logic of the Borromeo knot, a figure with three rings, each of which lies on top of
(but does not form a chain-link with) its predecessor. The resulting sequence could be
symbolized numerically 1 ⊃ 2 ⊃ 3 ⊃ 1 ⊃ 2 ⊃ 3 ⊃ 1... The knot “takes place” at the point where ‘3’,
“unwilling” to continue the bad infinity of a stack of rings, “decides” to overlap ‘1’ and
thereby set up a recursive, interlocking system. The bond between any two rings lies in
the presence of the third, a fact Lacan cherished in assigning the rings to the symbolic
(the sum total of relationships with other subjects, mediated by language and other sys-
tems of communication, what the Greeks called praxis), the imaginary (literally related
to the images constructed through optics and the imagination), and the Real (that which
resists imagination and symbolization but is the main ingredient of traumatic experience
and the residues of developmental leaps and transformative acts).

The fact that the Borromeo ring itself resists the logical and visual orders it occupies
makes us think immediately of Freud’s account of the etymology of the German word for
the uncanny, Unheimlich. Where “homely” originally included the security of the interior
home space from the prying gaze of strangers, this component of concealment became
the link to an opposite meaning, the “un-homely.” That which was concealed became
“that which ought to have remained concealed.” The point of view has obviously shifted,
from inside the house to outside, creating a corresponding change from a warm interior
to an empty one whose darkness conceals a presence where an absence is mandated
by logical events. This easily converts to Ernst Jentsch’s categories of the essential un-
canny. Something should be dead but it retains an “impossible-Real” kernel of life: D.".
The sense of a violation of logic reflects onto the opposite case, A, the living subject
with a time-bomb ticking inside, a bomb that is, more accurately, a map leading to an
appointment with death, a map willingly followed — in fact a map drawn up by — the
subject him/herself.

The recursive, “do-it-yourself” logic of the uncanny means that, reciprocally, the un-
canny is the totality of relationships of the symbolic, imaginary, and Real; and that this
trio’s symmetry is uncanny. The fact that the uncanny lies uncannily close to the center
of Lacan’s project has already been argued by Mladen Dolar. Just as Žižek has argued
for certain pathways that create a “short circuit” — “A short circuit occurs when there
is a wrong connection in the network — wrong, of course, from the standpoint of the
smooth functioning of the network” — we can see that “wrong” relates to this uncanny,
this self-referential resistance, this radical inclusion of a “curvature” that refuses to be
flattened out by the map.

Lacan on the Borromeo knot.
Freud’s essay on the uncanny.
Reference to Dolar.
Žižek on the short-circuit: intro to the MIT series.
Map 2.03

The sorites demonstrate how the suture of the “externalized” element into the center becomes the alagma, the “hidden treasure” which, as both comedy and psychoanalysis reveal, is the excremental clown, the kink in the works, the punch line (literally! — ◊). The cutting of a section to view the prohibited interior is related logically to the creation of the doubled space of enunciation, whose perimeter outside of énoncé is silenced (the muteness of the clown-fool) in symbolic sympathy to the demonic inside frame that is the machine’s beating heart. The clown’s katabasis into the machine interior and our section view of this interior, with its inside frame, are one and the same.

This brief scene explains how the sorites implicit in Lacan’s Borromeo organization of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real operate through a logic that converts privation into prohibition and, in the process, converts/obverts the spatio-temporal qualities of the frame, “clowning” it with multiple sites of exception. Stereognosis operates along the sagittal dimension orthogonal to the plane that creates the section view, but its logic is rotated 90º into the scene itself, charging elements that lie within the same plane of adjacencies (tuchē) through narrative opposition, moral-ethical value (good-evil), or other “temporalizing” schemas.

Although the frame is used to identify a visible field, technically the tuchē affords an invisibility sutured into the normal visual field in the same way a painting is hung in a museum. While technically visible, the field’s status corresponds to prophetic blindness: Tiresius, being blind, does not see the “blind spots” that those with vision do not see. This double negation smooths the space of prophecy so that normally excluded elements are able to resonate “stochastically” — a conversion of noise (parasite) to signal. The punch line’s role as efficient cause is effectively the geometry of the cinematic “fourth wall,” a space sectioned and made available for (voyeuristic) penetration, as in the case of Antonello’s St. Jerome. The hidden treasure is durably, permanently hidden; in effect, it remains hidden/secret no matter how much it is exposed, discovered, etc. This durability is evident in cases of sexualization, where The Women becomes the paradigm-exemplar of the Master: the troubadour tradition — i.e. no amount of exposure or violation can alter the enigmatic structure of the space that humiliates the troubador on his mission of erotic love.

Chaplin’s resistance to the machine in Modern Times is put in terms of his impossible circulation within a cut-away view of what must be a closed set of gears, whose intrinsic features normally prohibit any extrinsic view. The revelation of this view shifts from the technical internality of the machine (privation) to the violation of this privation, personified by the circulating clown, Chaplin. Charlie comes from the outside — a case of subjective objectivity, literally, because he is a factory worker — but invades the interior (extimité, obversion), an inside frame that subjectively subjectifies (privation to prohibition) the machine and, by extension, the machinic in general. Chaplin “does not know he is dead”: that is, he magically survives the ordeal of being squeezed by the gears.

Modern Times’ assembly line manifests the automation function of the “dropped out” element that, for enunciation, operates as a master signifier that, from behind a metaphoric curtain, pulls the strings of “puppets” on the framed stage (cf. University discourse) while acting as a ventriloquist for sites that become charged with acousmatic significance (i.e. the effect of “signalizing” in the face of a contraction or withdrawal of normative meaning. The puppet episode of the 1945 film Dead of Night demonstrates the function of fantasy in structuring a gapped circle of desire: the ventriloquist hallucinates a puppet who desires what he desires, but only at the cost of the ventriloquist’s annihilation.
2.03 / Privation and Prohibition

What makes the simple fact of privation (the unseen side, the unknowable events of the future, etc.) into prohibition (the involvement of the unconscious desire of the Other)? What, in our current terminology, makes value something knowable only in the negative cases where it has been lost or withdrawn? What, also in our current terminology of maps and atlases, defines the project of recovery (Gk. analepsis) in terms of an equivalency between the Other’s unconscious motive of prohibition and a cipher, embodied by the "treasure map," which seems to presume that the prohibition’s original medium was itself a kind of encoding?

These three questions constitute three steps that, while circular and “Borromean” in their own way, involve the imaginary, symbolic, and Real. As for subtraction, Lacan has described the means by which the mirror steals the image of the young subject’s self and creates an ideal ego, prematurely masterful, already assimilated into the network of symbolic relationships that the poor, reflected child does not yet enjoy. Permanent alienation is the cost of membership, and castration by symbols (the king by the crown, etc.) will in the last analysis be worse than any literal decommissioning of sexual potency. The Real of this situation, its status as an act, presents the imaginary, symbolic, and Real as a “Club Borromeo,” where, like Club Med®, all expenses will be paid for at the time of departure. Privation is the action of getting and spending. Prohibition is the element of costs, of charges silently and invisibly put down into an account book, added up to be settled at some end-point. Enjoyment of all that getting and spending is always alienated. It is an image of itself, a stereognostic reversal of the subject who watches herself having fun, who is having fun only in the presence of the Tour Guide whose commands come in two communications channels, one to compel actions (“Have a swim!”), another in the register of the Real (“Go drown yourself!”).

The system develops its economy, the accounting system that postpones payment until an “end” where it will be unclear who is recovering what, by living up to the two aspects of the reputation of the automaton: its function as the “blind chance” of nature; its aspect as Real and, by extension, resistant to the imaginary and symbolic as forms of representation, as a kink in the rotating machinery of “again” and “the same.” So, while it may be impossible to answer the three questions about the conversion of privation to prohibition, it is equally hard to avoid concluding that automaton is simply another word for this conversion.

This involves a more general set of arguments, grouped around the designation of ad aequatio of thought to things, Aristotle’s “correspondence theory of truth,” expandable to the question of whether or not the world is knowable and under what conditions or in what terms. Finding a treasure using some system (= “map”) means that the concealment of treasure was itself based on the same system. The equation of comprehension with construction is the essence of Vico’s dictum, verum ipsum factum, with the specific notion that factum is in essence a cipher (Thomas Aquinus, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 1, 2).

Lacan on the Borromeo knot.
Freud’s essay on the uncanny.
Reference to Dolar.
Thomas Aquinus, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 1, 2.
The Lacanian "treasury of signifiers" was used originally to designate the signifiers held in reserve by the Other, who, as "subject supposed to know," held the title to the domain of the symbolic in general. Pierre Skriabine, in his perceptive essay, "Clinic and Topology: Flaw in the Universe," points to the essential topological relationship of the treasury to the issue of the extimate. In the treasury, there will always be one signifier that is lacking. It is not possible to write a=a; the set cannot include itself except as a negative element. This becomes the $S_1$, the signifier that is always inaccessible to the subject. This is the relation of the subject-who-maps to the un-mappable element, the gaze, which forever limits the promised mastery of the map. This is the "unconscious" of the world, which works as a gaze works, to resist the subject's desire to surveille by itself forming an (un-locatable) element of surveillance.

The signifier inaccessible to the subject is inaccessible by virtue of its "topology": a self-referential, paradoxical "fold" or "hinge" that creates an obversion no matter how it's viewed. It is important to not overlook the issue of (in)accessibility, which, like (in)transitivity, is positively materialized in art and popular culture examples as dysfunctions of motility/travel, scale, and identity. Thus, a film such as Hitchcock's *Rebecca* (1940), which involves all three dysfunctions in central, performative ways, constitutes a laboratory for studying the treasury of signifiers — and throws in a literalized version of the treasury for good measure. The never-named narrator of *Rebecca* is forced to travel, to use travel as an authenticating device, because the inaccessible signifier's inaccessibility voids space that would otherwise be domesticatable. The *Unheimlich* realm of the young narrator is one of delay (the cause and effect are separated by a myriad of intervening terms), most evident in the fact that the new bride seems not to be able to consummate marriage properly. She remains a "child bride" amidst the paraphernalia of Rebecca and her super-ego stand-in, the servant Danvers. She does not fit in the giant world that had been occupied by Rebecca.

Manderley is the obverse landscape. Its condition of inaccessibility are extroverted into a radically instable set of metonymies that immediately convert effects into causes and require the narrator to assume the role of a Johnstonian traveler who, like Odysseus, must fill the "void left behind by the *jouissance* of the absent Other," as a Lacanian might put it so that Hitchcock could fill it out literally with the dead Rebecca and her obscene violations of social norms. Manderley's obversity culminates with Rebecca's perfectly maintained bedroom, whose ideal "overlook" of the sea puts it in direct content with the enigma of Rebecca's death at sea. The unbearable proximity of cause and effect, the immediate conversion of one to the other, makes the narrator always too early or too late. She always "just misses."
2.04 / Treasury of Signifiers

The exchange economy that turns privation into prohibition is able to guide us into some complex Lacanian territory. While it is still necessary to understand the desire that is the desire of the "unconscious" Other through the complex exchanges that link the imaginary, symbolic, and Real in their Borromeo knot configuration, and while it will always be necessary to return to the evidence of the "clinic," meaning pure psychoanalysis, to see these mechanisms clearly, the privation-to-prohibition formula takes a short-cut into the world of maps and atlases that can provide critical theory an immediate popular culture prosthesis. The relation of the map/atlas condition to virtual space has revealed four means by which the "negative" absent components of experience and perception may contaminate or intrude upon the "positive" evidence of the senses and the correspondences they seem to support. This is the radical Hegelian component of map theory. The exclusion is always re-inscribed at the center; the Real always "returns" (this is its definition) to the center of the frame, where it becomes an inside frame, the site of obversion, what Lacan has called extimité.

Inscription at the point of the inside frame always sounds a bit strange. It is the basis for the often misunderstood Lacanian gaze, which is not the gaze of a subject who exercises power or control over objects, but a gaze from the object to the subject that marks a point where control breaks down. Because this is also the point at which dimensionality itself — which has used distance, scale, and identification to create a network for power relationships — breaks down, the gaze is critical in the question of the map’s relation to the atlas. The map embodies mastery; it gives mastery a plan, a means to an end. The atlas underwrites this claim by extending the local aspiration to the global scale. Where the map dominates a territory, the atlas claims to dominate space itself. But, because as we have shown the map cannot assimilate curvature even though the atlas uses it as a datum, the gaze-as-limit is present in every map. Like the anamorphic skull in the portrait of The Ambassadors, it marks the limit of subjectivity by being inscribed at subjectivity’s center.

Taking this idea from the clinic to critical theory requires the short-cut through popular culture, not just because critical theory lacks the expertise to comprehend the evidence of the clinic directly, but because popular culture automatically engages what we may call, borrowing another term from Lacan, a "treasury of signifiers." This notion seems to restore a more general Vichian idea, that of the "common mental language" that Vico claimed was "spoken" be all cultures in their evolutionary development through stages of mythic, heroic, and human mental-expressive modes. It is not a language in the sense of a system of signs or structures. Rather, it is the "collective" unconscious of culture, which, like the human individual unconscious is, as Lacan put it, "structured like a language."

Hitchcock’s Rebecca (1940) depicts subjective limit directly, when a nameless young bride is swallowed up by rich environs of a newly widowed aristocrat. His estate, Manderley, troubles the innocent narrator in terms of dysfunctions of movement and scale that compress the inside-out compaction of x=x into x x as an anamorphic condition that locates the treasury of signifiers at the center of the house, the bedroom of the suicide Rebecca. The husband’s guilt (in the Hitchcock version) is also self-cancelling. He thought he “did it” but was mistaken. His error, however, "made way for" the solution by attracting the audience’s as well as the dijective characters’ suspicions, a knot that, once untied, releases both sides of the fiction from their burdens of form.
Rebecca begins with a floating POV narration. A disembodied eye passes through a locked iron gate and glides down a crumbling driveway to view Manderley by moonlight. The moon animates the ruin (DA), it "opens up a gap" between total absence (-1) and the magnificent mansion (+1) that has its counterweight in the unnamed heroine’s trials, as the new Mrs. de Winter, in the Redbeard Castle construct of the early part of the film. Her contractions contrasted with Rebecca’s "protuberance" as a larger-than-life personality. In High and Low, protuberance and contraction become a landscape section, the lowland harbor district of Yokohama and the dominating mansion on the hill. Their contrasting elevation allows the kidnapper’s telescope to activate the +1/-1 logic in terms of a shadow beneath which Gondo may consult the police, a shadow that finds its counterpart in the film’s second half, the search for the missing kidnapper, concealed “beneath” the map-view of puzzles and clues, 1/x.

In Rebecca, the almost-not-house (unheimlich) ruin has its counterpart in the almost-mansion (unheimlich), where the second Mrs. de Winter finds latitude — room enough to wander, get lost, be dis-membered. High and Low directly embodies this contrast of protuberance (Rebecca = Gondo, who becomes a zombie, Da) while his counterpart, the kidnapper, continues to elude the police, who must revert to a mapping strategy to pull together the clues for interpolation. Gondo’s interpellation, written in the logic of x=x, left a remainder materialized by the kidnapper’s telescope: a shadow beneath which police may move. The counterpart of this shadow is understood through comparison to Rebecca: the shadow of the map, as lamella, a surface of possibility leaving a gap between the police and the kidnapper, 1/x, who is "fated" to be caught, tried, and executed, Aa.

The x=x logic of interpellation that compels Gondo to pay ransom for his servant’s son contains echoes of Castor and Pollux (and, hence, foundation ritual), where the sacrificed must be simulacrum of the sacrificer. Interpellation, and the enigmatic demands of the Other, require misidentification, as in Kafka’s radical misidentification in The Trial. In Rebecca this is played out in the exchange of the prominently named, dead first wife and the never-named "second Mrs. de Winter." The use of "the wrong boy" intensifies the theme of signalizing, by which Gondo is compelled to "fulfill his obligation" for an "empty desire."

Signalizing, the cipher linking the first, "conscious" component of the story to the second, "unconscious" (i.e. written in a topological rebus code, 1/x as the cartographic strategy of the police) uses an α/α logic where the two shadows, a₁ and a₂, are linked. The "just before" and "just after" of the film’s future anterior is condensed into the final scene, where Gondo, financially and personally ruined, confronts the kidnapper before his execution. The gratuitousness of the crime returns the story to the central theme of "negation negating negation." The "forced choice" has, on account of the remainder of interpellation (Mladen Dolar, “Beyond Interpellation”) has created a composite subject, echoing the twinning of the sons in the opening scene.
2.05 / High and Low

The Japanese film-maker Akira Kurosawa’s 1963 crime thriller, *High and Low*, provides a quick trip to the interior of the reciprocity between privation and prohibition by drawing on all four of the models of virtuality. The English title is a bit of a topological euphamism. *Tengoku to Jigoku* literally means “heaven and hell,” but *High and Low* does us the service of keeping theological issues grounded in pure topology, requiring the full spectrum of virtuality’s powers. Kingo Gondo, an industrialist negotiating to take over his company, is interrupted by a kidnapping. The chauffeur’s son is taken by mistake (the two boys were playing “cowboys and Indians” in costume), but the industrialist is persuaded to accept full responsibility, not only ruining his chances for closing the deal but wiping out his wealth completely. The issue of double (detached virtuality) looms prominently, and here we can read events two ways, one as an economy of privation and the other as responses to prohibition. The background logic of *High and Low*’s plot is based on a plus–minus labyrinth of privation: the ransom equals exactly the amount of money the industrialist needed for his take-over; the chauffeur’s son played the role of an “exact copy” of the industrialist’s; the industrialist’s prominent house stands as an antipode to Yokahama’s low dock lands; the slum’s very son has risen from his job as a humble shoemaker to become the CEO of his company, and the house rises on its hill in sympathy to its owner. This back-and-forth contrasts the prelest of Gondo’s ambition. The kidnapper is the evil eye, the retribution of the lower classes against the rich. His literal gaze through a telescope at the house from his shack in the dock lands (to make sure Gondo does not consult the police) is invisible in Gondo’s picture-window view of Yokohama. In the second half of the film, the “police procedural” translates this invisibility into a carefully mapped search for the kidnapper. Interpolating evidence of sounds, smells, and sun-angles reported by the recovered chauffeur’s son, they triangulate the kidnapper’s apartment and sea-side hide-away. The key clue comes with the chemical that soaks the ransom money’s case. It burns pink and, in a film that is otherwise black and white, is shown in color.

Without Florensky’s idea of prelest, it would be hard to imagine the coordination of synesthetic clues, mathematical balances, and coincidental matches that abound both in the film and the film’s basis, the novel *King’s Ransom* by Ed McBain. In the opening scenes, Gondo is shown maneuvering for control in a meeting with other company executives. His position is tenuous but he manages to win out. This ambition turns out to be reckless: he has mortgaged his family’s entire wealth, including his wife’s, which oversteps what honor allows in Japanese society. His logic of privation, a perfect mathematical system of x’s balanced with -x’s, overlaps the system of prohibition. What is “taken away” by the kidnapper’s demand seems to have been invited by avarice and supplied by fate, who accepts debt in the currency of privation but returns it in the marked bills of prohibition. Prelest fixes the single dimension that adds up perfectly but creates, out of the tug-of-war of exact numbers, a transcendental field ruled by prohibition.

notes
“Signalizing,” “interpellation,” and obversion share a common topological logic. (1) “Signalizing” refers to a code that, much like a password, refers to the code itself in the process of delivering a message silently embedded within some “innocent” medium. A kidnapper has a gun pointed at his/her victim, who must answer the phone to avoid arousing suspicion. The victim wants to alert the caller that there is a kidnapper in the room but cannot make any direct reference to this. The only choice to “signalize” through some direct reference to the code itself, by creating an anomaly that the caller will notice but the kidnapper will accept as ordinary. (2) Interpellation is the conversion of an exterior bounding horizon of authority to an internal void within the subject, a command that is enigmatically blank, forcing the subject to voluntarily adopt the stance of responding to a “forced choice” situation. (3) “Obversion” is the topological flip that inscribes an exterior materiality into the center of individuals, making them subjects. Because this central inscription is a void, it has its own dimensionality, which can be anamorphically superimposed on the subject's empirical reality.

The commonality linking these three diverse conditions of obversion is demonstrated, bizarrely, by the way Michel Foucault constructed his model of ocular power, the Panopticon, in reverse. Foucault did not take the necessary step of topologizing the \(-x\) function of the Panopticon's guard tower. By making prisoners invisible from each other, the (multiple) prisoners are actually singular. A central void defines the condition of Florenskian “prelest” — the space that has been charged as good or evil by a stereognosis. Like the second Mrs. de Winter of 
*Rebecca*, the room to move around turns her into an anamorphic ghost superimposed on the near-mansion condition, a counterpart to the near-ruin condition (the ruin animated by moonlight). The guard tower, central and unitary in the Panopticon, is the \(360^\circ\) condition of anywhere, any time. Bentham's early anticipation of Althusser's ideological subject is, in fact, the obversion of the external point to the external circle to the interior void. This void, as Dolar argues, is a material remainder. In 
*Rebecca*, we see how it is an anamorphic ruin superimposed over the quotidian space of the mansion, \(1/x\).

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**SIGNALIZING**

Straight-up signalizing can be explained by a joke.

A worker decides to take a job in Siberia. Knowing that censors will read everything, he devises a code to use when writing home to his friends.

—If something is true, I’ll use blue ink, if it’s false, I’ll use red ink.

After a few months on his new job, he writes home.

—Everything is wonderful here—great food, comfortable housing, all utilities are provided, people are friendly—the only problem is, none of the stores carry red ink!

Žižek (*Welcome to the Desert of the Real*) notes that the writer has found a way to communicate the problem by referring to the code itself.

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**PANOPTICISM**

Foucault's use of Bentham's Panopticon as an emblem for the gaze of the other is unfortunately reversed. The evil eye belongs to the horizon — it is the basis of the boundary between social visibility and the invisibility of "raw life." The fact that this horizon can be fragmented and related as a partial object makes the evil eye portable, but the idea of encircling horizon remains, just as firmly embedded as in the formal concentric model.
2.06 / Interpellation and Interpolation

The contrast between the mathematical back-and-forth of privation (the first half of the film centered on the privation of the kidnapping) and the field of prohibition ("law") that dominates the second half’s police procedural demonstrates the fractal qualities of this dynamic pair of terms. The kidnapping, after all, seems to come at a time and in a way that suggests the retribution of the "evil eye." Gondo has violated a prohibition in risking his family’s fortune in a risky deal; the privation of the kidnapping is punishment, and the optics of the evil eye is built into the structure of the kidnapper’s telescopic surveillance of the house on the hill. And, though the general structure of the second half of the film is based on the prohibition nature of the police’s man-hunt, their logic of pursuit structures privation within the triangulation procedures of maps and search strategies.

This fluid exchange between privation and prohibition is translated and diversified, involving multiple levels of meaning and varied media, as when prohibition is seen in terms of (Althusserian) interpellation and privation is portrayed in the geometries of interpolation. With the phone call from the kidnapper, a voice — acousmatic in every sense — establishes the triangle of obligation that shames Gondo into paying the ransom. Gondo can refuse the anguished pleas of his chauffeur but not the moral conscience of his wife. The police take up the "generically maternal" position as well. The shadow line created by the line-of-sight of the kidnapper’s telescope has forced them to crouch and waddle below it, the submissive posture of women in Medieval Japanese households and a cue readily understood by most audiences. Gondo is interpellated by this maternal presence. He is able to stand up at the window so the kidnapper can see him plainly; his wife and the police’s presence is acoustic and "off stage" relative to the kidnapper just as the kidnapper’s voice is acousmatic relative to the mansion.

Isn’t the privation of the telescope simply a deployment of the lore of the evil eye? Gondo has over-reached, he has violated a prohibition against risking is family’s security. The evil eye, invisible as a panoptical gaze of envy, is integrated into visibility as a whole but, in this case, framed as a feature of Gondo’s picture window view of the docklands. Out there somewhere is a kidnapper with a telescope to make sure he doesn’t consult the police. This privation structure is set up to counter the "prohibition structure" of the law and its agents. The telescope’s view, a low angle on a high place, cuts the space of the living room in two. The shadow line allows the police to circulate as long as they crouch below it. It requires Gondo and his wife to appear so that the kidnapper can confirm their obedience. Within the room, the a, the kidnapper’s gaze, has imposed an a′−a′ division of sectional space. The orthogonal operator can be seen clearly in this view, structuring a logic of absence and acousmatics in the sagittal direction of the kidnapper, and keeping to the prohibitional logic of interpellation at a right angle to that. What Gondo has desired, the kidnapper has subtracted. The evil eye has done its job. After this, privation will be converted to a logic of prohibition, as the police tackle the problem of the kidnapper’s un-locatability. Privation converts to prohibition at the most general scale, but then the activation of the law addresses the issue of privation. Invisibility will be interpolated back into visibility. Another name for this interpolation is resonance. It is the mobilization of acts within a framed field, where initially unrelated or even random acts converge on a single point: an effect that converts into a cause, S₁, the unconscious of the subject — or, rather, the unconscious as the subject.

Fredric Jameson (1990), 26-27: the effectiveness of the symbol (S₁ here) is to "absorb and organize the quite diverse anxieties together." The inverted logic of S₁ involves retroaction and over-determination.
Mladen Dolar argues, in “Beyond Interpellation,” that the “clean cut” of Althusserian interpellation is not so clean. There is a remainder, just as the unnamed heroine of Rebecca finds wiggle room enough to get lost in the mansion, Manderley. This remainder, a void at the heart of the individual that has created, in a first-stage transformation, an “ideological subject,” will create a second, a “psychoanalytical subject,” through discourse, enunciation, and above all relations to the “impossible objects” created through obversion. Vico’s “natural history” of the subject comes into play, by showing off the role played by divination, an anxiety about the future that requires subjects to see nature in terms of the “signalizing” it yields in the form of prognosticating signs, which the Romans categorized as omen, ostentum, prodigium, miraculum, monstrum. Lacanians would benefit by consolidating Vico’s evidence on the matter of such “partial objects” and their correleative “sites of exception,” dedicated to memory, prophecy, concealment, and revelation. The acousmatics and mid-dire that serve discourse, enunciation, and psychoanalysis play roles in divinatory logic that move more quickly into the popular culture forms that constitute the clinic of the Freudian/Lacanian field.

Interpellation’s “flip” creates an exterior at the individual’s center, a void that constitutes an INSIDE FRAME. The materiality of ideology is the frame ‘x’ with secret/obscene contents, [α]. These actually exist only in retrospect, after the individual is interpellated, with the counter-conditions of [x]α, or the “scandal of the obversion,” the call of the policeman, “Hey, you!”

COMMENTS: Without the “scopic expansion” of the subject’s ideological interior frame, it would be impossible to account for the anamorphic conflict that leads to the fantasy of the “buried treasure,” akin to Poe’s purloined letter — an object in plain view that has been “vanished” by virtue of the structure of interpellation. Scopic expansions explain the means by which psychoanalytical subjectivity succeeds ideological subjectivity.

Good and evil theme: In Vico, evil “makes way for the good,” selfishness makes way for civilization, but not the utilitarian pleasure-principle argument. Has to do with fantasy, of attributing power to nature, as arbitrary and absolute (perfect automaton). This is also the secret that is suspended before the process of forced choice (ideology). The series of negations runs forward and backward at the same time (each previous claim is cancelled) ... this is like the sorites.

In zimzum terms, this is the contraction of nature as a series of instrumental relationships (animal relations) to an absence of meanings and remainder of meaningfulness. Divination is required to “satisfy this -x condition.” Note, this is related to the frame as -x, allowing x as a field to appear. What is outside constitutes the unconscious, what lies within the framed field is the symptom or synthose.

As with Dolar’s argument, the remainder of interpellation is the STRUCTURE of extimacy, the fact that the outside is inside. It’s the unavoidable truth, evidence of which is the question about it. This is also a temporality issue related to the just-before/just-after.
2.07 / The Automation of Good and Evil

The arts make sure that we don’t have to subsist on abstractions. Goodness is only goodness when challenged: the innocent person, the wrongly accused, the misidentified. Evil is the organ that looks back at us from all angles, ready to adjust our fate if we take more than our share, ready to insert a void into all subjects who think, when the policeman calls, "Hey, you!” that they must have done something wrong. The complexity of the concept is built into the weirdness of the objects and subjects and the impossibility of the spatial and temporal fields they are thrown into. Popular culture gives us a chance to see this component of difficulty/impossibility played out, activated, spread over multiple themes, genres, and media. Thinking about the problem of evil will lead nowhere. Watching how the evil eye, this blind spot in the field of the visible that is simultaneously a portable horizon, this limit to mastery, will reveal considerably more.

The feeling that one is being watched is common. Moslems who visit the graves of relatives firmly believe they are observed by the dead. Literal voyeurism is only a supplement to the inscription of the imaginary audience into any and all private chambers, converting solitude into a performance. The presence of an actual voyeur, as in Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous peeker kneeling at the hotel keyhole, is superfluous. The guest inside is already imagining he/she is being watched. The gaze is an inscription of the negative at the dead center of what it negates. Inscription creates an inside frame, an obversion. It is the exception that undermines the literal identity of \( x = x \), the basis of all logic. But, the negation is not a simple inversion (cf. prohibition), \( x \rightarrow 1/x \), nor is it just a cancellation (cf. privation), \( x \rightarrow -x \). It is the (imaginary) combination of the two modes of negation: \( -x = 1/x \), \( x^2 = -1 \); \( \sqrt{-1} \) or \( i \). The \( i \) is the logic of the orthogonal operator that converts privation and prohibition, interpellation and interpolation, the true and the made (Vico). It is the means by which Kurosawa can divide High and Low into a morality tale and a police procedural and the basis for the film’s extensive devotion to topology. As the title suggests, it is the radical convertibility of heaven and hell; the virtuality of the double whose scandal of coexistence is revealed in the final scene of mirrored images of victim and victimizer. Who knows, in these terms, who is dead and who is alive?

The film refuses to clarify and, in effect, remains true, as Lacan would say, "with respect to its desire,” i.e. to the centrality of its Real.

Within the vocabulary of Aristotle, we can enjoy a remarkable convergence of terms that link the uncanny with chance. Tuché is both the contingency of events, where opportunities present themselves based on a logic of touch and adjacency, and the vicissitudes of human desire, which imagine a line of sight leading desire to fulfillment, subject to object, etc. Automaton, as both natural chance and the automation, \( a \) of \( S_1 \) as the element of fate that guides objects and subjects towards a common, single end, not just in the face of choice but because of it — turning the "tree" of free choice around in an over-determined Borgesian convergeance known so well by ΩEdipus and Odysseus — provides the means of converting material cause, the factum, into formal cause, the verum: verum ipsum factum (Vico). This is the divided subject’s dilemma of desire, and fantasy’s response. Automaton works as unconscious (\$/a, Lacan’s notation for this component of the discourse of analysis), but the unconscious is not inside the subject’s head but, rather, “out there.” Its effectiveness is guaranteed, so to speak, by its externalization — extimation — its objectivity, its resistance to subjective inquiry and view. It is the ultimate object of desire, the blind spot, the evil eye, the organ without a body.

*Aristotle, Physics; Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction?*
Thornhill, the ad executive, enjoys what Roland Barthes called the *studium of experience*: a series of predications whereby easily mastered details are ordered beneath signifiers. He even forms an emblem of this relationship with his secretary, who accompanies him on a cab ride to lunch at the Plaza Hotel. “In the world of advertising, there is no such thing as a lie, only an expedient exaggeration.” Exaggeration is again emphasized around cocktails in the hotel lounge, as a deaf colleague, Fanning Nelson, requires exaggeration. The theme of protuberance continues when Thornhill stands up to send a message but gets a message by mistake. (This reverses the predication logic and “signalizes” to the KGB agents that he’s the man they had paged, George Kaplan). Signalizing calls forth the “missing elements” of the sorites, the dropped-out surplus/gap element, α, and the frame element itself, brought inside the field to “estimate” Thornhill’s hysterical situation. The Townsend mansion converts to a prison, Kaplan converts to a Nohbdy, Eve Kendell converts to a spy and back again — *la donna è mobile!* Where predications continually convert to signalizing, the hysteric Thornhill converts the *studium* to exceptions, including the famous site of exception for the crop-duster scene. The crop-duster, true to signalizing logic, is dusting crops “where there ain’t no crops.” Corn was used by the ancients as well as Hitchcock to serve as a “field of signifiers” able to conceal the hysteric, who resists the logic of location — i.e. he hides and is thereby “uninterpolated” by the machine-gun of the crop-duster. *Cardus* and *decumanus* of the rural highways, and the exploding truck that allows Thornhill to get away chiastically (the “pickup” he steals is almost a palindrome, and cool — it carries a refrigerator — in comparison to the tanker that just went up in flames). After the eyes of Teddy Roosevelt return Thornhill’s look through the park binoculers, he contrives to fake his own death in order to save Eve’s reputation (her “face”) but finds he must save her goods as well by getting her out of VanDamm’s modernist villa above Rushmore’s carvings, national “faces.” The inverted giant faces form the final inside-frame site of exception, where meaning as well as Eve are “suspended.”

Like Vico’s imaginative universal, exemplified by the thunder, the final element “escapes predication” and contracts the meaning of the preceding proto-signifiers. The material element of the frame becomes the extroverted field of signification, related to divinatory procedures using various fields: surfaces, the sky, animal entrails. Contraction of meaning, *zimzum*, creates the condition of signaling that is the first basis of divinatory sign-types: *omen, ostentum, monstrum*, etc. The “word without meaning,” α, becomes secret, unpronounceable, “impossible.” The grammar that sets this word into the network of signifiers, x, becomes the factor of location where past, present, and future merge, outside of the logic of predication.

Lacan’s formula for the hysteric’s discourse shows, on the left, the elements serving enunciation (the space from which enunciation occurs); the master signifier (S₁) and system of signifiers (S₂) serve as frame and field respectively. The objet petit α is, appropriately, “beneath the bar”; $ is barred as the “body in pieces” of the Mirror Stage, forced to attend to the sites of exception (x α in the graph) as “misrecognized,” i.e. as the Nohbdy, Kaplan.
Language begins with prohibition: the cosmic “no” of Vico/Joyce’s thunder clap. The condition of speaking and entering into networks of symbolic relationships is a choice: one takes the “blue pill,” so to speak, of neurosis and accepts the mis-fit, mis-identification, and false pride of symbolic relationships, predications linking signifiers and signifieds (Barthes: *studium*). Key to this formation is Lacan’s famous “discourse of the master,” which borrows its irony from Hegel’s master-slave relationship. The master seeks recognition, but the path to this lies in dependence on the servant, whose subordinate status is nonetheless to the key to the respect the master seeks. The master must be, in a succinct condensation of the logic of the extimate, “recognized” by those who are by definition themselves unrecognizable. Lacan’s other forms of discourse (university, analysis, hysteria) involve their own doses of extimacy, based on the subject’s relationship to *jouissance* (enjoyment). \$/a is the sign of hysteria, where the concealment of *jouissance* must surely relate to an inability to map or even contain organs that now seem to wander on their own. Advertisers who plant subliminal messages in ads know this all too well: what they eye may see it “keeps to itself,” that is, to the unconscious, where it is repackaged and sent up in cipher. Hearing, touch, taste, and smell collect their own intelligence without reporting all of it to consciousness, by which means memories are formed that surprise us because they were made in secret and organized for secret reasons.

With hysteria, we see the results, that S1/S2 subordinates signifiers, S2, beneath the commands of the super-ego, the master signifier, which can be ideology or ideology’s representatives, as in the example of Alfred Hitchcock’s *North by Northwest* (1959), where Roger O. Thornhill is caught between two competing “masters,” one a CIA/FBI director, the other an operative of the KGB. Thornhill is tuned into perfect hysterical pitch by Cary Grant, whose admission that the ‘O’ of his name “stands for nothing.” This is not modesty or irony but a literal equation. He stands, but being in between the ideologies of competing super-powers, he can find only the negative as his political flag. This he carries once the KGB have mistakenly identified him in the Plaza Hotel bar as George Kaplan, an American spy booked into a room upstairs. The CIA has invented Kaplan and planted his travel gear in hotels across the country to lead the KGB on a goose chase. Once Thornhill seems to answer a page for Kaplan, he is trapped, both by the master signifier equation of Kaplan as/as-not (ni) a spy and the masters who sustain both sides of this equation. Thornhill, the human anamorph, is continually “over-exposed,” as in the case when photographers at the UN seem to catch him in the act of murdering a diplomat; or, in the last scene, when his reflection is caught in the dark glass of the television set. The face is enlarged, set loose on the airwaves and news wires. The theme of the enlarged face culminates in the film’s last location, Mt. Rushmore, where the privation of Teddy Roosevelt’s stone pupils are enough to have him look back at Thornhill when he tries to look at it.

The truth of the matter, α, is that Thornhill enjoys it; he converts pain to pleasure, pleasure to pain. Getting drunk at a party is actually attempted murder by Russian spies, he tells the judge. His lover Eve Kendall is his hated enemy ... or not. The portal opens up a twisting road where one turn negates the other, then itself again. XXX. “Suspense,” the Hitchcock meta-motif, is literally hanging above a void: Golgotha. The earth beneath one’s feet has opened up (cf. *Young and Innocent, Saboteur, Rear Window*).
The formation of the master signifier, evident in popular culture terms as, among other things, the Hitchcockian "McGuffin," requires not just a topology but a "defective" one at that. The use of George Spencer-Brown's calculus to describe the system of sorites that, through a process related to predication yields remainders that estimate a field of affordances "bent by remainders" in the same way the space of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity internalized its "warp." The Lacanian master signifier, $S_1$, occupies the position of Other in the discourse of the hysteric. It becomes the field of affordances (tuchê). The body-in-pieces (the subject humiliated by the specular self of the Mirror Stage) creates the split between enunciation act and the enunciated (énoncé). Inside the specular field, however, it is the contradiction, the radically internalized warp, that emphasizes the role of "sites of exception" dominated by the tension between $\partial$ and $\alpha$. Can the calculus also track such formations? Does Spencer-Brown's system have its own "defective mode" corresponding to the obversions associated with Freudian hysteria and Lacanian master signification?

In George Spencer-Brown's original calculus (Laws of Form, 1979), there are no numbers, just two axioms, above. The first may be paraphrased, "a call and a call again are equivalent to a single call"; and "a cross and a cross again are equivalent to no cross." The first axiom seems to be a principle of redundancy. Once "the lights are turned on, they cannot be turned on again; they remain on." Or: "flipping the switch once turns the lights on, flipping it again turns them off." Spencer-Brown did not encourage empirical paraphrasing, but he did compare his symbol to a frame bounding space, with the unresolved ambiguity of how to count the "implicit frame" of the representational surface itself — i.e. does the drawing not already have four lines (the edges of the paper)?

The question of whether or not to add the frame of the act of representation complicates the "flat" version of Spencer-Brown's calculus. This complication is made more evident if the surface of representation is not flat but, rather, spherical. This is equivalent to the map-to-atlas problem of curvature and, hence, reminiscent of Einstein's transition from a local to a general theory of relativity, where the "warp" of a normal space becomes a space that is radically warped through and through. Reversing the initial axioms summarizes the "obverse" calculus conditions. Two calls are equivalent to the light switch that turns off and on (the negation of the Homeric "Nohbdy"), two crosses leave a remainder, the situation of Althusserian interpellation, a subject whose central void can be "dimensionalized."

On a closed curved surface, the "defect" of Spencer-Brown's calculus becomes evident. If Australia's frame is used as a point of view, the detached point of view of the case on the left is taken into the representation, adding a cross and inverting the value of the equation. Because this internalization is directly comparable to Freud's "introjection" and Lacan's extimacy, and because the internalization of the "externality" of the state apparatus in the process of Althusserian interpellation — which, Dolar claims, creates a remainder, the failure of the calculus is extremely informative. It creates a shorthand symbolism that may by applied, additionally, as a calculus describing the use of frames in discourse, visual representation, film editing, and narrative structure.
2.09 / Master Signifier as Spell

According to Lacan, the master signifier is not simply a paradigm but rather a defect in causality itself that differentiates the human concept from universals, such as the “laws of physics,” that play out tautological relationships without creating remainders. An example of this latter would be F=MA, or “force equals mass times acceleration”), Newton’s second law of motion. The terms are exchangeable according to the standard laws of algebraic equations. Force is mass times acceleration; acceleration is force divided by mass, etc. Causality, however, is defective in that the effect can retroactively determine the cause. Lacan argues that the defect is more general. By an “impossible” topology not unrelated to the Mirror Stage’s retroactive creation of the "body in pieces," which falls short of the mastery indicated by its very own spectral image in the mirror, one effect standing out of a contingent series can be accelerated into becoming what Deleuze has labeled a “demark,” a non–mark, an index that becomes its own indicated. In the Stephen Spielberg film, Jaws, the shark “stands out” from the order of nature to become a center of meaning, through which the greed of businessmen keen to keep the beaches open even in the face of danger, the moral degeneracy of teenagers having sex in the water, and the incursion of human activities on the domain of nature all funnel. Fredric Jameson summarizes:

[T]he vocation of the symbol — the killer shark — lies less in any single message or meaning than in its very capacity to absorb and organize all of these quite distinct anxieties together. As a symbolic vehicle, then, the shark must be understood in terms of its essentially polysemous function rather than any particular content attributable to it by this or that spectator. Yet it is precisely this polysemousness which is profoundly ideological, insofar as it allows essentially social and historical anxieties to be folded back into apparently “natural” ones, both to express and to be recontained in what looks like a conflict with other forms of biological existence.

The shark, as defect of nature, a monster (L. monstrum), creates “a sign or portent that disrupts the natural order as evidence of divine displeasure.” — But there are less serious versions: the Hitchcockian “McGuffin”:

It might be a Scottish name, taken from a story about two men in a train. One man says, “What’s that package up there in the baggage rack?” And the other answers, “Oh that’s a McGuffin.” The first one asks, “What’s a McGuffin?” “Well,” the other man says, “It’s an apparatus for trapping lions in the Scottish Highlands.” The first man says, “But there are no lions in the Scottish Highlands,” and the other one answers “Well, then that’s no McGuffin!” So you see, a McGuffin is nothing at all.

One could continue ... “So you see, the master signifier is nothing at all” — i.e. a spell.

Sidney Gottlieb and Christopher Brookhouse, Framing Hitchcock, 48.

The master signifier, by being nothing, is able to function as an automaton in the sense of an external agency that “does one’s thinking, desiring, fearing, grieving, etc. for one.” It is precisely the zero value that gives the automaton the power of the enthymeme, the “rhetorical syllogism” that connects the audience to the speaker by means of a “silent” middle term (ι — again, the sign of anamorphosis) which, by virtue of its circular logic, creates a condition of non-sense that is “really” non (negative) sense.
Italo Calvino’s graphic novel, *The Castle of Crossed Destinies*, provides an illustrated proof of Spencer-Brown’s “defective” calculus. The defect is introduced as a theme early in the narrative, when travelers converge on a castle in an enchanted wood. They cannot determine if the castle was a ruin taken over by an enterprising couple intent on raising it to the standard of a boutique hotel or, alternatively, the original king and queen had gradually been reduced to the status of inn-keepers as their kingdom and castle fell into ruin. This highlights the *internal defect of predication*, revealed in the marketer’s dilemma of whether to promote a beer as a “dark light beer” or a “light dark beer.” Calvino’s system of self-negating predications is established by an array of Tarot cards used to tell stories around the dinner table. Each card is used multiple times by stories that are unfolded in rows, columns, or diagonals. This “rounds” the matrix, “signalizing” the estimate and referencing the original inn-keeper/royal couple ambiguity. As in the case of *Rebecca*, what’s at stake is the loss of the name (= royal title). The master signifier, $S_1$, is “hystericized” when, like Roger O. Thornhill, its identity is “re-inscribed” through the introduction of a Homeric “Nohbdy,” a Kaplan (non-existent spy). This is the punctum in relation to the studium.

Calvino’s array of Tarot cards amounts to a summation of the possibilities of literary tuchē — the studium of predications (literary situations or scenes) — with, appropriately, empty locations at two corners and the middle. The array is the component, ‘A’, in the uncanny’s matheine of Ao. The $D$ element corresponds to the punctum, the point of extimacy, the stain or blank that obverts the terms of spectating. This picture of literary overdetermination operates according to a strategy of completion. How will the story end? The end cannot be a simple quantitative termination. A theme or element unnoticed in the beginning must be brought into connection with the final element. In an essential way, the conjunction of these two elements constitute an “organ,” i.e. a relation of interior and exterior, where the flip structure is itself incorporated as a material component, a “void” that can be expressed only through signalizing.
2.10 / The Sleep of Reason ...

The drift of maps across the plane defined by the atlas combines the components of the dream in a scientific format. The vertical view, up or down, loosely corresponds to dreams and nightmares. In Kurosawa’s High and Low, the kidnapper gazes up to imagine an easy path to the wealth of the industrialist in his white house. The industrialist then looks down, unable to find the invisible point that has reversed his fortunes through the paradox of kidnapping “the wrong boy.” Thornhill’s Kaplan is Gondo’s Shinichi, the chauffeur’s son. The zero operator works as master signifier, locking in fate ($A_D$). The inscription of death could be compared to the dream appearing in the midst of waking life, the “detached” form of virtuality, where a suppressed element “returns” to a place that is as impossible as it is Real.

This is, clearly, the domain of the spell, which, like the shark of Jaws, comes from nowhere and changes everything. The shark, Kaplan, Shinichi, and other master signifiers work because of their a-symmetry. This is not to be mistaken for a lack of symmetry but, rather, a symmetry that is postponed, delayed. In his perceptive novel, The Castle of Crossed Destinies, Italo Calvino penetrates the logic of the master signifier by casting the story as a magical tale about a magical event. Travelers pass through a forest that inexplicably robs them of the powers of speech. They nonetheless manage to find an inn that is itself a chaismus: either the landlords began as a king and queen whose domains gradually deteriorated to the point of reducing them to inn-keepers; or they began as humble hosts who gradually built up their inn to resemble a small palace. The guests overcome their muteness by telling stories using Tarot cards. With a finite deck, the stories overlap and cross; one story appropriates cards from another, changing their meanings through new frames.

The role of the vertical is clear but curiously unacknowledged. The journey to the castle is initially “horizontal,” just as the map seems to glide across the surface of the earth. The spell of the enchanted forest is the invisible element of jouissance, that returns in the form of the symmetry of stories. Calvino reveals the fullness of this magic by demonstrating, in a plate that accompanies the narrator’s own story, that the fully displayed Tarot pack has mapped the space of “all possible stories” — in theory, at least. The sample is convincing: Lady Macbeth, King Lear, Faust, Parsifal, Hamlet, Oedipus … each card has “lateral” potential. Like Lawrence Durrell’s Alexandria Quartet, different “winds” might blow across the same place, creating in effect different places within any one place. Hamlet’s comment that led to Hitchcock’s film title is suggestive: “I am but mad north-north-west: when the wind is southerly / I know a hawk from a handsaw” (Act 2, Scene 2). The fact that the Temple of the Winds in Athens was maintained by Sufi mystics during Ottoman rule suggests a broad, cross-cultural tradition linking winds (lateral) to fate (vertical).

Eric Santner: "The punctum is not an intervention of another order of reality, but a rising to consciousness of a non-symbolizable surplus within an otherwise intelligible reality, a sort of stain on the horizon of cultural intelligibility. When we are touched by the punctum of a photograph, we have been touched by a remainder, something leftover from our ‘reading’ of the studium” (On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, 74). The viewer is interpellated by the image, caught up in its imaginary extrapolation from the particular scene to the “universal” condition it represents. The frame literally flips. It reverses its enclosing power to frame the viewer, to implicate the act of looking as the undeniable performative element that has activated the photograph’s magic. In Florensky’s terms, the icon has looked back; the worshiper has been called out (“Hey, you!”) in the clearest Althusserian sense. The final call of the Apocalypse has been localized in the acousmatic/stochastic present, but the present has been, reciprocally, pulled forward into a future anterior reality, a “site of exception.”

Gondo drops out of society after payment of the ransom has exhausted his financial resources and chance of corporate success. The money is always associated with a gap: the need to “close the gap” in the deal, the gap between asking and offering price, the precise amount of ransom demand, the accidental substitution of the chauffer’s son for Gondo’s own.

Another way of writing “gap” is with the sign of predication, to indicate how, with each new layer of signification, there is a discarded content, present and not-present, that is a negative constituent of the chain of signifiers/predications that moves the story forward.

Below: with the gap, the “corners have been shaved off” while preserving (or, in order to preserve) the internal symmetry binding the studium of predications.

The collapse of signifiers/predictions in the process of interpolation condenses signs as well as the sensorial media (= synaesthesia) that support them. This creates the logic of the anamorphic sign, \( \omega \), that is the structural basis of the clue that not only solidifies the field of signifiers/predicates but "erects" the audience’s position within the work of art. The audience is interpellated by the punctum of the final scene of High and Low. This scene brings Gondo and the kidnapper together through reflections in the glass partition of the interview cell. The audience’s “impossible” location in the fourth wall of this scene is constructed by shots that zig-zag across the boundary, always including the reflection of the opposite space in the main image.
2.11 / ... Gives Rise to Monsters

Detached virtuality “rotates” the vertical to the horizontal, an act of contamination (of reality by the dream, logic by fiction, etc.). Thus, in *High and Low*, the story divides into one based on the steep site of the industrialist’s mansion and a second half dominated by maps of horizontal relationships. In the first story, the vertical separates rich from poor; in the second it is condensed into signs that use the vertical to collapse the dimensions that conceal the criminals: the colored smoke from the incinerator where the kidnapper has burned the ransom-money case; the hideaway triangulated by sounds and sun-angles; a scar spotted on the kidnapper’s wrist. The final scene uses reflections in the kidnappers wrap-around sunglasses (a motif Hitchcock exploited in the murder scene of *Strangers on a Train*), suggesting that dimensionality collapse and dramatic resolution are identical. As if to put a coda on this thesis, the final scene juxtaposes victim and victimizer in the glass partition of the prison interview room. The rotation of the vertical to the horizontal condenses into an anamorphic oscillation, a quick vibration between two antithetical realities, madness and sanity blowing across a Tower of Winds, which explains the orthogonal reason why towers and winds go together.

The monster of ancient divination traditions could be regarded as a grammatical defect that found its way into natural history. The body of the classical monster, the chimera, combines animals associated with seasons, so that the full body is fully anamorphized by collapsing the normal separation of cyclic temporal change. Isn’t this Florensky’s formula of the dream, which he connects to the face, the icon, and the full iconostasis of spiritual encounter? The “vertical” dream erects itself as a screen, up to which and through which, in a kind of radiance, its contents are made to seem to stream. The wind is the cosmic breath, the breath the word, and so on. The screen cannot escape the legacy of the spell; nor can the horizontal, which constitutes the field of play, the atlas, of the map, avoid the symmetry that Florensky attributes to whatever the populates the virtual obverse of the iconostasis. Calvino’s tiled arrangement of Tarot cards comes close, but its two-dimensional array is too limited. Instead, however, of needing to add a dimension or two, it is actually the collapse of each story, the way in which crisis and surprise twist the plot from the inside, that make the two-dimensional array “too generous” for the one-dimensional lines of action. The only way to go here is to the point, the monad of Leibniz or the “metaphysical points” of Vico, whose sneaky manipulation of etymology transformed the Latin *conatus* into both point and momentum. Momentum in what sense?

Pose this in terms of a short-circuit to the death drive, Freud’s misunderstood conceptualization of the subject’s resistance to death, which is in essence the energy that propels the dead subject past the moment of natural death into the zone that awaits a symbolic death. The monster is this: the vertical screen establishes the presence and role of the portal to the (ultimate) symmetry that is not given but must be unearthed, an archaeology of travel. This literal “de-monstration” of iconostasis focuses on two key elements: the role of the word, especially the whispered word, the password, and the action of twisting or flipping that must accomplish a double negation — an obversion — that, like logical obversion, preserves the truth of the situation. In this pursuit, angles must be preserved, particular when they appear as angels.

Johnstone’s categories of travel are distinguished from other kinds of motion in terms of the ‘authenticity’ of the relationship between the traveler and the travel environment; travel is related to knowledge and representation and both are related in turn to pleasure as a surplus/lack or ‘gap’ that cannot be closed. Travel requires a ‘construction’ of the representational experience, made by two ‘vectors’, one representing the artifacts that support representation, another standing for the structure and result of representation. “Home” is the exceptional category, constituting a “site of exception” which can be achieved centripetally or centrifugally, “home simple” (which lends travel its exotic quality) or “home away from home,” where travel is domesticated.

### Map 2.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accumulation</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>completing the “travel picture”</td>
<td>infrastructure, planning, strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cf. the imaginary)</td>
<td>(cf. the symbolic)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE GAP</th>
<th>Saturation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[the surplus/remainder of travel]</td>
<td>[the collapse of travel]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the relation of travel to desire</td>
<td>artifact overwhelms representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the ambiguity of “completion”</td>
<td>“wild travel”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suffering</th>
<th>Curiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety over completion</td>
<td>Opportunity, affordance, adjacency;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss of control</td>
<td>calculated risk of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[positioning commanded by the view]</td>
<td>[finding un-prescribed points of view]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflection</th>
<th>Solitude</th>
<th>Naïveté</th>
<th>Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to give an account</td>
<td>Necessity for a solitary point of view</td>
<td>Resistance to too much instruction</td>
<td>Need for instruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES (from Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *Odysseus as a Traveler: A Categorical Study*)

Control: “We see that travel proper is impossible when the moving person exercises either too much control or too little over his movement. He must, then exercise some control, but also be submissive to some extent to the exigencies of his situation. I have just enumerated two of the categories of travel.” [Emphasis mine]

Suffering: “The sufferer is still traveling, still attempting to increase his control. The challenge is exhilarating. Suffering is necessary because absolute control would transform a travel into an errand.”

Curiosity: “The curiosity of the traveler opens him to the possibilities both of an alien culture and of an alien nature. He learns what man is capable of, and thus what he is capable of. He also learns the range of forms in which the earth can appear to us.”

Accumulation: “Travel must be funded with memories of travel. You are not traveling when you are just starting out. Your trip must have a certain duration, a duration encompassed by memory.”

Home: “The traveler must be at home in his travels; and one is at home only where a memorial deposit has accumulated.” Home is not a category in the usual sense, but rather a structure holding together other categories.

Saturation: “Saturation can arise from a catastrophe so violent that it rips away the traveler’s sense of being at home in his travels. But it can also arise in nonviolent ways. Accumulation, I pointed out, requires that a trip be of a certain minimum duration. Saturation, on the other hand, arises from the exceeding of a certain maximum duration.” The Gap is the minimal dimensionality needed to sustain the POV in the face of Saturation’s collapse.

Reflection: “Reflection is a generic term of the account one must be able to give of one’s trip if it is to count as travel. … Reflection and Accumulation are … differently related to Home. Home is constituted of memories that accumulate. But we can be at home in these memories without knowing that we have a home.”

Solitude: “Solitude is what distinguishes travel from migration. … ”Two or more people can travel together, deliberately sharing an itinerary which in different ways satisfies the travel purposes of each. … My point is only that each must make the trip for himself, reflecting on it in his own way, acting on the basis of his own curiosity, subject to his own physiology of saturation.”

Personal: “A traveler needs a guide. If he finds himself in truly strange circumstances, he will not even be able to grasp how strange they are if he is limited to his own interpretive resources. He can at most guess what the strange structures are that he sees, or what the weird rituals are intended to bring about. He needs to have these things explained to him.”

Naïveté: “The fact that curiosity can be suffocated by facts points to the need for a categorical term to designate unsuffocated curiosity.” Naïveté thus constitutes the opportunity to create, ex nihilo, novelty within program.
2.12 / Contingent Motion

Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., an American idealist philosopher and academic, although nearing retirement, undertook the formal study of classical Greek. As a part of his doctoral program, he wrote periodic essays on Greek literature and culture, only a few of which have been published. Two conferences, one on travel (1977) and another on the philosophical role of the category (1977-1978), gave Johnstone the opportunity to formalize his ideas about travel’s relation to authenticity. The resulting essays applied the form of the category to conditions Homer’s Odysseus encountered as he delayed his return to Ithaca (see Appendix 1). Johnstone’s categories are described sequentially in loose relationship, but it is easy to see how they might be condensed into a single “travel syllogism.” The syllogism form relates both to the idea of the Lacanian master signifier and the enthymeme, the “rhetorical syllogism” that, in a Hegelian fashion, makes use of an “empty” and recursive middle term that “negates itself” in true master signifier fashion.

A syllogism must connect a subject and predicate through a process of suspended judgment that obeys logical rules. The thematic of a “space of judgment,” correlative to the interval between the two deaths, is relevant. In the context of an atlas of the obverse, subject and predicate may be expected to undergo simultaneous negations that are the key to preserving their authenticity under the threat of total destruction. This kind of radical transformation-under-threat-of-extinction is a familiar component of travel. Johnstone, in fact, exposed himself to an experimental journey around the world, imposing a discipline that disallowed any air travel. He sailed, bussed, trained, walked, and rode on various beasts of burden as far as India, where he found the going had gotten too rough and abandoned his project. The travel experiment demonstrates that Johnstone himself understood the syllogistic challenge of travel, and that he would possibly have given permission for a further topo-logical condensation of his ten travel categories.

Johnstone’s categories and the syllogism that condenses them are intended for testing against two great travel writers, Bruce Chatwin and W. G. Sebald. Both authors have a knack for articulating the precise problem of travel’s “orthogonality” — the effect of the right-angled turn (unforeseen opportunity), the “knight’s move” where the original motive of travel is negated but where another “motive” is discovered as a “floating signifier” within the autonomy of the travel experience itself. Putting it another way, travel is more than edifying, it is revelational, self-organizing, and in every aspect an “automaton,” in Lacan’s sense: a chain of signifiers with the lack between them and, underlying this chain, a more fundamental lack, concerning the Real beyond any signifier. The first cause lacks any determination whatsoever.

The autonomy of travel as an “automaton” brings it close to the idea of autopoiesis developed by Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana. This was essentially a biological concept whose ideas of sustainability and self-regulation have been used as a metaphor for similar cases of autonomy in human systems. There are a few key differences: (1) human autopoiesis is based on the structure of demand/desire; the role of the Other in creating a gap and circular return to an indefinable void is unique to the symbolic order and, hence, limited to humans, who have language; (2) self-reference is common in mathematics and nature (cf. the Fibonacci series) but this does not involve the “Möbius-band conditions” that construct truly human boundaries in terms of transitivity and retroaction; here, boundaries are the main site for development of the psyche within a (neurotic) field of impasses and contradictions, and mathematical recursion is simply an analogy for the more complex human situation; (3) the “linguistic turn” is not sufficient to explain the role of recursion and, hence, autopoiesis in the psyche, since it is principally at the level of the “partial object,” especially the voice, that language itself reaches a limit that is the occasion for the paradoxical structure of identity around the collapse of identity. Lacan embodied this collapse into the four principal forms of discourse and his theory of enunciation, where the extimate (inside-out conversions) was central. The twin functions of automaton — natural chance and partial object — fully account for the logic of autopoiesis when taken in the context of the reversal of the causal process in tuché and automaton.
Vectorial analysis creates a logical square joining two “operators,” finalization strategies and continuation strategies. The risk of dimensional collapse shows how Florensky’s model of the dream, face, icon (“iconostasis”) in turn reveals the inner debt to the uncanny’s primary categories, \(A\) and \(D\). The sub-elements of these are, through the relations of automaton and \(tuchē\), the elements of depth (\(\alpha\), also \(jouissance\), semblance) and curvature, \(\partial\), (also defect, dis-placement, contiguity).

The contrast of travel, between strategies that strive to complete and account for travel as a meaningful experience (“drive” in Freud’s terminology) and strategies that strive to continue to travel experience by extending it into successive adventures at the risk of the (missing) category of Home (\(unheimlich\)), is the structure of the gap, where travel as a motive returns to the same impasse through a cyclic series of challenges and resolutions. The similarity of this contrast to the dream, whose goal is to continue sleep but whose narrative structure constructs a beginning, middle, and end, confirms the long-maintained thesis of the kinship of travel and dream. We might generalize this pattern to include narrative as a whole as well as to any series that, like Sheherazade’s *A Thousand Nights and One Night* (Arabic: ٨ليلو ةليل فلأ باتك), sets in motion \(A\) while necessitating a symmetrically opposed \(D\).

Saturation is the collapse of dimensionality and the vectors of control and suffering that “keep open” the travel experience (and, hence, strive for continuation). Control can also collapse travel by folding into the category/dimension of Suffering, creating the situation described by Florensky as “prelest” (false spiritualization of the travel experience). The “knight’s move” involves a deployment of \(tuchē\) (opportunity, contingency, contiguity, metonymy) that displaces \(A\), the traveler as primarily an isolated individual (cf. Solitude) whose destiny is to complete (the “D” component of \(A\)) the travel experience (cf. finalization strategies).
2.13 / Uncanny Travel

The travel experience, in its necessity to stay open to chance, correlates to the fantasy, whose dimensionalities must “keep things at a distance,” including a temporal distance, delay. Travel is never a matter of all-at-once. It inherently has the variable of velocity. It can be sped up or slowed down, but once it stops there is no longer travel, and the well-known “five cities in five days” manner of travel amounts to the same destruction of travel possibility. The travel syllogism uses the middle term, the gap and its possibility of collapse, to hold open the other two groups of terms. Travel’s “vertical” dimensions are the heaven and hell associated with success or failure. Some Control is required for authentic travel, but too much Control leads to a collapse. This is the uncanny’s carefully plotted path of trials defining the $D\alpha$, the equivalent of the journey between the two deaths. The small-A element holds death open, keeps subjectivity moving, sustains the momentum of life. D as Control without $\alpha$ is Control that, like Florensky’s “prelest,” has produced a simulacrum of travel but without any risks: a truly zombie-like travel that simply goes through the motions but does not encounter anything novel.

The $\alpha$ is the Suffering that over-Control avoids by staying at chain hotels, eating at McDonalds, etc. The $\alpha$ element seeks out the darker quarters of town; converts travel into a true katabasis ($κατά, “down”; βαίνω “go”) or verticality. We could say that $\alpha$ has “dropped out” in the sense of “gone silent,” following the tradition of Eurydice, who was commanded to remain silent on her trip out of Hades; or “become invisible” like the veiled wife-bride in Euripides’ Alcestis. The $\alpha$ is also $\alpha$, the element of depth and jouissance on account of its resistance to representation.

The horizontal axis of travel corresponds to the immanent experience of motion across the surface, a motion led forward by Curiosity, an analog to life, $A$. In the uncanny’s formula $A\partial\alpha$, $\partial$ is both $\partial$, the component of curvature and turning, and the right-angle that makes what is accidental ($tuchē$) seem straight ahead but behind a screen or curtain. The two forms of chance, $\partial$ and $\alpha$, $tuchē$ and automaton. The right-angled “knight’s move” of opportunistic travel guided by curiosity is properly related to the autonomy component of the automaton that has been given life as a virtual “beyond,” just as the iconostasis gave life to the array of saints and angels behind the screen.

We are familiar with popular images of the automaton in relation to the curvature of travel, $\partial$. The labyrinth is topped by a temple, the gnomon placed on the curved surface of the earth points to a central Hades, “invisible,” where depth, $\alpha$, is depth incarnate, the place where everything that has “dropped out” goes and finds its ideal placement. We see this tradition of correct placement in Dante’s Inferno, where each ring is based on the internal symmetry of sin, and the justice of punishment is a matter of location. The symmetry is concealed, delayed — after all, Hades is The Invisible — but it is complete, hence Johnstone’s idea of Accumulation.

With Johnstone’s categories of travel, we have the means for converting the uncanny into the topography of the travel — and, hence, any — landscape. Or, vice versa.

Giambattista Vico, Ancient Wisdom, 69.
Henry Johnstone, Jr., “Odysseus as a Traveler: A Categorial Study” (see Appendix 1).
The modalities of travel, with their strategies of completion (Accumulation, Control) and competing strategies of continuation (Suffering, Curiosity, and related categories) point to another set of terms, for identifying a reality that exists beyond the physical space of travel and sometimes disobeying the rules of space-time ($R_1$) and an internal inconsistency, error, or problem that works like a clue pointing to some “central tendency” pulling together all such signs ($R_2$). Circular, recursive motion characterizes the ritual-like discovery of $R_1$, as an escape to a higher order reality from an exit that lies in the center or on the periphery of the bounded space. Escape itself is metaphorically vertical, because the enclosing reality has enclosed appearances from above, as in the case of the puppet master, or below, as in the case of demons occupying internal space. The horizontality of $R_2$ and the verticality of $R_1$ allow further comparisons of the travel categories to the vectors of the map and atlas.

**ACCUMULATION / CONTROL**

Completion:
- semblance
- authenticity
- testimony
- momentum
- identity
- automaton

**SUFFERING / CURIOSITY**

Continuation:
- contiguity
- stereognosis
- dis-placement
- labyrinth
- trial
- test

The gapped circle marks the point of return, an identity of origins and ends, the use of the boundary itself in oaths, esp. those whose violation is punished in temporal ways. References to buried treasure, or to an original fact or pledge, are indicative of the symmetries involved in pledges, an economy of debts for favors rendered, even ones incurred in ignorance, as in fairy tales. This is the modality of the “delayed” category of the uncanny, $\partial$... Hence the motif of travel in Hades (“invisible”) as circular.

The function of $\partial$ is that of an internal error or inconsistency, encountered in the course of an otherwise smooth operation. Forward linear motion encounters a glitch, but the glitch is the centripetal pull of a central force curving travel into a circle, returning it to its origin. This is the error of inconsistency, akin to the plot point or clue; a sign based on something out of place. This is the modality of the “delayed” category of the uncanny, $A...$. Hence, the frequent theme in travel through “ordinary space” of the wrong place.

**The Truman Show (1998)**

$R_2$: occasions are encountered in travel’s “horizontal” mode, as in this example from Peter Weir’s *The Truman Show* (1998), where an orphan has been raised from birth inside a production set (“Seahaven”) where he is the main character of a long-running television series but the only one on the set unaware that everything is a part of the show. He discovers the truth through linking his encounters with internal consistencies, as in this scene where his car radio picks up the director’s instructions to actors on the scene around him who are wired. The metaphor of the short circuit is apt. $R_2$ logic is an unintended link between two incompatible versions of reality.

The gap of discovery of the $R_1$ real can point upward and outward, as in Truman’s discovery of the outside world, accessible through an exit door at the top of a stair engraved into the sky at the set’s outer shell. The vector of this kind of discovery is vertical, and up may freely convert to down and vice versa. In this case Truman’s escape is to the “higher order reality” that has encased his life since infancy. Its spatiality and temporality is symbolically vertical, like the moon that is actually the director’s control room. The puppet’s reality is determined from above and maintained by strings of suspension that, when broken, lead to a downward collapse.
2.14 / Completion vs. Continuation

Johnstone’s categories of authentic travel reveal two principal strategies, completion and continuation, that constitute irreducible and opposed components of any travel experience, at any scale. Are these also vectors that can “re-enter” the travel equation at the level of syllogism (the position of the silent middle term) or the map-atlas metaphor, at the point where the tuchē of the map is brought functionally into contact with the atlas’s function as automata? Re-entry is critical in that completion/continuation are traditionally cast in the language of literary criticism, whose themes and methods offer an expanded field for elaborating the uncanny’s central role in travel and the extimate’s role in perceptual and representational space. But, by far the most significant connection is to the Freudian death drive, where the unconscious’s projects of continuation — evident most clearly in the function of the dream — come to heads with repetition and return as the effort made by the organism to attach its origin to its end. The image of the Uroboros is instructive even if a bit too “Jungian.” In contrast to the usual employment of the tail-swallowing serpent as a symbol of eternity, the point is missed by the New Age euphemism that the Uroboros is engaged in a culinary angle on self-reference, and that although “cuisine” is hardly what is implied certainly the hearth and its intimate relations to magic, death, and boundaries are no less interested than the tail-swallower in the complex conundrum of self-reference and extimacy.

The death drive is misunderstood in two classic ways. Either it is taken as a “drive towards death” in contrast to the preservation-minded projects that seek pleasure and reward; or it is seen as a repetition machine without reference to the partial logic that allows it to run the imagination through its everyday paces. The death drive ties completion and continuation together, as strategies, in a truly Hegelian way. Just as Florensky saw that the chaismus of the dream did not “resolve” any paradoxes of time but, rather, preserved an eternal antagonism, the death drive offers a comprehensive package of materialization options through which the strategies of completion and continuation can “carry their fight outside,” in the “street” of the everyday. Johnstone’s categories of travel show how completion and continuation work as the silent middle term, the “Janusian” hinge about which the uncanny may, through delays of any and all kinds, inscribe death into life and vice versa while stretching out this inscription to “wind up” a temporal spring that snaps the two elements back together, collapsing the dimensions of the fantasy that had temporarily held them apart.

Johnstone’s travel categories come close to being an atlas themselves, offering the cardinal directions by which completion and continuation may continue their acts of war in increasingly exotic locales. These include not just the usual settings of exploration and tourism but new topical locations as well — uniting both senses of the word, topos, the physical and mental place. Mind and place, the basis of a topology of thought, was in fact Lacan’s explicit goal, so we are doing no more than returning Lacan to Lacan, via the uncanny of travel, cuisine, and his own coin, the extimate.

Henry Johnstone, Jr., “Odysseus as a Traveler: A Categorial Study” (see Appendix 1).
**Map 2.15**

*Tuchē* (affordance, opportunity, contingency) draws together diverse thematic stratagems under the rubric of the horizontal, including the field effects of travel that produce general signs of dissonance. Perhaps the strongest field effect is the nausea felt by Antoine Roquentin, the principal character in Jean-Paul Sartre’s *La Nausée*, who reports that “The Nausea is not inside me: I feel it out there in the wall, in the suspenders, everywhere around me. It makes itself one with the café, I am the one who is within it.” This condition of extimacy creates a *moiré*, a negative resonance. External objects shimmer; their edges are frayed. They are covered with the lamella. W. G. Sebald describes situations of sudden disappearance of figures in the passageways of Venice in *Vertigo* and, in *Campo Santo*, of encountering troops of dead on the roads of Corsica, who can be identified because the margins of their profiles seem to blur and shimmer. As is clear in the example of *The Truman Show*, the horizontal forces a lamination of worlds, otherwise separated by a vertical space, so that an over- or under-world is able to break through weak spots in the fabric of ordinary reality. The common description of places as “magic” or “demonic” employs this logic, which is rooted in the fundamental structures of the popular uncanny.

The positive version of the *moiré* of the knight’s move is the (Joycean/Proustian) epiphany, also involving a “thinning” of horizontal space at the condition of a vertical screen, intimating the overlap of co-existing realities. In the positive form, the *moiré* becomes more of shimmering. In either form, the co-presence of two contrasting versions of reality directly produces an emotional and uncanny response.
2.15 / Ego-Ideal and Ideal Ego as Structure

The thinning of ordinary reality to a framed screen through which a vertically co-existent world begins to break through is a collapse of dimensionality, which should be regarded as fantasy constructed using the logic of the mirror stage. This is the geometry of the "ideal ego," the reflection of the masterful self in the mirror (stage), which comes into relationship with the (symbolic) "ego-ideal," a positioning of the subject with the network of symbolic relationships. The ideal ego is an image, the self as other. The ego-ideal is, in contrast, a relationship that continually refers to other (absent) signifiers.

This complex Lacanian account, that involves nearly every aspect of his theories of the subject, can be condensed by means of Johnstone's categories of travel, where the horizontal strategies of continuation short-circuit with the vertical strategies of completion. The former cannot imagine the latter — literally, in the sense that the vertical cannot be formed within the horizontal’s imaginary resources. A substitute must be fashioned as a work-around. This make-shift stand-in is in every way a false representation, which can refer to the vertical only by means of negatives: interruptions, errors, overlaps, gaps, deceptions. Thus, when Truman first begins to realize the reality around him is being directed by a distant unknown entity, the medium is the defective radio, which picks up interference from the director’s broadcast to the actors on the set. There is no easy way to connect the two contrasting readings of the scene. Truman’s car dangerously veers around the plaza as it hears yelled instructions and simultaneously sees actors jumping out of the way.

The ego-ideal’s relationship to the names of the father in Lacan’s system is spookily replicated in The Truman Show. Truman, an orphan, dreams of his (stage) father’s actual fatherliness and believes that he may have not died but simply left Seahaven following some trauma. A homeless man seems to resemble him, and Truman pursues him but is blocked by the producers. The producer-director, Christof, reveals himself as the paternal stand-in. Just as the name of the father may be anything that identifies what has interrupted the child’s ideal (imaginary) relationship with the mother with a symbolic mandate, Christof, a new media version of religious authority, gives Truman the ultimatum at the point of his escape: Truman’s life “on the outside,” he claims, will be (symbolically) nothing, because it is only through the symbolic castration of the show that he has become pure jouissance — pleasure of the subject possible only as a pleasure of the Other — i.e. his existence as an ideal ego, an image, an image-on-the-screen.

Johnstone would see this in terms of Odysseus’s return to Ithaca, a collapse of the fantasy of travel encounters, a termination and completion of the role of the ideal ego who has maintained an identity on behalf of the Other, “horizontally,” in perpetual tension with the vertical requirements of Accumulation and Solitude. The occasions for blurring, shimmering, and vibrating margins of scenes and figures, where the fabric of the horizontal is worn thin, where “screens” are erected in the form of experiments such as the visit to the cave of the Cyclops, put the symbolic mandate of return into the imaginary vocabulary of escape. We can see at this point that the screen naturally resembles a trap. Its spell can be broken by directly addressing the point of blindness, the gaze, the blank spot inscribed at the center of visibility that also marks the edge of mastery, the point where not just those who imagine but the imaginary itself fails.

Henry Johnstone, Jr., "Odysseus as a Traveler: A Categorial Study" (see Appendix 1).
In the condition known as "over-stuffing the signifier," or signalizing, a conventional sign is packed with an extra-phonemic content or internal flaw that refers to the code itself as defective. The anecdote about the worker in Siberia who could not find any place to buy red ink shows how sophisticated this negative technique can be. The complementary condition to over-stuffing is verboseness, over-stuffing the frame of discourse with signifiers, a condition simulated to great hilarity by Eugene Ionesco's play, *The New Tenant*, where movers bring furniture on stage until the characters are overwhelmed. Julia Kristeva notes, in *Powers of Horror*, that loquaciousness is the "tell" of a primordial type of hunger that involves both an *extimité* connecting the interior condition with an external threat, but that the estimated object takes the form, in her example, of the dog, but this must be examined in its "pre-domesticated" version, the wolf, the "primordially hungry" animal. Here, feast and famine's etymological turmoil, played out in terms for host and hostility, ghost and gast (taste) play out the logic of the *unheimlich* — that which protects the interior (ancestral gods) from the threat of view from outside but then ends up by letting the gaze of these same gods loose to roam the landscape. The wolf is the agent of this roaming, and the pack — both a hunting strategy and a semiotic tag, in the same way "flock" and "herd" are singularities that embed singularities — the essence of the wolf *is* the pack, its movements, its strategies. The field, therefore, is "permanently warped" by the agency of anxiety, whose "hunger" is the minimal element of obversion, qualified by character (the wolf as predicate of hunger) and motion-as-stealth, as *predicate of the field itself*.

A self-predicating field is able to perform a variety of seemingly autonomous transformations, not the least of which is that of "extimacy," the topological obversion that exchanges "external" material conditions with a dimension-alized subjective void. The example of the forest shows that the wolf is both predicate and spiritual designation of "that which makes a forest a forest" — i.e. subjective hunger, estimated to a field of predicated conditions.

Kristeva's example of the girl afraid of a dog (= domesticated version of "wolf") shows how the $\Gamma$ operator may work as a $+1/-1$ function or an $x$ vs. $1/x$ function. Note that this composite functionality is the essence of the $\Gamma$ operator, i.e. as $i$, "the imaginary," $\sqrt{-1}$.

The field of tuchē (affordance, opportunity, adjacency) is defined by the $\Gamma$ in both the sense of this convertibility between $+/-$ and $1/x$ logics but also in the way by which the "knight's move," $\Gamma$, distinguishes between aim and goal, desire and demand. In effect, $\Gamma$ "domesticates" the function of interpellation and the remainder that produces the dimensionalized void that becomes the Lacanian sinthome.

The $\Gamma$ often has surprisingly commonplace ideograms in popular culture, such as Red Riding Hood's red riding hood, a disguise and magic garment that allows her to elude the gastronomic ambitions of both the wolf and his eponymous forest. Traditional versions of the story include the key detail, that the wolf is a "stuffed signifier" related to a field "stuffed with signifiers."

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Spencer-Brown's demonstration of the "consequence" known as "occultation," shows essentially how any element is equivalent, not to itself, as in the logical statement of identity, $A=A$, but as a self-inscribed expression that could also be written as: $a = a$
2.16 / The Guides Must Be Crazy

The vibration and blurry edges of Sartre's nausea and Sebald's marching bands of dead souls says much about the geometry of extimacy. For one thing, it is clear that this geometry goes far back, into topics that seem to have preceded its first articulation. Freud's famous case of the Fort! and Da! exclaimed by his young grandson (in anticipation of the mother's absence?) is, in Lacan's view, not so much an adjustment to the trauma of separation as a rehearsal for entry into the symbolic order. Is the concept of the extimize really necessary for this rehearsal?

Two clues point to the need to re-assess this Freudian concept in order to "tune it up" to the idea of the extimize, and with this tuning, a resonance with the uncanny. The first is the theme of repetition, the possibility of permanence, even under conditions of disappearance. This is a principle of conservation in the face of an apparent total loss. The Joni Mitchell principle, "You don't know what you've got 'til it's gone" is radically reinforced: you can't have anything until it's completely negated! This is Hegel's preservation-through-cancellation, aufheben. As the centripetal force in strategies of completion, we again recognize the central role played by a void that is simultaneously on the periphery (a boundary condition) and in the center of the space that is bounded.

The other clue might do us a favor and align itself with strategies of continuation, making Freud's thesis of Fort! and Da! a component of the categories of travel. The key lies in the exclamation marks, so to speak, the value of the expressions as enunciations, whose effectiveness relies on the (total) absence of the signified. If this absence is not obtained through physical-perceptual conditions, it is produced through a retroactive over-determination that puts the first component/event into an imaginary center. Just as the ideal ego, the reflected subject, of the mirror stage becomes reciprocally bonded to the ego ideal (conditions for membership into the symbolic order), the it is the object on the periphery that brings the periphery into being. In effect, the image in the mirror "brings the mirror into being" and retroactively dismembers (corps morcelé in Lacan's terms) the subject standing in front of it. Because the reflected subject requires a fundamental mis-identification, we are in the territory of Hitchcock's Wrong Man, who "knows too much" but does not know what he knows, which Others found so important. The mirror-stage child and North by Northwest's Roger O. Thornhill (whose middle initial, he tells us "stands for nothing") read from the same script. The child can no more cross the space into the reflected world any more than Thornhill can become what the KGB agents insist that he be, the non-existent CIA agent Kaplan, but the bond cannot be broken; the symbolic order that this misidentification has brought about makes the center of the bounded image-space bonded to the periphery where the subject lies in pieces, isolated, sent on a journey, "anthologized" in the way that Odysseus is stretched out over so many episodes that test him through the categories of travel. The first event that bounds a space (through enunciation, as it turns out: Fort!) is the same event that sits at the center, as an interpreter, a translator, a key to the cipher of separation and disaggregation. The repetition (death drive) of Fort! / Da!, thanks to its relation to the enunciation of the necessarily absent signified (the bomb that is the efficient cause of the shout, "Bomb!") is the basis for the cipher-book, the centrality of the formerly peripheral (suppressed) efficient cause, α.

Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1–64.
Jacques-Alain Miller, "Extimacy."
In Julia Kristeva’s account of loquaciousness replacing hunger, a girl compensates for the loss of her mother to a new boyfriend by imagining a dog who wants to eat her. The key to this tale is the dog. Unlike the wolf, the primordial “archetype” of hunger, the dog is “allowed into the house” — i.e. it permits the girl to domesticate her hunger across a field of signifiers. As with dreams of flying, the lack of anxiety allows the dreamer to stuff the signifying field (tuchē) so that the dreamer is able to float/drift across a complete, detailed landscape. Domestication is key to Borges story, “Death and the Compass,” where an initial accident of omission creates a field of signification where the four-letter name of God is superimposed on a “criminalized” space, drawing the detective Lönnrot to his rival, Red Scharlach. The theme of red in the names has to do with temperature more than color: the field has been “heated up” by the 1/x logic of mapping, where every signifier finds a signified. The “cool detective” gets hot. The fact that the field has been “flipped” from the theological matrix of the name fulfills the destiny by which the left-out phrase on the dead rabbi’s typewriter page is “nothing more than nothing,” an accident (automaton) that converts chance to the necessity of an automated chase based on interpolation of the name to new crime scenes. The wolf of the forest (-x) converts to the dog-in-the-house (1/x), the field is domesticated by crimes, the hunger fills every space, including the void of reflections in the Villa Triste-le-Roi (“house of royal melancholy”).

The Rabbi’s death was natural, the sentence he was typing was incomplete. But, the half-predication created an imaginary field where the predication can be completed, “automated” by the logic of the fragment and the fact of its negation (murder; clue). Automaton works both as “natural chance” and “machinic generation.”

Unable to articulate her situation in the symbolic realm (in terms of predications), the girl must “domesticate” the problem of the boyfriend by filling a field with signifiers (loquaciousness) and, at the same time imagining a hungry dog that takes the place of her own hunger for her mother’s affections. To move into range of the field, the wolf must be a domesticated animal, i.e. a dog.
2.17 / Enunciation, Ciphers, and Spells

Automaton is both chance and determinism. *Tuchē* is a field of affordance made possible by the exclusion of “natural” accident, i.e. what happens is given the dynamics of intentionality, even if in the form of the enigmatic designs of fate. Just as *tuchē* brings chance down to the human level by extending the logic of predication to any and all acts and perceptions, it covers experience completely. It fills the field of possibilities with a consistent, all-embracing logic that, despite its universality, is charged by the idea of absence, the “gap” of *jouissance*. In Jorge Luis Borges’ masterful parody of the empirical attitude, the fictional explorer Suárez Miranda (“to look on”) describes a ruined civilization that aimed to map every part of reality. As the project covered not only landscapes but houses, rooms, objects in rooms, etc., the country smothered itself in representation. In reality, the project of “domestication” must always leave a gap, -x, materialized by the idea of the clue, the cipher, the spell, constructed on the logic of 1/x, the “currency converter” of thought. The field, 1/x, is made “available to predication.”

The example of the crime best exemplifies this logic, because the element of natural chance, α, cannot be simplified. It is permanently extimate with relation to the system. It is the motive for action and is therefore diagrammatically prior, but this priority is also posterior, since the motive is not conceivable before the act has been undertaken. It is formed in the process (and on account) of the act. This is what makes Efficient Cause so extremely efficient. It is thoroughly and completely extimate, thanks to this suppression of the automaton. It is the “just after” in relation to the “just before.”

The automaton as an excluded position, a non-space, will be the void to which enunciation will return. It’s perfect symmetry will be “flipped” to the field of affordance that domesticates it, but a charge will remain. For example, in the lore of the mystery novel, the murderer always returns to a key place, the scene of the crime, that is to say, to the *locus solus* of the suppression of the motive that fused with opportunity, the “fate” that brought the killer and the victim together. No clearer evidence of this bonding of remote components, a bonding that in effect establishes the remoteness itself, can be found than in Borges’ story, “Death and the Compass” (1942). The murder of a Rabbi in his hotel room introduces the first clue: “The first letter of the Name has been written ....” The investigating detective, Lönnrot, postulates that his Nemesis, Red Scharlach, has begun a pattern that will involve further crimes, predicted by the letters and geometry of the Tetragammaton, the four letters of the name of God (*יהוה*, JVHV). Scharlach articulates the principle of the automaton: “I sensed that the world was a labyrinth, impossible to escape — for all roads, even if they pretended to lead north or south, returned finally to Rome ....” But, the Rabbi’s death had been an accident, the words he was typing before he died were really a sentence fragment, not a complete death note. Scharlach learned about this detail and took advantage of *tuchē* to set in motion the automaton that began with the spell/enunciation written on the Rabbi’s typewriter — a spell that would be understood only by the future victim, the detective who would, in the classic uncanny logic of *Ao*, follow the labyrinth of the compass/tetragammaton to its conclusion, the villa Triste-le-Roi. The suppressed element became the cipher, the periphery re-appeared at the center. The spell, by virtue of its fictionality, became effectively true.

Aristotle, *Physics*.
Map 2.18

The "magic square" idea enforces a challenging goal of combining sequence, sum, and geometric pattern. Albrecht Dürer used the "Square of Jupiter" in his famous engraving, Melencholia I (1514). "Joviality" was specified as an antidote to Saturnian melancholy. Numbers specify a sequence that traces symmetrical U-shaped sequences. Internally, other patterns also yield the square’s “theme number,” 34 — a square that “rotates” to shave off the corners, and a rectangle that connects squares adjacent to the corners. Like the famous "ROTAS-SATOR" square, such configurations were regarded as embodiments of esoteric wisdom.

Dürer’s famous allegorical engraving of Melancholy as an angel shows, according to the famous study, Saturn and Melancholy, evidence of Marcilio Ficino’s and possibly Luca Pacioli’s influence, treating this humor as the gateway to the riches of the Age of Saturn. The keys and purse hanging on Melancholy’s belt repeats a well-known motif. The melancholic had access to great riches, even if through stealth or dishonesty (284, 327). The title, Melencholia I, possibly refers to the “first type of melancholy” cited by the German humanist, Cornelius Agrippa, "imaginative melancholy." If this is true, then the square of Jove may relate directly to the idea of unlocking the riches of the imagination, just as Vico later championed his discovery of the "imaginative universal," capable of "unlocking" the truths of mythic thought that were the origins of culture and history in general. The square’s sum, 34, is the age of Christ at the time of the Passion plus one.

What about the square of Jove "unlocks" the riches of Saturn? Each of the planets was assigned a traditional association with ratios and number sequences in the Middle Ages. The magic square added the themes of field and motion, casting the idea of pure mathematics into the affordances of adjacency. Dürer makes use of this by the "coincidental" juxtaposition of 15 and 14, the date of the engraving, at the bottom center of the square. The way the numbers "rotate" an internal square within the main one and "accentuate" the role of the corners, whose numbers also reach the sum of 34, points to the role of an "anamorphic" reading related to the keys-and-riches theme. Numbers turn in the square, squares inside the square turn. Like Calvino’s idealized matrix of Tarot cards, turning is identical to the interpolation theme of mapping: that the map is "that which uncovers a treasury (of signifiers) — a treasury that exists retroactively, which is to say, there was no treasure before there was a map to conceal/find it." This could point to the idea that the "riches" were "content-free": i.e. pure performance or enactment. As Vico put it in his advice to the readers of the New Science, you have to "make it for yourself."
2.18 / The Circularity of Spells

Borges’ detective Lönnrot is brought to his death through the logic of self-reference. “This sentence contains four errors” at first glance may seem to contain only three, the misspellings, but if the claim of the sentence itself, as an enunciation, is taken into account, the fourth error is that there are only three errors. The Lönnrot’s error is that there are only three errors, but his error counts as the fourth, and this brings him to his death at the abandoned villa melancholied by mirrors and other motifs of return:

Seen at closer quarters, the house ... abounded in pointless symmetries and obsessive repetitions; a glacial Diana in a gloomy niche was echoed by a second Diana in a second niche; one balcony was reflected in another; double stairways opened into a double balustrade. A two-faced Hermes threw a monstrous shadow.

Hermes was, after all, the god who arranged the passage of the dead across the Styx, but it is important to see how he, dressed as Janus for this part, is not just the body in pieces of Lacan’s mirror stage but the god mediating the more cosmic passage of all souls past the spheres of the planets and their astrological empowerments. The circular element of such passages is their chiastic geometry, encapsulated in the popularized alphabet word, abracadabra, which began its career in magic as a triangle, first documented by the physician to the Emperor Caracalla, Serenus Sammonicus.

A - B - R - A - C - A - D - A - B - R - A
A - B - R - A - C - A - D - A
A - B - R - A - C - A - D
A - B - R - A - C
A - B - R - A
A - B - R
A - B
A

Like the famous “ROTAS-SATOR” square and other “magic” squares, the value of the geometrized letters lay in their cancellation of the geometry’s asymmetries. As with Calvino’s Castle, any chance (automaton) arrangement led to the “automation” of another tale — the strategy of continuation — by means of the affordance of adjacencies (tuchē). Numerical versions claim the same logic, enhanced by the pattern made by the counting sequence combined with the constant sum made by each row and column. Completion (the sum) and continuation (motion around the square) logically underlie these magic concoctions.

Friedrich Vollmer, Quinti Sereni Liber Medicinalis (on De Medicina Praecepta Saluberrima), 143.

The “ROTAS-SATOR” square is a chiastic composition that stacks SATOR, AREPO, TENET, and ROTAS so that the outer “circle” of letters spells ROTAS (=rotate) or, backward, SATOR (=founder, planter); TENET (=hold) “holds” the cardus and decumanus of the compass points, and OPERA (=work, accomplishment) and AREPO (=ad repo, “creep towards”?!) basically is what it does. The center holds, the periphery encircles, and the middle ground is performed. This would all be spurious archaic nonsense were it not for the coincidental logic of the spell used to found cities, preserved in the apocryphal accounts of the rites of Romulus and Remus, Castor and Pollux, Thýestes and Atreus, etc. The templum, α, is established by means of an encirclement, a cursus (turn, spoken formula) that involves symmetry, reflected in the motifs of Janus, Hermes, twins, and sacrifice.
Map 2.19

The engraving inserted as a frontispiece in the 1744 edition of Vico’s *New Science* presents both an answer and a new puzzle to the mysteries posed in its companion illustration, the so-called “dipintura” (see Map 1.7). The design follows the traditions of the emblem books of the late Renaissance. The allegorical figure depicting Metaphysics (“above nature”) sits, appropriately, on the sphere of the visible world. She is both invisible and “blind” in the same sense that the goddess Justice was traditionally shown as blindfolded because her head penetrated the layer separating visible nature from the Empyrean realm. Metafisica is doubly blind in this case, not able to see the carpenter’s square she holds in her right hand, dependent on its stereo twin reflected in the mirror. The marginal has been excluded, only to appear as a literal blind spot (though visible in this case to invisibility itself, Metafisica). The knowledge of stereognosis is the completion of the circuit of knowledge of touch/affordance/tuchē, but the circuit is not a simple circle but more akin to the Möbius band, a circuit of impossible extimacy (∞).
2.19 / Stereognosis as Gnosis

The simple medical test for semblance aphasia, where the patient is asked to identify objects by touch that he/she cannot identify by sight, invites expansion to the general case.

Where the visual field marks the extent of mastery, the gaze works as a blind spot, a punctum sæcum, which resists mastery. This point inscribes the periphery of vision, made invisible by the boundary of the subject’s “horizon,” into the center of the field. Semblance therefore finds its limit — not just for the victims of aphasia — in a “knowledge” that relies on tangency, adjacency, tuchē (affordance). This is a means of “knowing without knowing,” in effect, an accomplishment of the unconscious. The mechanics of this accomplishment lies in its use of symmetry and repetition. All gnosis in the strict sense is a knowing without knowing,” a knowledge by means of halves (mi-dire), dependent on the extimacy of an element that, suppressed at the point of enunciation (bounding of a field of effect-iveness), will serve as the void to which this knowledge will return to complete itself (ipsam).

This fulfills the meaning of Vico’s dictum, verum ipsum factum: true knowledge is that which completes itself through return (analepsis). This itself is a recovery of Vico’s intended meaning, embedded within the motto shown on the plinth of the engraving known as “the impressa”: Ignota Latebat (“She Lay Hidden”). Metafisica is shown leaning/depending on this plinth while gazing into a mirror to view a carpenter’s square held in her other hand. In other words, that which stands outside/above visible nature, meta-physic, the invisible, looks at what it has made itself, a triangulation that is also a means of quadrature. Through speculative extension, the triangulation is both chiasmus and the Lacanian formula for fantasy, $◊a, subjectivity in relationship to desire, embodied in the “impossible object” and echoed by Lacan’s three-fold system of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the Real. The quadrature is the determination of the fulcrum/templum where continuation and completion combine. It is also the central feature of foundation rituals, by which encirclement protects civic space with a logic of the extimate.

“She lay” is significant both in its gender specificity and vector status. The horizontality of Metaphysica, the past imperfect tense, and the implication that the revelation of the impressa is in a present that pulls this horizontality into the vertical, as an image on a screen, tells us that verticality (Metaphysical’s spatially superior position to the visible world) and her function, in the dipintura, as a mirror herself, completely “Lacanifies” this Vichian graphical moment but at the same time recognizes that Vico’s overt use of vectors in the dipintura was intentional and indicative. We might venture a translation:

A gnosis is embedded in the forward horizontal motion of travel, a travel that is the performative aspect of the interval between the two deaths. Recovery (analepsis) of this (stereo-)gnosis is a matter of contrasting ‘left-hand’ and ‘right-hand’ alternatives that divide this horizontality into two halves, whose connection (‘verticality’) is grounded (literally!) in the function of a cipher that translates the concealed code.

Donald Phillip Verene, Giambattista Vico, Keys to the New Science.
The mystery of the *impresa* revolves around the motto, "she lay hidden/unknown," and the gap in the visual circuit that is filled in by Metafisica’s right hand, supporting the builder’s square that she sees as a reflection in the mirror held in her left hand. This stereognosis gives away the secret of the *dipintura* — that the eye of God is really a hole through which the viewer gazes at a mirror. Around the hole the image of the *dipintura* in reverse has been pasted so that the viewer sees him/herself as the creator — as Vico argues strenuously elsewhere — of the *New Science*. As Donald Verene claims, the *impresa* is the “after” of the *dipintura*’s “before,” but an “after” that solves the mystery of the *New Science* through the logic of metalepsis and in the time signature of the future anterior. The *impresa* tells us to read the *dipintura* not as a *picture of a reflection* but through an *act of (literal) reflection*. The before is “just before”; the after is “just after.” The builder’s square (which is a right triangle in terms of its actual form but possibly seen as an equilateral triangle in the mirror) quadrates the human world as the imaginary, the “first world” of melancholy cited by Cornelius Agrippa. City foundation rites refer to this quadration as both a bounding and an internal distinction of *cardus* and *decumanus* — the *templum* of north-south and east-west lines. The outer is inscribed into the center, whose void is filled out dimensionally by the predications of the dwarfish subject concealed within. These predications (journal mode) are set to shimmer by the internal-external presence of the elements that have dropped out or been forbidden, whose postponed reunion “has already taken place.”
2.20 / Vectors: Aim and Goal

Horizontal momentum directs desire outward, by means of demand articulated in the register of the symbolic (a relationship set up among signifiers). Like a planet orbiting in the solar system, this demand is pulled by a centripetal gravity that is central to the direction of demand, but in a way that will be shown only in a future anterior point of failure/dysfunction, akin to the moment of Florensky’s dream when the broken bed-frame falls on the neck of the dreamer, instigating a dream about the French Revolution. Where aim follows the protocol of continuation, goal is a project of completion. We see, in the erection of a screen orthogonal to the path of horizontal travel, an image that competes with its double, that shimmers and vibrates in the way elaborated by Sartre and Sebald. Could this shimmer be related to the continual friction between a “journal mentality,” which seeks to extend itself through a logic of the day-by-day, and a “map mentality,” which, by means of its implicit membership in a virtual or actual atlas, desires to tie things up for once and for all?

The set of vectors joined at a right angle (Γ), known as an “operator” because of its ability to show how the artifact plays a silent role in producing a representation, also conveniently relates the map to the journal — the horizontal strategies of continuation with the vertical strategies of completion, and the binary qualities of desire and desire’s circular combination of aim and goal. One more employment, the relation of the screen to the sagittal dimension connecting the viewer with the image, presents the opportunity to connect a true ars topica — art of topics — that makes this system of vectors into an automaton: not a picture of but a machine capable of mimicking the actions of the unconscious whenever it is extimated to an object (which then by definition becomes a “partial object”). Like Turing’s famous test, the standard of this model is that it doesn’t represent, it becomes. Slavoj Zizek:

The circuit of the drive is perhaps best defined as the pulsation between goal and aim: initially, the drive is on the path towards a certain goal; subsequently, this goal coincides with the experience of the path itself, whose “aim is nothing else but the return of this circuit” — in short, the true end (“infinite,” aim) achieves itself by traversing its incessant failure to achieve the “finite” end (goal); in the very failure to achieve our intended goal, the true aim is always already achieved.

Thus, predication bears within itself the ambiguity of goal and aim, demand and desire. In the studium-as-sorites, the self-cancelling circuit will always leave a remainder that causes the internal boundaries of predication to shimmer. Because internal real, R2, localizes and mobilizes the remainder, R1, the external real, will always find its interior subjective space materialized as a locale, as a mobilization. The horror of anamorphosis, ω, is domesticated by the practices and traditions of melancholy. The keys to the treasure are always “the wrong keys”: continually converting, falsifying, self-negating, too late, too early. Without error, δ, the impresa’s stereognosis of quadrature and imagination (the essence of melancholy) cannot take its own queer steps between visibility and invisibility, metaphysics and materialism.

Donald Kunze, “Vichianism after Vico.”
This scene of the Resurrection of the Flesh by Luca Signorelli (1445-1523) is located in the Cathedral at Orvieto, Italy, in the Chapel of St. Brizio. Resurrection ranks, along with transubstantiation, the Annunciation, and the perpetual virginity of Mary, as one of Christianity’s most material (and, hence, incredible) principles. Curiously, the majority of these are directly related to a sound: the bell of the mass, the “acousmatic” structure of the Annunciation, the clarion trumpets of the angels of the Apocalypse. Mary’s perpetual virginity, a state rather than a specific event, could be considered as a codicil to the Annunciation, as indeed Antonello da Messina’s painting *St. Jerome in His Study* indicates in connecting this ardent defender of the virginity thesis, himself shown translating the Vulgate, to the notion of translation as impregnation (and *vice versa*). Such unions of materiality and transcendence tempt fundamentalists into their most inane fall-back positions: the Rapture, Immaculate Conception, heaven as a suburban utopia, etc. But, they are also the crux of the radical Hegelian dialectic.
2.21 / Two Types of Real

Ed Pluth articulates the role of two kinds of Lacanian Real that relate directly to the strategies of completion and continuation (I have abbreviated the notation):

There is a first real \( R_1 \) … and there is another “second-order” real \( R_2 \), which is an effect of the symbolic order itself. \( R_1 \) sounds like a typically “realist” notion: the real consists of stuff “out there” that language tries to symbolize. \( R_2 \), however is not outside the symbolic, as \( R_1 \) seems to be. This second-order real “is characterized by impasses and impossibilities” that occur in the symbolic order itself. In what I think is his best definition of this understanding of the real, Lacan said that “the real can only be inscribed on the basis of an impasse of formalization.” Instead of being a field of referents that language aims at, this version of the real is a stumbling block in the field of signification itself.

The impasse within the symbolic that constitutes \( R_2 \) is the gap within the circle of repetition that defines the relation of demand and desire, aim and goal. The places the Real, which resists the symbolic (absolutely), within the symbolic. Like Deleuze’s demark, Hitchcock’s McGuffin, Jameson’s “profoundly ideological polysemy (2.09), and Lacan’s master signifier, it is the anti-signifier that is a purely rhetorical presence that works through its un-grammaticality. As Dolar would put it, the external Real, \( R_2 \), is “a voice and nothing more,” a remainder that resists all stable associations.

In terms of the orthogonal vectors that combine in the orthogonal set we have designated as “operator,” the right angle is now a means of a Hegelian combination of opposites. This is not to be confused with the Medieval aspiration of the *conjunctio oppositorum*, but grasped as a basely material moment that resists symbolic union and, true to its rule, becomes the means of a transcendence through materiality. Not surprisingly, this idea has been a staple of the artist’s curiosity cabinet for centuries, if only because of the necessity of paintings to be literally silent and noisier media to be metaphorically silent on the matter of resurrection. In Luca Signorelli’s (1445–1523) fresco of the Resurrection of the Dead, we are given a starkly material view that could serve even T. S. Eliot as a model of transubstantiation-without-the-mysticism, i.e. a purely poetic principle.

James Joyce (*Ulysses*, in the modernist mode; *Finnegans Wake* as pure acousmatic mode, where language becomes pure hypotext) is perhaps the best demonstration of the necessity to couple dialectic with acousmatics and acousmatics with enunciation. Again, we see enunciation in its most radical mode: a call, a resonance, “a shout in the street,” Stephen Dedalus’s definition of God in the “Nestor” chapter of *Ulysses*. Usually taken as a sign of Stephen’s apostasy, this thesis, put up to counter the headmaster Deasy’s romanticized definition of history as a movement toward the goal of God’s manifestation, is actually a correction. Motion toward a goal is corrected, *acousmatically*, by an announcement (énoncé), a “shout in the street.”


The connection with Lacan’s concept of énoncé and Joyce’s reference to the acousmatic theology of “a shout in the street” is intriguingly pursued by A. M. Klein, “A Shout in the Street,” *New Directions*. Klein doggedly analyzes each sentence and word in the Nestor episode to show its relation to Giambattista Vico’s three stages of the “ideal eternal history.”

Map 2.22

The voice as the fifth of Lacan’s “partial objects” (increasing Freud’s classic three, the breast, feces, and phallus by adding the gaze and the voice) replicates the uncanny geometry that distinguishes the two strategies of travel, continuation and completion. The gapped circle, which shows the way to an escape to the first type of Real, $R_1$, is first processed by the knight’s move encounter with $R_2$, the internal error or difference. Mladen Dolar criticizes phonological linguistics in much the same way, showing that its emphasis on pure difference as the basis of meaning is only a kind of $R_2$ that, in itself, cannot explain the function of escape. Is this escape modeled within the graphical logic of the “gapped circle” of $R_1$? Dolar’s example of the Jewish horn, the shofar, seems to confirm this. The horn/trumpet is not only the instrument of the Apocalypse, the resurrection of the flesh (i.e. transcendence by means of a pure materialism), but it is the “reversible” instrument of the civic, able to destroy as well as construct the Law as embodied in space: the polis. Shofars are, furthermore, effective when deployed geometrically; the reverse-direction encirclement of Jericho. The civic, as architectural emblem of extimacy, reinforces the idea that the Law is grounded in the “impossible” voice — for which we have Vico’s anticipation of Lacan in citing the thunder of Jove in precisely the same role.

"Joshua and the Fall of Jericho" from Flavius Josephus’ Antiquités Judaïques, manuscript illuminated by Jean Fouquet, c. 1474; in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (Ms. Fr. 247).
Mladen Dolar emphasizes the role of the acousmatic voice as starkly unassignable to other language functions. It is not the "irreducible individuality of the voice," the "unmistakable flavor or timbre that makes each voice instantly recognizable." It is not Roland Barthes "grain," the sheer materiality of the voice, the voice as object; nor is it the musicality of the voice, which works to domesticate the voice as object, to turn the voice into something pleasurable. The acousmatic voice is a counterweight to the function of differentiation, which linguists have concluded is the true function of phonemics: to make "cat" different from "bat" and so on, so that a full table of such distinctions can be taken for language's entire repertoire. After reviewing Derrida's similar critique, which ends with an emphasis on writing, Dolar settles on the example of the shofar, the "trumpet" (a ram's horn) used in Jewish ritual. The sound of the shofar has been compared to the voice of the indifferent, dying father-God, or as the voice of the unbearable Law (think of Job or Abraham). In many ways, the shofar is the equivalent of the Vichian thunder, which inspired such pure fear in the first humans that they imagined for the first time that nature had articulated a word meant to rule them.

It was a circling chorus of shofars that brought down Jericho, on account of which we connect the foundation of the civic as a function of the voice as Law but also the destruction of it when the voice is "put into reverse," i.e. by encircling the city in a counterclockwise or cursing direction. (Think of the function of David Lynch's backward-talking dwarf-demon, Michael J. Anderson.) The voice in its consummate example of the shofar is true to the diagrammatic logic of the uncanny. It is both the central void or gap, the point that demands completion and hence judgment — the trial aspect of the Law, so to speak — and the peripheral, encircling element that takes continual aim but is pulled centripetally towards this empty center. This is not so much a confirmation of the universality of the vector-logic of travel, maps, the uncanny, etc. as it is an addition that reveals what is perhaps the most essential aspect of these diagrammatic relationships: their status as subjective objects, that is to say, the extimate in its most effective and compact form.

The gaze is a blind spot in the screen that veils appearance and acts as a "tower of winds" — calibrating the winds that blow through the enchanted wood that is our eternal context of travel. The gaze in this regard recovers its Egyptian etymological relationship to the sun: an eye that is simultaneously a mouth holding a sun, and a mouth that is not simply articulating an afflatus that is capable of impregnating (as in the case of Antonello's St. Jerome), one that whispers truth through a translation of one language into another (Steiner), but a mouth with a sun in it — which is simultaneously a "son" and a "father," if we take the role of impregnation seriously. We are on the edge of a psychotic interpretation, one carried out by George Bataille, whose book, The Solar Anus, is actualized in the novel, The Blue of Noon, where the narrator and his lover copulate on a cliff-edge overlooking a cemetery lit with candles, a precise obversion of the scene famously described by Macrobius in his review of Scipio's Dream, where the younger Scipio is taken to heaven by his deceased famous uncle and shown earth below, which, he explains, is in truth, just "a cemetery with lights," i.e. that for the soul, what we take to be life is death but death (of the body) is actually life for the soul. What we want from the "dead," all pre-modern traditions agree, is a voice, and this criss-cross that takes place on the boundary of death and life, marked by XXX, is simultaneously a chiasmus and a loud cry that is simultaneously a call and command.
In the Sixth Book of The Æneid, the Trojan hero undertakes a visit to Hades to consult his father Anchises on the future of his enterprise. Before this katabasis, however, he pauses to survey the elaborate cast images left behind as a gift from the exiled Daedalus, grateful for the sanctuary given him after his flight from the wrath of King Minos. The story of the Athenian tribute, of Minos’s over-reaching sacrifice, of Pasiphaë’s seduction, of the Labyrinth and Minotaur ... the images are from well-known stories but Æneas intuits that there is something more in their arrangement and placement, specifically, at the portal to the underworld. Before he can complete this line of reasoning, however, he is snatched away by the priestess: a technique of halving, already a part of the bi-fold logic of the gate images themselves, arrayed to the left and the right (rite) of the entry. Stereognosis in this case is disclosed in the puns involved in the doubling of the gates, as ivory (false dreams) and horn (true dreams). The true dream is acousmatic, i.e. called by the shofar.

When space is frozen (epitome condition = “prison”), time moves as a frame, creating the apparent motion of a dot moving in a circle. This circle is “gapped” in that the relation of the plane to the helix is orthogonal (invisible, blind). The relationship is epitomized as the key or password allowing escape from the "prison," an acousmetric function related the Ø-function that makes motion appear to link a static series of fixed frames.

When time is frozen (epitome condition = "screen/map"), space moves as a frame (epitome = "atlas"), creating the apparent motion of a vertical consciousness completing a series by detecting a design. The ideal of this completion is the tiled matrix, e.g. the atlas. Quadrations may freeze time by allowing travel through time or by referring to the co-existence of simultaneous layers (R1), which can contamination each other through the knight’s move (R2).

The “tiling” of experience is performed neurologically by the brain, so that experience itself must be constituted by constructing a bridge (= fantasy) to cross the gap created by freezing time ("frame/map"). The dynamics of this accomplishment requires that frozen space be converted to the idea of a key, password, or acousmatic voice that allows the “hero” to "escape" the epitome condition, the “prison.” R1, the gap, contains the means to reach R2.
2.23 / Function and Metaphor

The shofar, as a “pure case” of the voice, a case that excludes by its very nature and employments the “false cases” of recognizability, vocal “grain,” and musicality, gets to the issue of enunciation and the important corollaries of enunciation: the password and the magic spell. It is most tempting at this point to tarry around this promise of sure forward passage, but like Æneas at the gates of Cumæ, snatched away just as he is about to decipher the interior code Dædalus built into the Calvino-like arrangement of tiled images, we must depart to collect another key ingredient in the formula of enunciation: spacetime.

In other cases of destroyed/breached city walls, the generic condition frozen space is developed through its epitome condition, such as the Trojan horse story from Virgil. Confine freezes space while time changes. As in the encirclement of Jericho, we find an acousmatic function. An “extimacy” converts interior to exterior, in this case translated into the medium of prophecy. Priam’s daughter, Cassandra, delivers true predictions of disaster but her speech has been cursed to be unbelieved. In Vichian terms, the vera narratio of history is its fictions. The epitome of frozen space opens the way to the tiled truth of frozen time, the guiding principle of The Odyssey’s twelve paradigmatic episodes. Where Joyce rounds these into a seasonal logic (ending, as David Bertolini has claimed, with the death dream of Bloom), we have another image of the atlas, in this example as an encyclopedia of the humors dramatized through the human natures of sanguine warmth, choleric aggression, phlegmatic hesitation, and melancholy reverie. Tile logic works like a cipher inside and around the text-as-textile, whose warp is continuation and woof completion: the problem of Penelope at the loom.

These epitome cases (the prison, the tiled screen, the shofar, etc.) show that the “operator” (Γ) is really a pure condition of the mathematical function, which allows us to map one domain on to another. Here is where the root meaning of metaphor, metaphoréin, “to carry across,” suggests how epitome cases, each of which comes endowed with a history, a repertoire of acts and associations, and a durable modality that allows it to echo as theme and structure throughout the human imagination. Function as a mapping from one domain to another, in the traditional form, f(x)=y, is the essence of the password, the cipher. In the “frozen time” of the domain as a tiled space, the password/cipher guides each value across, from one field to the other. This link is fundamentally acousmatic, and like Cassandra’s disbelieved truths, it allows the two fields to exist simultaneously, one beneath or on top or within the other, just as the Yoruba cosmogram was placed within the quotidian space of the master’s household, waiting to be called out.

Michael Riffaterre, Fictional Truth.
We must reverse usual relationship of “example” and “principle.” The relation of the shofar (as example) to encirclement (as principle) makes the acousmatic voice into the result of the logic of repetition epitomized by the gapped circle. We can see the “logic” played out in the theme of the gap, as it is turned into a breach of city walls, escape from prison, etc. A reversal, taking the shofar as the principle, forces us to consider how all the variations of the gap theme now seem to be endowed with an acousmatic element, as if to say the maddening sound of the shofar logically and historically comes before the city walls it is able to destroy. Vico and Joyce have in fact taken up this logic in their elaboration of the idea of the thunder as human culture’s originative moment. Without the thunder’s specifically acousmatic quality, the fable of Romulus and Remus, as one example, would make no real sense.
Charles David Bertolini, ““Bloom’s Death in “Ithaca” or the END of Ulysses.”
The automaton’s "machinic" stability allows it to set up tuchē as an action akin to breaking through the smooth surface of expectations. All surprise in the arts owes to this relationship, which is nothing more than an alternation between frozen space and frozen time. These technical conditions can surface, however, in the form of their “epitome conditions,” such as the tiled portal, Calvino’s array of Tarot cards, or Simonides’ memory of guests’ seating positions for frozen time. For frozen space, any prison will do, especially ones where the condition of imprisonment is indirectly induced, as when the lost traveler discovers that he/she has been walking in circles.

The Simonides tale allows a means of analyzing the method of memory places as automaton that produces a narrative continuity, Ø, conceived as a “surface” defined as a means of registering and calibrating tuchē, the occasion of opportunity/chance. This was in fact the main rhetorical benefit of the method, allowing the poet to rely on memorized content that remained open to the inclusion of unexpected details, names, events, etc.

The array, serving as a means of freezing time so that spatial simultaneity can open up a dimension formerly forbidden (∂) serves as a password mechanism initiating a “charmed” journey of prescribed limits (e.g., Odysseus was destined to wander for ten years; Apuleius’s hero in The Golden Ass for twelve months). The period constitutes the “frozen time” upon which Ø is conditional. Hence, ∂ is traditionally and functionally tied to curvature. Travel between the two deaths is circular, but the constriction is based on frozen space.
2.24 / Frozen Time ... Frozen Space

Metaphor, in the largest sense, carries across meaning from one side of something to another, that is its “function.” The knight’s move, Γ, which vectorially freezes either space or time plays a key role that we can discern through its epitome conditions, the tiled array and the prison. In both we discern the central role of la voix acousmatique, either in direct forms such as Cassandra’s always-obverted true speech (vera narratio), or in the shofar’s final penetration of Jericho’s walls. The function of the password in metaphor becomes clearer. The Janus-faced cipher, the acousmatic device, links two fields and carries meaning from one to the other. Can we use the knight’s move, frozen time and its complement, frozen space to create a more intuitively accessible model? Do the epitome conditions of the tiled array (such as the gates of Cumæ) and the prison turn up as motifs in actual stories whose details may further this project?

In Werner Fassbinder’s last film about an aging film star struggling to get jobs in an increasingly modernizing post-war Germany, Veronika Voss (1982) begins when the point-of-view character, a sports reporter, encounters Veronika in a park during a rainstorm. He offers her his umbrella, quoting an old German hymn about ships finding safe harbor. The reporter does not recognize the star, but he quickly falls under her spell, just as he has himself enunciated one in the form of a well known religious phrase. They catch a trolly, which Fassbinder films from the opposite side to emphasize the framing of their movement down the train through windows that resemble the frames of a strip of film. They move among the stationary passengers, imitating the role of the Ø function that produces the illusion of motion between static frames. This scene works as a knight’s move in the sense that both characters have taken advantage of this affordance (tuchē), but also in the way a return to the old hymn has frozen time in order to open up a space, to carry forward temporal action as an “illusionary” ß across a tiled field, and also in the way this spatial entry has been given an “acousmatic” blessing, a password. The film ends with Veronika, at the end of her long addiction to morphine by the unscrupulous doctor who has depleted the actress’s savings, locked in the clinic’s tiny white cell, the radio tuned to Easter morning celebrations of Mass. Space is now locked, “the train has come to a stop,” with the final exhaustion of the animating ß function, no escape but death.

In addition to the acousmatic opening and end, the film uses the lyrics of music from a radio playing in the doctor’s clinic to resonate with the plot. An American Army disc-jockey plays Tommy Collins’ country music song, “High on a Hilltop.” Its lyrics spookily parallel the film’s story. In the song, the singer stands on a hill overlooking the city. With x-ray vision he can see the lights below and into a bar where his estranged lover dances in a dingy barroom. How? He’s dead, like the narrator of Scipio’s dream and Bataille’s Blue of Noon. All “vertical” viewers use the procédé described by Raymond Roussel, able to skip over distances and violate spatial scale. Veronika herself gives away the function of this final episode of her “life,” really a momentum that carries through past the moment of a first death until it reaches a second. Unlike the cultural version of “between the two deaths,” Veronika’s first death is symbolic, her addiction to morphine

Georges Bataille’s Blue of Noon has not been regarded as a death narrative, despite its opening scene, Troppmann’s sick-bed in a hospital. Like Don Juan, Troppmann (“trope man”?) receives an invitation from a Commandatore in a graveyard. Bataille’s own father was a blind invalid suffering from advanced syphilis by the time Bataille was born. Troppmann’s voice is Bataille’s, but Bataille’s father is the real ventriloquist. Troppmann finds himself in the “Scipio position,” high on a hilltop, with advanced powers of telescopic vision, overlooking a “cemetery with lights.”
Map 2.25

The use of parallel tracking shots in *Veronika Voss* derives from the well-known technique of dividing the point of view to two slightly out-of-synch paths. The slip of registration may be minimal or even only potential. The point is to generate a specific kind of anxiety that, in the context of the flattened spatial potential of the movie camera, substitutes for the kind of depth that might "return the gaze." The fundamental structure is two ladders, each of which is segmented, as if to simulate the bars of the film strip. These mark the position of the Ø function of film, the suppressed gap between still photos that gives rise to the illusion of motion. When parodied within the visual field, they constitute a kind of index of time and motion. These are the basis for the construction of another ladder that combines the first two, whose rungs attempt to synchronize the separate motions of the subject (audience view) and the object (scene and actors). Intervening elements (trees, window partitions, columns, etc.) simulate these rungs, which are slightly unpredictable. They create the anxiety that the camera will "lose" the scene-object, that the paths will diverge, that one will speed up while the other slows down, etc.

The most obvious example of a parallel motion tracking shot in *Veronika Voss* is the trolley scene, where the windows of the trolley simulates the frames of the film strip. As Veronika and Robert move to the back of the tram, the frames pass to the left as the actors and camera track to the right. The anxiety of this scene miniaturizes that of the movie's general anxiety between the interrogative VO of Robert and the path of Veronika's last days of addiction and betrayal.

The Ø function works similar to the obversion of the lungs in dreams of flying. Air inside the body becomes the body "inside" air, minus the anxiety that would normally attend an individual attempting flight. Slight a-synchrony (awareness of floating) provokes the in-fill of landscape details: trees, buildings, lawns, etc., brought forward to support the illusion of gliding.

"HIGH ON A HILLTOP"
Tommy Collins (1930-1999)

Choral

High on a hilltop over-looking the city
I can see the bright lights as they gleam;
And somewhere you’re dancing in some dingy barroom,
And the lure of the gayness takes the place of our dream.

CHORUS

High on a hilltop my heart cries, Oh Lord
Forgive her she knows not the way;
And give me the power to believe and some day,
High on a hilltop to-gether we’ll pray.

I can vision a rounnder with a line so smooth,
And a promise of riches for you;
But you see not the danger, ‘cause you’re silly with booze,
And high on a hilltop I see the devil win you.

The Ø function is "hystericized" when it is diversified into subjective and objective components that run side by side in a race to a common end. Anxiety about their divergence or loss of synchronism creates an unstable relationship between the automaton, functioning as machinic fate/depth, and α, the sometimes stumbling path of the observer, "who cannot reach" the lost object. In Hitchcock’s *Young and Innocent*, this is captured by the frontal tracking shot that ends in a tight shot of the drummer in a tea-room band, the disguised killer in black-face whose uncontrollable twitching cannot be controlled by the sedatives he takes, whose side-effect is to impair his ability to keep time with the drums.

The synchronized tracking shots derive from the "ticking clock" method of generating audience anxiety, and famous examples point up the basic rules. In Chaplin’s *Modern Times*, the Tramp, an assembly line worker, cannot keep up with the acceleration of the conveyer belt. The belt and its widgets disappear down a vent that leads to the giant machinery wheels where Chaplin, caught up in their circuit, becomes the human surplus miraculously accommodated within their gears.

In a bizarre way, Tibetan prayer wheels capture precisely the "psychotheological" dimension of parallel tracking, and the "spiritual" function of the relations of ß and α that are embedded in the anamorphic lamella, ω, separating the two levels of reality. The small amount of anxiety that is the remainder of the conversion of (machinic) automaton to human affordance (luche) is the remainder required to support the "lateral transfer" across the field separating the two tracks. This is the general plan of Veronika Voss: the woman "caught up in the machinery" of life, whose identity as a partial object "between shadow and light" constitutes a theological breach of dimensionality — hence, the meaning of the song "High on a Hilltop" that figures as a hymn at the film’s conclusion, antipode to the film’s opening benediction," when Robert quotes a German hymn when he meets Veronika in the rain.
2.25 / Between the Two Frames

The illusion of movement that arises with a sequence of static photos depends on absence, the dark dividing bar or temporal gap where, on account of this hole in reality, the brain supplies a subjective bond. The mechanical advancement of the sequence of images encouraged Henri Bergson to elaborate several theses about duration’s role in the construction of a visually-experientially stable space. Our interest focuses on the automaton, which in one sense corresponds to the machinic regulator, identical in both camera and projector, that enforces the frames-per-second rule and synchs sounds to visual sources. We know that even a slight error creates an uncanny effect, since the brain seems surrealististically able to detect even small discrepancies. Mechanical synchrony creates a smooth illusional surface. R1 “excludes itself” as an enclosing condition, a silent point of departure and return, so that the illusion can exist. Beneath this smooth surface any number of subliminal fish may swim, as long as they do not come up for air (Γ, R2). The effect of this surface would seem to be no better than what we experience in the everyday life without cameras and projectors; but a different idea results when we, like Bergson, realize how automaton functions as a metaphor for whatever actually works in everyday perception to maintain experiential continuity, both as machine and blind chance. Until the automaton metaphor, we have called synchronizing problems by a myriad of names, fixed by a myriad of forces working behind the scenes (the “truths” behind “appearances”). The automaton, and its “silencing” of the machinic master-function, alerts us to the broad significance of the agency of the field — by means of which time is frozen into an array of simultaneous relationships, a field across which an Other may move in search of a pattern, a cipher, a password, a key.

Vico gets the point more readily than Deleuze. The sky and forest (epitome cases of agency as field) must have holes at their center (the forest is “hungry,” hence Dante’s portal-as mouth in the selva oscurra). The subject puts eyes and ears onto nature, excavates hollows beneath surfaces to accommodate sometimes vengeful demons. All such are “organs without bodies,” sustained by our presence as a point of view, as “subjective objects”; their energy must be held in place by constant input. Subjectivity pushes reality from frame to frame, with its silent geodesic control point (α) and positional point of view (Ø) which enacts the mechanism by itself as Other moving from one frame to another. So-called “epitome conditions” of this movement and the field it moves across tells us where we are, what places have been defined, by the kind of discourse they allow and sustain. The university (campus as a field of signifiers), the master (the "field of honor"), the hysteric (the extricated body as an anxiety landscape). Analysis, where desire becomes a matrix, is “placeless” because its acousmatics reduces the spatial field to pure vectors. A “slip of the tongue,” ∂, gives voice to the α, the unconscious as an order of signifiers resisting signification, nonetheless “structured like a language” (S2).

The tuchē and automaton of Vico’s emblem motto, “Ignota Latebat” (“She lay hidden”) comes close to being the eyes and ears of nature in the full Lacanian sense. Veronika lies in the dark frames separating the images Robert captures. The centripetal pull emanates from this dark matter, triangulated (as Metafisica shows) between mirror’s virtuality (Ø), the material-mechanical sequencing procedure (hand with builder’s square, automaton, α), and the winged temples (Γ, also written ‘V’).

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (1907).
Chiasmus is implicit in the aim/goal relationship, at least for subjectivity. The aim is continually displaced by a goal that acts “at a distance,” pulling it into a circular orbit returning to the origin (the point of the “passe” in psychoanalysis, where the analysand takes responsibility for her fantasies). The appearance of a “transitive” aim/goal relationship creates a field that serves as the functional domain onto which are mapped the agent of discourse and its activating POV, serving as a “Ø-phenomenon” to pattern desire based on the stable field’s coordinates. Curvature that chiastically bends what appears to be at first straight-line travel is epitomized by “knight’s move situations,” Γ, such as “plot points” in narratives, where the vertical controlling elements, silenced/suppressed with the creation of the field, break through. The over-determination of these breakthroughs plots a return, an analepsis or recovery of the suppressed element, the “truth” of the field.

Fassbinder constructs the logic of chiasmus in scenes that contrast the camera/projector’s frame-by-frame advance with elements of the set (windows and other penetrable partitions) that, like the tram in the opening scenes, induce a spell through the curve of the viewer’s space into the viewed; the shadow into the light and vice versa.

Veronika Voss’s field freezes time as a classic mystery story array, clues whose synchrony must be determined by investigation of a “cold detective” (Robert). Robert’s failure, his conversion to a “hot detective” (too involved with his client) adds meaning to the line in his role as Ø — a split subject, $, who identifies with Veronika’s split between shadow and light.

As “university discourse,” the field is an arrangement of signifiers (S₂), which Robert, as subject and Ø-agent must traverse. He encounters discontinuities created by Dr. Katz’s scheme to rob and kill Veronika through morphine addiction. Key locations are homogenized through standardized features, such as the portraits of Konrad Adenauer.

Morphine addiction fills the role of the chiastic aim/goal model. The circular motion is parodied by the camera, which takes large arcs filming through interior windows at Veronika’s party. The gap is thematized by the “epitome space” of the hidden room in Dr. Katz’s clinic. It is the return point of the film, where the benediction of the opening returns to the radio broadcast of Easter morning services.

Lacan’s formula for university discourse (“a system of signifiers, S₁, manipulated from behind the scenes by shadowy “masters,” commands the subject to Enjoy! but this enjoyment is empty — i.e. morphine addiction). The subject is split, so in the film Veronika and her protector occupy a mid-ground and have doubled personalities.

The small isolation cell in the clinic is the frozen space to which Veronika must return after the failure of Robert’s investigation (= the curvature of the field, S₂ has led to the retroaction/over-determination of the story). “High on a Hilltop” reveals that is a story told from the perspective of death, the uncanny category of Aø. This completes the symmetry of Veronika’s first, symbolic, death, Đa.
Fassbinder’s *Veronika Voss* works like a handbook of frozen time and frozen space, showing how the automaton as field and its Ø activator have a diverse and central function in the film medium generally. After all, *Veronika Voss* is a “movie about movies” whose star is an actress playing an actress. This self-reference function is revealed in the beginning of the film, when we see Veronika watching one of her early films, which happens to be the story of an actress. This self-reference is geometricized into an interval between darkness and light. Veronika meets the reporter, Robert, in an upscale restaurant. She asks the maître d’ to turn down the lights and use the candles instead. Her face regains its roundness, its magic as a mask. In the film studio and in other scenes, the camera is turned directly into light sources which are given star-bursts with a filter over the lens. Veronika must keep her distance from these lights, as if they contain the horror of confronting a Doppelgänger. In a studio session where she has been given a minor role, the camera and lights advancing on a track cause her to collapse when they get too close. The automaton must maintain its other, Ø, as a medium, a middle ground, a buffer but also an animating agent. The line through the Ø is both this middle and the division of motion between horizontal pursuit and discovery (Γ) of the “vertical” secret, Veronika’s morphine addiction. Robert, the journalist, “moves the plot forward,” but more generally he establishes our grasp of story’s reality, and our POV place in it. He pays for this role, in Lacanian terms, by having to assume a costume, an a-synchronous spatial position, a false role, hence his divided subjectivity ($).

The smooth surface is a field where breaks (∂, R²) become significant. Time is frozen to reveal the simultaneities that constitute this field; discontinuities are positionally compared to determine the curvature of the field; space is frozen to reveal the “moving image of eternity” that is the empty place to which Ø returns. The epitome conditions of these freezes, fields, and motions across the field establish where we are. In *Veronika Voss*, the trolley windows mimic the frames of the film strip, the internal windows of Dr. Katz’s clinic and at Veronika’s villa re-frame the scenes so that the POV can float in giant arcs, and the clinic has its locked cell where Veronika is induced to take her own life. These epitomes allow us to see how the mystery story works within the general rules of Lacan’s “university discourse,” with the Ø as (literally) a reporter who traverses the field of signifiers to calculate the Other, the center of their curvature — morphine. The master signifier takes the form of Dr. Katz, who has organized this field from behind her transparent screen. The Other never appears (i.e. it resists signification), but its “treasure” is buried in the cell at the back of the clinic. Voss’s villa and estate go to the doctor and her collaborators.

The automaton as field and motion is effective because it is silent, outside of the framed domain it affords, with a capacity to convert anything lying at the edge of the film into something that was lying close at hand all the time, *tuchē*. The camera moves left, right, up, down; we do not catch sight of the crew and equipment. Rather, we see more of the diagetic reality that is the field of the story. The automaton’s machinic regulation, working itself from “behind a screen,” i.e. beyond the edge of the frame, regulates this periphery as an “always-already” field to-be-seen.

Fassbinder several times uses the technique perfected by Max Orphuls, of a tracking shot to film a scene through layers of windows and openings. This not only creates “internal frames” akin to the film’s static frames, but its circling motion emphasizes the theme of obversion. The camera is “on the outside,” unable to exhaust the visuality of the central scene. The scene retains its darkness no matter how much light is expended. Its darkness, in fact, becomes a source of light that is thrown back at the camera, blinded by this excess.
Map 2.27

Lacan developed four primary formulas for discourse (master-servant, hysteric, university, analysis). Although he intimated that there could be others, the logic of four forms with four terms "rotating against" four positions makes four the canonical number. In the matter of "charmed travel" as an epitome condition for the map-atlas relationship, four also predominates, primarily from the role of the operators, "frozen" time and space, which yield a field, something concealed vertically, a motive for continuing motion, and a mode of subjectivizing the system. The "global intention" is completion, a finitude expressed by the cross that bridges the four corners of the Lacanian formula and which acts as an itinerary within the "fields" established by discourse. The connection to language justifies connecting the atlas to the grimoire, and travel theory in general to Lacan’s theory of enunciation. The aim is to discover the central cosmogram of travel, which is not just movement within the mapped field but the portability of the map itself. The fuel for this system, automaton and tuchê, work much as they do within the Aristotilian system of four causes. Automaton machinally synchronizes ("charms") form and field; tuchê develops points within the field that create folds, twists, and erasures of opportunity that constitute "experiments" with time and space. The dynamic between entrapment and escape (R2/R1 logic of the gapped circle) and the motion across a "tiled field" combine Lacan’s spatialized form of discourse with both the logic and graphic forms of cosmograms as well as the well-documented strategies of memory theory (Ramón Llull, Giulio Camillo) and modernist employments of hopscotch thinking (Edgar Allan Poe, James Joyce, Julio Cortázar, Italo Calvino, Georges Perec, Jorge Luis Borges, and others). The work of art in general and not just literature employs this logic as a synesthetic basis for creating novelty without infinity.

Two motions activate Lacan’s model of discourse: (1) the circular rotation of elements (S1, S2, a, $) whose positions define four types of discourse; and (2) the criss-cross dynamic connecting the diagonal elements, for us the Ø and the other the "automaton."

The "expanded field" of the Lacanian model converts the agent into a field, analogous to a map of "simultaneity", a tiled field of relationships among objects that must be encountered (nonetheless) sequentially. The map and journal vie as modes of representation, making the field and its activating Ø (production) the bases for opportunities (tuchê), where the horizontal movement of the map/journal will connect with vertical elements — truth, the Other, desire, gnosis.

The field is enclosed by a spell, curse, blessing, or charm that, as in fairy tale logic, suspends some action or ability. Frozen time is the necessary presupposition of truth, a simultaneous relationship of parts to themselves and to a whole. Frozen time is the final puzzle or trap that must be escaped in order to make this truth knowable and, actually, known.

Ramón Llull’s memory system of figures contained by a circle suggests that the model’s logic is fundamental and ancient. Like the cosmograms of the Yoruba, it addresses space as frozen time in order to exercise mastery. Lacan, in contrast uses the same form to show how mastery breaks down.

Vico’s verum ipsum factum is read in reverse: an initial making (spell 1) is mirrored by the discovery of truth (spell 2), thematized as a trap from which subjectivity escapes. The puzzling "amorphic structures" encountered as defects (3) required resolution by adjusting the POV. Spell 2 is a counter-action that "breaks the hold" of the dream-like field that has "immobilized" the subject.
2.27 / Darkness Shining through Light

The knight's move (Γ) is a carefully engineered break, calling for the most expert editing. It uses Ø to create the illusion of motion across a smooth ground, vertically penetrated by chance — something "pops up." These are chastic "plot points," which articulate planned surprises. Again, we might model the relation of the automaton to the "controlled plot twists" that arise out of the α, the R² (internal) sign of the Real. As long as the a remains outside the frame, "silently" securing the Ø of smooth illusion, the α can create manageable Γ conditions. The a as Truth, effective in its "absence/silence," plays the role of a time bomb, the point to which action will return, as the tide rolls back on to the shore of the first scene. In Veronika Voss, this tide is the retroaction and overdetermination that culminates in the locked cell of Dr. Katz's clinic.

With space frozen through this epitome architectural condition, the words of "High on a Hilltop" now acquire their "full reverse reading." The film functions as a grimoire, between the two spells, a blessing and a curse. And, if we don't realize the place of this final scene, Veronika grabs a mirror to underscore its authenticity. The Easter Mass that replaces the country music promises life after death, but Veronika has already had her second (symbolic) death, so to speak. It takes a crocodile hanging from the ceiling of Robert's newsroom to say where we are, swimming through a space redefined as under water. He lost his detachment and became a "hot detective." He returns to his cluttered desk, defeated, after Veronika's "suicide," realizing that the lights had been turned the wrong way. Joyce: "a darkness shining in brightness which brightness could not comprehend." His function as objective observer were compromised once he entered the frame. He became the Ø-automaton, following the element of death in the apparent life of the action, the key to the tiled frames. The Calvino array framed within the frozen time of the film's plot suggests that A is every plot: an invocation to enter a field where at some point we will find a buried bomb, locked in its white cell, with a mirror to mock its end.

The reversal of the light-to-frame relation "blinds the viewer." Robert is blind at first to Veronika's fame, then her deviousness, then the morphine that drives her deviousness. We are blind to what? — the spot in the image that returns our look, where the object acquires a face (stereognosis) with one eye (it is a cyclops, or we are, or both). Blindness is exchangeable with invisibility. The morphine is not there; its effects culminate in the cell hidden at the back of the clinic.

We have seen the story already, in the early moments of the film where Veronika sits, Fassbinder playing a fellow cinema-goer in the row behind, watching a film she made about an actress in the power of an evil doctor who addicts her to morphine to steal her fortune. An actress plays an actress watching an actress (herself) playing an actress. The light is indeed shining out of the darkness of the film-in-the-film. Add to this the "real actress," Sybille Schmitz, the historical model for Veronika Voss, and you have yet another layer of (un)reality.

James Joyce, Ulysses. The Cyclops episode is a miniature of this logic of spatial inversion. The Cyclops' fire in the dark cave, prison as the epitome of frozen space, is the key to escape (a, the sharpened stake), effected by giving a password ("My name is Nohbdy") and even a pass-form (men suspended beneath sheep). The one-eyed giant is the master, the field is the "relation of signifiers" that Odysseus (hero = "dead man") uses as an experiment (to find out if this notoriously inhospitable race can be induced to give travelers the customary gifts required by the rules of hospitality). Anamorphic operators dominate throughout. Odysseus goads the Cyclops after he has blinded him, to remember that his name is "Nohbdy" (i.e. literally the "nobody" of the pronoun, nobody). The crew escape by playing the part of metaphors, being "carried across" beneath a signifier. The Cyclops' "single eye" refers to his personal optics, his cave, and the Cyclopes localized religion, which treated the heart of each family as the temple of family gods, the manes.
The reason why the Cyclopes are included in The Odyssey is perhaps to counterbalance the civic sensibilities respected to the full in the Iliad. The Cyclopes epitomized early cultures’ worship of the gods of the hearth. Each family had one "eye," which is to say one clearing whose devotional fire sought the advice of one family's deceased ancestors. These were the manes, later differentiated into the lares and penates. The protection of the hearth limited alliances among families until the means of handling the dead and managing their protection and advice could be centralized. Cities were thus first mortuary "instruments," whose officials handled both corpses and managed divinatory rituals. Aldo Rossi’s retelling of the story of the Roman Forum (The Architecture of the City, 1982) is accurate. Tribes who formerly avoided each other’s contact were united by the priests who became kings because they could speak the dialects and already had developed a position of power based on religion. Paul Wheatley outlines this process in detail in his Pivot of the Four Quarters (1971). Urbanism in all seven of the regions of early development began in the centralization of funerary functions. This justifies looking at foundation rituals in terms of necromancy.

Rituals begin and end with purification procedures, and the effectiveness of (traditional) prayer has to do with formulae intalled inside the words that use their literal ("literal" in the sense of being the discarded materiality of the words) features in poetic ways. Enunciating and énoncé aspects of ritual produce internal anamorphs whose ungrammaticality (δ) leads to the effective connection with the dead, α. The prayer is “litterally” an expanded field.

Plate’s and Odysseus’s caves begin as frozen space, epitomized by the prison condition. Plato literally binds the audience so that there can be no oblique POVs. The Cyclopes limit each family to a single hearth. There can be no "civic space" without the oblique, the possibility of the anamorph. Odysseus’s advantage is that he can see the field, which as a "portable civic space," shows him the way out, through an added dimension.

The "frozen space" of the ritual field contains, anamorphically, the gap needed for "escape," although for the victim this may be to Hades.

Foundation rituals inevitably involve the spatial limitation of one of a set of twins, as in the case where Remus is forbidden to cross the "wall" Romulus plows as a furrow. Remus’s mockery and subsequent murder establish him in Hades, as the sacrificed advisor, stand-in for the manes. Like Castor and Pollux, he will "do his time" — i.e. he endures time, frozen as a spatial field — like any hero cursed to an exile of fixed duration. Hades becomes the epitome case of the foundation ritual, and the orthogonal operator of frozen time (α and δ joined in the signature of D₂, the uncanny of “between the two deaths”). As "the invisible," Hades is converted into a visual anamorphic presence within the everyday visible, the presence of tiles and hidden guide-lines that call forth the dead when needed, in the way that Yoruba cosmograms effected an acousmatic resonance spatially. The discourse of the city, in terms of foundation ritual, is that of the master and servant, twinned (as Hegel teaches us) but one is made invisible, exiled to Hades.
2.28 / Caves and Cities

In Homer's, *Odyssey*, the Cyclops episode is a miniature of the logic of spatial inversion. The Cyclops' fire, a sun in the mouth, the dark cave, gives rise to the sharpened stake that blinds the already monocular giant and is tied to the acousmatic effect that will complete the escape, Odysseus's trick of telling the giant that his name is "Nohbdy." Like Roger O. Thornhill's 'O', this turns out to be true: it "stands for nothing." The pronoun "nobody" will have the desired effect as enunciation when the Cyclops yells to his neighbors for help: "Nobody has blinded me!" The distinction between enunciating as an act ("Help!") and the *énoncé* as literal content ("Don't worry, nobody has harmed me") will freeze their potential aid. The Cyclopes were already famous for their indifference.

For cities to emerge as dominant cultural forms, they first had be cemeteries (Wheatley, 1971). The communal burial ground, attended by those who were equally estranged from their client groups and thus able to mediate disputes, translated dialects, traded surpluses, interpreted omens for the common good, and formalized specific judgments into permanent laws, was the negative void that made way for the central forum. The logic is completely geometric: what is a periphery to groups arranged in a circle becomes a center, estimating the client groups as the new periphery. Meaning as well as space is estimated, in the exchange of the literal/litteral *énoncé* for the performative enunciating. This obversion process is preserved in tales such as the Cyclops Cave episode. From the standpoint of the epic, the story is an experiment in the *tuchê* of travel. Johnstone's idea of authentic travel shows how Saturation is avoided through an acousmatic trick. Vico however deepens the significance of the tale with his account of the necessary "cyclopean" function of the hearth in all early religion. Official foundation myths, reflected in such stories as Romulus and Remus, Atreus and Thyestes, Castor and Pollux, use the dramatic device of rival twins to dramatize the relationship of the dead to the living, effected by ritual sacrifice. It, too, is a geometry of the estimate, where communications from Hades are to the acousmatic as the visible is to the invisible.

The epitome of frozen space as a prison, with the symmetrical emphasis on escape, shows how the commonplace password begins as a magic word compressing the performative and the litter-al aspects of enunciation, a call to the dead, the invisible. This pushes the acousmatic further in the direction of stochastic resonance and its visual counterpart, anamorphosis. This is helpful in connecting metaphor, with its connections to the functional mapping of meaning from one field to another, and metonymy, an effect based on the absence of a signifier. Lacan gives this in the formula:

\[ F(S \ldots S') \equiv S(\ldots) s \]

Ed Pluth (*Signifiers and Acts*, 37) provides a translation:

The Ss stand for signifiers, and the s for a signified effect. This formula expresses much that we already know about metonymy: the movement from one signifier to another in the signifying chain \((S \ldots S')\) is congruent to or tantamount to \((S\equiv)\) one signifier giving the effect of there being a signified somewhere, an effect that is not placed in the signifying chain but that "resonates" beyond the signifying chain, indeed, beyond the signifier itself \((S\equiv s)\). The bar between S and s can then be taken to represent a gap between signifiers and the signified effect but also as a minus sign, such that metonymy gives us signifiers with an absent signified effect. "Resonance" is perhaps the ideal term for expressing what it is that metonymy achieves.
Blurring and excess are hallmarks of the (in)transitive boundary, which mandates that a remainder "usurp" meaning at a final termination, via the mechanics of metalepsis. The actions that take place on the field of enunciation (which can be extrapolated to any field of conscious, intentional action) are analogous to the processes of castration, which should be approached in a "hybrid" way, combining Žižek's account of Lacanian sexuation, Bloom's account of zimzum (contraction), and Levi Bryant's merger of the idea of sexuation with contraction.

The usual way of misreading Lacan's formulations of sexuation is to reduce the difference of the masculine and the feminine to the two formulas that define the masculine position, as if masculine is the universal phallic function and feminine the exception. This reading completely misses Lacan's point, which is that this very position of the Woman as exception — say, in the guise of the Lady in courtly love — is a masculine fantasy par excellence. As the exemplary case of the exception constitutive of the phallic function, one usually mentions the fantasmatric, obscene figure of the primordial father-jouisseur who was not encumbered by any prohibition and was as such able fully to enjoy all women. Does, however, the figure of the Lady in courtly love not fully fit these determinations of the primordial father? Is she not also a capricious Master who wants it all, i.e., who, herself not bound by any Law, charges her knight-servant with arbitrary and outrageous ordeals?

"In this precise sense, Woman is one of the names-of-the-father. The crucial details not to be missed here are the use of plural and the lack of capital letters: not Name-of-the-Father, but one of the names-of-the-father — one of the nominations of the excess called primordial father. In the case of Woman — the mythical She, the Queen from Rider Haggard’s novel of the same name for example as well as in the case of the primordial father, we are dealing with an agency of power which is pre-symbolic, unbrided by the Law of castration; in both cases, the role of this fantasmatric agency is to fill out the vicious cycle of the symbolic order, the void of its origins: what the notion of Woman (or of the primordial father) provides is the mythical starting point of unbrided fullness whose 'primordial repression' constitutes the symbolic order."


A combined reading allows each of the "formulations" to be (mis)read in terms of the other. Both mathemes are about exception. Lacan sees exception in terms of sexuation, Bloom in terms of creation. But, isn’t Žižek’s point that the rule applies to the rule itself, as self-excluding? In this sense, the theology of comes remarkably close to Vico’s account of the animus/anima distinction of the causum (wit, wedge, agutezza, angle). The contraction of God in zimzum leaves behind a “breathless” field of anxiety, charged with the enigmatic desire/command of the Other — a Woman, in this case. This combination of Lacan and Bloom qualifies the issue of castration. The language of “all” and “not-all” is about resistance. Women, all of whom are not-all caught up in the symbolic (phallic) mandate, are the agents of this resistance. This is the feminine ‘J’ of JHWH, the active principle in creation.

Levi Bryant: "The phallic function, of course, refers to castration or lack. Rather than referring to a masculine and feminine side of the graph, we can instead refer to a side of the graph that pertains to ontologies or philosophies of presence (the masculine), and a side of the graph that refers to object-oriented ontologies (the feminine). Moreover, rather than treating phi as the 'phallic function', we should instead treat phi as withdrawal. What we get in this schema are two fundamentally different ways of discoursing about being" [emphasis mine]. Bryant’s contrast of feminine object-oriented ontologies with masculine philosophies of presence points to the possibility of a philosophical account of the Annunciation, as a Christian fulfillment of the "botched" Old Testament creation of masculine naming. Mary’s body is the ideal vessel of extimacy coupled with acousmatics, "word made flesh."

2.29 / Sexuation and Zimzum

Resonance is a relationship of synchrony with distance. Metonymy resonates “beyond” the signifying chain and this beyond may be measured in feet or meters or, in relativistic terms, in relation to certain fixed features within the geodesic field of enunciation. The performative component of enunciation, “enunciating” (enunciation in French, which unlike English distinguishes clearly between the act and content of speech), is like the shout of a bomb scare. “Bomb!” gets people moving; they don’t stop to question the place and nature of the signified. This literal content drops out of the equation, so to speak, hence the equation literal = “litteral.” The litter is the absent element, the thing that is powerful because it is absent. Because it is absent, distance is created; landmarks and other topological features set up to calibrate and shape this distance. In short, the result is a field, an organized set of distances, onto which are mapped the elements that, through their resonance, set up an over-determination of meaning.

The enigma of enunciation is also the enigma of the Annunciation, the subsumption of the holy spirit within the body of Mary, as a “proof of the body,” i.e. the word made flesh. Stochastic resonance originally helped explain biological phenomenon of weak signal detection. Some organisms develop the means for using random noise to amplify weak signals to the threshold of perception. Without noise, there can be no perception. Mary’s impregnation through the acousmatics of the text she is reading is not simply an extension of a semiotic principle to afford a divine birth. The idea of copulation as sexual is necessary to the copula of semantic and philosophical meaning. Stochastic resonance must be established through absence, and absence through contraction (zimzum) or, in more human terms, “an agency of power which is pre-symbolic, unbridled by the Law of castration; in both cases, the role of this fantasmatic agency is to fill out the vicious cycle of the symbolic order, the void of its origins” (Žižek).

In what is called “subsumption architecture,” a robot is organized in terms of many molecular units of behavior, which automate simple tasks, arranged in layers. Each layer of units accomplishes a set of goals of the agent, from simple to complex. But, what if the lowest layer, following the insights of Heinrich von Kleist’s essay “On the Marionette Theatre,” is in fact the most spiritual — the level at which complete “un-self-consciousness” can be accomplished? And, to carry on Žižek’s idea, that the Lady of the troubadour tradition perfected the notion of the “exception par excellence,” the connection between sexuality and creation — “creatureliness” in general — is, essentially, the feminine — “the mythical starting point of unbridled fullness whose ‘primordial repression’ constitutes the symbolic order.” We read the event of the Annunciation backward. It is not the case that the authority of God impregnates Mary via the agency of the Angel Gabriel. It is Mary’s presence as a void that is simultaneously corporal (thence capable of incorporation) and acousmatic (thence capable of prophetic meaning). Zimzum is more generally distributed. It is not the isolated single event at the beginning of time, the contraction of God so that (secular/human) creation can take place. Rather, it is the anxiety (Freud, Bryant). By treating Ø as just the phallic function, we miss sight of its function as withdrawal: “the exemplary case of the exception constitutive of the phallic function,” the demanding Master exempt from the Law — i.e. the Lady of Love?


Vertigo’s two episode structures are based on the common Janusian character of Madeleine/Judy. Hired to impersonate the wife of a ship-building magnate, Elster, to set up Scottie to be an “ideal witness” to give testimony at a future inquest. In the second set of episodes, Scottie, has met Judy by accident and compels her to play the role of the “dead” Madeleine. Not knowing that Judy is the very same Madeleine, his task is “impossible-Real” — if achieved, it would reveal the impossible truth; but it is impossible to achieve because Judy is “already Madeleine” and would be “playing herself playing herself.” In a sense, Carlotta wins. When Scottie discovers the jewel Judy had used to convince Scottie of a connection with Carlotta, he realizes her role. The plot pivots around this point, ∂, leading to the mirror configuration of “power and freedom.” Where power had been the artifact supporting the freedom of men of the 19c. to act with impunity towards women without social standing, “freedom” (incorporation of the knowledge of the double-cross) was integrated into the “space” of Scottie’s power over Judy. Like Einstein’s “curvature,” relocated into the very structure of space in his second, General Theory, and like the endless space of Piranesi’s “prison,” Scottie compels Judy to undergo a “vertical trial,” where he overcomes his vertigo but “loses” Judy a second time.

The title of the source novel, translated as “between deaths” rather than “from among the dead,” finds its realization in the script as the repetition of a phrase, “the freedom and the power,” occurring at the beginning and end of the film. In the “rotation” of the portent from a Madeleine/Carlotta position to a Judy/Madeleine position, Scottie himself is rotated as a POV, first thinking himself to occupy the shadow field of a traditional trailing detective, but then realizing that he has been in the frame, “trailed” by Elster and Judy. The automaton of their scheme was discovered only through the tuchē of his encounter with Judy in her shop-girl persona.

The terms “freedom” and “power” convert automaton and tuchē into components of the matheme for fate, A₀. This is the dynamic controlling the first set of episodes, where Scottie, thinking that he is the hired detective following the delusional Madeleine, falls in love with his prey. His working construct is the related matheme of Madeleine/Carlotta, the living wife haunted by the dead ancestor. This is the “frozen time” that allows the past to contaminate the present and direct the apparently free living Madeleine towards an “appointment in Samarra.” Automaton seems to force Madeleine to meet Carlotta by jumping into the San Francisco bay: vertical resolution.
In Hitchcock’s 1958 masterpiece, *Vertigo*, Scottie, a retired detective, has fallen in love with the actress (Judy) hired by the ship-building magnate Elster to dupe him into thinking the industrialist’s wife, Madeleine, was obsessed with suicide. After Elster murders the actual wife with Scottie set up as a false witness, Scottie spots the actress on the street but doesn’t yet realize the connection. When she wears a jewel that had been a part of her former costume, however, he makes the connection and forces her to return to the convent bell-tower where she had first led him to set up the faked suicide. Scottie forces her to listen to his enumeration of the monstrous plot, describing Elster as a man “with the freedom and the power” to commit such a crime. Kyle Brown, while an architecture student in Pennsylvania, discovered that this phrase echoes word for word what we now realize was an early portent enunciated by “Pop” Leibl at his bookstore, where Scottie and his friend Midge had gone to research the wife’s purported ancestress, Carlotta Valdez, who was “calling Madeleine back to the grave.”

The bookstore, “The Argosy,” was named after Ambrose Bierce’s early 20c. literary newspaper, *The Argonaut*. Bierce was the author of the famous story, “The Incident at Owl Creek Bridge,” a case of a fantasy constructed between the moment of symbolic and actual death, just as Vertigo was adopted from a novel, *d’Entre les Mort*, usually translated as “from among the dead,” but equally rendered as “between the (two) deaths.” This over-determination sets up a resonance embracing the plot’s source, its psycho-analytical coordinates, and the two points in the film which, like halves of a tessera, match perfectly when brought together by the perceptive viewer. Certainly they were matched in Scottie’s mind, if only unconsciously, when he “put two and two together” to realize that his presence at the scene of the crime was engineered, that his status as a retired policeman would give him credibility at the inquest, but that his fear of heights — his retirement was provoked by the death of a colleague who fell from a rooftop trying to assist Scottie — would prevent him from discovering Elster throwing the real wife off the tower top. The view he finally attains recalls Bataille’s panoramic view in *Blue of Noon*, and the radio tune in *Veronika Voss*, “High on a Hilltop.” Such vertical POVs are positioned to appreciate the receptive screen that maps the multiple sources of “acoustic” clues, now magnified to the point of audibility. Resonance and the field it creates puts the viewer/reader into the place of Scipio, who gazing down from the heavens, realizes that life is, in terms of the soul, actually death; and that the interval associated with “a life” is actually the time and space between actuality and symbolic resolution, a judgment.

Vertical gnosis is the form mastery takes as it “unearths” the treasure buried as litter in the opening moments of enunciation. The spell is cast, the portent set in motion, the metonymical “logic at a distance” spun out through its traps of anamorphosis, anacoluthon (unexpected or “ungrammatical” ending), apophasis (sudden turns), and metalepsis (metonymy of metonymy, distance of a distance, i.e. verticality/vertigo). The horizontal comes into focus by means of this orthogonality, i.e. the fulfilled prophecy is a “stereo-gnosis,” a parallax view but not the usual binocular view into the depth of a scene, but an orthogonal view that constructs the depth to recover the original litter/noise that initiated the performative field.

*Vertigo* serves as a template of Hitchcockian enunciation in that it strictly organizes two complete sequences linked by Scottie’s nervous breakdown. These can be modelled across the field set up “between the two deaths,” materialized as the “actual death” (Elster’s real wife) and the “symbolic death” (death of the actress who had played the wife to secure Scottie’s evidence at the inquest. The issue of stochastic resonance (i.e. metonymy, meaning “at a distance” based on an absence) is clear in the two occasions of the phrase, “the freedom and the power,” which expresses the idea of the field and the Ø function that pushes the plot through the “litter-al.”
Zeuxis, as an artist, is in the business of ordering signifiers (S1), material entities with formal qualities (S2), that attest to the fact that the artist has sublated his normal conscious intentionality in order to give the artwork "a will of its own." Who is speaking in the work of art? Of course, authorial intent is present and is evident, more of it on closer analysis; but the autonomy of the work of art (A) and its development of opportunity (tuchē) with the framed field leads to a point that seems both pre-determined and completely surprising (A0). In all this, tradition goes, the artist has made a deal with the Devil, and in accounts of artists' lives, the theme of a contract comes up again and again. It is, like Faust's contract, a secret pact. The delay of its final terms is the arc allowed for fame and decline, but by putting the Devil on hold, the artist is in this sense a saint, perhaps the ultimate saint (Christ) who is "willing to save humankind" by spending an eternity in Hades in order to produce works of genius. For the single mortal artist this is the end; but for the artist as a momentary host to a single re-circulating soul that is re-born in every generation, the time in Hell is D1; the trial-journey where encounters with the past, as in Dante's case, are pre-requisite for creation. In Zeuxis's contest with Parrhasius, A0 is paired with D0 before any literal death, and Parrhasius plays the twin come to take the place of his brother. The trick Parrhasius plays gives away his role. He presents the material cause, the artifact, in mode of illusion. This short-circuits the judge's suspension of disbelief, forcing them to admit the "sinthome" (willing suspension...). This collapses the contractual set of causes in and by which Zeuxis's illusions could prosper; the contact comes due. In Zeuxis's case, the artist was exiled to an island known to be populated by ugly women. Nonetheless, he painted "the most beautiful woman in the world" by finding one beautiful feature of each woman as a model for a composite final form — a kind of inverse monster, made of "organs without bodies."

Aristotle's Formal and Material causes work as an orthogonal combination of (1) a vector of representation (what the artwork is said to express or resemble) and (2) a vector of the artifact that supports this function. Material cause is regarded as variable with respect to form, in the sense that a statue of Apollo might be made of wood, bronze, or marble. In key cases, however, the metonymies of artifact serve as a hiding place for a secondary code planted within the artwork (S2/a).

The sublation of the artist's intentionality, to allow for the artwork's "mind of its own," bars subjectivity on behalf of the Efficient cause, itself based on the concealment of a "deal with the Devil" — i.e. a talent that allows art to exceed nature, not simply copy it. This contract binds the subject through a double negation, first "1" then "2," to afford "3" its wondrous capability to charm the audience.

Because the contract enhances the artifact component of the work of art, it is also capable of working as automaton, a machine that will eventually bring the work to a disastrous end. Here, disaster is related to revelation of the artist's secret relation "with the Devil" and the discovery of the evidence of this relation within the metonymies of the work of art.

The double negation of subjectivity, first to conceal a "Faustian contract" and, second, to allow the autonomy of the artwork, correlates to the framing of the artwork by which a single boundary is doubled and the second, internal boundary is "rotated" to create an inside frame. This frame may be spatially present as an "iconistic" element of self-reference inside the (visual) work of art, but it is more generally effective in terms of a temporalized circuit that returns the work of art to its "contractual" secret embedded within the metonymy of the artwork. This is the metonymy that Parrhasius reveals with his curtain trick. The spatial iconicity of the curtain is tellingly correlated to the four types of virtuality: (1) contiguous virtuality employed by Zeuxis, (2) attached virtuality, by which the bird is deceived and killed, (3) detached virtuality, by which the curtain is made into a reverse illusion, and (4) anomalous virtuality, by which the judges are made conscious of their original suspension of disbelief, as a Lacanian "sinthome."
The story of Zeuxis and Parrhasius is ancient. The two painters competed to see which was the greatest master, choosing the medium of fresco on two parts of the same wall. Zeuxis painted a bowl of fruit, so lifelike that, when the painting was revealed to the judges, a passing bird flew into it and broke its head, convincing everyone that he would win the prize. Next in turn, Parrhasius seemed to hesitate to show his work. The judges grew impatient and asked him to pull back the curtain to show it. After a considerable pause, he replied that the curtain was his painting. Zeuxis had fooled a bird but Parrhasius had fooled men — and not just any men but experts intent on making a judgment.

The story is repeated often, but understood in different ways. In it we can see an echo or perhaps an anticipation of Aristotle’s system of causality. What does Zeuxis have in mind? The production of a form, into which he will invest considerable trickery. Where does this trickery come from? We would do well to honor the traditional notion that artists made deals with the devil — the “Faust syndrome.” This is a contract, an economy. The artist gains knowledge to surpass nature. In this detail we see that art must distinguish itself from two kinds of chance, which Aristotle also cites: tuchē and automaton. On one hand art cannot be something produced by accident. Even in the aleatory methods of John Cage and Jackson Pollack, we note that even generous invitations sent to nature had their conditions. Neither can art be something attached conveniently to other projects lying at hand. The motive — the final cause — must be “disinterested” in accomplishing anything useful. The Devil’s investment lies in the material cause, where its tricks are best concealed.

To form these principles in terms of vectors brings us to a system of interlocked exclusions and distinctions. The Efficient Cause in Faustian terms conceals the original pact with the Devil, the promise to return to Hades when all is done. This affords a field of opportunity, tuchē, against which the work of art must stand out not just from these affordances but from natural chance, automaton. But, because automaton is “on the side of nature,” it is also the stuff that drives the contract. The success of Zeuxis’s trompe-l’œil is proved by nature: a bird mistakes the fruit as real and breaks its neck on the Material Cause. It is the element of fate that draws the artist closer to the end of the deal: Aò.

In these terms, Parrhasius knows he must deal with humans, not the Devil. He uses the metonymy of Material Cause, a curtain. Regarding as “just a prop,” the judges become impatient and ask Parrhasius to pull it back, to show his work. This trick reveals the structure of demand and desire. The desire was to be duped by an image similar in kind to Zeuxis’s bowl of fruit. The demand to pull back what was likely a less masterful painting but a cleverer trick “trumped the trompe.” The automaton took its revenge once the judges appropriated tuchē, as “insiders to the production of art.” Their suspension of disbelief amounted to a neurotic claim, a voluntary split of subjectivity.

Nonetheless, the Devil comes for Zeuxis. The contract must be paid up in full; and so the automaton reveals its negative side: à rebours — “against nature.”


Joris-Karl Huysmans’ novel À rebours ( Against Nature ) was credited as being a turn from naturalism to idealism, in effect a turn from automaton to tuchē as a paradigm of human existence. Huysmans’ character Jean Des Esseintes, however, makes it clear that automaton has been converted, or rather inverted, into a principle combining the most extreme possibilities of human desire. His most coveted possession is a living beetle encrusted with jewels. ”Nature,” says Des Esseintes, “has had her day.”
Alciati’s emblem of the eye in the palm relates directly to the “enthymeme,” the rhetorical syllogism, which creates an obverse (idiotically symmetrical) gap that, resistant to all symbolic attempts to bridge cause and effect naturally, allows for the conversion of effect into cause, a “self-evidence” of the world in appearance. This is preserved in language and customs that connect azure with authenticity.

Vico uses the *dipintura* in a similar way, and says as much in his reference to the “Table of Cebes,” the story of which involves pilgrims who inquire into the meaning of an image they see in the Temple of Saturn. This image has the power to enlighten or madden. The image's "tiled logic" is both an insulator and a delay tactic. The "green of envy" indirectly adds the theme of the evil eye, the returned gaze of the scene to the viewer through the blur, the hole in the visible-as-screen. Envy/lack is created in the human mentality through the device of the symbolic, made possible by the perception of the thunder as the "first word." This envy, Vico says, leads to institutions that try selfishly to preserve and extend ownership and power but inadvertently extend protection to ever-distant groups: first the family (Cyclopean culture), then other families, then the city as a collection of the families, then collections of cities as nations, finally to humankind in general with the concept of the human as something abstract.

The cœlum as both "heaven" and "wedge," Vico explains in his *Autobiography*, is the key to the function of metaphor, which is "argute" or "sharp" in its effect on thought. Alciati's emblem of "The Limbs of the Mind" shows that this idea was current in early-Modern thought. The metaphor, the principle by which meaning is carried across from one field to another, is in rhetoric the enthymeme, where the two fields are speaker and audience, and the "middle term" is the silent, self-referencing term of the speaker's character, judged by the audience through gestures. The speaker in effect becomes a partial object, a voice — an *acousmatic* voice — in this direct relation to authenticity. The middle term is an example of the Lacanian master signifier, an "empty signifier" that (cf. Deleuze's idea of a "demark," an aberration of nature) creates a connection by constructing a permanent gap. The partial object is acute: able to penetrate the "feminine" anima, visible nature (cloud) with a "masculine" animus, thought — azure, divine eye.
2.32 / The Touch of the Mind’s Eye

The circular clearing in any green forest must find its bearings, its winds, its cardinal directions. The cloud’s antipode, its tell, its vane, is the tower, whether in negative (the Inferno’s articulated descent terminated by an inverted Lucifer) or positive: a temple of winds, Dorothy’s tornado conveyance to Oz, topped by a crushed witch and the spoils of the ruby slippers, foot-gear designed specifically for another journey designated by color, the Yellow Brick Road. In both directions, the tower is a telescope able to penetrate the green cloud’s obscurity, and in this sense the tower is revelational, a place where separated halves of a puzzle are matched along their original broken edge.

The green cloud enveloping Judy in the final half of Vertigo presages the tower that will be her death. At the top of the tower she hears the words that release her from the spell of guilt, “freedom and the power;” and is pushed by the image of a black figure approaching her from the shadows, in actuality a nun come up to see what the fuss was all about. Overcoming his vertigo, which had prevented him reaching the tower’s belfry in the first story, Scottie has made it to the top, through the green cloud of his unwitting false witness at the real Madeleine’s inquest. Parrhasius’s judges were about to give false witness; dazzled by the trompe-l’œil of Zeuxis’s bowl of fruit, they were prepared to endorse its naturalism, confident that the bird who broke its neck on the wall was sufficient confirmation of their view. Parrhasius’s curtain, like Turing’s, is blue over green, an opening, a tower, a wedge, a cœlum.

The theme of the “cloud of promised (delusional) joy,” translated as shadows hanging from a line, are also the “malic molds” in Duchamp’s Large Glass. Duchamp’s notes about these hanging garments tell us about Parrhasius’s curtain as well. The green cloud covers the false dream, the bachelors’ dream of optical naturalism. They have met the bride “inadvertently,” and she has blinded them, given them the horns of envy. The basis of Duchamp’s malic molds is the Lacanian idea of “symbolic castration” — literally a “castration by the symbolic,” a reduction of subjectivity to a role assigned by the Other. This is Diana’s reverse splash that makes Actæon a self-hunted hunter and Tiresius a master of seeing the invisible half that other bachelors cannot see. Scottie knows by halves: stereognosis. His partialized eye (“private eye”) and partialized hand (extended by the policeman who died in his stead in the opening five minutes of the film) combine in the classic emblem of the eye in the hand. Alciati gives the clues: Heraclitus, asked to give advice on civic tranquility to the citizens of Ephesus, instead of speaking took a cup of cold water, sprinkled in barley and stirred it with a branch of pennyroyal, a favorite ancient flavoring oil. This “silent middle term” in the rhetorical syllogism known as the enthymeme (i.e. a Lacanian “master signifier”) was clear to all who, in those days, knew the meaning of the gesture: be content with simple things (i.e. don’t ask for wine). The silent gesture confirmed what Epicharmus had said: the mind sees all, the other sense are blind. Alciati gives the mind a hand as well as an eye, emphasizing in his text the role of silent gesture. The image silences the symbolic, paralyzes speech, splits it into parallax halves. This is stereognosis through propriocept: knowledge of the world through touch, gesture, halves.

Giambattista Vico, Autobiogaphy.
Marcel Ducham, The Box in a Valise.
Andrea Alciati, Emblematum libellus, 1546, Emblem 16, ”The Limbs of the Mind.”
The Ø phenomenon has two speeds, "normal" and "slow." A speed-up (e.g. running the project at a higher number of frames-per-second than the camera recorded) tightens up the relationship of the audience with the "machinic" function of the Ø. Spreading out the frames, as in Douglas Gordon’s 24 Psycho, allows the audience to insert content between the diatonic still photos, re-animating it with new connective strategies. A faster machinic rate can be induced by a suggested slippage between two parallel sequences, as (below) Charlie falls behind his task as the conveyor belt speeds up to improve productivity or, in the butterfly map of a Venetian canal, the stereo views of left and right sides disallow any perfect synthesis.

The result of projecting Hitchcock’s Psycho at a rate of some two frames-per-second is not to slow the film down, although the duration is certainly extended, but rather to allow for the invasion of extraneous imagined content supplied by the viewer. The frame functions in an entirely different way. In the machinic mode, the frame and screen are “transparent” to the diatonic scene. When the film is slowed down, however, the frame and screen play a more active role. The potential for iconostasis—a mode of intensive interplay between the artifacts and representation of the medium—becomes high. With iconostasis, the POV is destabilized and representational motive is undermined.

In contrast, the imagined speeding up of the rate of representation, here parodied at normal speed in Charles Chaplin’s Modern Times, serves to secure the machinic imagination’s hold on the audience. Each near miss of Charlie’s bolt-tightening creates anxiety that acts as a speed governor, hoping to slow down the conveyor belt that has been accelerated to improve plant productivity.

Taken as an unlikely pair, Chaplin’s assembly line and Venice’s butterflyed canal-view “map” (an unauthorized reconstruction of separate views from Antonio Quadri’s Il Canale Grande di Venezia, 1828) share an important common feature: both are coordinated "machinically," so that the synchronization of a "right side component" with a counterpart on the "left" is slightly loosened. Once this happens, the scene’s acceleration creates the anxiety that, somehow, reality can easily come undone without a continual input from the subject. This anxiety drove Hume to madness, but for most of us it is the more entertaining ploy of comedy. The Ø in these cases becomes a medium of blackmail.
One distinctive style of Venetian maps showed, in opposite orientation, the appearance of houses on either side of the canals. The “butterflied” elevations give the canal traveler a convenient way of identifying points of interest. The canal, the movement, is the Ø and the point of view, the field has been “stereognosed” by this Ø. It is an idealization of the flow of travel. The journal aspect of movement is built into the map, just as ancient itinerary maps showed the traveler scenes in the order they would be encountered. This style seems to be a cartographic specialty, its violation of spatial rules of flatness and vertical projection justified by the usefulness of including immanent scenery. Isn’t this style congenial to Heraklitus’s motto, “everything flows” (Πάντα ῥεῖ)? If you cannot step into the same river twice, isn’t it also true that you can no longer regard the field of the “map” as flat, as a frozen space; isn’t it more the case that the frame, in freezing time, has formed a topology completely integrating curvature, \( \partial \)?

If this is true, then the Ø, which is the glue of the mind, the basis of perceptual and experiential stability, is a “wild” operator whose turns may simply be wandering or, if the discipline of travel is brought to bear, aimed at the moving target that is subjective desire. This is perhaps the reason that Actæon is a hunter and Diana is a goddess. Desire requires the imaginary in the guise of a (naked) truth; knowledge requires the line-of-fire set up by aim and goal, i.e. the constructed dimension or distance that establishes knowledge’s desire as Other, “out there,” estimate.

The tiled map, the hopscotched field, suggests that there an be an order of Ø that, articulated within the horizontal choices that are idealized as a left and right to be assembled as an order of knowing. There is another variable, however, that can be wrung from the stories of Odysseus and other travelers: speed. This is not simply a quantitative factor that allows little to be said about fast and slow other than that they are comparatively greater or lesser. There is the issue of the gap that is opened up when speed is altered, and we must compare curvature and difference, \( \partial \), to this gap. When Douglas Gordon slowed down Alfred Hitchcock’s 1960 thriller, Psycho, so that each frame was shown for a little more than two seconds, audience members “inserted” new narratives to substitute for the originally machinic Ø function. Out of synch, the Ø became a cipher, an opening with the same carte blanche as a password able to carry thought from one “side” of the film to another, a field where authenticity was guaranteed by transferring the authorship from the film-maker to the audience.

Can we not see the same logic in Freud’s grandson, who in playing the “Fort and Da game” rehearses a similar kind of authenticity by slowing down the flow of time in which he had found himself newly immersed? Isn’t this also the “Cyclopian” time Odysseus slowed down with his deliberate experiment in hospitality? In a qualitative rather than quantitative mode, the speed of Ø has only two settings: normal and slow. As in the “slow food” phenomenon, there are both ideological and sensual issues to examine.

Douglas Gordon, 24 Hour Psycho, Tramway (Glasgow), 1993.

In consideration of the “tensioning” of the rate of Ø as machinic (i.e. a speed-up), Odysseus’s experiment could be considered as such. He is trying to bring the Cyclopes into the Homeric age, where international travel is afforded by widely recognized standards of hospitality. The Greeks were forever expanding their œcumene on the principal that peripheral cultures should either be assimilated or destroyed. Odysseus tightens the machinic hold on the Ø function by portraying his visit as hospitable (frozen time = simultaneity of the Greeks and Cyclopes). The space of the cave constitutes the alternative matheme, frozen space. Here, the Ø must be endured as a gap between death and freedom, thematized as the escape plan Odysseus must discover in order to “functionally” map the Greeks from the cave interior to a free domain. In this light, the acousmatic role his name is clear.
3.00
Enunciation and the Performative

The Thunder, Perfect Mind

For what is inside of you is what is outside of you,
and the one who fashions you on the outside
is the one who shaped the inside of you.
And what you see outside of you, you see inside of you;
it is visible and it is your garment.
Hear me, you hearers
and learn of my words, you who know me.
I am the hearing that is attainable to everything;
I am the speech that cannot be grasped.
I am the name of the sound
and the sound of the name.
I am the sign of the letter
and the designation of the division.

—trans. George W. MacRae, The Nag Hammadi Library

“There is a certain charm to films that begin with the
awakening of a man and then introduce us to his point of view
... as a result, one could say that there is not truly an escape
when the character sleeps while the action either begins or
continues without him.”

—Michel Chion, “The Fourth Side”

HOMO NON INTELLIGENDO FIT OMNIA

("Man makes all things by not understanding them.)

—Giambattista Vico, The New Science, §405
3.00 / Cipher Magic from Poe to Hitchcock

§1

The most compelling cases for Surrealism’s interest in “atlas issues” in surely is to be found in two “proto-Surrealists,” the French prodigy Raymond Roussel (1877–1933) and the American inventor of detective fiction, Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849). Roussel, after all, took Lautréamont’s dark interiors outdoors in his fantastic “tiled field,” the garden of the eccentric scientist, Martial Canterel, in Locus Solus (1914). Poe belonged, as the French film director François Truffaut wrote in 1967, to the family of “artists of anxiety,” which included Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Hitchcock. After Poe’s decisive break with New England literary traditions — a break compensated by his lionization by the French — American literature would maintain a line of the uncanny, a Ø of delayed connections snaking through every normal suburb and picturesque park. Just how did Poe, however, establish his role as a poet-laureate of the Surreal atlas? The answer lies in the way Poe, like Roussel, employed methods of automated construction.

Surrealism is remarkably consistent and rule-driven, and these proto-Surrealists could be said to have set the pace. Roussel revealed his techniques, collected under the term, the procédé, in his famous work, How I Wrote Certain of my Books (1935). These included the strategic separation of alternative meanings of double entendres, travel through tiny optical pathways, and pun-fed metonymies very likely derived from, Mark Ford argues, from his childhood experiences of the têtes de carton in carnival parades. Each giant comic puppet came with a traditional saying or political slogan that could be inverted to reveal a hidden irony. Poe discovered the same trick. His early interest in ciphers and codes led to consummate skill in arranging mirror texts whose strategically chosen centers allowed meaning to ladder across between the two chiastic wings. Surrealism’s court painter, René Magritte, acknowledged this trick by placing a copy of Poe’s Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (1838) on the sill beneath the uncooperative mirror in Not to Be Reproduced (1937). The mirror design of Pym employs a pivotal thirteenth chapter to divide the book’s twenty-four chapters by the death of his brother Augustus, whose name’s Latin etymology traces back to the sciences of divination.

Chiasmus has been documented not just for Pym but for more prominent projects, such as “The Purloined Letter.” The Poe scholar Richard Kopley has shown how a center is indicated by the exchange of the scandalous letter for the reward, a passage that emphasizes hands. This center, an extension of the “limbs of the mind,” could easily be represented by Alciati’s ocular palm; it is a silent center, a signifier that organizes other signifiers. From this center, symmetrically aligned phrases match up to produce new meanings, often with direct reference to the “handedness” of the story, as in the reference to the game of “odds and evens” (also known as “Morra,” a game where hands are cast with fingers indicating numbers to combine in odd or even counts, like “rock, paper, scissors”). The opposed “left” and “right” wings of the butterflied text corresponds to the case of ciphers where each letter of the alphabet is assigned another, and the message visible to all as a puzzle contains a hidden twin. Generally, Poe exploits this as an opposition of sense to idea, reconnected through mechanisms of geometry, topology, and of course counting. Poe was an excellent classical scholar, and included a reference to the myth of the twins Thyestes and Atreus at the end of “The Purloined Letter” as if to emphasize the way the story itself has offered the audience the cooked remains of its own “children.”
Although Roussel has been included with Poe in many lists, the connections seem to be triangular rather than direct. Poe was popularized in France by Charles Baudelaire and Stephane Mallarmé. Some have claimed that Jules Verne drew much of his inspiration directly from Poe. Roussel so revered Verne that he could not bear to loan a convalescing family friend his copy of one of Verne’s novels. If there was no direct line of influence, there were certainly coincidences in the preference for “automatic” devices used on two levels: (1) to generate situations in the text that left the reader to create new meanings and (2) to produce characters, objects, and themes within the texts themselves, either as literal embodiments of automata or as defective instruments of description or exposition, which the reader had to look past in order to see the truths lying in the distance.

There is no one term to designate the cleverness and material range of these automata. Most work at the level of the frame, where the technical vocabulary is slim. Chiaroscuro, “dark-light,” is one part frame-inside-the-frame, two parts painterly device of creating a shadowed foreground. Encadrement works only in English, where its literal French meaning of “framing” can be forgotten and the strange-in-English term can be specialized to indicate cases of multiple, complex framing. Both terms relate to the filmic idea of the “fourth wall,” the opening of the set where director, assistants, and technicians crowd amidst cameras, lights, wires, control boards, in a gumbo of cinema production. This is the “place of the artifact,” necessary to the process of representing the dihetic actions of characters. Without it, the place of representation would not be able to work as a prop. One dimension subtracted, two added back. How else could films be made? Even when we imagine the hand-held camera carried though the open air, the fourth wall idea is present because the camera itself subtracts it by slicing into the 360° of reality. Also, there are lines the camera is forbidden to cross, things it cannot show. Limited movement and prescribed invisibility is written into the professionalism of production.

The problems with the fourth wall as a unifying term have to do with how it can be dragged out of the film production world. The spatial rules that tell the camera where not to go help show where, in non-filmic experience, the same lines are drawn. In everyday experience, there is an element of the performative. There is, as Mladen Dolar has pointed out, the minimum presence of ventriloquism, also of the gaze of the Other, of voyeurism, even when we are alone in a shuttered room. This is because within everyday experience we are present as subjects, whose thoughts, words, and deeds constitute discourse and enunciation.

As soon as we awake to consciousness, we ask ourselves, “what is happening?,” “what are we doing?” Objects come into focus; dimensions stretch themselves out; costs and rewards of doing something are calculated. Treasure gets buried and the POV is charged with the duties of Ø, to carry across some smuggled cargo. A fourth wall is opened up, via the acousmatic voice and the voyeuristic gaze of the imagined Other. Framing is built in to our everyday space; an audience is watching. If chiaroscuro, encadrement, and the fourth wall are each insufficient to summarize the full range of these discursive, performative operations, then we will have to use them like a set of knives, each with its own specialty blade, to cut into particular varied materials.

Richard Bernheimer has pointed out that the late Renaissance idea of the structure of the theater seemed to influence artists’ ideas of how heaven opened up to receive the resurrected souls of the blessed. From life to death to life-in-death, the geometry of the
auditorium made clouds into seats arranged in aisles and rows, ranking the angels and saints in order radiating out from the azure royal box of God and/or Jesus. Florensky's "array of saints and angels," the virtuality embodied and delayed by the iconostasis, the preeminent "tiled screen," could not be more relevant. Like the field of Veronika Voss, it is magically protected with an opening hymn and a closing benediction. And, like the paintings that employ this theatrical motif, the deceased is filmed (again Veronika Voss offers the perfect example) by a camera that takes a wide arc but holds its subject in a constant center, shooting through layers of glass and actors standing around the center in concentric circles.

§3

Two conditions dominate in the application of any chosen term. (1) In a "frontal" version, the scene is placed within a frame shown as, already, a part of the scene: a window, door, or portal. (2) In an "oblique" variation, the spectator is placed to the side of a process of observation or production, able to take in both the observer and observed, producer and produced, as well as the device or method that connects them. This is not just the trick of peeking backstage, of pulling to the side as in Edward Hopper's oblique views of subjects looking out from the painted scene. (3) In an "obverse" position, we see the world from a reverse-angle view, like the young man in Magritte's painting of the uncooperative mirror, Not to be Reproduced. Multiple framing possibilities seem to activate Horace's dictum, *ut pictura poiesis* ("paintings should be like poems"). When "enunciation" is used generally as the central aspect of all experience, we organize things according to the complex visibility of the frame-within-the-frame. The language aspect of enunciation is dominated by "visual" considerations, even when invisibility and acoustics are at issue. Discourse involves (visual) framing, visual framing involves discourse/enunciation. The options of frontal, oblique, and obverse framing suggest that virtual space, like discourse, has global conditions that set up a pervasive logic from the beginning. We ask different questions of a direct representation than we do for a sideways view that shows the process of production. And, when we peek through the scenery to see the audience in the dark space behind the performers on stage, the inclusion of response along with action makes obversity an intense case of double negation.

But, even in the "purely" narrative versions of frontal and oblique views, where we see the equipment of the frame, screen, and theater building, double negation is present. The "defective narrator," the most common means of turning a story sideways, operates like Dürer's engraving of the "Artist and Model in the Studio." The lucinda, the drawing device used by the artist, is turned almost 90º. Our visually oblique view becomes a double negation in its knowledge relation to the original point of view. Finally, in frontal situations, where writing tries to "stick to the facts" with minimum influence of artifact, we find double negation as soon as we detect, within the main frame of the work, a small space that encloses a second frame, a zone where the author's work and intentionality struggle to stay behind a curtain.

As the space between the two frames increases, even the frontal view is unable to hold on to its diatetic, documentary function. The map's aspiration for 1:1 accuracy gives way, radically, to the growing awareness of a map that maps the mapping. We could turn this view to the side, to see it stretched out along its line of production, or we could — on behalf of developing an anxiety that will intensify to the point of screaming — continue to pull back the main view to increase the space of the artifact to the point that it dwarfs the original space of representation. The "degree zero" has obverted; it is now
the degree-infinite.

This seems to be Surrealism’s preferred tactic, and surely the credit must go to these proto-Surrealists for perfecting the tightening mechanisms. We see this in Poe’s resistance to oblique applications of chiaroscuro, too often been rigged up by romanticists bent on out-Horacing Horace. Allegorical scenes such as Thomas Cole’s “The Voyage of Life,” turn the tube of perspectival space into a temporal sequence redefines the role of the point of view and vanishing point in terms of narrative. Poe saw such paintings and knew their tricks, but his dedication to the sublimity of suspense and horror kept him from cashing in on such harvests. He was, in contrast, a gleaner who saw treasure in the remains. Both Poe and Roussel valued the triangulation of first impressions by delaying them through gradations of emotional intensity and reversals of the diabolic “reality.” They “stayed frontal” in the way they kept the audience strapped into their seats in the fashion of the Platonic Cave. You can’t turn away from the illusion even when it develops extremities and evident defects; you must “tarry with the negative,” so to speak.

Similarly, with Roussel, it was hard to know what he intended until you encountered the last sentence with its reversed meanings, a hard wall that bounced thought back through the left-behind scenes and the false impressions that had sustained them at the time. And, with Poe, there is even more of a delay — an infinite postponement perhaps? — to count up the coins minted by the ciphers that linked the two wings of his stories. These were paid directly to the reader’s unconscious, a kind of silent or even secret symmetry. Such wealth is realized only through some catastrophe that destroys the normative supports of diabolic meaning. Only after the banquet hall collapses do we call Simonides back in to identify the dead. Our only access to an oblique view is the one we construct at the back of our heads. With no access to rotating the view, the audience is in effect “frozen in space,” forced to travel along temporality’s single forward-backward dimension, the Cyclops’ cave.

Frontality imposed an austere style and other extreme conditions on Poe’s texts, but this was principally what had attracted the Surrealists. Temporal delay was also a delay of identity, requiring the creation of zombies, decayed corpses, and partial objects — sensational effects that seemed to rule out critical concepts. If for no other reason, the effects of these proto-Surrealists can be appreciated only in a Lacanian dialect, where the uncanny (extimity, between the two deaths, organs without bodies, the lamella, etc.) finds a settled home in theory. We know, here, that frontality’s imposition of frozen space forces the atmosphere of the dream, the green cloud.

“Berenice,” the story of a woman who wastes away and is prematurely buried, was a sensation for André Breton and Max Ernst. It would be wrong to count the Surrealists simply as first-in-line consumers of uncanny effects, but it is impossible to excavate much critical theory in an archaeological manner. Rather, this final series of thirty and three short essays skips directly to the psychoanalytical function — how, for example, Poe seems to anticipate Lacan’s idea of the “body in pieces,” a metonymy where a body part (the heart in “The Tell-Tale Heart,” the teeth of “Berenice”) retained life after its host had died, or at least was buried. Where traffic directions are required, terms are taken directly from standard grammatical and rhetorical sources. Where Poe is found to circulate metonymies backward and forward, the terms metalesis and anlesis are sufficiently rich to describe what happens. When Poe and others construct a macaronic world, it is to insert the Ø as a wedge, an animus, into the anima of Florenskian “prelest,” the dark forest.
Poe’s economy of circulating metonymies backward and forward in his stories (meta-
lepsis and analepsis), in fact, effectively prefigure substantial portions of Lacan’s theory
of the unconscious as structured like language. Poe’s unconscious was a “metonymy
economy,” in the sense that he created spaces with temporalized narrative elements
(automations of the point-of-view function) that were structured as coded ciphers to al-
low the reader to combine and resonate the meanings of the work. For the cipher book,
we have to turn to Lacan.

This strategy seems to follow directly Jentsch’s polar exemplars of the uncanny, Ao and
Dα. Metonymy effectively constructs a circuit between these extreme poles as is clear in
such stories as “The Tell-Tale Heart,” where the sclerotic eye of the old man (Ao) is the
ominous, maddening agent symmetrical with the beating heart of the murdered corpse
(Dα). Like Roussel’s separated pun-twins, les lettres de blanc sur les bandes du vieux
billard/pillard (“the white letters chalked on the cushions of the old billiard table” versus
“the letters sent by the white man about the hordes of the old pillager”), one meaning
must “play dead” (le mort = “the dummy”) inside the other until the tables have turned.
As an added benefit, the isolated incidences of Ao, such as the sclerotic eye in cases as
widely spread as Picasso’s old women and Poe’s old men; and Dα, the multiple prema-
turely buried corpses that populate Gothic stories, provide characters and props.

Jentsch’s formula Ao/Dα influenced Sigmund Freud’s own condensation of the uncanny:
(1) themes of stolen identity (doubles, portraits that sapped the souls of their subjects,
“nobodies,” wrong names, etc.) and (2) optics (the evil eye, telescopic or microscopic
perception, a breakdown in the system of dimensions, etc.). The parallel is not at first
clear. Stolen identity themes, such as the portrait that steals the soul of its subject, is
the transaction between Ao, the subject with an appointment to keep, and the Dα, the
time-basis of the portrait, which must abide in the shadows while its counterpart enjoys
life in the light of day. This criss-cross can be traced back to the myth of Castor and Pol-
lux, who were granted enternal life as long as they took turns in Hades. The exchange
between Ao and Dα addresses and somewhat explains the full complexities of identity as
challenged by the possibilities of the double.

In the optical uncanny, the visible scene “out there” contains subjective element, an
envious or panoptical eye, whose location is always unknown. This gaze, a major ele-
ment in both Jean-Paul Sartre’s as well as Lacan’s theories of perception, mandates a
constant, a perennial coupling of the “subjective object” (externality, space) and the
observing “objectivized” subject that is always reciprocal. If the Ao could be said to char-
acterize the envied subject blind to the envious gaze of D, the structure of envy itself
may be said to reside within the interval between the two deaths, where the anxious
not-fully-dead soul seeks symbolic rest. Dα becomes this interval, the other side of the
optical unconscious.

§4

Chiasmus, ciphers, and the references to both systems of the uncanny layer the field of
enunciation with multiple possibilities. Over-determination means that a given signifier
may either have multiple meanings or no meanings at all. The subjective objective (Dα)
suggests the objective subject (Ao ). Cases where objects dominate to create what Ger-
hard Hoffmann called, in reference to Poe, a “mood-invested space” (gestimmter Raum),
the corresponding subjective condition, the spatially/dimensionally determined subject,
lies close at hand. (Think, for example, of the second, “police procedural” part of High
and Low, where the kidnapper’s location was the subject of an intensive project of syn-aesthetic interpellation — another word for over-determination.) Over-determination is not just a matter of layering possibilities on top of each other in a story. Rather, it is the regulated way that the experience in its performative sense is chiastically and stereognostically split into “odd” and “even” parts. And, when the internal polarity of the subjective object and objective subject sets itself up as a cipher, the multiple echoes intercept each other as they proceed in a linear way from the origin to the end of the acousmatic field.

It may seem that the idea of the atlas has been left behind once matters shift towards themes of enunciation and acousmatics. The aim of this set of essays will be to return continuously to issues of the point of view, the frame, and the η/α relations that characterize map-atlas relations. In these we can detect, “already inscribed,” the issues of the uncanny, over-determination, and the “stochastic resonance” of the acousmatic that are key to the interests of enunciation. In short, there is only a question of perspective. The map and atlas are the obverse of enunciation, and vice versa.

This exchange is both functional and symbolic. The case of “epitome travelers” — those whose travel experiences most intensify and sharpen the idea that the traveler is a cipher of the Ø, moving across a field charged with over-determination — can demonstrate that the most mundane and material circumstances of travel, familiar to the casual tourist as well as the intrepid explorer, are cases of what Sebald would call a “natural history” of the subject. As Eric Santner has thoughtfully elaborated, this is the subject without the portfolio of symbolic relationships that normally sustain the subject as a member of this or that culture, family, or social group. Such symbolic relationships stumble on the Biblical command to “love thy neighbor.” There is little justification for this inclusion of the Other, especially the other who lives outside of the covenant that insists on this inclusion. Santner’s study of Franz Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption forced him to adapt psychoanalytical theory to the problematic idea that the stranger must be allowed to have an unconscious — what in Rosenzweig’s terms is a “proto-cosmic dimension” of being and thought. Freud encountered this enigma in the case of the Rat Man, at precisely the point where he confronted the face of the Rat Man, a face manifesting a horror of an enjoyment of which he was unaware. Santner argues in his book Psychotheology that Rosenzweig’s understanding of neighborly loved “orbit around the difficult task of turning toward such a face, of becoming responsive, answerable to the new ethical material,” which he calls “metaethical.”

With all these references to the face and turning, can we ignore our prior thoughts about the face, especially the “iconic face,” which pulls Florensky’s thoughts about iconostasis into tight orbit? Is there not the same “false solution” to the problem of the neighbor as Florensky’s “prelest,” the false romanticism of what Hegel called “the beautiful soul”? The system of gyres and circles lays out a “natural history” where subjectivity is put purely on the basis of the traveler’s dilemma, a condition of Ø that is globalized, cosmized even. It is worth quoting Santner at some length to prepare for this turn.

As we shall see, Sebald’s writing is deeply indebted to the Benjaminian view that at some level we truly encounter the radical otherness of the “natural” world only where it appears in the guise of historical remnant. The opacity and recalcitrance that we associate with the materiality of nature — the mute “thingness” of nature — is, paradoxically, most pal-pable where we encounter it as a piece of human history that has be-
come an enigmatic ruin beyond our capacity to endow it with meaning, to integrate it into our symbolic universe. Where a piece of the human world presents itself as a surplus that both demands and resists symbolization, that is both inside and outside the “symbolic order” — for Benjamin, this is the unnerving point of departure of the allegorical imagination — that is where we find ourselves in the midst of “natural history.” What I am calling creaturely life is a dimension of human existence called into being at such natural historical fissures or caesuras in the space of meaning. These are sites where the struggle for new meaning — in Nietzsche’s terms, the exercise of will to power — is at its most intense. And it is precisely at such fissures — sites that can persist as uncanny loci of alterity within the order of meaning — that we will find W. G. Sebald at work.

— And this is precisely where our work will begin, with the “impossibility” of mapping such uncanny loci of alterity, an impossibility that the idea of the Atlas has already absorbed, with a specifically melancholy indifference. We will build out Sebald’s natural history with the dossiers of epitome travelers, many of them drawn from film. In the midst of a “natural history” we find the tell-tale traces of cosmograms, omens, and pathways of those between the two deaths. Travel’s “utilitarian” relationship to maps and atlases, where curvature is embedded, fractal style, into every corner, gives way to its magical use. Here, we do not use magic in the allegorical manner of the Harry Potter genre of magical realism. Before Potter and Co. there were magical realists, such as Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, and Franz Kafka who aimed to show how the Real, though impossible, was a continuing central presence in life. Just as trauma directs the subjective psyche “from afar,” through codes and treasure maps that the subject “knows without knowing,” the Real operates within the unconscious of things — landscapes, buildings, ordinary objects. This is the extimity of the Real, its necessity to appear within the guise of a “natural history.” Things have unconsciousness, and this seems, in the ordinary manner of rational thought, irrational. But, what would be more irrational would be to ignore the presence of the real or refuse the conditions of its presence. Such refusals pervert science into scientism, and the Real into realism.

We will also regard as travel terrain the films of Alfred Hitchcock, whose has used screens, fields, and topologies in such landmark films as Vertigo and Rear Window with a particularly Lacanian flair. In filmic terms, magical realism can become Real because the audience supplies the Ø features of the terrain that is constructed within the ones we are shown on screen. We move beyond analogy of Bergson, and the analysis of Deleuze, to see that the drive for completion can be imagined at multiple scales, the drive for continuation is always a plea for one more night. What better place to begin, then, with a kind of cave on whose window walls we see countless illusions being projected; as well as a place where two kinds of Bluebeards reign: one as a real wife-murderer, another as a more domesticated pre-emptive wife-preventer. Duchamp’s warning against the unnaturalness of bachelorhood in the face of the bride laid bare is taken to heart by Hitchcock, who in Rear Window as in countless other of his films, puts marriage into the center of concern. More than most of his other films, however, Rear Window involves the kind of emblem that Poe could appreciate. This “iconistic” film seems to parody the act of film-watching, in its slow uncurtaining of a three-paneled studio apartment window that will, for all our purposes, be identical to the physical screen we face in the darkened auditorium. But, here we face a subtlety and not just a self-reference joke.
Rear Window’s window faces another window, and in this window-to-window collapse of distance we have an “inside face” that seems attentive in every way to Santner’s face-of-the-neighbor, able to express the unconscious that will give the neighbor status of a Proper Stranger. The murderer is hardly proper, but the expectation is that he should be, and the question of morality dominates Rear Window as much as any Hitchcock film. Jeff Jefferies, the photographer temporarily invalided by an accident on the job, does not let up in his pursuit of the thesis of civic perfectability. His zero tolerance of murder eventually arrives at its real destination: the acceptance of the marriage idea and end of his fantasy-driven bachelorhood. What makes this more than a morality tale, however, is the geometry driven by the charm required by art, to freeze the audience inside its magic diagram. Rear Window allows us to see this diagram in literal ways that prepare us for the more fantastic cosmograms of Poe.

Mark Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams.
Richard Bernheimer, “Theatrum Mundi.”
Eric Santner, On Creaturely Life, xii–xiii, xv.
Sigmund Freud, “Notes on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis.”
Fredric Jameson, “On Magic Realism in Film,” 311. The inclusion of “magical” content in films and novels is in fact an ideological project on behalf of a realism that banishes the Real on behalf of a simplified ethical polarity. The slightest complications become the focus of plot paradoxes that must be resolved on the level of confrontation. Science fiction differs from fantasy only in that it grounds its super-human powers in technology. What I intend by magic realism differs from fantasy on one side and the “normalization” of fantasy within a realistic context, as in the case of Harry Potter. Jameson clarifies: “This is, I believe, the most adequate way of theorizing the ‘moment of truth’ in the anthropological view of literary magic realism outlined above, and of accounting for the strategic reformulation of the term by Carpentier in his conception of a ‘marvelous real’, a real maravilloso: not a realism to be transfigured by the “supplement” of a magical perspective but a reality which is already in and of itself magical or fantastic. Whence the insistence of both Carpentier and García Márquez that in the social reality of Latin America, ‘realism’ is already necessarily a ‘magic realism’: ‘¿qué es la historia de América toda sino una crónica de lo real-maravilloso?’” (Carpentier, “Prólogo,” El Reino de este mundo, 16.) This approach continually cycles back to the central issues of the uncanny, as Mladen Dolar broadens the term and re-seats it within the Lacanian extimate and Freudian symptom.
Map 3.01

Devices that deserve the title of “thinking machines” have existed in art and literature long before the invention of electronic computers. Through various media, the process of predication (connecting particulars to universals) has been qualified by a process of relation that has operated outside of the original temporal order of predication, joining and “cancelling” universals and particulars whatever their distribution in space and time. A third process, retroaction, works outside of even the first two parallel orders, gives access to parts that have lain as an “unconscious order,” requiring a key or code to be released. Thinking machines have followed the lines set up by the historical and poetic understanding of the psyche — both the “mind” of philosophy, the subject of psychoanalysis, and the “spirit” of religious-mythic traditions — in that extremity (interpellation etc.) has relied on two distinct “spaces” where chance may come to operate — or be seen to operate — as mechanism (order). This “theological” dimension has given thought its reputation for transcendence and its fondness for travel. But, in actuality, it is the key to the mind’s durability, its independence of empirical circumstances, thanks to a perfect affinity for precisely those same circumstances. “What lay hidden” is always a “treasury,” durable because always false, lost because never possessed, of signifiers that, in their performance of predication create that which they would name. In Rear Window, a thinking machine par excellence, those two distinct spaces required by extremity are apartments separated by an urban courtyard.

SLOW SPACE: The studio apartment of “Jeff” Jefferies and the antipodal apartment of Lars Thorwald resist the time-flow of their neighbors. Each is slowed by a different initial motive. Jefferies’ space forms around his convalescence during medical leave from his work as an action photographer. Thorwald’s consecutive kitchen, living room, and bedroom are slowed by the murder of his wife, Anna, and concealment of the crime.

PROTOTYPES OF THE UNCANNY: Jefferies survival of a life-threatening accident at a raceway establishes the potentiality of a death-narrative. Like Endymion, he is kissed by his own Semele/Diana, his girlfriend Lisa, who introduces herself by illuminating his apartment. Thorwald’s Ao thematics initiate the structure of circumstances that will lead to his capture and confession. With two opposite elements, A and B, both slowing down the invalid and the salesman, one as momentum, the other as fate, the space separating them is destined to be traversed by means of the classic themes of the Freudian uncanny, optics and identity. Anamorphy combines both, turning Jeff’s outward gaze into a mirror operation. As a “body in pieces,” Jeff uses Thorwald to play out the “dirty fantasy” of idealized bachelorhood.

PREDICATION: With the onset of the heat wave, neighbors become visible but their condition as mi-dire is made evident: the “bachelor condition” means the courtyard is a section cut making a subjective interior visible. Jeff’s bachelor condition is qualified: as a photographer he exploits the section cut optically, as a would-be voyeur. What has contracted — the view — is matched by what sticks out: Thorwald. This is the templum at the “top” of the inverted mons delectus.

COLLATION: When the crime is solved and the heat-wave is over, predication becomes restoration of the “marriage condition,” pairing previously free “halves” (e.g. the composer and Miss Lonelyhearts). The falsely coupled newlyweds take the reverse course, toward unhappiness. With the fulfillment of predication’s mi-dire condition, synchronism returns. The courtyard has been purged of its uncanny, which had twinned Jeff and Lars through identity and optics. Halves are matched through a “heating” and destiny that slows down time and opens up a space within a space.

SYNCHRONISM: The slight out-of-synch relationship between a and d create the opportunities for the uncanny twinship of Jeff and Lars who, like Romulus and Remus, take on an adversarial relationship. The double tracking technique, however, allows the film to parody the film-making process, as evident in the opening shot’s framing of Jeff’s apartment windows. The whole film is a “∂-intrusion” into a (subjective) object space that conceals-conserves a reverse-angle view (i.e. Jeff’s apartment is seen only twice in the film).
3.01 / Hitchcock’s Manna

Chiasmus in its most literal form is a trick of spacing. Its negative strategies do not aim to relate any signifiers to signifieds. Instead, they intend to build an “emblem” (a form of cosmogram) inside the work of art that constitutes the work’s unconscious. “Delay” is one way of describing these negative effects, and in the world of travel, the simple delay of stopping in one’s tracks is only the beginning. Delay can employ a right-angled “knight’s move” toward some unexpected attraction that has just come into view. Or, it can wander, prevaricate, insert events or stories, or wedge Zeno-style steps in to slow down a small remainder of space-time. Delay might be regarded as the subjective object whose partiality (the out-of-body, still working organ) is the by-product of its displacement. In *Rear Window*, for example, Anna Thorwald’s wedding ring and purse are important because they are not with her. The ring functions both as the key to proving the murder and symbolically breaking the spell that has kept Lisa and Jeff apart. In true obversity, it is Lisa and Jeff’s wedding ring, a late-appearing anacoluthon based on the two couples’ eerie, “ungrammatical” resemblance.

When Thorwald sees Lisa point to the ring after he has caught her snooping through his apartment, he looks out of the window to realize for the first time, retroactively, that he has been surveilled from across the courtyard. It is now only a matter of time before he uses a telephone call to test the exact address of Jeff’s apartment. Jeff’s optics has closed courtyard’s void, leaving a small gap indicated by the vignetting on the audience’s views of Jeff’s telephoto lens views. This gap leaves room for a face, an exteriority, that is interior. The relation of this face to the emblem of *Rear Window’s* unconscious makes it “creaturely”: as Santner puts it, it is “a surplus that both demands and resists symbolization, that is both inside and outside the ‘symbolic order’” [emphasis mine]. As a partial object, this inside face creates its own style of history, a “natural history,” by slowing down the space of the urban courtyard. Its slowness is gauged against the rush of clues at normal speed, the POV struggles to keep up. Zeno steps orchestrate the final confrontation, where the murder’s approach is slowed down by bursts from Jeff’s flash attachment, shows the relation of the internal, subjective objectivity of the inside face to an external objective subjectivity. Thorwald reveals the details of his wife’s murder in the Øs that delay his advance before the flash-bulb sequence. This version of Gordon Douglas’s “24 Psycho” is an acoustic confessional — what the audience “needed to hear,” the kind of mana that can only come from the negative automatism of the thrillers Hitchcock had mastered with precision.

Leo Steinberg’s repurposing of the idea of manna substitutes, for “communication,” the idea that the work of art nourishes the audience at the level of its animality. This gets at the ambiguity of the mouth, where at multiple levels there is an exchange between food and signs, one taking the place of another. This is the kind of food that, like “knowing without knowing,” fills a void by being negative itself.

The theme of time and being out of synch is cued by Hitchcock’s cameo appearance. He visits the composer’s apartment and winds the clock. Other time references include alarm clocks, music that simulates alarms, and morning radios that accompany residents’ waking activities. At night, Jeff sleeps in his wheelchair and wakes up to check his watch. Occasionally the audience sees what goes on while he’s napping. Other synch issues: Jeff’s disability take him out of the assignment schedule that would have sent him to cover a foreign trouble-spot; Jeff falls asleep during the actual murder, Stella runs down to the street to get the license-plate number of the delivery truck but misses it; the flowers in Thorwald’s garden grow too slowly; Lisa’s break-in is interrupted by Lars’ return; action has to be artificially accelerated in the final scene to “catch up.”

Leo Steinberg, *Other Criteria*. A lesser known component of manna’s reputed benefit is its effectiveness, in liquid form, as a balm for the eyes.
"What is thought?" is the question that must be asked before the question of "artificial thought" or "thinking machines" can be considered. The question of thought, in turn, is a question of truth (Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*). In the reduced terminology of boundaries, truth is created retroactively, making it simultaneously prophecy and history, but the history is a "natural history" that reflects the process of truth-making (i.e. all truth is "artificial") and the prophecy is a form of divination that calls into being what never before existed. George Spencer-Brown’s formula for occultation pinpoints the precise calculus of this operation, and Hitchcock’s films provide popular culture’s "disinterested" confirmation. The key of this kind of proof is over-determination: truth should be written in not one but a myriad of languages, hence the analogy of Babel, both in terms of (1) phonemic language’s debt to a root "acousmatic" *vera narratio*, and (2) the form of the *mons delectus*, whose top-most segment is a *templum* combining human error-chance (8) and natural "machinic" chance (9). In the case of *Rear Window*, Babel has been inverted to create the void of the urban courtyard. The templum marks the point of burial. In *The Birds*, Babel reveals the effects of interpellation that "ideologize" subjects in order that they may subsequently become "psychoanalytical subjects" in full possession of the secret of marriage.

**Map 3.02**

**OCCULTATION.** George Spencer-Brown’s corollary for "occultation" satisfies Hegel’s objection to the idiocy of standard logic’s account of identity as $A = A$. In Spencer-Brown’s calculus, $A$’s identity is based on its ability to be both predicated and predicating, reflecting Lacan’s two-spaces theory of enunciation. $A$’s self-occultation is condensed by the "gratuitous" operator, $B \bar{B}$, the "flip" that can be as easily read as $B \bar{B}$. Occultation provides a mathematical basis for the two-step process of the creation of subjectivity, first through a stage of interpellation to create an "ideological subject" whose central void is a materialization of an automated exterior, $a$; second through a process of interpolation of the "dimensionalized" void of interpellation. Truth, as $a$, exists retroactively — it did not exist before the process through which it was recklessly lost. The gratuitous framing that brought it into being works to "bury the treasure" of signifiers, marked by an empty grave (*Rear Window*) or localized as an empty eye-socket — Coppélius (*The Birds*, "The Sandman").

**EXTIMACY.** The geographical map of *The Birds* shows concentric features: Bodega Bay, the island-town of Bodega Bay (cf. reduplication, as in "Jeff Jefferies"), and the birds on the island. In the flip of interpellation, the birds become the all-enclosing gaze of nature, a Deleuzian "demark" signifying a defect that has become a master signifier, as in the case of the shark in *Jaws*. Subjects are "ideologized" (sub-ject to the enigmatic demands of the Big Other). They are, like Odysseus, trapped in the Cyclop’s cave, a monocular space. The birds have cursed Bodega bay, pulled the island-town out of normal time. As with the challenge of breaking any spell, the key is in the code, but the film’s subjects are unable to crack it. As with *Rear Window*, the issue is marriage, but unlike *Rear Window*, the couple, Mitch and Melanie, are not able to unite successfully, even though the maternal super-ego is stricken by catatonia.

**MONOCULARITY.** The space of *Rear Window* is regulated by the partial objects that circulate through the film. The wedding ring (meaningful in that the owner is missing), the murdered dog/child extimated from the couple’s apartment, the "half-beings" looking for partners (Lonelyhearts, composer, Miss Torso) and Jeff’s surveillance that is not returned until Lars sees Lisa signal Jeff using the ring. Partiality is accommodated spatially with the contraction of Lars’ apartment, following the model of the empty eye-socket used also in *The Birds*. Film in general can be considered as a "magic spell," a slow-down of the time of the audience. Parts of the spell are themselves parts: the apartments cut in half by the "section line" of the heat-wave, marital problems, and incomplete predications — i.e. *mi-dire*. The spell of cinema divides into this slow-down component and a curse component, where symmetry and self-cancellation "dimensionalize" various subjective interior voids.
3.02 / The Natural History of Rear Window

More than any other film, Hitchcock’s *The Birds* seems to confirm directly Santner’s idea of natural history, the basis of the epitome travel of Sebald and others, with components equally engaged in the uncanny of film, travel, and magic maps. The penetrating gaze of the black-eyed birds comes as close as any cinematic effect can to play out the consequences of “creaturely life,” materializing the invisible-Real gaze that haunts space in general, needing no point of view or perspectival vanishing point, respecting no spatial distance or temporal category. This collective animal face becomes the fissure that Santner identifies with the “uncanny loci of alterity.”

*The Birds* moves from an interior San Francisco to the open air of Botega Bay. The freedom of the water and sky is kinked by the interior face of the birds, who, by being able to invade the most intimate vents and margins of houses, link nature’s “revenge gaze” and architectural poché space. Significantly, the film’s most acute horror comes from the discovery of the neighbor who has had his eyes pecked out — the Lacanian objet petit a in its ultimate form of empty eye-sockets. It seems unlikely that *The Birds* and *Rear Window* share more than a blond protagonist, but, in *The Birds*’ clear and optical creatureliness there is a means of demonstrating how *Rear Window* constitutes a natural history based on the idea of the face. At the level of the emblem we see in *The Birds* an “outdoors version” of what is presented as interiority in *Rear Window*. This leads us to look for the inside face, the look of the bird, as a function rather than animal, although we might find some small element of animality that helps us define this function.

The interiority of New York is made even more interior by the studio set of *Rear Window*. The artificial courtyard was surrounded by apartments fitted out with real furnishings and utilities; they could be lived in as actual apartments. The story never leaves the set. Like *Rope* and *Lifeboat*, Hitchcock uses confinement to intensify the plot’s narrative suspense. The natural civic exteriority of the street (i.e. the ability to walk from Thorwald’s building to Jeff’s) would be normal in a city, but in the film this involves crossing the forbidden fourth wall. Thorwald’s discovery of Jeff’s apartment number and final attack are, therefore, a kind of magic appearance based on trespassing over a “cursed space.” *Rear Window*’s cosmogram involves creating a natural-history idea of space out of the identity of the audience’s cinematic view and Jeff’s studio apartment window. The literal rear window is a triptych opened sequentially at the beginning and closed at the end of the film, so that the merger of the audience’s and Jeff’s POV is clear. The spell of the audience is transferred to the film at the level of the estimated space, whose curses and omens, written into the emblem of the work’s unconsciousness, mine the imaginary urban space according to the same logic that the audience’s own space of reception is mined.

*Rear Window*’s interiority was a fundamental production value, but it is important to move behind the technical accomplishments of the set — its simulation of sunlight, rain, night, urban sounds, etc. — and realize the ideological importance of artificiality per se on the audience. The simulation of “natural elements” is commonplace in film production; no one is surprised at snow or rain falling from machines or wind blown by fans. What is truly interior, however, is when the artificial effect reveals something about the audience’s space-time condition and its status as a consciousness suspended between the “actual death” of voluntary immobility and silence, a requirement of auditorium customs, and the symbolic death brought about by the satisfactory end of the performance. *Rear Window* makes an ambitious and aggressive effort to incorporate the audience’s natural elements — this geometry of watching “between the two deaths” — into the film at the level of its own natural history. Just as *The Birds* made rigid, projective visibility into a flexible “lamella” able to slip under doors and down chimneys (a truly orthoscopic methodology!), *Rear Window* pioneered the construction of an “iconistic spatial monogram” whose points and crosses duplicated the “geometry” of the spell transfixing the audience’s attention. Were not this spell graphic in the first place, such a transfer would not have been possible. The idea of enchantment would have to remain a purely temporal idea.
The subject’s emergence from “ideology” (cross-predication, navigation through a dimensionalized void/prison) is, in the terms of literature, art, and magic, a matter of wit. Thus, Odysseus navigates the monocular cave (= cone of vision, or Tower of Babel in ocular terms) by dividing his code into two parts, one for the reader, the other for the literalist Cyclops, who cannot understand that the predicating B has become the predicated B, the “Nohbdy.” If a machine is to think, it must be that it moves beyond computation and into the region of wit where this kind of split code and recombinant predications are the rule. Hence, Alan Turing’s test, which also involved a split code and recombinant predictions (human? machine?) centered around the function of a curtain. In Rear Window, this boundary condition is taken up by a small dog, unencumbered by city law, who digs up a grave that had been the former hiding-place of the partial object par excellence, Anna Thorwald’s head. The "dog who knew too much" was sacrificed, and the scene where his body is discovered allows the camera — exotverted into the courtyard space for a rare exception to the rule of remaining within Jeff’s apartment — collates the evidence needed to fit the apartments into the general plan of Camillo’s Theater of Memory, an inverted Tower of Babel that, as Richard Bernheimer has suggested, resembles nothing so much as the arrays of angels and saints in “auditorium seats” arrayed over the grave to receive the spirit of the deceased. Since ancient times, dogs have been the favored dog of the boundary. In this case, the dog divides not only heaven and earth, courtyard and theater; but the first part of the film, the (failed) love story from the mystery story. Their “idiotic symmetry” is a pairing two parts structured by the Γ function: a diachronic back-and-forth between adversaries/lovers, qualified by a surplus element which in both cases happens to be a ring.

Map 3.03

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3.03 / The Other Side of Babel

The courtyard of *Rear Window* is a clearing in the urban forest of buildings and streets, it is also clearing according to the chaistic logic of $A_1/B/A_2$, where scale carries logic from the highest level to the lowest: $A_{a/b/c}/B_{a/b/c}/A_{a/b/c}$. This fractalization allows the "incident of the dog in the night time" to play essentially the same role it played in *Sherlock Holmes*, where the negative converts into the positive. The dog in the 1950s, as yet troubled by New York City Health Code Ordinance 161.03, was a free agent, and the childless couple’s terrier was tolerated in the courtyard’s lawns and gardens. So, the killing of the “innocent” dog carried the weight of a serious infraction of neighborliness. The transition from $A_1$ to $A_2$ makes this incident the middle of *Rear Window*; and just as the courtyard itself is a clearing, the death of the dog is a clearing in the middle of the plot.

The natural history of this moment is that the dog was digging in the flower bed to find “buried treasure” of human remains, $a$. The possibility of having a body part buried in an urban courtyard, of course, raises the film’s anxiety production level. Anna Thorwald’s body is “present and not present” in this device. Jeff’s discovery of the burial is, significantly, anamorphic. He compares an earlier photo of the spot’s flowers to the present, to demonstrate that they have “grown backwards.” The interior face thus has three aspects: the innocent dog is killed for “no good reason,” the body which has disappeared from the apartment has also disappeared from the garden, and the normal cycle of organic growth has itself been reversed. The symmetry is idiotic; the film’s middle term, like the audience’s own “suspension of disbelief,” involves negating a negation.

Like Gordon Douglas’s *24 Hour Psycho*, the interval that normally provides continuity becomes, by a process of enlargement, converted from a machine sustaining illusion into one conveying illusions from an “elsewhere.” If the first illusion seems to run from left to right, the other intersects it at a right angle. The diastole and systole of imagination breathe, instead of in a straight biological line, in and out, in an ontological one, in and in again. This radical interiority echoes the more demonstrable correspondence of the geometry of the amphitheater-like courtyard with its obverse, a version of the Biblical Tower of Babel. The comparison of the courtyard’s void to the positive form of the tower — whose top is either unfinished, destroyed, or invisible depending on which tradition you consult — is complicated by the role of chiasmus played in both. The Hebrew word for babble, preserved in English, somehow compounds the Babylonian meaning of Bab-El, “Gate of God.” This is what clearings are for, after all, just as the Babylonian ziggurat, as precursor of the Biblical Babel, functioned as an acousmatic device for interpreting the “celestial words” of the sky. Ø as middle term, especially as void, negative, anamorphic, and “idiotic” as it functions for *Rear Window*, seems both as an idea and the “barred” letter phi, capable of joining the film’s two “wings” of meaning (the murder mystery and the love story) with an empty, doggy middle. The void is first and foremost a clearing, an eye whose authentic azure permits divination, travel through time. This time, as Florensky’s dream/face thesis would have it, is to a point in the future where the past will have arrived simultaneously, but backward.

Franz Kafka, “The Great Wall and the Tower of Babel,” *Parables and Paradoxes*. Kafka preserves the ambiguity by which the Tower is both unfinished and destroyed. Like language itself, the Tower is “unable to finish what it had to say” (the unfinished project, the half-speech, $mi$-$dira$) but also “says too much” — which attracts the revenge of *God*. *Rear Window* appropriately couples the theme of revenge from the side of Jeff’s invisible surveillance from the side of the audience with the divided emblem, a tessera broken into a Jeff-Lisa part and Lars-Anna part, each of which is broken further and “reunited” by, respectively, marriage and jail. Who can say that there is no such thing as “poetic justice”? 155
**Map 3.04**

The possibility that *Rear Window* is a death narrative seems slim and has not been noted by any critic. Yet, the signs of a near-death experience open the film (we see the broken camera, the "last photo" of a race-car crash). Sigh of relief; the tight shot of the cast on Jeff's left leg tells us he has survived and is likely to recover fully. Or ... could it be that this is the fantasy Jeff has imagined in his last moments? Is this dream a preparation for eternity, a last attempt to correct his shortcomings, pay for his sins? Death narratives are successful ploys because they work whether or not the audience pays attention to them. A "straight reading" is just as successful as a death narrative reading, if only because a death narrative must obey the same rules as digetic tales and must sustain the illusion of life whether the "audience" is actual or a soon-to-be-deceased dreamer. In Jeff's case, the problem is motility, limited to gliding around his apartment in a wheel-chair. Usually, the death-dreamer wanders through a mazed landscape pregnant with portents. Jeff's gliding, however, is estimated. The camera takes us out of his window and reveals that his innermost feature, the broken leg — mathematically a case of 1/x, or "prohibition" — is, in the present heat-wave, now an architectural condition. Apartments, stories, and residents themselves are present as one half of a whole, and we know from this that the story will be about finding the missing part.

**EXTIMACY 1:** Jeff Jefferes' death drive necessitates an extimacy from his literal condition to a dream state, where interior subjectivities and externalities change places. The interior is specified in detail by the opening scene, which pans across objects of Jeff's profession as a photographer; displayed on a side table — photos, sample magazines, his broken Speed Graflex camera, a print of "his last shot" on a race course, with a race-car tire hurtling toward him. The camera drifts out of the window, its pan shot takes in the particulars of the courtyard. Finally, the camera settles on the cast on his left leg, with the inscription "Here lie the broken bones of L. B. Jefferies." Could there be any clearer representation of the intention to obvert inside for outside, subject for object? In dreams of flying, the condition of air-inside-body is extimated to the body inside-inside-air. Jefferies is empowered to "fly" by means of his surveillance of neighbors. What has been overlooked is that his broken leg ("one of two," a 1/x or "prohibition" condition) has been extimated as well: turned into the "section effect" brought on by the heat-wave that has forced residents to open their curtains and shades to reveal their interior lives to their neighbors. Other wholes (1/1) are broken as well: singles in search of partners, composers in search of tunes. It is this extimacy that signals the condition of the dream as the dominant mode of *Rear Window*.

**EXTIMACY 2:** The "prohibition" of Jeff's 1/x leg condition leads to a "privation" geometry of x/-x. Jeff's apartment's prohibition causes a direct response: Thorwald's apartment contracts; Thorwald "pulls back" into the shadows to conceal his murder of Anna. The wedding ring is hidden. For all of Lisa's "showing off" (she "introduces herself" by turning on lights and whirling around in her new dress; later she displays her new overnight gear to Jeff), Anna is not just concealed but dismembered. The two women take up positions on either side of the mirror of Lacan's mirror stage. Lisa is the confident ego-image; Anna is the body-in-pieces. This second extimacy also involves a disintegration of x/-x logic from 1/x logic. Jeff is now the scene of privation (-x). His apartment, thanks to its service as a point-of-view mechanism, has become "invisible." Although his curtains are translucent bamboo screens, Lisa and Jeff seem to enjoy perfect privacy and need only retreat from the window to remain hidden, unknown (ignota latae[1]). Thorwald moves into prohibition space by concealing a murder and cover-up. His obversion initiates the interpolation logic that is the basis of all crime fiction. 1/x is "putting the pieces together" in sympathy with the victim's status as a body-in-pieces. Thus, Thorwald's apartment must "rotate" so that Jeff's view intersects it at a "right" (= just) angle.

**BETWEEN THE TWO DEATHS:** In the age-old tradition of Da, there is a first, literal death and a second symbolic death. Between the two, the subject must "prove" something, pass the various tests put before him/her. Frequently this is put in terms of 1/x: a pattern in shown but then half is obliterated. Passage is equivalent to restoring the missing half, finding the partner, guessing the end that matches the beginning. Here, the motif of twins pervades both the space and time of "between the two deaths." Could Justice Douglas's concern for the Ethel and Julius Rosenberg case have been driven by the fact that the couple was a couple? Did the Dali Lama somehow warn him about the magic of twins? Jeff and Lisa are mirrored, grotesquely, by Lars and Anna. Their x/-x separation, which works as a constant dimension that has Jeff's "proterubance" generate an equal and opposite "contraction" of the Thorwald apartment opposite his, works within the economy of extimacy that switches privation (x/-x) for prohibition (1/x) with every flip of space-time.

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1. "ignota latae"
3.04 / Dead Man Rolling

The mystery story genre could be defined as the estrangement of the past initiated by the (scandalous) presence of a corpse. When the corpse, as in the case of *Rear Window*, can’t be found, the estrangement is aggravated, intensified. As in the case of the accelerating assembly line in Chaplin’s *Modern Times*, time-space is tightened. As Santner would put it, the world becomes “an enigmatic ruin beyond our capacity to endow it with meaning, to integrate it into our symbolic universe.” Isn’t this where the fenestration of *Rear Window* becomes a true “obverse”? Its three panels open up to an anterior space, a void. The exiled hero, the hero in disguise, puts the audience on edge. In the case of Jeff’s convalescence, we stay with the absence, tarry with the negative.

It seems a stretch of the death narrative’s rules and regulations to argue that Jeffries is actually dead — hasn’t he just had a near miss, evidenced by his broken leg and smashed camera? But, this would be just the kind of smooth surface that would allow momentum to carry the victim past the trauma of death. Because all of the other characters are seen from Jeff’s point of view, they could be shades, themselves, generated by Jeff’s memory as it resists the idea of dying. The visiting nurse, Stella, is a consequence of the crash; Jeff’s girlfriend Lisa kisses her prince awake in dreamy slow-motion; and Detective Doyle (Wendell Corey), a war buddy, could easily be another gliding soul who didn’t actually survive the war. But, the indeterminacy’s the thing. They’re all just characters in our dream, after all. The interval between the two deaths is a narrative structure, driven by a strategy of continuation, haunted by the idea of completion, which is formalized by the counterpoint of the murder of Anna Thorwald. a field whose Möbius band topology is present only in the negative. Solve the murder, reach the second, symbolic death; end of story.

The DA mode of the uncanny, is operative even if the “diagnostic” actuality of a first death can’t be determined. Is Jeff dead? It doesn’t matter. It’s actually the indeterminacy per se that is materialized. If the matter is decided, the energy of the indeterminacy is no longer able to move the plot along. After all, Hitchcock’s cameo has him winding a clock in the studio of the composer who’s trying to work out a tune called “Lisa.” Thus, Da is a matter of complementary halves that work as diastole and systole. Jeff is half-dysfunctional: one leg in a cast, girlfriend on hold, not fired but assignment suspended. For a photographer, being grounded is the equivalent of being blinded. Like the blind prophet Tiresius, he has been given the second sight of prophecy, but with another variation on indeterminacy, a “Cassandra rider”: no one believes him. But, the audience has sat beside him, even while he has slept through the scream and breaking glass of the actual murder. We are his dream, his unconscious. We are anxious and silent on the other side of our rear window. The curtains rise on Jeff’s window at the same time the credits wind up on ours, and Jeff’s convalescence is the timer set to hit zero at the end of the film (though it will do this as Jeff’s other leg, broken at the end, gives the film a way to end with a strategy of continuation, this time with Lisa in place).

Lisa pretends to read *Beyond the High Himalayas* by William O. Douglas but switches to *Harper’s Bazaar* once Jeff falls asleep. Her character was been modeled on Anita Colby, the model-actor-executive and famous New York socialite of the 1950s. Douglas had faced impeachment charges in 1953 after he had stayed the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, a case dealing with spying and government entrapment. Douglas had met the then very young Dali Lama on his travels, however, and this could be a means of inserting the theme of transubstantiation. After all, actors and films are themselves a literal example of life-in-death, a stay of execution (the one night of a thousand and one nights). *Rear Window*’s courtyard residents exemplified the delusional aspects of: the sculptor, musician, couple-with-dog, dancer, and Miss Lonelyhearts tell their stories through gestures and pantomimes. Their exiles end at the same time Jeff reunites with Lisa. Jeff’s second, symbolic death confirms the fact that he has been the corpse of this mystery. Anna Thorwald was a “stand-in.”
The condition of the neighbor is that one doesn’t get to choose. So, like the ethical-religious injunction to “love thy neighbor;” the matter is a forced choice. Love thy neighbor ... or what? Lacan, following Hegel, sees a structure in the forced choice that employs the three principal forms of negation: denial (Verneinung), renunciation (Verleugnung), and foreclosure (Verwerfung). Each form not only denies some empirical content, it denies the denial it succeeds. The full series returns to a concealed content, an “unconscious motive,” that had been “there all along” to trump any resistance against the forced choice. But, what role does the forced choice play in Rear Window’s essay on neighborliness? Is the background atmosphere of law and order, which would in any event be a component of any crime story, more than a casual component? The question points to the central role played by extimité. The short-circuits atmosphere makes with the unconscious desire that was “there all along” blazes the trail that Thorwald takes to reach Jefferies’ apartment. But, this trail would not be possible at all were it not for the “original extimacy” by which the whole film gains the status of a death-dream — a flip that begins in the opening scenes before we meet any of the characters, the flip between the interior of Jefferies’ apartment and the courtyard that encloses it — it it encloses.

DENIAL (Verneinung):
“Saddam Hussein is concealing WMDs.”

RENUCNIATION (Verleugnung):
“Even though we can’t find the WMDs, we must invade.”

FORECLOSURE (Verwerfung):
“Even if there were no WMDs to be found, getting rid of Saddam Hussein was a good thing.”

[UNCONSCIOUS]: “Kill Saddam!”

EXTIMACY OF THE FORCED CHOICE: In the example of the Iraq war rationale, the level of foreclosure “shuts down” the previous reasons given for going to war. It connects to the initial unconscious motive that was “there from the start,” the desire to kill Saddam Hussein. Foreclosure reveals the previous rationales as “forced”: they were necessary steps of an incremental conversion to an ultimate inevitable decision that, once started, set in motion a series of false predications. The final link is explained by Lacan’s dictum that “the unconscious is structured like a language.” By this, we may understand that enunciation’s double structure — it’s Möbius-band-like construction of a field of affordances (tuché) that is simultaneously inside and outside of a space-time from which the dramatization takes place (énoncé). This “primary extimacy” of enunciation as performance reveals the unconscious’s own primary extimacy, a stereognosis of the two legs, one broken. The forced choice of neighborliness in Rear Window concentrates attention on the case of Anna Thorwald, the murder of a stranger that is a stone set even closer to the corner of ethics’ foundations. Jeff’s obsession with the murdered wife is a matter of identity. He realizes that it is the direct precipitate of his own extimacy, his own broken leg, concealed in a cast with “the wrong name.”

A short-list of cases where extimacy results in an “artificial intelligence” modeled after marriage suggests that Hitchcock’s obsession with this theme, coupled with his own cinematic techniques of obversion, were fully integrated into his narratological ideas of a well-formed script. The film as a popular culture “clinic” for studying the emergence of the psychoanalytical subject (from its ideological predecessor) thus corrects the “problem” of film criticism from Oudart to Metz, viz. “getting the direction of the Lacanian gaze backwards” (Todd McGowan, The Real Gaze).
3.05 / The Inside Face

Coupling of the themes of the neighbor and marriage make Rear Window into a kind of Hitchcockian summa theologia. The Bing Crosby song that floats among the other ambient sounds recreating the New York Greenwich Village atmosphere, “To See You Is to Love You,” sums it up. The film is a monogram, and seeing it — seeing this emblematic quality within it — is to realize the transcendental dialectic of lack and over-presence that the film realizes so explicitly. The face inscribed into the center of Rear Window matches up to the screen onto which the film itself is projected. The audience watches a film-in-a-film, with Jeff Jefferies as their “host.” Because all audiences must “play dead,” immobilized in the darkened auditorium, Jefferies is then a kind of Hermes, conducting us on our death tour until we reach a symbolic end signaled by the lowering of the three bamboo shades. What we see we shall love. What then of the neighbors? Why should we love them? Jefferies investigates their situation and finds little to love, except in sympathy for their abjection. Miss Torso is beset by wolves, Miss Lonelyhearts would like at least one wolf. The composer can’t finish his love song. The sculptor portrays “Hunger.” Thorwald tends his sick wife but will betray her with a Woman in Black. Jeff’s cynical view takes us back to Santner’s (and Rosenzweig’s) central point: the neighbor must be imagined to have an unconscious — which in this film is developed spatially. The death of the childless couple’s dog is the point in the film where the camera moves to the center of the courtyard just as the wife challenges here neighbors’ rejection of the natural love the dog had extended to all of them. The film’s narrative turns on the very point where the “middle term” of the set, the courtyard void, is turned visually inside out. The extimate is materialized as the Ø, the “idiotic symmetry” of the middle term.

The childless couple who fawn over their small dog establish the role of neighboring and in effect challenge the cynical live-and-let-live position. In effect they consolidate Jefferies’ investment in the condition of Anna Thorwald, which Lisa has found ghoulish. Santner, following Franz Rosenzweig, isolates the key factor: The striking thing about Rear Window is that this unconscious is delivered in a definitively geometric form. In its self-inverting extimacy, we see how the central position is played by the complex (Janusian) face. The face of Jeff’s studio windows, and the relation of this face to Thorwald’s face opposite, is not face-to-face (Thorwald doesn’t look back at Jeff) but, rather, face to side-ways, an orthogonal view into the stretched-out sequence of rooms that make up the Thorwalds’ apartment, a kind of ant-farm arrangement.

Jeff collapses the distance between them into a vignetted view through his telephoto lens even though there is no actual “vignette” in a telephoto lens. Hitchcock adds this to preserve a minimal distance between Jeff and Lars, a distance that allows us to consider how they are doubles: both are trying to rid themselves of their partners, Lars is the component of invisibility to balance out Jeff’s hyper-visibility. Anna and Lisa are both blonds who demand more attention. Jeff and Lars deal with refraction of light, one by lenses, the other by jewels. While Jeff can pull back from potential exposure at his window ledge, Lars can only turn out the lights or lower the blinds, and here we can see how the orthogonal view constitutes a function of the ∂ as tuchē, “opportunity” (Jeff has the “occasion” to see his neighbors lives on display, and we must take this form of accident seriously as such, and not, as some have argued, an intentional voyeurism). The logic of Rear Window, more perhaps than any other film, can be drawn. It is an automaton, a mechanism that generates meaning on behalf of the audience, which is free to use it as a speculative unconscious.
To say that "Rear Window functions as a thinking machine," what is meant? Is it the set, the narrative, the cinematic experience? Or, is it the variable reception of the film in the afterthoughts of the audience's highly differential minds? Rather than a computer as material object, Rear Window constitutes a model of a way of thinking that is so portable that it can operate at any scale, in any event or circumstance, no matter how small or large. This portability evidences the existence of an arc connecting shamanistic magic, European adaptations throughout the history of philosophy, and of course the silent deployments without which art would lose its effectiveness as a form of hypnosis. The proof is not "what if" but "what if not." Such a thinking machine is necessary for the utilitarian expansion of the acoustics of speech to non-speech synaesthetic media. As Plato seems to have known, it is the basis of the meaning of ἱδέα and justification of the expansion of idea to memory, anamnesis. This highly flexible computer, which requires nothing more than a story and an audience or, even less, a single thinking thinker, uses extimacy and collation to convert the ideological subject to a "psychoanalytical" one, which is to say that the subject is able to move beyond interpolation to interpolation: from being mapped to mapping, traveling, encountering an empirical world armed with little more than curiosity.

The mathematical imaginary of the Renaissance was consolidated around a number of memory devices that seemed to embody essential truths. The "lambda" (top) combined the double and triple proportionals, the Nicomachus of Gerasa (Jay Kappraff) provided several "sequences" that allowed architects to use a compact set of numbers (enclosed by the hexagon) to achieve arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic means within built works. Because these measurements related to optics and perception as well as the firmitas of structure, they constituted a "musical" solution to the problem of unifying the Vitruvian values of Venus, poetry, and firmitas. Buildings were, literally, "sung into being," thanks to the harmonic properties of the measurements used to set the foundations (ichnography), raise the walls (orthography), and adjust relations between the interior and exterior (scenography). Because the last of this series dealt with shadows and light (Frascari, 2011), architects were able to incorporate a utilitarian magic akin to the sacrificial rites used to guarantee the spiritual security of cities. Rear Window lies in this tradition, setting up a field of stochastic harmonics so that the sacrifice of a victim, Anna, might restore the urban courtyard to a harmonic that moves beyond the ideology of forced choice — i.e. the idiocy of "love thy neighbor." Foundation rituals used the music of proportionals but it was the extimacy of these proportionals that allowed the building to relate the very small to the very large — i.e. the classical arc linking the tomb, the house, the city, and the cosmos. The proportionals, prominent in the use of cosmograms of the Yoruba and others, insured that luck (automaton, tuché) might be brought out of its status as noise into focus through "stochastic resonance" — noise to signal.

Working at a variety of literary scales, Poe employed a chiasmic design that divided the text into two halves so that elements on opposite sides could be paired in the reader's memory, creating a zone of "anamorphic predications" that existed solely as a performative component of the reading of the work. This answers the question of what and where the "computer" of artificial intelligence may be found — from the transition from the ideological subject of reading (reception) to the active, psychoanalytical subject (writing). The reader writes automatically, i.e. as a medium in the style of the 19c. mystics who, pen in hand, transcribed the words of the dead, XXX. Poe's lambda hinged about a point of exchange, a hinge in three senses: (1) the joint between the two halves of the narrative, (2) the regulator of distances that filled out the void left by the interpolation of ideology, and (3) the inside face by which any materials might be collated/predicated, thanks to the anamorphic function of Λ. Poe provided all the necessary detail for a "user's manual" in his short story, "The Purloined Letter," where the object of interest is concealed "in plain view" by creating an artificial poché, given away in the palindromic sounds of "card-rack":

This acoustical trick epitomizes the other linkages, including the ultimate pair, the opening words, "It was an odd evening" (referring to the ancient game of Morra, which involves guessing odd or even numbers) with the final reference to the story of Atreus and Thyestes, rival twins. The vengeful Atreas fed his brother boiled limbs of his own children — a predication involving a "defective leg" in the most literal, stereognostic, and gruesome sense.
Rear Window's emblem/diagram tells the story of a negative reunion (Lars and Jeff) followed by multiple positive reunions (Miss Lonelyhearts and the composer, Miss Torso and her returned soldier-husband, the childless couple and their new dog, and of course Jeff and Lisa). Only the official married couple who honeymooned during the mysteries dark investigative period is having problems, proof that their bliss/pain cycle was in truth automatically linked with the rest, just as their shade was pulled while others were open. The mechanical quality of these coordinated fortunes justifies building a mechanical bridge — where the engineering qualities of automaton and tuchē are emphasized — connecting Hitchcock with Edgar Allan Poe's cipher writing system. Like the story of the same name, Poe opened up an imaginary space between the opening and closing of his stories, across which jumped constructs provoked by the echoes of situations and sometimes literal words. This middle, like the courtyard of Rear Window, was "anamorphic" in that not only the optics but identity components of the uncanny are involved in defining the position and dimensionality of the point of view. Just as Jeff's desire to avoid marriage was mirrored in the magnified situation of the Thorwalds, a "left-hand" version of Jeff's comparatively benign situation.

Automaton and tuchē are materialized in Rear Window, in the coordination of conditions shared by neighbors as well as the structure of Jeff's opportunistic investigation. He intercepts the Thorwalds apartment from the side view. In fact, one could consider the façades of the buildings on the other side of the courtyard from Jeff's studio as a screen, a tiled arrangement or "mosaic" exemplifying Lacan's idea of language as a system of relations linking signifiers (S₂). As a "master signifier" (S₁) himself, whose "idiocy" or self-negating nature is built into his invalid status as well as his ambiguity toward marriage, Jeff faces this S₀ obliquely, the right angle providing him a "knight's move" (Γ) of opportunities to observe without exposing himself. This serves to sustain the tuchē components of his optical observation and Lisa's break-in until Thorwald notices Lisa gesturing to Anna Thorwald's wedding ring she has found and concealed on her own hand. It is as if she is saying both "I found it!" and "We're married at last, albeit by proxy of a dead woman!" Thorwald's direct returned stare of hostility comes alloyed to Jeff's realization that his bachelor days are over. He is in double trouble.

Quickly the geometry switches to the obversion techniques by which Thorwald locates and comes to kill Jeff. His Great Circle route around the city block acts as a payment or return trip of the film's topology. And, just as Jeff's view involved a series of tightly spaced steps interpolated by the sequence of clues of the crime, Lars' completion of the outer circle met with a series of steps interpolated by Jeff's flash gun. The point of these seems to have been a mechanism for incorporating Ø elements, the missing pieces that, when added back, glue the parts together in the alternative thesis of murder.

Poe shows how this invisible/negative Ø can be worked into a cipher that anamorphically binds the left and right of a narrative. It is the heart of the work that, by being suppressed or excluded, can beat on past the moment of technical death, postponing the unconscious of the work until the second, symbolic (= ciphered) death is reached.

Richard Kopley, "Formal Considerations of the Dupin Mysteries." Kopley develops a particularly vivid account of Poe's method but does not develop it graphically. Yet Poe seems to have been aware of precursors where such a graphic comparison was made. In his "landscape story," "The Domain of Arnheim, or the Landscape Garden" an explicitly chiastic design can be traced back to Giles Fletcher's poem, "Christ's Victorie and Triumph, in Heaven, and Earth, over, and after Death," re-published in 1841 and quoted by Poe in his story to suggest that the protagonist's journey is a death narrative.
Human action, taken in its purely performative aspect, requires two distinctions, or negations, before any meaning can take place. First, action must be distinguished from natural accident (automaton) in the same way a pile of stones is made to create a “herm,” a point for silent trade. The pile (cf. sorites) “could not have happened simply by accident.” Second, action must be shown to be intentional, i.e. a (silent) part of a sentence whose first part has been given but second part requires (predication). Even in cases of the beautiful and the sublime in nature, where purposiveness and intentionality have been ruled out, predication is felt to exist. In silent trade, *tuchē* as adjacency is limited to the object (the donors never meet). Their silence/visibility allows agency to be attributed to Hermes. Typically occurring at a crossroads, the tradition of silent trade is stabilized by the mental estimate, made by the participants, of the equivalence of goods they leave in trade. Over- or under-estimates would be “offensive to the god.” This stability is carried forward into modern exchange theory, where the buyer must always conceive that the buying price is favorably low and the seller that the selling price is favorably high, otherwise no trade takes place. Unexpectedly, this theory of exchange is also a proof of the existence of deity, albeit a “machinic” deity.

Silent trade, the historic practice whereby trading partners never meet but exchange goods at a crossroads marked by a pile of stones, requires that the pile of stones itself be distinguished from an accidental collection of rocks that have simply fallen close together. That is, the pile must exist as a pile (the basis of the idea of sorites). The essence of this distinction is that the rock at the bottom of the pile, even taken as isolated and singular, retains this quality although the other rocks may have been removed. “Hermes” thus exists as a silent and concealed operator, and his domain (Hadès) also exists.

The herm “signalizes” (makes reference to the signifying system itself) and distinguishes the instance defined by a future anteriority (the time of the trade). *Who came before* may now relate to *who came after*, thanks to the space that will protect the left object within its field. The crossroads becomes synonymous with this “time just before” and “time just after,” consummated by the predication of the trade. The silence of the signalizing is materialized as both an acousmatic and optical absence: Hermes’ secrets and invisibility.

The predication of trade (a thing is both bought and sold at the same time whenever it is traded) leaves a small remainder (the buyer must think the price is a bit low, while the seller must think it a bit high). This remainder preserves the silence of silent trade, and must be the *unacknowledged secret*, the “enthymeme” — B)B — that binds them into an implicit contract of exchange. Poe’s automation of meaning within the butterflyed text also uses this strong bonding technique, “inverting” initially casual phrases into early instances of “signalizing.”

Automaton is both the distinction from natural accident and the machinic automation of invisible process that regulates transaction. Type one error (contraction, R₂) can signalize type two (“cosmic”) intentionality (R₁) within the field of predication. In the literary/artistic imagination, R₁ is often represented through a “negational geometry” — i.e. the recursive spiral, the upside-down, the labyrinthine. In such structures, the *templum* is embedded as a silent feature guiding travel by means of an inside frame.

Hermes holds his finger to his lips while holding a candela-bra symbolizing the planetary system. Its branches are the concentric zones of the pre-Copernican zone that, in ancient times, territorialized the transition between life and death. The D₄ component (the Empyrean heaven beyond this mediating zone) was echoed on earth by A₀, mortal life fated by the configuration of planets at the moment of birth.

Each planet functioned as a “ruler” and a “house” (Γ), predicator and predicated. Astrology aims to distinguish the “intentions” of the planets from chance, grounding its causality in the affordances established cosmically and through a process of retroactive over-determination. Confirmation is defined by the “just-before/just-after” temporality of predication and fulfillment. Birth determines death but this determination takes two forms: A₀ and D₄.
3.07 / Enunciation and Causality

Jacques-Alain Miller has compared enunciation’s structure to a shout that clears out a room with one signifier, where the signified is almost always invisible and sometimes non-existent: “Bomb!” There are few better ways to describe what happens to an audience in relation to a screen on which is projected a picture of diachronic reality. Whether this reality exists or is merely something from the past does not limit the effectiveness of our imaginative transfer. We reach the other side by leaving behind a “content” we will pick up later, whose absence will allow, at some future moment, it to be the point to which we will return, with a collection of other suppressed things and ideas. This dropped-behind element works like a secret password. Once in the new field, our passage is a timed interval between the hypnotist’s instruction to sleep and then, some moments later, wake up. In effect, our bodies have been paralyzed while our minds venture forth. Time is kept by internal chronometers that work on analogies drawn from space. When physical distance collapses we know that our time is up.

The (Johnstonian) travel of enunciation works through a sequence of accounting systems that keep track of internal stages and their completions. This is true whether we are talking about a literary narrative or literal trade; a spatial array integrates the “silence/invisibiltiy” of the “Bomb!” so that it may serve as a binding middle term, as the enthymeme in rhetoric works to bind the audience to the speaker. Final cause dominates once natural chance has been “settled” into the mode of signalizing. The motif of travel (the isolation of the individual from his/her home, family, and friends) domesticates this idea by using predication logic (Γ), where the four “primary” causes (formal, material, final, efficient) dominate, to stage its particular scenes and situations.

The material being of the artistic experience is divided. Dominant, on the surface, is the form we recognize as something — a building, lamp, sunset. Supporting this form is the material cause that we might break down scientifically or metonymically. The relation between formal and material cause is orthogonal, in that the same materials and techniques might produce many other forms; and the same form might be produced by other means. In any event, the wires and ropes of production are kept in the background, off-screen so to say. The tooling marks are sanded smooth to sustain the illusion.

In these four causes, sequenced as efficient, final, and formal/material, the distinction is made from what is intended and the results of accident. Aristotle includes these in his discussion of cause but is unclear about any integration. Yet, it is clear that efficient cause acts as a “figure” against the “ground” of automaton, natural chance. For anything to stand out as a communicative formation, it must be seen as different from random occurrence. This difference is its organization, its economy, its efficiency. Once a frame forms separating this economy from its background, the question of intention can be posed as a “field” upon which forms (identities) and their material conditions (synaesthetic basis for perception) appear. The design of this field must draw a fine line between intention, which may be complex and partly concealed, and tuchē, the opportunism and affordance that would be, simply, one thing after another, no closure, no point. Once these two chance elements are initially excluded, however, they can be brought back as devices to manage surprise, as when a “unreliable narrator” introduces the inside frame of a defective point of view. The dynamics between the “standard set” of causes and the two forms of chance might be said to be the life force of the work of art, its claim to constitute performativity.
Map 3.08

The issue of "authorial intention" is the situation of the Turing test: an interrogator, and a responder next to a machine, and a curtain. Similarly, the question of who writes and who reads comes into full "Vichian" focus with the idea that an empirical subject partners with a machine. Vico’s idea was to play the fool, but possibly it was also to allow himself the freedom to actually be the fool — an author who understands 20% or less able to find a reader who understands 200% or more. This points to so-called “automatic writing,” the trick of the spiritualist who claims his/her pen is transcribing the dictated thoughts of some deceased shade. The matter should be put in other terms: What author does not dictate the thoughts of long-dead thinkers? What author fully understands Plato, whose Cave he/she nonetheless describes, missing key inflections but passing on the blueprint that others may interpret "beyond" the imperfect transcription? Every author is to some extent “defective,” every writing is partly a transcription. Even Plato seems to have knowingly falsified content he got elsewhere; certainly, he was one of the first to demonstrate how lies can be the media of truth, and what kind of truth, philosophically, this may be. Misprision, in Harold Bloom’s account, opens up a void in authorship that is filled in the same way reading begins with the reader “dimensionalizing” the void that was interpellated from the author/Other’s enigmatic demand. The text as a “thinking machine” is not a metaphor. It is an operational device. It either works or it doesn’t. In Poe’s "The Purloined Letter" the letter is hidden from the reader as much as it is from the police who scour the Minister’s apartments — and, it is hidden in the same way! It is hidden, in short, “in front of the eyes,” a specification we must read very literally, very seriously.

The sequence — the forced choice of ideological deception, interpellation and exception, (re-)predication and the construction of exception through anamorphosis, and collation at the mirror’s bezel — is based on empirical examples, particularly those to be found in the writings of Giulio Camillo, Giambattista Vico, the Platonic dialogs; or, in more modern times, Franz Kafka, Franz Rosenweig, Bruno Schultz. The common theme is the emergence of subjectivity from the enigmatic ethical invective related to the forced choice, “Love thy neighbor.” The key to this foundation of the command to love is the Heideggarian throwness of Dasein: it is automaton — blind chance — deprived of tuchē, that sets the stage for the radical choices that surround the "sites of exception" where subjectivity will finally emerge, embodied by a process of enactment: literally, the “pure theater” of collation, the ultimate ars topica where the (collectivized and estimated) mind — a truly artificial intelligence — can “know without knowing,” which is to say conceive of the any in terms of the any. This sequential teleology is best understood through comedy and music, where collation is embodied as ecstasy, as in the films of Chaplin or saxophone solos of Charlie Parker.

"In front of one’s nose," the magician’s hang-out, is the space of the interface where the objet petit a, the phallic Φ, glues and unglues the phantom appearance of image as imago, the visual password, radically visible (to those who are “blind” through prophecy) and radically acousmatic (a result of a "stochastic resonance" within a context of noise, ignota latebat). The pass is the triangular key, interpellation, where any collates to any, ultimate gnosis, but without the mysticism.

Rear Window’s Thorwald is at first “de-subjectivized” by Jeffries’ surveillance — i.e. he is interpellated by the photographer’s gaze, but he retains a minimum remainder, a void that is dimensionalized by his apartment walls and recesses, his trips out into the rainy night, etc. He wraps his tools, and by wrapping predicates the dissection of his murder. The failure of the collation, wringing, opens up the sudden appearance of “the gaze itself” — i.e. the signalizing of the gaze that triggers Thorwald’s revenge, a spatial suture to cover the distance extimated by the courtyard, a materialization of the Joycean “shout in the
3.08 / The Performative

When automaton and tuchē return from their initial exile from the intentionality of the work (the Ø of mechanical advancement of frames, the suppression of the production apparatus; the planned shape of a story, etc.), they shape as mechanisms and opportunities encountered in ordinary experience. That is, the chance/materiality of the work, which is separated from representational content by the frame, is inscribed inside the frame as the bases for multiple figure-ground distinctions. This provides a continual resource for the work's ability to strike a balance between peril and survival, destruction and success. We see a fictionalized version of what we have already used to frame the diëgetic conditions of the artwork. The logic of the double is already established; a stereognosis is in effect. Because the frame initiates an occasion of repetition, where recognition will be postponed by disguise (we know that the characters, in comedy at least, are not really in peril; things will work out in the end), our experience of the reunion of these twin versions takes place in the negative. We have been complicit in the suppression, but ourselves suppressed in this complicity. We have formed the fantasy but accepted it as "presented" rather than "self-constructed."

The performative, therefore, creates an unconscious and, correlative to this unconscious, a face that, like Jefferies, does not face another face but, rather, faces a lateral view, a "tiled array," a puzzled anthology whose relations, whose Ø mechanisms, have been concealed. The Ø may be represented, as in Rear Window, as a "marriage" of previously isolated parts. "Fate has brought them together" and in this reunion we encounter the old symmetry between marriages and funerals: Ad. Our timed interval, in which we have concealed from ourselves the idea of a plan, is the uncanny DA that wanders across the field of constructed intentionality where mines have been planted, turning our projective idea of space-time into a moral topology. Here is the "neighborhood" of the work of art, the terrain that constitutes the basis of the traveler's "creaturely" discovery of a natural history.

While the monogram of the estimate circles of Rear Window suggests that a gap will appear in two places, both of which will be interpolated by micro-intervals that seem to delay the immanent collapse of distance, the connections linking these two gaps themselves will collapse the original distance constructed by the frame. The surplus left behind in the creation of this distance will fund this collapse; the dreamer will awake. The performative requires this final self-exposure, what Vico called a "proof of the body," where the reader becomes the author by realizing that he/she has already-always narrated the text in an indelible, material basis — as a precondition for the illusion of an externally framed reality.

The unconscious created by the performative consists of the discarded "production components" that were the conditions of enunciation. It is easy to see how tradition has regarded the Annunciation as a proof of the mechanics of this functional transfer to a field set up "acoustically" to amplify the volume of otherwise weak signals. Automaton and tuchē, suppressed as "rude mechanicals" return, so to speak, in fancy garb to haunt the acousmatic grid. Their costumes are allowed a broad range, from actions, words, and objects to actual characters. They are the "return of the Real" in Lacanian terms, the angels (or demons) who, like puppeteers holding strings from above, control the show and even occasionally appear as puppets themselves. It is important not to forget how the normal human unconscious communicates its content in dreams: the ciphers, homophones, anagrams, and rebuses. These constitute a "hieroglyphic" mentality, where the material basis for language and the linguistic status of objects (they are credited with the power of speech) criss-cross. The perfectability of the system is based on the iconistic nature of even this action: the Janusian ability to go in both directions, sometimes at the same time, as a tennis ball thrown at a mirror, which miraculously "changes places" with its reflection to continue on in the virtual world. The point of this simultaneous double cross is the space of Santner's "creaturely."

Vico, New Science, §345.
Endymion is, although this is not recognized by Classics scholarship, a displacement of the idea of the natural eclipse, where the moon is superimposed onto the sun. By some miracle of solar system geometry, the moon’s size, from the earth’s point of view, exactly coincides with the sun’s diameter. The eclipse is an astronomical version of anamorphosis, where darkness overcomes and stands in the place of light, regarded by all cultures as a moment of uncertainty requiring ritual intervention. In stories of Selene (goddess of the moon, hence Diana), the goddess falls in love with the mortal shepherd Endymion because of his beauty; but this view is troubled by the more powerful idea that Selene’s love was provoked by Endymion’s contemplation, and in some traditions he is an astronomer rather than a shepherd, although shepherds are characterized for their constant exposure to and contemplation of nature. Endymion’s sleep is often qualified as hypnosis, a sleep with eyes wide open, which compounds the idea of the eclipse, or “kiss” of the mid-day sun by the dark moon. Geometrically, the eclipse combines the idea of a stereognostic, acousmatic, and stochastic amplification with that of a coincidence of freely wandering agents, brought together in an instance of “love” materialized by the kiss.

One possible confirmation of the idea of Endymion as the sun and the “kiss of Selene” as eclipse may be found in numerous references to chariot races, commonly compared to the circuit of the sun. At the turning points of the oblong race-ways, contenders had the opportunity to cut others off to advance their positions. “The kiss” was the shortening of distance by the internal diagonals afforded by the turn. By the kiss, the slower racer might overtake the naturally faster rival. At some locations, this turning point was marked by a small building called “The Tomb of Endymion.” The sun of reason might, at this location, be made unconscious of the kiss which, emulating the eclipse of the celestial sun by the moon, signal the key index points of any calendar and thus be regarded by religions and secular authorities alike as worthy of the highest festival observances.

For what is inside of you is what is outside of you, and the one who fashions you on the outside is the one who shaped the inside of you. And what you see outside of you, you see inside of you; it is visible and it is your garment. Hear me, you hearers and learn of my words, you who know me. I am the hearing that is attainable to everything; I am the speech that cannot be grasped. I am the name of the sound and the sound of the name. I am the sign of the letter and the designation of the division.

“The Thunder, Perfect Mind,” trans. George W. MacRae, *The Nag Hammadi Library*

The kiss, the eclipse, and the *tuchē* of affordance guided by the automation of a circular cosmos combine the religious, astronomical, and poetic/artistic components of this theme. Endymion can be approached through analogy: the technique of close-up magic, which effects its appearances and disappearances by conditioning a “poché space” within the visible field, preferably inside the zone of preferred visual focus. The suddenly appearing object thus “pops” into view, if only because it is “too close” — dimensionality has collapsed at the same time the invisible has been made visible. The quarter-turn is the rotation of vectors of form and materiality so that the orthogonal set is balanced perfectly between signal and noise, i.e. “signalizing” — reference to the signifying system itself. This is also the impossible space between the two spaces created by enunciation. Ideology gives access to only one, the diagetic. Fantasy ($\partial_1 \alpha_2$) holds opens up the void of this interpellation. The void is correlated to the protuberance whose sudden appearance opens up a gate/curtain that becomes the Rosetta Stone, obverse of the Biblical Tower of Babel but restoration of the original Assyrian Bab’el, “Gate of God.” The gate of the city is the city. The boundary is the bounded.
3.09 / Endymion's Quarter Turn

The ancient story of Endymion (cf. eclipse, aphanisis) is complicated by the number of contradictory narratives used to settle its central paradox, the state of dreaming while awake (the idea of the eclipse of the “sun” of diagesis by the moon of magical narrative; blindness; invisibility; Φ). The common factors of the variants are tightly structured by the logic of the dream, and so we must regard the Endymion tradition as a precursor of Florensky’s study of the crisscross times of the dream. Further, we must acknowledge the “accident” of Florensky’s interest in the icon and Orthodox iconostasis, the iconic face as a point of passage into a spiritual order, qualified as a stereognosis of the left-hand, or negative, “precursor” (“prelest”) and a corrected twin view. When we encounter essentially the same logic in Dante’s discovery of the perfect circles of the divine by means of their reflected image in Beatrice’s two eyes, it is hard to deny the poetic over-determination of the role of chiasmus in hypnosis, which is the proper word for the critical awareness of what happens in the suspended state of the dream. “We know without knowing” is readable as a knowledge about the state of not-knowing, as well as the negative methodology that must be employed by this knowledge.

The face-to-screen realizes the tuchē of spectatorship, and corrects the Platonic cave position (face-to-face) by inserting an orthogonal turn. The lateral view pulls things out of balance. The seer cannot be seen, the knower cannot be known, at least until the moment when this self-knowledge imposes a correction. By this time, the correction has been loaded with animated signification that transports the conditions of viewing and knowing into the field of diagetic play. The discarded surplus that afforded the orthogonal turn returns, or — the same thing in the Relativity Theory of enunciation — is returned to life with the full logical particularity of reincarnation, intensified into the moment of Final Judgment following the Resurrection. All stories, it seems, are ghost stories, aiming at the final Da symbolic settling of the roaming spirit. The mathematics of this journey is ciphered into the travel episodes that condense epitome conditions, or “mathemes,” of travel’s anamorphic, stereognostic field.

The quarter turn’s power and freedom come from its ability to make the twist of travel appear to be facing forward. “Resurrection of the body,” a critical component of the Nicene Creed and stumbling block for rational Christians repelled by its literality, is the necessity of the materiality of the knight’s move, of tuchē. Materiality is the screen, the Cave wall. Without this face-as-tiled-array, the dream of Endymion, anamorphic because it is a hieroglyphic, composite, “stereognostic” imaginary, would not allow us to understand the meaning of the kiss, a key component in all Kabbalistic versions of the model of discovery.

The condition of “dreaming while awake” is the hieroglyphic consciousness, domesticated by Coleridge as “suspension of disbelief.” The state is also anamorphic, in that two substantially independent points of view can be experienced simultaneously, making one the cipher or translator of the other. The equal strength of both components, however, makes it difficult if not impossible to say what translates what, and the resulting resonance of same with same creates the condition of the “pure gap,” a reduction to what Eric Santner calls “the creaturely.”

Plato himself “corrects” the face-to-face situation of the Cave interior by taking a freed prisoner to the edge of the cave, where he is able to see a three-dimensional Real, from which he must turn away. Lacan notes this moment and annotates it with reference to the Möbius band. The face-to-face has been orthogonal “all the time,” and the cave-mouth view is not the blinding vision of some ineffable truth but the retroactive realization of the Real of the projected illusion, whose hypnosis had been sustained voluntarily by the imprisoned audience.

Lacan’s matheme symbol, ◊, combines the idea of authenticity (the mark is borrowed from the poinçon of silversmiths and train conductors) with that of extimacy (<> as “both greater than, ’>’, and less than, ’<’”). The transfer of elements functioning as conditions of experience to “diagetic” elements represented within experience (cf. “iconicity” as defined by Max Nanny and Olga Fischer). In essence, the matheme is Santner’s idea of the creaturely, a condensation of the “natural history” of subjectivity.
The sudden shift of point of view ($\partial_1 \equiv \partial_2$) leads to $a$, but the principle of reification allows $a$, as depth, to be realized as vertical movement or relationship. A mountain topped by a temple, as in the case of the *mons delectus*, is thus qualified by the ability of $a$ to construct invisibility or sudden appearance, and temporality ("revelation") is joined to the spatial phenomenon. Both are components of the tradition of azure as the color of truth, divination, and the animus. The orthogonality of vertical-to-horizontal is explicitly active in the myth of Selene/Diana and Endymion, and a component of traditions about the solar eclipse. Because *tuchê* involves both the spatiality of movement past a concealing barrier ($\Gamma$) and the temporality of sudden appearance or disappearance, reification into an "iconistic site" within the diachronic field is typically marked by devices that, magically or otherwise, build in such effects.

Piero Valeriano, *Hieroglyphica, sive, De acris Aegyptiorum literis commentarii* (Basil, 1556). The importance of this image for Giulio Camillo, who constructed a memory theater using combinations of lore from antiquity, the Zohar, and the Kabbalah, lies in the idea of the human soul (Endymion) as a $\partial_1 \equiv \partial_2$ motion intersected by a divine component, $a$. The relation to the face is revealed by realizing the astronomical source for this myth, Diana/Selene as moon and Endymion as sun/Apollo, whose "mortality" was materialized by the annual rise and decline of the solar cycle. The eclipse was the "kiss" by which the moon's disc exactly matched that of the sun. The interval of the eclipse required ritual intervention, intensifying the role of $\partial_1 \equiv \partial_2$ in the same way the cosmogram "called out" divine intervention for Yoruba practitioners.

Different ways of transcribing the Endymion eclipse/kiss into diagram form shows retroactively why the eclipse, as in the case of Mayan civilization, was related both to sites of governmental authority and "universities" that combined practical skills with esoteric learning, based on systems of artificial memory. Knowledge, epitomized by the unlimited collation of "the any with the any," was the Homeric ideal of oral poetry: extemporaneous synthesis of local detail with the timeless stories of established heroes and gods. The "contamination of reality by the dream" was the retroactive effect of such performances by itinerant (blind) rhapsodes, and the reason why Plato, in *The Republic*, ironically advised leading the rhapsodes (literally) to the city gates — not to show them the way out but to join like with like.
3.10 / Artifact to Representation

The reification of the conditions of the reception creates sites within the diagetic field of those works that are (tautologically speaking) iconistic. They first allow audiences enter into the fictional illusion, but as metaphors they acquire free agency. They are only partly employed to further the project of self-reference and otherwise spend their time as disguised citizens of the dijagnostic world. In some Swedish fairy tales, magic beings are able to disappear by turning sideways. Affordance (Γ) is based on the logic of appearance and disappearance, revelation and concealment. The Annunciation, for example, is based on making evident what has “been there all the time,” in Mary’s unconscious, with the illusion of a transference of a magical substance from a virtual realm into the ordinary one. Annunciation is therefore a special case of enunciation, where the (diagnostic) field is constructed and mined with “sites of exception” that are structured by affordance. Such sites are anamorphic and destabilizing. They can quickly “obvert” from the diagnostic circumstance to the framing function. While approaches to these sites is delayed by series of thresholds holding open the “travel” of experience (e.g. the stages of discovery of the murder in Rear Window, repeated in Thorwald’s step-wise attack of Jefferies at the end), the effect of entry/arrival is a quick “drop” through levels of meaning that had allowed a co-existence of conflicting realities. The minimum distance collapses.

The map of shifts in the point of view (∂) and the factor of depth (α) can be used to annotate the relation of affordance to the sudden appearance or disappearance of a reified iconistic element. Where the point of view is changed rapidly or suddenly (∂₁ ⇌ ∂₂, where ⇌ = Ø), α is made to appear suddenly and/or just as suddenly, disappear. This effect is by no means limited to fantastic literature but is a device more useful in converting any work of art into a case of “close-up magic,” where de-sensitization of audience attention creates pockets within the work’s “unconscious” that may be used to store components in order that they may be invoked later in the construction of experiences of surprise. It does not matter whether this unconscious is attributed to the subject or the art as object. It cannot be said to belong exclusively to either, since it is a principle of territorial transfer that converts a movement from outside to inside (of the diagnostic field) to a movement of surface to depth (or height, depending on the metaphor).

The representation of artifact is evident not only in the imagery of the kiss but of the hand of someone about to fall, “holding on for dear life.” The entire logic of Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) depends on this image, and the failure of the extended hand to save the victim from a fatal fall. In the kiss, coincidence of sun and moon (∂₁ ⇌ ∂₂) creates a critical interval where α₁, in the case of Endymion, is the vertical connection of mortal with goddess; or, in Hitchcock’s Vertigo, where the Madeleine/Judy anamorph (∂₁ ⇌ ∂₂) is related directly to the fall of, first, Gavin Elster’s real wife and, second, of her double.

The sideways method of disappearing can be understood as an extension of Abbott’s Flatland analogy, to compare the so-called fourth dimension to the role of the third dimension in a world defined entirely by two dimensions. The third dimension becomes as mysterious to two-dimensional beings as the fourth is to three dimensional beings who have no way of experiencing it directly. Anyone able to occupy the third dimension effectively disappears. A less fantastic explanation is based on the idea of tuchē as a knight’s move. Affordance may be divided into two components: (1) a goal conceived from an initial point of view that draws the subject past a barrier to some new opportunity; (2) once past the concealing barrier, the new opportunity seems to appear suddenly, and its advantages becomes suddenly known. In the logic of reification, the process can be reversed, and the same elements that suddenly appeared may suddenly disappear. The right-angle that diagrammatically defines the relation of the new opportunity to the line of travel towards the initial goal designates the “invisibility” that exists inside visibility, made accessible by a quarter-turn. The general formula of reification is the basic syllogism: A:B, B:C, A:C. If affordance is structured to appear suddenly, and the geometry of appearance is orthogonal (Γ), then the transitivity of orthogonality applies also to appearance: affordance can vanish the same way it appeared.
Franz Kafka, in the short story, "The Top" (Der Kreisel), told of a scientist who wished to understand the universe by grasping completely one element in it — the ultimate predication! Obsessed with the spinning top, he sought to arrest it at "exactly the right moment." The scientist was unable to accomplish his goal of extimacy (all predications through one predication) because he ignored the temporality of the "ultimate predication," \( \partial/\alpha \), which "shimmers" in the "pure tension" of difference. The is/isn't state of the top affords the extended collation of meaning, however, and the scientist was at least correct on this point. What was available to the scientific mentality only through death (= killing the top's dynamics) has its own productive mode, the uncanny's paradigm, \( \partial_{\alpha} \), "between the two deaths." Isn't this after all the model of all paradigms, that must settle the experimental finding (first death) through a translation into a second "death" of symbolic meanings? If scientific discourse is in fact an encomium, the alter-ego of the scientist is the mnemonicist who finds a means of sustaining the shimmer created by the gap within the exception in the field of predications — i.e. of realizing the influence of the "wobbling" axes, \( \alpha \) and \( \partial \). This is the definition of Endymion's con-templation, which afforded him, and all other such awakened dreamers, the prophetic sight of those who, sleeping, also enjoy the benefits of blindness, i.e. invisibility and anonymity.

The tension between \( \partial_1 \) and \( \partial_2 \), the original efficient cause of the site of exception (the Cave of Endymion) is a state of unknowing in the sense that it is overwritten and over-ridden by ciphers that signalize thought and the place of thought simultaneously. The ciphers are self-sufficient, i.e. they have no "literal translations" back in to ordinary language. They exist only in a pure state of what Cassirer identified as symbolic Pragmaz = a readiness, a state of anticipation. This is the (Lacanian) future anterior of creaturely being, extimacy at its purest. It is possible to understand the hitherto unlikely connection with the race-course turn, the middle position of the artifact, half-way between silence and contamination. This is the kiss that is equivalent to the call, the kiss for example in Rear Window where Lisa "awakens" Jeff and calls the film's story out of diagesis and into mythic memory. From this point, both the audience and Jeff may enjoy the contraction of Thorwald's apartment through their generated protuberance, the \( \partial_2 \) function (in both phallic and connective roles) of the mystery, on behalf of the stranger, Anna. Their knowing-without-knowing, constructed out of signalizing references (\( \alpha \)) aim to reassemble Anna's body, making their effort equivalent to Molly's reconstruction in the final chapter of Ulysses.

Camillo's theater of memory becomes a more broadly relevant model when the position of the mnemonicist, the sole occupant of a small stage, is seen in relation to the contraction of Apollo from the first, planetary, level of the auditorium, leaving a space for contemplation that is akin to the relation of Jefferies and Thorwald in Rear Window. This contraction/protuberance relation draws in the logical system of Endymion, with its mysterious particulars of eclipse, contemplation, dreaming-while-awake, and the exemplary kiss. This is the pattern of the shamanistic spell, and the theater is, of course, nothing less than a cosmogram, hopscotch, and 'o' of \( \alpha_0 \), a shadow over waking life. The mnemonicist on stage enters into a "site of exception," but we see now that this "site" is in reality two sites in anomorphic tension, equivalent to the tension between the two poles of the uncanny, \( \alpha_0 \) and \( \partial_\alpha \) — this tension is the force that maintains contemplation and sustains the dream of Endymion, or any dream. Out of this tension, signalizing — revelation — occurs out the stochastic resonance that creates "in retroaction" the condition that Vico identified when he claimed that imagination and memory were the same thing (New Science, §211, 699§).
3.11 / Endymion’s Cave Dream

Plato’s account of anamnesis leaves in doubt whether the “diagnosis” of what we take to be ordinary life is not in fact a dream of immortals who direct us via their own fourth wall, or our own subjectivity in a state of timeless suspension. All temporality is invented to make the dream possible, credible, and durable for a prescribed interval, although the point of the dream, as Freud says, is to maintain sleep, so the dream comes with a built-in resistance to the idea that it is a dream. This inverts the usual presuppositions that ground speculation about dreams’ relationship to waking life. The question is usually about the validity of the dream. Evidence against the omen function piles up on the side of enclosure. We fall asleep and then wake up, framing the dream as an exception to waking. As Žižek says, Chuang-Tzu’s paradox of the butterfly dreaming he is a man being indistinguishable from a man dreaming he is a butterfly can be resolved by noting that the butterfly lacks the symbolic obligation that all humans have; he/she “is not required to be a butterfly for someone else.”

The issue of natural history pulls this issue back into the fire, however, for at such moments when “sites of exception” (iconistic “outliers” of the framing process) offer a means of a “knight’s move” into a dimension of (in-)visibility, even the butterfly begins to have doubts. Rather, the butterfly is awakened in uncanny realization of the interval imposed on this deviation that make it a case of “between the two deaths” — Giorgio Agamben’s situation of the homo sacer, who wanders without legal status among those who, though forbidden by law to kill, may murder the homo sacer with impunity. Consider what makes murder murder. It is the intentionality, final cause, which qualifies murder as such, that changes. In the case of creaturely life, intentionality itself floats away from the causal field. Its finality is suspended for the interval of \( \partial_1 \equiv \partial_2 \), which Lacan has labeled “between the two deaths.” The butterfly must now be a butterfly for an Other who lacks coherence or self-control. In other words, the homo sacer’s interior butterfly is now in the position of the famous paranoiac Paul Schreber. His God — crazy, voracious, unfettered — is coming after him! Divine truth comes at a horrible cost.

Anamnesis — knowledge in terms of memory — can be put in terms of the classical technique of memory places, where an imagined place becomes a tiled field to place objects. Transforming this as a series of rebuses in the field’s “unconscious” provides an informative introduction to the landscape of natural history. Giulio Camillo must have realized this when, in his 7 x 7 matrix of auditorium seats that held stories, anagrams, icons, and other passwords granting escape from the small stage occupied by the mnemonicist, he pulled Apollo out of his rightful place with the other planetary gods (an eclipse by proxy), left “The Banquet” in his place, and gave him the cover of what should be the middle position at the banquet level: “That God is hidden from sight, and yet is most manifest.” What a key to the role of blindness/invisibility in the tuchē (rules of adjacency) of mnemonics! Apollo has been pushed off course; he has been, in the guise of Endymion, been charmed into sleep and kissed, and thereby made immortal. Perfect eclipse: “darkness shining in the brightness” (Joyce).

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer; Stephen Gaselee, “The Soul in the Kiss”; Harold Bloom, James Joyce, 209.
Lou Beery Winneker, “An Examination of L’Idea del Theatro,” 225, 333. Translating from Camillo’s L’Idea del Theatro: “Therefore, since the body is that, which holds us apart from a true union, and from the kiss which Celestial things would like to give our souls, gathering them to themselves, it follows that by the dissolution of it [the body], one might come to this kiss [L’Idea, 75].
Map 3.12

The obverse, and its strategies of continuation and completion, are distributed across a number of themes and projects. The Vico-Freud-Lacan "axis" uses extimacy to show subjectivity in relation to "partial objects," what Santner would call "sites of exception" and Johnstone would study as episodes experimenting with the idea of authentic travel. Travel of the soul (katabasis) aligns ancient traditions of "between the two deaths" (Lacan), and Florensky compounds Santner's insights into the face and "creaturely life" as central to the issue of subjectivity "in the face of the Other." The logic of vectors, coordinates, and other paraphernalia of map making focus on the dynamics of the field defined by enunciation and the "sites of exception" that seem at first to warp this field but which, in essence, are built into the field's radically curved structure.

Vico anticipated the "face" idea in his relation of the swidden ritual clearings with the divinatory surface of the sky, a "face of nature." His idea of human thought is chiastic in its exchange of the made and the true (verum ipsum factum).

Florensky combines the logics of the dream, the iconic face, and the transformative spiritual experience mediated by the iconostasis, transferring the idea of dream chiasmus to ideas of tuchē and automaton.

"Natural history" and the concept of the creaturely evolve from the consideration of the neighbor and the forced choice of ideology, summed up with the idea of the face that communicates the unconscious of the stranger.

Katabasis (descent) specifies a vertical shadow α within experience that operates in conjunction with the ∂₁↔∂₂ of "horizontal" travel. Within a new level, the same pattern is reified, constituting a scale dysfunction or "fractal" pattern. Lacan's "extimacy" accounts for the obversion of subjectivity in this process.

The Freudian revolution affects subjectivity in its most radical condition — the relation to the neighbor as a subjectivity with an estimated unconscious, and the unconscious as that which is communicated in the complex grammar and spatial-temporal structure of the face. This "chiastic" account means that the subjectivity of the empirical subject is "extimated" to the external world, so that the expression, "unconscious of" applies equally to objects as to subjects, but where objects with an unconscious have the structure of a "site of exception" and are components of the travel landscape defined by Johnstone.

Poe uses an explicit "unconscious" in his chiastic narrative designs and the Freudian revolutionary concept of the death drive — as that which resists death by restructuring time to allow the presence of the radically negative absences constituted by trauma — is the basis of dream and travel logic. It is key to the way the unconscious communicates with the "diagnostic" formations of art and life. Subjectivity, defined by loss rather than positive attributes, is temporalized through ideas of the creaturely and the face.

Coda: Desargues' "dreams" (Map 1.15) function as terminal points of his scientific paradigm, his own "between the two deaths" (Map 3.11) that begin with the freezing of nature's dynamic conditions. In the second, symbolic death, the demonstrations reveal that they bear the mark of the dream, by signaling (thanks to their diagramatic form), an exteriority and internality that is simultaneous by means of Augustine's idea of distensis — both a stretching out and a keeping separate. In this way, Augustine "defines" time, but in the Lacanian mode of the future perfect: the ultimate end of the paradigm.
3.12 / Poe’s Dream Cipher

The rather drastic reduction of the previous fragment (3.11) is necessary to introduce properly the fully radical ciphering of the unconscious carried out by Poe in his story “The Purloined Letter” and other works. The design is basic. A text is divided into two parts, separated by an exchange point that can be literally represented, diagnostically, as a literal exchange. In “The Purloined Letter” the Commissioner hands the detective, Dupin, a check, reward money for having determined the whereabouts of a letter compromising the reputation of the Queen. This point allows the two adjacent plot sequences to pivot into a Λ-shape, creating a space between them that is bridged by echoes created by words, phrases, and images lying on either side. In some cases the bridges simply calibrate the relative position of the two text sequences. In other cases they act as mutual interpretants, filling out a meaning that would otherwise be incomplete. In all cases, the two separated parts function as tesserae that, together or separate, transfer to the unconscious of the reader, which (following the rules of extimacy) is indistinguishable from what we can call the “unconscious of the text.”

Poe matches such expressions as “Dupin now arose … but sat down again” with “it is far more easy to get up than to come down.” This indexical use calibrates the fold, so that the Minister’s theft of the letter from the table in the King’s chamber is echoed by Dupin’s theft of it from the Minister’s letter-box. The letter-box is described as a “card-rack,” whose sounds when pronounced backwards show that it is a palindrome, a chiasmus in miniature. The prize match, however, is the connection of a reference to the banquet of Atreus for his twin Thyestes (Atreus fed Thyestes his own children, butchered and cooked, in revenge for Thyestes’ seduction of his wife). This gruesome event is matched to the most subtle of Poe’s references to Morra, at the beginning of the tale: “It was an odd evening.” Indeed! Morra, Poe instructs us, is won by anyone who correctly judges the intelligence of his/her opponent. The game is something like the popular children’s game of “rock, paper, scissors,” where gestures are anticipated by an opponent’s calls. The dim player will follow a mechanical estimation of the relative likelihood of repeated gestures. The intelligent player will focus on the opponent’s intelligence as a separate issue. The shift from act to agent opens up, just has Poe had opened up in his critique of the automaton known as “The Turk,” the key to the code employed. This cipher, like a password, allows forward motion into forbidden territory. One escapes the cave — or gains entry into it.

Where, for Endymion, the unconscious was an eclipse of the ordinary by a hieroglyphic “other meaning,” for Scottie in Vertigo, it was the actualized haunting of Judy the shop girl by Madeleine the beautiful heiress, retro-activating the (faked) haunting of Madeleine by Carolotta Valdez. Popular culture manages to “get it right” when it comes to the motif of the dream inside the dream. For Poe, the dream inside the dream is the automaton that has been suppressed within the caves created in the text, whose stepped edges (cf. Carlo Scarpa’s crenolated edges at the Brion Chapel) maintain a minimum distance that, before the final “fall” into the abyss, incarnate the Ø as a material interval, calling for a password, a resonance that is ”stochastic” in its ability to amplify weak signals by creating a background of noise.

Piero Valeriano, Hieroglyphica, 738–739.
The poinçon’s most famous role in Lacan’s theory of the subject is $◊α$, the barred subject, $\$, in an “extimate” relationship, $<>$, that carries with it a certain authentication function, $\phi$, that allows the subject to dimensionalize the void created by the enigmatic demands of the Other. The obscene presence of the Real must be deflected or masked (McGowan). Manifest as a gaze from the Other to the subject, distributed indefinitely throughout the horizon of the visible, it is surely the gate-keeper and central headquarters for the virtuality of the detached (cf. 1.19) that is, in perception, attached to the immediacies of sensory encounter through a process of induction or abduction. In induction, the brain automatically infers the existence of adjacencies that affirm continuity: the hidden sides look more or less like the visible ones. In abduction, virtuality resolves an uncanny, surprising, or absurd situation. The shadow seems to have escaped its object (“attached virtuality”), or some anomalous content, such as a dream or prophecy, has contaminated waking reality (“detached virtuality,” “anomalous virtuality”). For Pierce, the resolution deflates the appearance of magic agency, but if abduction is allowed to signify its traditional signified, kidnapping, of stealing the bride from the ancestral hearth (*manes*), a more interesting role is uncovered. Where Pierce’s abduction reduces the absurd appearance to consistent causality, Lacanian abduction, $\phi$, establishes that the normative appearance is the result of “absurd” causalities managed by master signifiers that, in no way reducible to Boolean logic, regulate predication (appearance) through the two forms of virtuality that involve the “impossible” separations of the same and reunions of opposites. These separations and reunions, the basis of all actions and motions within the genre of “the uncanny” in ritual, religion, folklore, literature, art, architecture, etc. are the active agencies that make the (intransitive) boundary what it is: a radical “grapheme” (a “matheme” in diagram

The opposition of $180^\circ (\equiv)$ is equivalent to the $90^\circ$ “suppression” of $α$ (automaton, chance) for the “affordance” of a field (*tuchê*) in which error may be encountered (\(\partial\)) that “signalizes” the role of $α$ in the automation of repetition that returns to a central void. This $90^\circ$ function can be further reduced “mathematically” to the “grapheme” of the quarter-turn, the spatial-temporal pairing of protuberance with a *zimzum*-style contraction of signification that creates a void related to the acousmatic voice. Unlike its linguistic counterpart, the phoneme, the grapheme resists semantic functioning and resists symbolization. It is a “sign of the Real,” which is to say, a non-sign, an indicator of a negative presence, an effect of negation(s). An example in language is the simultaneous positive and negative role of the word “but.”

The subject, it should be remembered, is barred in the process of the extimacy of ideology (interpelation), a flip-flop of external materiality (Althusser: of the “state apparatus”) but now put into a successive extimating process in relation to the suppressed element, $α$. The bar of $\$ relates to the *poinçon* in terms of extimacy as well as $S_1$, the enigmatic commands of the Other. Fantasy can take one of four courses: (1) fantasmic distortion following the over-presence of $α$ as gaze, (2) sustaining $α$ as absence, (3) ideological substitution to fill in the void of $α$, a “step backwards into ideology,” and (4) direct encounter with $α$, with the screen of fantasy removed, a “step forwards into subjective crisis. Where 1 and 2 constitute dealing with the Real in terms of presence or absence, 3 and 4 define the sequence from ideology to psychoanalysis via *extimité*.

3.13 / Matheme as Orthogonal Fold

Lacan’s most useful expression of the productive relationship was the “matheme” of the poinçon, ♦, also written <>, indicating the primary role of extimité governing the relationship of the terms on either side. In $q\alpha$, the matheme for fantasy, the subject is “barred” by the relation of the conscious to the unconscious, the α is the impossible “object-cause of desire” (manifest only through absences and lacks), and the ♦ is the mark of authenticity (borrowed from the kinds of marks made by silversmiths to indicate the quality of metal as well as the punch made to validate train and tram tickets).

Because ♦ is also <>, “both lesser than and greater than,” Lacan’s matheme is less of an equation than it is a contract binding two terms in a relation of radical conversion. Container and contained switch places, concentricity establishes the crisscross of chi-asmus (think of Δα and Аα of the Jentschian uncanny), and the idea of enunciation as performative (“Bomb!”), where the act of enunciating is split off from the material component, énoncé, comes into play. “Inscription,” where the outermost, discarded surplus element re-appears at precisely the location of a central void, and where this marks the point at which, as Lacan liked to put it, “the letter always reaches its destination,” is another synonym.

Is there a case for a new way of looking at the poinçon? Inasmuch as a definition imposes a limitation, the answer is no. However, there is an aspect of the existing functions of the poinçon that justifies returning to the condition of the fold, where two vectors may be considered as both joined and separated in an orthogonal “hinge” that allows relations of exchange between opposites (⇔), independence (Γ), simultaneity (‖), and rotation (quarter turn). Particularly in the formation of fantasy, which can be regarded as that which makes it possible for the subject to bear the traumatic Real, the poinçon embodies all of these functions. Chiasmus regulates an exchange of opposites in the logic of the dream; the dream in turn strives to extend sleep by maintaining its independence through strategies of continuation, just as the unconscious “protects” its contents from overexposure to the consciousness by disguising them as rebuses; the conscious and unconscious continue “side by side” in the metaphorical-metonymical processes of enunciation; and the physics of desire requires demand to forever return to the same empty gap. Throughout, the inside-outside conversions of extimacy, which allow the unconscious to attach to create subjective, or partial, objects compels us to consider the fold of Γ as a means of expanding the poinçon graphically (to the idea of the grapheme) and experimentally. The case of Endymion — both a narrative tradition and a universal cultural landmark that goes back to the astrological lore of the Assyrians — calls for any and all of the functions that recover the full significance of the sleeper who is awake, the blind subject who sees, and the object that “thinks” with an endowed demonic mentality.

Lacan used other expressions not employing the poinçon. The L-scheme (1955) related components of the ego and Other; complex graphs elaborated the process of “quilting” in language; the four primary discourses (hyster- ic, analysis, master-servant, university) combined four standard components rotating through four fixed fields; and formulas of sexuation (1972) articulated the idea of separate masculine and feminine psychical structures. The poinçon, as Lacan liked to say, was intentionally ambiguous. It meant “one or a hundred relationships.” See “Commentary,” in Appendix I.

In the case, too, of Edgar Allan Poe’s narrative strategy, anticipating the proto-Surrealists in its exacting creation of a ciphered unconscious inside meanings set to resonate within the performance of writing, we have a call for the expansion of the poinçon to include the folding of the text around a hinge of exchange. Poe’s tendency to materialize pure functions as characters, elements, and even organs (think of the sclerotic eye of the old man in “The Tell-Tale Heart,” to say nothing of the heart that continues to “beat” after his murder) demonstrates how reification (the subjective object) is the necessary complement of the unconscious as automaton.
Map 3.14

Justizia's head cannot be seen by those below the ether crystal she penetrates, according to the logic by which the body mirrors the cosmos, feet to earth, middle to water and air, head to fire and, hence, the animus that is the basis of genius, genus. In the like-to-like correspondence, the highest soul "knows" the "highest" of the concentric worlds whose "center is everywhere, circumference nowhere." In terms of extimacy, this means also the lowest, the most trivial, the abject. Or, more correctly, the ether is about the flip between the two, souls arriving and souls departing. In the historical drama film, The King's Speech (2010), King George VI has a stammer that is cured by blocking the patient's perception of "his own voice." This reveals the curious role of ventriloquism, that the future king's own voice is both a voice for the Other(s) — his father, the king, and brother, Bertie, Prince of Wales — and the voice of the Other. For George VI, this ventriloquism amounted to the insertion of an alien element that wished to impede him. Stochastic noise, in his case a Beethoven symphony, had to be introduced to neutralize this "inner" voice to allow his own voice, present subliminally, to emerge through "signalizing." It is important to avoid misconstruing this "emergence," which was not the emergence of an "inner voice" but rather an estimated "outer" voice privately (idiotically) contained within the unconscious of external objects. The speech therapist, Lionel Logue, had discovered this surprisingly psychoanalytical method treating shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I. The success of this method demonstrates the extimacy by which the "externality" of the world not only dominates subjectivity at the ideological stage, but dominates from a nearly impregnable central position, where it acts as an inside frame. The "stochastic method" replicates Freud's use of the talking cure to generate seemingly meaningless details to overwhelm the ventriloquism of the Other, to allow the "registry" of the subject to be deciphered. Deafness thus corresponds to the role played by blindness in prophecy. The question of truth is not the choice between the implant of the deceiving Other and the authentic self, but the flip between the two modalities that has constituted the central organ of subjectivity. External individuals — as well as objects, plants, and animals — thus are the nodes of an unconscious that leads back to the perceiving subject, who "emerges" through his/her relation to them, first as an ideological subject, second as a "psychoanalytical subject," thanks to a process akin to the phenomenon of transferrence/love (Mladin Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation").

Valeriano's image of Justizia shows the goddess's head in direct contact with the divine aether, where she receives her wisdom. This makes her head invisible from our position below; the goddess appears as headless. The astrological position of Justice, between the scales of Libra, the seventh sign of astrology, and Leo, the fifth, making Justice the sixth, or Virgo.

Justice = Virgo = the Virgin = the acousmatic emergence of true speech (vera narratio) through an incarnation process that does not "count" as a crossing (sex between male and female), i.e. a "virgin birth." Just as George VI had to cancel ("noise-ify") the ventriloquism of the Other in order for his "true voice" to be released, Justizia must relate the head's role in the natural cosmology of the body to the estimated body of the cosmos itself, where the animus of the psyche may come into contact with the animus of the ether. The invisibility of the head (from below) means that this process exceeds the logic of the imaginary but may, through stochastic resonance within the symbolic (triangulated meanings; interpellation), emerge "in the sixth place" between the melancholy scales of judgment and the choleric of courage. Vico characterized himself as choleric-melancholic, positioning himself as a Virgo whose own birth (June 23, 1668) on Midsummer's Day adds a coincidental proof of this "flip point" between reflection and action, subject and Other, ideological and full ("idiotic" = "private") subjectivity. Virgo, an earth sign, marks the moment between expansion and contraction, carrying forward the theme of the summer solstice (scales) to the idea of Justice, whose traditional blind-fold signals the equivalence of blindness and invisibility. The Virgin localizes this by the ear that is (hysterically) impregnated by the afflatus of the divine word. Vera narratio is the predication of elements that return, like Lacan's letter that "always arrives at its destination." This is the restoration of what was never possessed, of what was created through retroaction, i.e. the crucifixion (denial, renunciation, foreclosure).
3.14 / Graphemes of Invisibility

In child psychology as well as ancient myths, invisibility is exchangeable with blindness. In Valeriano’s image of justice, the goddess is shown “headless,” which is to say that her head, in direct contact with the azure of the “true” heaven, is invisible to those looking from below. The same logic transposes Justizia as blindfolded, as we see her represented on public buildings. Children commonly think themselves to be invisible when they put a sack over their heads, demonstrating that Vico’s thesis about the mentality of the first humans being evident in the beliefs and games of children. The “ideal eternal history,” which begins with the expressive function (demonic nature), develops into a representational function (designation of things by words), and then becomes a fully conceptual-abstract mentality, is not so much a definitive temporal sequence of mutually exclusive stages but a layering of mental attitudes, each available to the other through a series of smugglers’ routes and concealed passageways. The sense that any contamination involves a transgression of the Law derives from the dominance of the symbolic, or rather the dominance of the master signifier that works within the symbolic to regulate relations among signifiers. Like the super-ego, the master signifier is not itself rational, though it imposes an ad hoc model of rationality on everything and everyone else.

Blindness is one of the utilities of the master signifier, particularly as it works to automate the announcements and commands of the unconscious. These must work as “passwords in reverse.” Just as Poe’s ciphers allowed the construction of a third, anamorphic territory lying between the two branches of his bifurcated text, passwords construct the bridge that itself the basis for the field of discourse. Calvino, in Invisible Cities, invents the notion of two cities separated by an impassable chasm. Each thinks the other to be a city of the dead where the souls of their deceased citizens live out an eternity in identical houses, walk identical streets, gather in identical public squares. It would be entirely feasible to build a bridge between these two “idiotically symmetrical” necropolises, operated by ingenious undertakers who, to optimize the patronage of their two constituencies, tell each that the other is the burial ground where their family remains must be kept without visiting privileges. In the middle of this bridge, all remains could be cremated and dropped into the chasm below.

This Hitchcock version of Calvino involves the idea that stability arises out of symmetry rather than truth written in the correspondence mode. As long as two groups maintain their mutual invisibility, each performs for the other the function of serving as the necessary “prohibited domain” of death. Their mutual denial of the true function of the bridge allows things to work as long as the negative is maintained as such. In these terms, it is impossible to identify the unconscious as mental content with any exact locus or time. Rather, it is non-time and non-place that structures the extimacy of the unconscious and binds them into a single functionality. True to the rule of reification, however, non-place converts into the space of exile and the sites of the creaturely this space maintains; and non-time converts into the strictly defined temporality of this journey. The mathemes of invisibility are the ciphers that guard the peripheries of these sites, the passwords required to grant entry. In a sense, all such cordons are constructed out of the matheme for fantasy: the subject’s bipolarity of conscious affordance and automated unconscious; the void; and the mark of authenticity.

Lacan notes that blindness is a question of blindness by whom and for what. Ordinary sight is blind to the returned gaze of the evil eye; thus, the blind are unable to make the distinction between the evil eye and other objects in the field of the visible.
Interpellation’s sudden effect is, as Dolar puts it, “not entirely clean.” There is a small remainder, the cost of the eximity by which the subject realizes a central void. The void is central only from the point of view of its production. It is an “inside frame,” experienced an external periphery, a horizon with sites of resistance identified with the gaze, $a$. However, any object or being in the external field, $x$, despite the general geometry of centrifugal radiation, contains a “demonic” component whose vector aims toward a common center, a Hades, whose Greek name retains its traditional relation to invisibility. The subject’s central void, read as an outward-radiating periphery, thus self-obverts on a spiritual level. The process of ideological interpellation leaves behind a magnetism that is experienced as “the unconscious of $x$.“ Any object within the already-obverted field may have its own autonomous unconscious, but because this field is “in reality” the central inside frame of the subject, its unconscious is a proxy for any perceiver — with a catch. Because all such objects-with-unconsciouses are physically in a the public domain, their unconscious components are collective. They are basis for the uncanny commonality of memory and imagination; their grapheme is the model of intersecting cones dreamed by Georgie Hyde-Lees, Yeats spiritualist wife who supplied him with the graphical logic behind his poem, “The Second Coming”; or the dialectic seasonality of empathetic and abstracting cultures of Wilhelm Worringer. These alternating interior-exterior domains cannot be frozen for any representative snapshot. Rather, multiple graphemes are required to describe, even minimally, what is going on in the emergence of the subject from ideological interpellation to (psychoanalytical) awareness through interpolation.

When interpellation creates the internal void of the subject, this void, an “inside frame,” is experienced as its opposite, an enclosing periphery radiating outward, not inward. Yet, each object retains its central tendency as a “demonic” gravity or magnetism drawing it toward a common center (Hades, “invisible”). Looking “outward,” the subject perceives objects and other subjects whose degree of familiarity is represented by distance. The most alien beings occupy an imaginary horizon of the known world (the œcumene). Yet, paradoxically, the unknown component of each points to a common center. The grapheme of this resistant unknowability is centripetal, while experiential encounters are centrifugal. Each object thus has a potential “unconscious” that is (1) in the public domain, and hence a “common mind”; and (2) an unconscious driven by the subject who, simultaneously central and peripheral, is doubly interpellated, first through the ideological alienation of these objects and other subjects, second by the process of interpolation that must take into account the conflict between centripetal and centrifugal graphemes. “Dimensionalizing the void” involves reading the contained as a container with a demonic central tendency. Thus, the classical Thesean labyrinth, with its alternating inward and outward pathways, is the preferred model for this conflict between subjective alienation and separation, which is the source of the uncanny’s process of “double inscription,” life crossed with death. The gap/remainder created at the point where the centrifugal position of the subject gives way to the demonic convergence of resistance is marked by the figure of metalipsis.

Poe’s butterfly design acknowledges the dominance of narrative continuity, but constructs multiple types of invisibility and temporal reversals inside the conscious flow of events. These “unconscious” elements operate through anamorphosis and ciphering, making it possible for the text to oververt at any point.
3.15 / Metalepsis: Return of the Repressed

Metalepsis is about violating the frame that had been created to sustain a “diagetic” illusion; but, instead of breaking the spell of this illusion, the result is that we are in the grips of an even more powerful framing effect. Metalepsis is the short-circuit that allows the remainders of interpellation, left behind at the margins of the field, to tunnel through to the center and, still retaining its ability to change shape (anamorphosis) or remain invisible within the field of imposed visibility, create a “site of exception,” an obscene remainder that, in violating the rules, imposes Law that is not contingent but absolute.

With enunciation, the field lights up while the margins go dark. Yet the darkness will connect to a point in the center of this field, where it will emerge and still retain its status as dark. It will be “durable anamorphic,” darkness-in-light. Thus, in *Rear Window*, when all the other residents come to their windows to witness the speech of the woman who has just lost her dog, Thorwald will stay seated on his couch, smoking a cigar whose pulsating glow becomes the sinister heartbeat of this durable darkness. This motif of the darkened room and a point-source of light will return at the end when Thorwald crosses out of the enunciative field to attack Jeff in his apartment. As remarkably complex as this tunnelling of darkness into the light is, Poe’s protocol of composition shows how simply it works. Metalepsis is the point of exchange that sets up concealment and discovery as twins. We will hide the purloined letter in the middle of visibility and discover it with a shout in the street to divert the sentinel. The guilty secret we never discover in “The Purloined Letter” shows that we do not need contents to drive this moment from cause to effect; it is pure guilt, pure effect, an effect with multiple causes. Time can, from this point, go backward. Once guilt has been purified and realized in this way, the “cat is out of the bag” without illusion loosening its grip on us one bit. In fact, the gun is now to our head. We are the hostage.

Poe’s butterfly model expands to cover the (concealed) outside the frame — in effect, the “unconscious.” Poe’s method may be adopted for the estimate in general; any “echo” activates the enunciative, turning it into an acousmatic field where anamorphic “sites of exception” emerge as opportunities, *tuchē*: anomalous holes in the field, with “crenolated edges” to forestall the collapse of distance. Any two phenomena may serve as “twins” leading to this anamorphic third, which is the knight’s move that defines the contingency of the traveller who, like the soldier returning from war, must be decontaminated within the death-march interval, D₁/D₂.

Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited and Metalepse: De la Figure à la Fiction*, 131: “All fictions are woven through with metalepsis.” Genette’s promotion of metalepsis could be supported by this project because of this figure’s implicit boundary behavior: it is the figure, after all, that operationalizes extimacy. Like Florensky’s relation of dream time to the “cut” of the iconostasis, we approach the issues of natural history, sites of exception, and the miracle (Santner, Rosenzweig) with a remarkably consistent theoretical apparatus.

John Pier, “Metalepsis.” “In its narratological sense, metalepsis, first identified semiotically by Genette, is a paradoxical contamination between the world of the telling and the world of the told: ‘any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.), or the inverse.’” This introduces a condition of an “overcharged signifier” — over-determination in our terms — where in addition to meanings packed into a small space, time has been re-routed to include the retroaction of effect for cause. Since this is the classic M.O. of the master signifier (the exchange of effect for cause and the design of many causes for any one effect), we will not be surprised that the boundary condition of the master signifier as enthymeme (B>B) is also present in the case of metalepsis. While the master signifier may be considered to serve as the “rules of the game” establishing the field of enunciating, metalepsis may be regarded as the “outlier” within this field that constitutes a site of exception, a place where the exterior, *énoncé*, has tunneled underground to reach some point inside the field and emerge, charged with overdetermined meaning and concentric (“crenolated”) defenses against spatio-temporal collapse. Such sites of exception are common in popular culture, for example the forbidden field (“the Zone”) with its anamnetic forbidden Room in Tarkovsky’s *Stalker* (1979). The film could be considered a near-literal account of the enunciative field with its metaleptic sites of exception, purported to be places to recover desire, which magnetically retrieves remainders long abandoned in the past.
The case of the over-stuffed signifier helps resolve the atlas-map condition of extimacy. A locus interior to a “charged field” becomes a “site of exception” defined by both a surplus and lack condition. Like the toilet in Francis Ford Coppola’s film, The Conversation (1974), a connection is made between the “inside frame” location and an unidentified externality, a plenum of unrestricted flow, whose bizarre physics cancels any difference between positive and negative, in and out. Like a “black hole,” the edges of this site are crenellated by anamorphic, “square wave” phenomena that collate diverse materials, packing in multiple meanings (or lost meanings) into tight succession. From the ideological position of a paid informer, Caul is interpellated with an interior void (his “listening station,” symbolized by high-tech surveillance gear connected intimately to his body; intensified by his choice next to the toilet). The exterior intimate conversation — between a couple — he strains to hear occupies the convex-concave horizon limiting his sense knowledge.

The introverted private investigator, Henry Caul, surveils a couple’s conversation from an adjacent apartment. This “inside frame” is coincidental to a toilet that, in Caul’s fantasy, becomes the head of an infinite plenum, horrifyingly overflowing with blood. Its fantasized back-flow connects this central location with an infinite periphery, demonstrating the logic of metalepsis, the signifier that is “overloaded” to the point of failure. Caul’s surveillance plan plays out the square-wave logic of the zone leading up to this inside frame position. It can be detected throughout the field, as a curvature built into the straight grid.

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What is the “site of exception”? In cases where this notion is synonymous with the idea of natural history, the iconic face and chiastically folded time of the dream come into play. The “crenelated edges” slow down the collapse of dimensionality that makes such sites resistant to symbolic representation. The architecture of the site of exception is based on the logic of metalepsis — the connection between the outside of the frame to the two competing centers of the field. The phenomenon of “over-stuffing” — a tight packing of objects and/or events within a restricted field and over-determination of meanings to the point of bursting apart the semantic field — is evident in popular culture identifications of margins of imaginary transactions with the dead: the wall of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington, D.C., the gate at Buckingham Palace following the death of Princess Diana. These could be simply cases where “display space” cannot support the full measure of devotional acts and objects; or it could be that the spectacle of stuffing itself produces an (unconsciously) desired effect.

In Coppola’s 1974 film, *The Conversation*, private investigator Harry Caul sits in a hotel bathroom monitoring the a conversation of a couple who are staying next door. The toilet begins to overflow with a red, blood-like liquid. This horrifying condition is the essence of metalepsis, where the source of the flow is an imaginary plenum connecting a traumatically intimate point with an unlimited external “elsewhere.” Extimacy’s physics demands that the periphery and center be precisely aligned; that their relationship be materialized as a continuous, unrestricted flow. *The Conversation* perceptively relates this logic to Caul’s activities as a professional spy, who from a concealed perimeter monitors intimate conversations of those who do not realize he is *in their midst*. The conversations he records, however, reverse the logic of analepsis. It is as if Douglas Gordon’s *24 Psycho* logic of stretched out action is done in reverse. The surveilled conversations are, in their natural history condition, a series of frames with gaps. When shrunken to the captured tape Caul makes for his client, the gaps won’t go away. They continue to resist meaning at every scale of reproduction. Attempts to smooth over the gaps result in disastrous mis-readings of what has been said, and Caul. struggling morally with the consequences of these failed interpretations, fantasizes that the toilet in his bathroom surveillance station has backed up and overflows with blood.

*The Conversation* demonstrates the reversible polarity of metalepsis; more important, it demonstrates how reversal realizes the full functionality of the site of exception and its ability to materialize the condition Santner defines as “natural history.” In well known cultural cases of analepsis, such as the iconostasis, we now see how over-stuffing constitutes the “iconostasis condition” by which the inside frame constitutes the $\partial/\alpha$ ratio within the framed field of enunciation. In this tight formation, the POV and screen are the operators that, relative to each other, confine dimensionality. Such sites seem to enact Gordon Douglas’s *24 Psycho* in reverse. The gaps that Douglas created by stretching out Alfred Hitchcock’s famous thriller, allowing other interpretations of the action to slip into the diachronic original, are preserved intact by sites of exception when they collapse dimensions. The result is not a return to smooth diagesis but a “ragged” strobe-light effect. This is a token of the square-wave model of anamorphy: it is radically either-or, without any mediating middle condition. This “crenelation” allows the signifier to be overloaded, stuffed with meanings from “extraneous” sites.

Map 3.17

The obverted exterior space experienced by the interpellated (ideological) subject is filled with potential sites of exception, akin to the theory that miniature black holes populate the seemingly normal universe. Each site is demonic — a partial object (or subject) whose partiality is collated into a gravitational field whose center is a Hades: invisible, mechanical, absolute. Tradition maintains that the edge and center of Hades are defined by the theme of judgment. The edge and first peripheral rings are akin to the forced choice sequence of negations: denial (Verneigung), renunciation (Verleugnung), and foreclosure (Verwerfung). The center reveals the original, suppressed motive and so this gravitational pull of partiality is about the space outside of the enunciative frame, the word that began creation, Vico’s “first word” of the thunder. This over-stuffed signifier is recognized for what it is by Joyce, who continues the theme in Finnegans Wake, which could be regarded as the extreme condition of predication as such, an analumma defining the vicissitudes of the point of view of subjectivity as it gyres from interpellation of ideology to the interolation of psychoanalysis. A key point is the horizon joining the regions of alienation (interpellation) and separation (interpolation). This is the “Alcestis point,” where Herakles brings Alcestis back from Hades, still covered with a veil, to get Admetus to break his vow, given at Alcestis’s death, not to remarry. This farcical humiliation of the king compares to Odysseus’s need to disguise himself before slaughtering the suitors besieging Penelope: only, a scar gives him away to his nurse. The sign, a letter, “always arrives at its destination.”

Automata and Opportunities:
The two forms of Aristotelian chance constitute binary possibilities, mutually exclusive, within the formal geometry of obversion. Opportunity and affordance, tuché, is thus a matter of the forced choice, the condition of the neighbor, even in matters of simple adjacency. Roman Jakobson’s theory connecting metaphor and metonymy to the forms of aphasias is instructive. Contiguity disorder (inability to see, for example, the function of a hand within the co-presence of four fingers and a thumb) is not to be able to experience the anxiety of predication generated by \(-x\) and \(1/x\)! This anxiety would construct the idea of the “hand” from the flipped predication allowing alternative constructions of “mastery,” out of a “master signifier” able to reverse causes and effects. The “anomalous virtuality” of the signifier lying on the distant horizon is brought close through a collapse of protective “distanciation” (any and all measures taken to prevent or protect from adjacency). Detached virtuality effects contamination, based on the flip of predication and damage to the Euclidian field. The irrationality of the forced choice, and the protocol of successive (Heelian) negations, creates the site of exception and condition of creatureliness through metalepsis. The resulting over-stuffing of signifiers leads to a “Rosetta Stone effect,” a maximization of the condition of collation, where perverse analogies allow “anything to mean everything.” This glossolalia is the Tower of Babel constructed through deconstruction, the Garden without God (Yahweh); or, the Garden that is itself God (Elohim).

Overstuffed Signifiers, in a Pantry of Predications:
My wud! The warped flooring of the lair and soundconducting walls thereof, to say nothing of the uprights and imposts, were persianly literated with burst loveletters, telltale stories, stickyback snaps, doubtful eggshells, bouchers, flints, borers, puffers, amygdaloid almonds, windless raisins, alphabeticlyformed verbage, vivical vi-effects, impiter dictas, visus umbique, ahems and ahas, ineffable tries at speech unassailable, you owe mes, eyoldhym, flueful smut, fallen lucifers, vestas which had served, showered ornaments, borrowed brogues, reversibles jackets, blackeye lenses, family jars, falsehair shirts, God-forsaken scapulaires, neverworn breeches, cutthroat ties, counterfeit franks, best intentions, curried notes, upset litten tintsacks, unused mill and stumpling stones, twisted quills, painful digestes, magnifying wineglasses, solid objects cast at gobulins, once current puns, quashed quotatoes, messes of moitgage, unquestionable issue papers, seedy ejaculations limerick damns, crocodile tears, split ink, blasphematory spits, stale shestruts, schoolgirls’, young ladies’, milkmaids’, washerwomen’s, shopkeepers’ wives, merry widows; ex nuns’, vice abbess’s, pro virgins; super whores; silent sisters; Charleys’ aunts; granmothers; mother’s-in-laws; forstermothers; godmothers’ garters,

—James Joyce, Finnegans Wake, 183
Franz Rosenszweig’s theological treatise, *Star of Redemption*, suggests some interesting conditions affecting the site of exception that help explain the function of analepsis and the functioning of the inside frame. As a place of the miraculous, it is not simply an occasion for the inexplicable or extraordinary. It is a relation of signs. The signs, originating in a linguistic framework, are prophetic without being intelligible. They do not communicate anything. The constitute a muteness, fracture, and breakdown that, from inside language and other sign systems, create meaning from impasse. Santner relates this “creaturely” condition to the opacity of the messages of the adult Other, perceived by the child entering for the first time into networks of symbolic relationships. The adult’s message is both overdetermined and insufficient. It is the basis of Lacan’s idea of *Che vuoi?* — “I know what you’re saying but what do you really want of me?” The Other is lacking, as in Kafka’s radically inconsistent judiciary in *The Trial*.

It is worthwhile to make a quick comparison to the famous impasse of psychoanalysis, the point at which analysis is terminated. Jacques-Alain Miller notes that this is, in male terms, the castration complex, which cannot be further reduced. Castration is only partly the fear of literal physical mutilation. It is more generally “symbolic castration,” which is not the symbolization of this mutilation but, rather, castration by symbols: the subject’s replacement by the “effects” of signification, reversing the cause-effect relationship. In temporal terms, the fact that one effect is the result of multiple causes (many of which are unknown) in this process links this obversion to the creation of the master signifier. It is, in fact, a means of talking about the master signifier in terms of a spatio-temporal field, a site of exception, and linking it to Vico’s primal forest clearing in which the first humans witness the “miracle” of the word of the thunder, a word that produces not meaning but the response *Que vuoi?* — what does Zeus want from us?

The Vichian concept anticipates Rosenszweig’s notion of the miracle in every detail, to the point of distinguishing the miracle as semantic rather than simply supernatural. Santner’s insight — that such creation and creatureliness are the same, and that both are related to the over-determination of the Other as paternal super-ego — follow the pattern of Vico’s idea of imaginative universality (*universale fantastico*), the form of universality qualifying mythic thought as a process of divination, a “call” of the divine requiring human responses in the forms of sacrifice, ritual, spoken formulas, in other words the full paraphernalia of the uncanny. The impasse in modern psychoanalysis of the secular individual can be linked convincingly to the site of exception in which the “miracle” of Jove’s first incomprehensible word, if only one uses Miller’s insight, that the analysand, upon approaching the analyst’s door, often reaches into her pocket to find the latch-key to her own home. This literal link between two spaces, two intimacies, is the extimité of touch, a metalepsis that is or will be the place of impasse, a *passe* requiring an uncanny (*unheimlich*) *passe*-word, the cipher required for entry and escape, an effect with multiple causes.

Franz Rosenszweig, *Star of Redemption*.
Eric Santner, “Miracles Happen.”

Map 3.18

The most significant thing about the blind man, Lacan observes, is that he is blind to what we are blind to — the returned gaze and its variants. The game of blind man’s bluff, or buff, is a obverse edition of Medussa’s paralyzing gaze. The players are obliged to freeze in place while the blind-folded player wanders about to find them. The keys of immobility, the gaze, and the chosen-at-random victim offer us the components of an archaic formula. Comparing this image to the magic mountain of the *mons delectus*, which combines the temple and the labyrinth, and it’s possible to see that they are remarkably similar. The invisible temple works under the formula of conversion (blindness = invisibility). The petrified players are, in the labyrinth, immobilized by the fractal logic that imprisons by allowing free motion. The singular gaze must operate with the logic used normally by the sense of touch, stereognostically, translated: “left and right are the logic of wisdom.” The twinned snakes of Asklepius relate to his vials taken from the separate sides of the body of Medussa, slain by Perseus. Perseus, the model for Mithras, had a cosmic role related to the constellation Taurus, whose bull he is depicted as slaying. Mithras is also shown dining with Apollo, a banquet whose mystery is shrouded in the dynamics of the eclipse: the sun that is sleeping while it is awake. In some depictions of the banquet scene, a torchbearer points a caduceus toward the base of the altar, where flames seem to spring up.

*Blind Man’s Buff*, Sir David Wilkie (1785-1841), engraved by Abraham Raimbach, Paul Jarrard & Sons.
3.18 / Banquet

A round clearing in the forest (Vico); a stochastic resonance created by noise; an altar set up for a dinner of the gods; invitations sent to a deceased father (Don Giovanni); a message written in halves (mi-dire), requiring a special code to be translated (Lacan, Freud: the clinic); a collapse of distance into the compact arrangement of a screen (Florensky, Virgil); chiasmus or warp and woof, turning the screen into a pattern of relations (Calvino), a tablet of culture (Cebes), an emblem and code of a new science (Vico); the use of the clearing to predict a future that is always-already a past ….

The field of the map is shadowed by the structure of clearing. The atlas thus works on two levels: one to organize the projective progression of maps in their optimistic hope of relating signifiers to one another (Lacan’s S2), another to manage the economy of the clearings, the resistant sites of exception, places of prophecy and divination, which at the same time return us to a state of creaturely existence, a model of origins that is in a literal sense the beginning to which all creation reduces — an Eden that is perpetually a paradise lost. Giulio Camillo undoubtedly had this in mind with his 7 x 7 grid of auditorium “seats” around the central difference (ã, tuchê) marked by Apollo’s displacement from the row of elements to the Banquet level. Apollo was eclipsed (Lacan’s S1); kissed; asleep with eyes open; blind to the visible just as he is made invisible; able to see what all blind prophets see, no difference between the object of desire (Lacan’s α, the Atlas’s α), no difference, hysterically, between pleasure and pain, privation or prohibition. In Camillo’s theater, these connections also mean that imagination and memory are the same thing (New Science, §211) — prophecy and history are, stereognostically, a chaotically matched pair, a tessera whose broken edge confirms authenticity.

For this reason, the subject is bound, immobilized (Lacan’s $), on a tiny stage (Camillo), obliged (Santner), set apart (Agamben’s homo sacer), brought to a stop (Freud’s impasse, Lacan’s passe, Vico’s “proof of the body”). Is the architectural column a demonstration of tonal opening (XXX), whose proportions secure firmitas (Vitruvius) through a built-in cipher/spell? Alternatively, is the division, in every discourse, between enunciating (performative) and the enunciated (material cause) not also a machine, an automaton, able to reverse the temporal tree of choices (cf. mons delectus) into a deterministic gnomon, multiple causes leading to a single effect?

Where temporality is reduced to polarity, the labyrinth comes to mind; its fractal structure of nested triplets (AABA, BABA, AABA carried on to one more level) returns us to the stochastic resonance of Poe’s plan for the perfect crime, the card-rack (a sonic palindrome) which turns the objet petit a, the missing letter and gap in the circle of the drive, into the visible made invisible by making it visible only to blind prophets who “can’t tell the difference.” Analipsis, in the locus solus (Roussel), the site of exception, turns this trick into a case of extimacy, by which the reader changes places with the writer, the detective with the thief, the analyst with the analysand, the sage with the fool (idiot = “private person,” hence a locus solus and homo sacer combined). In Robert Wise’s The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951), when the ship from outer space lands, analeptically, on the Washington D.C. Capitol Mall, the morality of the moment is implicit. Philosophy becomes theology.

Franz Rosenzweig, Star of Redemption.
Map 3.19

Why does the lowly partridge occupy such a pivotal position in mythology and theology? On account of its sexiness (it can be impregnated merely by the wind), Antonello attaches it to the divine afflatus that also impregnated Mary. On account of its ground habitat, classical tradition associates it with Dædalus’s murdered nephew, whose soul, once transformed into a bird, no longer wishes to risk the heights that had been his cause of death. As a witness to Icarus’s fall in Breughel’s Landscape with the Fall of Icarus, the partridge allows us to reverse-engineer the normative scene. This is nothing less than the deconstruction of the home, the dom of domesticity, the root of the uncanny (unheimlich). We can untangle the terms using Jentsch’s crisscross methodology. Just as the dream of flying/floating is an extimation of the body’s suspension of air in the lungs (yielding the sensation of the body floating in air — as normal! It is the domestication that requires the “scandalous” obverted condition. Virtual space conditions for the “fourth wall”(⊏) are used to notate this deconstruction.


Pieter Breughel, the Elder, *Landscape with the Fall of Icarus* c. 1558; Musées Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, Brussels.

...but the key lies in the way flying/floating is normalized (=domesticated). The uncanniness is suspended in order to preserve the sleeper’s dream.

Perdix’s story, told in the code of the Jentschian uncanny, explains the murdered boy’s transformation into a partridge, a bird that stays close to the ground.

The dream of flying is an extimate phenomenon. According to Ludwig Strümpell, cited by Freud in his book *The Interpretation of Dreams*, floating and flying dreams arise from the sleeper’s awareness of the lungs’ regular inhaling and exhaling. The body’s containment of air in equilibrium is “estimated” to the condition of the weightless body in air, experienced as normal. The floating/flying dream is clearly extimate: the subject dreams of looking back at itself from a distance. This is the second type of virtuality, the detachment of “interior” consciousness as a staging of external conditions of opportunity. Because the affordance field of tuché is essentially this, even the first projection of enunciation involves this kind of extimacy. The “norm” of contiguous virtuality is emphasized by flying: mastery of the full set of Cartesian dimensions.

The obverse condition of virtuality is directly correlated to the dream’s use of extimacy (body-to-world transfers). The effect of normalcy is the key to the relation of the uncanny to the home, in that the experience of extimacy seems entirely normal. “Normalization” is in fact what takes place in travel, the complementary case of domestic estrangement. In travel, the strange is made familiar, but the uncanny is present nonetheless and increases directly in proportion with the increase of familiarization. Finding a home in the travel environment distinguishes the true traveler from others who experience “oblique views” (running errands, migration, etc.). The home away from home is the fundamental condition of the “site of exception” and the acousmatic voice of prophecy.
3.19 / Afflatus, Divine and Otherwise

Slavoj Žižek has cleverly set up the following argument: fantasies occur in twos, a positive version and its negative counterpart. However, we must not see them as directly opposite or even necessarily in competition. Rather, the negative fantasy “makes way for” the positive version. It clears a path, so to speak, so that the positive version arrives with the added flair that accompanies “just-in-time solutions.” Let’s move to the extreme case. Cosmically, one could say that mortal experience in its entirety, the sum total of human failure, catastrophe, injustice, needless suffering, disease, enmity, war, perfidy — in short, sin in all its particulars — is in its perfect horror is only making way for the perfect order of Heaven, which arrives in the tsunami of the Apocalypse. One thing is clear. It has been true since Dante’s *Divina Comedia* that the negative case has proved far more interesting and intelligible than its positive counterpart. Where the perfect order of Paradise is, for understandable reasons, ineffable, the fallen and fractured remains of sinful mortality are not only “effable,” they are the stuff of human curiosity. As George Steiner called it, “the gossip of eternity” is attracted far more to evil than good. We look then to the abject, hard-to-swallow negative evidence to pencil in the framework of the nicer twin.

This contrarian claim is easier to swallow, perhaps, if it is scaled down to the more modest case of *afflatus*, the wind that is the conveyance or equivalence of the word. The positive version of divine afflatus can be found in the example of Mary’s impregnation by the Holy Spirit, a “new medium” modality unmistakable in the presence of such obvious clues as the Angel Gabriel as annunciator, the fact that Mary is always shown reading holy text, and, in some cases, references to Mary’s impregnation through the ear, surely the most famous case of early hysteria on record. Antonello da Messina, of course, understood this thesis so clearly that he was able to link Mary’s impregnation with St. Jerome’s by reverse-engineering the translation of the Vulgate as an act of impregnation rather than rationalized scholarly intertextuality. Without the negative clue of the partridge, whose associations with the myth of Dædalus are worth mentioning, Antonello’s thesis would be simply conjecture. With the clue, however, we realize that Antonello was not alone in thinking that inspiration and impregnation were necessarily related.

The negative of the divine impregnating afflatus is the lowly fart, the semiotics of which has been dared in a serious way by Peter Sloterdijk in his *Critique of Cynical Reason*. There is no reason to view the fart as sacrilegious mockery. Sloterdijk notes that it brings the spirit down to the level of the body, where the body in fact gains the upper hand. A cleaned-up retail version of this idea is to be found in Charlie Chaplin’s *City Lights*, where the Tramp, a guest of his rich benefactor at a raucous party, swallows a whistle that continues to sound as his stomach burps in dissatisfaction with its unwanted occupant. The whistle, Eric Santner notes, is evidence of the body’s nagging attachment to its natural history, which forever stains attempts at polity and dignity. The whistle incident expands on the comedy of the opening scene, a political rally whose speakers are given mock voices, as if heard over a faulty telephone line. *City Lights* was a sound movie, but the sound track supported only these acoustic props and the orchestral accompaniment. The speaking voice was held at bay, as if the years of silent films had let it regress back to animal sounds.

Slavoj Žižek. *Interrogating the Real*, 63–64.
Peter Sloterdijk, *Critique of Cynical Reason*. 

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Map 3.20

The studio apartment overlooking the interior urban courtyard in Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window (1954) is an unlikely counterpart to the Odyssean travels that constitute the first paradigm for the returning warrior. The interior space pulls back from the public yard, making it more obviously a case of an idealized point of view; its resident, Jeff Jefferies, is immobilized with a broken leg, his visibility expands through optics and curiosity, his girlfriend and nurse do his “legwork” for him. But, there are other telling details. Jefferies is a veteran whose assignments to global hotspots continues his military career in kind. He asks his fiancée to postpone marriage on account of these adventures. His interest in his neighbor’s suspicious activity begins to resemble a military operation after he involves his war buddy, now a police inspector, to help. What is most useful, however, is his relation to the neighbor. Lars Thorwald has a blond wife, whose nagging reminds Jefferies of Lisa’s complaints about his bachelorhood. Anna Thorwald, like Jeff, is an invalid. The period covered by the film constitutes an exile for Jefferies. Before he can return to his job (or to marriage to Lisa and a more sedentary life style), he must be “de-contaminated.” We do not recognize this project, because it’s translated into the more conventional terms of convalescence. The issues of bachelorhood, military-style surveillance, and purification through the trial of the mystery seem to be simply coincidental. Where structure holds the key, however, we can regard these “accidents” as essential to the project at hand: returning the warrior, cleansed, to family and friends.

The uncanny’s polar constants, Da and Ad — the zombie who keeps walking and the living person doomed to a fore-ordained fate — powers the dynamics who live across each other in the New York City courtyard. Jefferies’ invalid status is ambiguous. Photos in his apartment suggest that this could be a death narrative — the imagination of a deceased in the brief seconds after the moment of death. Lisa, however, is the element of life compelling him to return to the normalcy of domestic life. Lars’ wife Anna is sick. His attempt to escape his burdensome marriage is what attracts Jefferies, not so much on account of the injustice of murder as for the strange symmetries that unite them as couples.

The boundary between life and death is thickened to create the overlap that graphically represents the crisscross of death and life that constitutes the uncanny’s two principal terms. This thickness is, more accurately, a double boundary that makes the boundary (in)transitive in psychological terms. In compensation for this complexity, the direction of travel can now go both ways, at least symbolically. The warrior who “dies” by being contaminated by battle is able to return, but this return is conditional. Jefferies’ return takes on stages that are set out in terms of the four types of virtuality: contiguous, attached, detached, and anomalous. Why: these are the successive dimensions of the gap, the impasse.

Sequencing the extimacy of the (in)transitive boundary involves three prototypical stages. (1) The simple boundary, presumed by contingent virtuality, is “thickened” by the discontinuity between spatial-temporal causes and effects — attached virtuality. (2) The orthogonal relationship between in-and-out motions, or inside-outside relations, creates a quadratic condition. Finally, (3) the “letter arrives at its destination,” in Lacanian terms — i.e. to identify the element whose absence afforded the “field” of affordances (tuchē) created by the initial (in)transitivity.

As the temperature returns to normal, Lisa joins Jefferies to convalesce his newly broken legs.

The diagrams tell the story, but in this highly “spatial” tale, it is important to look at the involvement of virtual space. The conventional Cartesian space of the urban courtyard yields to the (in)transitivity of Thorwald’s gaze. When the small dog is killed, Thorwald is the only one who doesn’t come to the window. The curiosity that ties all neighbors to the visible spectacles of the courtyard is broken; Thorwald’s gaze contracts. The contamination theme is taken up by the woman in black, who accompanies Thorwald during one part of his crime. The anomalous virtual involves the sequence in which Thorwald discovers Jefferies’ identity and travels around the block to break into his apartment. In effect, the movie provides the diagrams in the literal staging of events. Rear Window offers a “Rosetta Stone” for translating the de-contamination of the determining warrior in terms of virtuality.

The doubling of the boundary is Jefferies’ studio apartment, a metonymy of the function of the windows (opened during a heat wave). The orthogonal turn is the discovery of the potential crime, the T-like intersection of Jeff’s gaze with Thorwald’s apartment.

1. interval of trial, error, proof, and cleansing — via the technics derived from virtual space conditions
2. decontamination zone
3. WAR RETURN HOME

The orthogonal turn is the discovery of the potential crime, the T-like intersection of Jeff’s gaze with Thorwald’s apartment.
In societies where warfare was ritualized, the warrior who had killed could not return home without undergoing purification procedures to prevent him from "bringing death home with him." In effect, the warrior was tied to his dead victim through the logic of obversion. Killer and killed were in a fated relationship, twins. Like Castor and Pollux, one was assigned to Hades while the other was allowed to continue life above. The twin gods rotated, and their exchange was the basis for seasonal correlations. Other twins, such as Romulus and Remus, modified cosmic rotation into the idea of periodic renewal, where in more general cases the king was symbolically or literally killed by an assigned rival.

The uncanny's A/D/D/A formula, the twinship of death and life, characterizes rotating kingship, and the motif of twins in civic foundation rites. The chiasmatic crisscross negotiated the boundary separating life and death and, in turn, reified the regions on either side, one as labyrinth, the other as crystalline temple. The intersection (templum) was a combination of both, and the point where a portal was opened up by means of sacrifice and rewarded with prophecy. The problem in modern times is that actual returning warriors must internalize the purification process, enduring it in the form of neurosis or psychosis. With the translation into debilitating psychiatric disorders without social or ritual components, they cannot re-join society or recover mental stability.

The returning warrior must therefore wander before returning home; his wandering is a trial imposed on behalf of his slain rival whose soul must be "settled" before the living twin can return home. We now see how Home, as a category of travel, unseats the sentimentalized versions of this idea of subjective residency. The true traveler must be to some extent at home while traveling. Lacan and Freud relate this oxymoronic condition to the ultimate terminus of analysis. What for Freud was an impasse was for Lacan a passe: a coming to terms with (symbolic) castration. Symbolic castration is the necessary and sufficient condition of military order. In travel terms, it is the disguise of the traveler, the opacity of subjectivity to itself (due to the over-determination of identity by the symbolic), an objective subjectivity that correlates to the travel network's status as radically alien symbolic relationships, subjective objectivity. While travel is the standard modality of homelessness and separation, we can see the complementary condition: we are even more radically homeless when we are at home, where misrecognition forces on us the condition of alienation. We might qualify this contradiction by saying that Home, as a category, has two modalities. One, the positive version, is "centrifugal" in its desire to continue the travel experience, accumulating experiences and piling up memories. The negative version risks and even seeks termination, a centripetal collapse of the dimensions that keep travel open. How can this be Home? Herein lies the Hegelian aspect of travel — the requirement that travel maintain "risk factors" that continually threaten stability but which, all the while, constitute a dynamic form of stability that constitutes its essential performativity. Home-as-performative combines the Lacanian themes of alienation and separation, matched to strategies, respectively, of continuation and completion, departure and return: a Lacanian "round trip ticket." This reveals Home's fundamental uncanniness. The security promised by home's secret enclosing protects "what not ought to be discovered." The heimlich necessitates and generates the unheimlich.

Slavoj Žižek, "The Most Sublime Hysteric."
Ed Pluth, *Signifiers and Acts*.
Sigmund Freud, *The Uncanny*. 
Maps express topography through the convention of (mostly) concentric lines connecting points of equal elevation. In this way, mountains, the original defensive fortresses and sacred temple sites, are inadvertently provided with an emblem where the center is protected by rings of gates guarding the valued interior. Topography must yield to error, however. Every map’s finitude owes to the necessary curvature that, abstracted as the property, $\partial$, introduces extimacy — the conversion of inside to outside — by means of $\partial$’s conspiracy with $\alpha$, the fulcrum of curvature and “artifact” to the map’s representational performativity. How simply and directly the map tells the complex story of the moral terrain by which the concentration of power demands the dynamic of secret conspiracy, the sublation of a criminal-obscene act, and the creation of ideology through discourse. For “masters,” substitute “master signifier” to discover the intimate involvement of the logics of the University, the Hysteric, and Analysis. But, for the master key, look to the discourse of the Master-Servant and the Hegelian dynamic between enunciating and jouissance. The curvature of desire that perpetually returns the traveler to the empty location is the field ($tuchë$), pock-marked with land mines of “vertigo,” that rhetorically over-pack signifiers to set up the return, via metalepsis, to the subject, barred, strapped to the loom (automaton), hounded by her “bachelors,” even (Penelope, cf. the artist Marcel Duchamp’s Bride Laid Bare by Her Bachelors, Even).

Just as elevation accentuates the error of map projection, power carries the error factor to the surface that it exploits via $tuchë$.

Lacan’s matheme for the discourse of the Master-Servant maps the topography of enunciating to the topology (field of enunciating) where “vertiginous” rhetorical devices (analepsis, metalepsis, etc.) that “return” travel to its automaton/barred-subject.

The extimacy principle that “imprisons” (“ocults”) $\alpha$ in topological alignment with but vertiginous isolation from $S$, sets the system up to be “outed” by revelation, which functions as the system’s apocalypse: a collapse of dimensions based on a (stereo-)gnostic discovery about the “artifact” of the discursive field.

Santner/Rosenzweig’s “site of exception” can be identified through the topography-to-topology transformation of the enunciating field, interpreted through the matheme for the discourse of the Master-Servant. This is also Vico’s “imaginative universal,” depicted in nearly identical terms in the dipintura of The New Science, where Metafisica surmounts the globe of the sensible universe (obverted, from container to spherical contained), in precarious balance between the astrological signs of Leo and Virgo ($NS$, §3). This position indicates with precision the “stereognostic” condition of metaphysics in general. The Lion was an interpolation of the earth-encircling, nature-paralyzing Uroboros, symbol of winter. The Virgin was the sign of the Golden Age of Saturn, i.e. the combination of domestication of nature through agriculture (sown fields, or $sati$). The humor of melancholy, which connects Saturn to the Uroboros/winter is the key, the cipher, that unlocks the seasons, setting them into motion, a field (tiled array) upon which a circular movement enacts a double inscription. The black bile of melancholy was the poison that, as Asklepius discovered with the slaying of Medusa, could kill, if taken from the left of Medusa’s body, or, if taken from the right, restore life. The formula of uncanny chiasmus between Da and Ao thus results in the image of St. George, the armed knight who slays the dragon who holds the sacrificial daughter hostage. The daughter is token of the city, whose virginity equals the city’s physical security and moral integrity. The site of exception is prophecy, the “true speech” ($NS$, §34, §219, §825), which preserves this integrity in the face of collapse.
The travel field’s intimate relation to enunciation theory, Lacan’s theory of the four discourses, and the uncanny is revealed by its “military status.” In the context of ritualized warfare of pre-Homeric times (inverted “hysterically” in The Iliad to conform to the Greeks’ new hero paradigm), the dynamics of the returning soldier reveal how the field of enunciation “flattens” hierarchical space to allow for tuchē (affordance, opportunity, contiguity) while transforming the automaton into sites of “local vertigo,” magnetized by the antipodal influence of ∂ and α. The flattened field is popularly recognized by the concentric thresholds separating the rich and powerful from the poor and dispossessed, but the same devices are evident on (American) university campuses, whose hierarchically ordered spaces terminate in a phallic expression such as a tower or main building, an “act” that “stands out” from the symbolic order in the same way that the tops of all hierarchies defend themselves in terms of the ∂/α relationship. Here, we must understand, simultaneously, the relationship binding together the specifically military aspect of enunciation (giving and receiving orders, i.e. master signifiers), the essential role of the act (= phallic element), jouissance (Lacan’s objet petit a), a shame/honor dynamic, and a conspiratorial dynamic grounded in the discourse of the master. At this intersection of themes and processes, discourse reveals its logic in terms of a “political philosophy” embodied by purely rhetorical devices. Why is ∂ essentially transgressive? In other words, why is the curvature of the map not simply an accident or error to be “smoothed out” technically or symbolically? The key lies in the continual conversion of the automaton of vertigo (depth) to the opportunism embodied by the lateral structures of tuchē. This conversion is essentially political and transgressive. Transgression is the access of the master to the servant that violates the “transitive” thresholds that guarantee hierarchical spatial distinctions. The master can pass but the servant cannot. This is the function of the password, but now we see how it is structurally related to the Freudian impasse and the Lacanian passe through the common factor of symbolic castration. Yet, the master is not in any way free to act. Mastery itself must be self-reflective; it must present itself within a conspiracy (the pure form of the Other) able to value the transgression, ∂. This “empirical” feature reveals, through reverse-engineering, the real point of this system: conspiracy is proof of the social bond without which no social or subjective mental or emotional order can survive. The “military” order, historically manifest by the social bonds connecting soldiers, is cemented by the possession of a secret that — true or not, existent or not — automates the entire field of enunciation. The field, in turn, may be understood as an automated grid whose thresholds are passed “naturally” but with an effect that triggers a disruption, ∂, whose physics is determined by an antipodal α, the element of vertigo.

This seemingly tortured account is nonetheless the effective-efficient cause of literary-mythic commonplaces such as the returning soldier’s need for ritual purification within the field of travel opportunities. The Odyssey is in fact a handbook of conspiratorial land mines planted by competing gods; the opportunism, tuchē, of Odysseus that makes bad situations worse; the complex role of passwords (cf. “Nohbdy” name Odysseus gives the Cyclops); and the sacrifice of victims (literal nobodies) that produces the scandal needed to bind masters and the secret force automating mastery. Flatness and verticality, tuchē and automaton, are convertible via the “operator” (Γ) of causality.

Ed Pluth, Signifiers and Acts.
The tiled field defines the affordance directed from “behind the scenes” by the exiled/disappeared antipodal automating force, α, becomes acousmatic (= prophetic, divinatory, “true speech” or vera narratio) by virtue of the extimate flip that unites the objective subject and the subjective object in its uncanny double inscription of life and death. In Borges’ fable about the strangely heavy object (“a cone of bright metal” which fell out of the pocket of the dead man about whom nothing was known except that “he came from the border”) and the precursor fable by T. E. Lawrence about the column in the Turkish mosque where innumerable voices could be heard, the truth object does not separate the subject from the universe, object is truly subjective but ing to the diagram of the vesica pisces, developed by James Joyce as two triangles joined to form a parallelogram.

The uncanny is identical with the overlap between the states of death and life, an overlap that demands a double perspective and double inscription, an alternative where life is dominant and death operates behind the scenes in the form of a fate magnetically drawing all action to a single end, and another alternative where death is the context for life’s momentum past the technical moment of death (“between the two deaths.”

The “ideological” discourse of the master — S1 $\rightarrow$ S2/α — sublates the relationship Lacan identified with fantasy: $S\alpha$. The multiple meanings attached to the poinçon (both greater and less than, $<$, authenticity, over-determination, obversion/extimacy, etc.) are played out in the uncanny flip between life and death. The Wizard of Oz, whose fantasmic face is projected onto a smoke screen from his position in a concealed control room, is duplicated in the structure below, where the clear concentric paths of the labyrinth — its “ideological aspect” — conceal the cipher-like fractals that link the upper paths together to create a puzzle and sustain/continue the fantasy of entrapment (entrapment is the essence of continuation and, hence, fantasy).
3.22 / True Speech and Sites of Exception

True speech (Vico) is the speech of prophecy that first appears in the form of “hieroglyphic ciphers” perceived in nature, speech that is not understandable in the terms of a conventional semiotics of signifiers and signifieds but rather as an “acousmatic voice” within language encountered, variously, as silence, paradox, password, slip of the tongue, whisper, etc. With any account of the sites of exception associated with the reversion to “creaturely life,” we must face this intimate relationship between physical, visible structures and acousmatics, whether the sound is an analogy of the voice or literally made effective as “stochastic resonance.” The music of the shofars in the Biblical case of Jericho, must have been a 1:1 acousmatic obverse to architectural defenses — which must therefore have been originally acousmatic! The formula is compact and clear. Truth, as resonance and signals concealed within noise or even at first mistaken for noise, is synonymous with architectural “truth” embodied by the civic — which may be conceived as rhetorical (enthymeric) or magic (Yoruba: the spell of the cosmogram).

The “shout in the street” that interrupts the schoolmaster Deasy’s boring diatribe compels Ulysses’ narrator, Stephen Daedalus, to call it the voice of God. The scholar A. M. Klein went a step further, if such is possible, to show how the entire Nestor episode is nothing more than sequential phrases that repeat Vico’s “ideal eternal history” — the ages of gods, heroes, and men, with a ricorso to the beginning of a new cycle. Shouts and other noises are followed by heroic conflicts followed by meaningless small-scale struggles followed by a return to a new cycle. Joyce uses repetition to register the end of the former line with the beginning of the next (“Weep no more … weep no more … It must be a movement then.”) The automation of Vico’s ideal eternal history is carried to every line and word of Nestor’s narrative, as Klein demonstrates, and we are justified in comparing this terza rima to Edgar Allan Poe’s cipher structure of “The Purloined Letter,” where the left and right-hand sides of the narrative are joined by “anamorphic” ideas hatched in the minds of the readers. Vico’s concept of The New Science was that it, too, was to be created within and by the act of reading. Vico’s reader is advised to consider if there are more or fewer or different causes of the civil world (cf. Lacan’s poinçon as <>) than adduced by The New Science. If the reader cannot, Vico promises that the he “will experience in his mortal body a divine pleasure as he contemplates in the divine ideas this world of nations in all the extent of its places, times, and varieties” (NS, §345).

Automation, it seems clear, is the stuff of philosophical jouissance! Tuchē is given in the form of the text as a field of adjacencies, affordances, opportunities. The field contains sites of exception in the special sense that the reader will be reduced to a body, a homo sacer. Comprehension — science-made-new — will be based not on rational evaluation but, rather, a resonance that automates a bodily conversion, a pleasure. The new science will be both an imagination, a prophecy, and a (collective) memory. Its speech will be true because the field is overdetermined, pushed past conventional kinds of meaning with the usual contingencies and provisos. The content is the same (Joyce’s vesica pisces: ALP) but the meaning now arrives by epiphany (αλπ). The boundary/screen presumed to enclose the object is now subjectivized: it is now the extremely heavy object that, Borges says in “Tlön,” can barely be lifted because it contains the whole world.

Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More.
James Joyce, Ulysses. Both Ulysses and Finnegas Wake could be considered as demonstrations of over-determination, as Joyce maps salient narrative events on to myth, history, philosophy, and the primitive conditions of his own theodicy. See A. M. Klein, “A Shout in the Street: An Analysis of the Second Chapter of Joyce’s 'Ulysses'.”
Map 3.23

The site of exception is a place of prophecy, a repository of signifiers, a treasury. This is not so much the phenomenon of the hoard of wealth as a geometry of extimacy that converts meanings into meaning per se — a point where predication (defining through associations) is by-passed, where semiotic openness becomes, simply, "the open." The function of the so-called fourth wall in theater and film, the side of the scene open, first, to the production apparatus and, second, to the physical presence and view of the audience is employed more generally in experience, in conditions where the idea of performance is used to structure what we see and do. This framing is largely unconscious and presuppositional. We configure virtual space to facilitate an economy of actions, communications, and objects in terms of the possibilities correlated to our position relative to the fourth wall.

The fourth wall is an analogy for the basic division of zones in the framing process. All frames become, in this analogy, performative in that any "consumption" presumes a "production" aimed to effect an experience mediated by conscious controls of perception within specified time frames and space frames. The fourth wall idea is taken from the analogy of the film production set, where rooms are constructed to allow for the presence of production equipment and personnel. "Space" becomes an analogy for the time involved for each of the stages of production and consumption. "The archive" is generally an expansion of the original framed work of art. The production space-time and documentation about the audience's reception can be included. The archive is essentially the plan view as shown at the left, denoted with three basic labels: the framed production, the apparatus space-time, and the space-time of the audience.

The angle of view indicates how, by framing the framed scene itself, we can also view the spaces of production-consumption "from the side" as well as encounter the obverse, where we take up the position of the performance as it "faces the audience." The two oblique conditions, which seem to vary only by being a left-hand and right-hand version of the same thing, are useful in distinguishing the roles of attached and detached virtuality. Attached virtuality, in which what is normally attached in experience is imagined to escape, can be nominally described as a "right-hand" case in comparison to the more "sinister" situations of contamination, as in the case where a "dream comes true." The obverse fourth position is analogous to reverse angle shots taking in actors facing the audience or the more disturbing example of René Magritte's painting, "Not to Be Reproduced" (1937), where the a subject is shown looking at his image in a mirror, but the image has turned its back on the subject.

Everyday experience involves encounters with varied "positional" relationship to virtuality, where we consume intentional framed situations in conventional ways, happen upon "events in progress" where we are neither producers or consumers, or happen upon the "obverse" cases of paradox, anomaly, self-realization, or absurdity, the "condition of acousmatics."
3.23 / Performing the Archive

A. M. Klein’s manic analysis of the Nestor episode of James Joyce’s *Ulysses* demonstrates how over-determination, when adopted as a method of study, yields results that are, themselves, a form of performance. Simone Osthoff has explored the idea of “performing the archive” in her study of the retro-reflective works of Brazilian artists Paulo Bruscky and Eduardo Kac. Osthoff advises that “we abandon our fantasy of mastery over representation and respond in kind to the archive-as-artwork, to ‘living’ archives, and to reenactments of history with their seamless connections between fiction and non-fiction.” Performing the archive is grounded in the fact that performativity is present in the artwork already, in the form of its potential weakening within the collectivity of the archive. The archive provides a distance, defined in terms of a specific spatio-temporal dimensionality, that corresponds to the distance established by enunciation in everyday experience. While the field of enunciation provides a place for subjectivity, this place is fundamentally alienating, its uncanny effect is to make “home” feel “homeless.”

Alienation unsettles the enunciating field, but it justifies what Osthoff develops as the archive’s newly realized performative dimensionality. In this, fiction and fact blur boundaries; reality encounters its obverse. But, in keeping with the obverse’s logical quality of preserving truth value in the face of doubled negations, it is precisely the situations of “idiotic symmetry” that establish such conditions and preserve the truth that is the basis of Vico’s true speech.

The condition of natural history as method is illustrated by a theatrical tradition that stretches back at least to Plautus’s *Amphytrion*, a farce involving Hermes’ disguise as the servant Sosia and the new twins’ arguments as to which is authentic. A variation, Woody Allen’s 1985 film, *The Purple Rose of Cairo*, follows the escape of Tom Baxter, a character in an escape film about socialites of the 1930s. Baxter, who plays an explorer in the film-in-a-film, moves past the fourth wall to meet the impoverished, lonely waitress whose addiction to films eases her painful economic and marital situation during the Great Depression in New Jersey. No one steps out of *Purple Rose* to meet up with a spectator of the Woody Allen film in 1985, but the demonstration is sufficient. Baxter speaks a *vera narratio* by virtue of the two registers in which he resonates simultaneously. Acoustics becomes acousmatics once it takes on the form and structure of anamorphosis. It is “both true and false” with its blend of representational art and circumstantial fact, but like the prophecy of the ancient Sibyls, the performativity of the questioner brings about the most obscure and impossible component of the prediction. Lacan defined this moment in the verb tense of future anterior — a point in the future by the time of which something will have been accomplished. This is Florensky’s logic of the dream: a backward and forward motion meeting at an “impossible nexus.”

The fourth wall is, ordinarily, a technical term describing the face in cinema’s diachronic constructions that admits the equipment of film production and, subsequently, the view of the audience that converts the recording apparatus to a projection apparatus. This bi-polarity affords a constructive critical analogy to natural history’s use of the obverse of a “polymorphous/polysemous” construction that, in the discovery of the site of exception, becomes the true voice of the past when it is reverse (“ob-versed”) as archive.

Simone Osthoff, *Performing the Archive*. 
Map 3.24

W. G. Sebald’s *Rings of Saturn* includes, in its excursions across the remains of blighted landscapes, details that function as passwords giving access to his method. “If one slits open a caterpillar that has been killed with ethyl alcohol along the length of its back, one sees a cluster of intertwined small tubes that resemble intestines. They end by the mouth, in two very fine orifices, through which the juices pour forth” (275). The doubled speech of using examples as “tells” is doubled by the example itself, and one re-reads the text using the new clue. Sebald has charged the field of travel retroactively, requiring the text to circle back on itself continually — a process of mnemonic over-determination. When Sebald “plays dead” — note the revelation on the last page, about souls tarrying behind if they see images of landscapes, people, or fruits of the field — he meets the dying landscape on its own terms. The dark, blurred photographs he includes in his books are not just evidence of a lack of skill. They are the kinds of images that, like the ghosts in Corsica (*Campo Santo*), who are frayed on the edges and shimmer slightly. By tracking Sebald’s progress in terms of “the fourth wall,” we can see how disinterested wandering leads to a “conversion moment.” At this point, natural history yields up fundamental conditions of discourse amounts to a discovery of the “acousmatic-prophetic” voice within the journey, a voice that can be attributed to the “uncanny landscape” itself.


Figs. 473-477: Seidenspinner, *Bombyx mori*. Fig. 473, Das Männchen; Fig. 474, Das Weibchen. Fig. 475, Die Raupe. Fig. 476, Puppenkokon. Fig. 477, Puppe et-was verkleinert.

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**Tuchê:** deteriorated landscape

CULTURAL HISTORY: the evolution of the silk trade, growth and decline

NATURAL HISTORY: anatomy of the silk-worm

ANATOMY: conditions of discourse

DISCOURSE PLACED IN “LANDSCAPE CONDITIONS”: mirrors draped in black silk to avoid distracting the soul on its way to Hades.
3.24 / Natural History as Method

The peripatetic narrative archivist W. F. Sebald may be easily regarded as the master of the natural history method in recent times. His novels involve long walks across sparsely inhabited landscapes abandoned by industry, wealth, and tourism. The reader can feel the exhaled breath that may be the last of a dying economy and culture. In the early days of what may be a long or permanent winter, Sebald finds tidal deposits, fragments that survive against all odds. They tell their stories in terms of rusted metal, shadows, and dust. Sebald's writing mixes accounts of his digetic movement across such landscape with encyclopaedic exposition involving such subjects as herring fishing, silk trade, the reconstruction of the Temple of Solomon. In a favorite technique, Sebald encounters someone who becomes an informer and takes up the narration seamlessly, without the conventional use of quotes or second-person pronouns. In this way, the reader's imagination flows directly from Sebald's itinerary into the narrative of a resident whose recollections expand into new chambers of the novels' hearts.

Sebald gives a clue into his method: he notes that in Holland, in houses where a recent death has taken place, black silk was used to cover mirrors and paintings of landscapes, people, and food, so the soul "would not be distracted ... by a reflection of itself or by a last glimpse of a land now being lost forever" (Rings of Saturn, 296). Run this statement in reverse and you get Sebald's method: to play the dead soul who tarries in the landscapes, buildings, and rereveries of dying/dead ways of life; to sustain a contamination that binds the subject to the object in a mutual fate of inevitable decay. The contamination does and does not happen all by itself. Sebald sets up a field with component parts in a precise location. He details the history of the silk worm, silk cultivation, the evolution of silk trade, the cultural practices that sprung up around the use of silk, etc. In his discussion of the geography of the silk industry, the town he has visited earlier for other reasons "comes into play" in a surprising way. Families we have read about in other contexts now are seen in a new light. With everything in place, the scene begins to play itself out. The reality of the reconstruction is that this automation of metonymical details repeats in miniature the same dynamic of the original. Just as, in the construction of events, the intended cause had been overwhelmed by the resonance of other forces that circumstantially became allied with the intended one, the reconstruction sets up the conditions of over-determination that create the uncanny effect of A\(\rightarrow\)D, a \textit{déjà-vu} of the future anterior, of temporality acting as eternity.

The automation of this condition of over-determination pushes past particular sequences of causality. Coincidence that can have no more than poetic claim within a causal chain "flips" from effect to cause, precisely along the hinge that Joyce specified: the double triangle of obversion between life and death, the uncanny collusion of A\(\rightarrow\)D and D\(\rightarrow\)A. The silkworm's mouth, Sebald notes, has "two very fine orifices, through which the juices pour forth." This description is not only emblematic of the process of writing natural history, of reaching the essence of history's "natural" automation, but it retroactively animates episodes encountered earlier in the book: "Time and again, looking at Swinborn, this visitor continued, he was reminded of the ashy gray silkworm, \textit{Bombbyx mori}, from the Greek for βόμβος (a buzzing bug, also the deep hollow sound such bugs make), is a pun for "dead bomb." The poet Swinborn (Rings of Saturn, 165) therefore awakes abruptly after lunch "to new life" and flaps around his library like a startled moth. Is it an accident that Sebald's major project of natural history is about Germany after the war, when many "dead bombs" lie in the form of dust and rubble? Accidents happen.
The enunciative field, established by a modality of discourse (Master-Servant, Hysteria, University, Analysis) sets up particular kinds of opportunity, tied to specific kinds of outcomes. It is each culture’s prerogative to use these variables to fashion distinctive ways of knowing, acting, thinking, etc., but to treat them as predicates overlooks the grammar that generates them in the first place. Predication leads to cultural relativism, foreclosing any possibility of discovering the universal actions taken to establish subjectivity within any cultural and physical circumstances as distinctively “human,” despite cultural or historical variations. Though he never gave details, Vico’s idea of a “common mental dictionary” spoken by all cultures and time periods is, for critical theory, the “treasury of signifiers.” Like Lacan’s “linguistic turn,” it expands the idea of language to include the imaginary (i.e. the non-linguistic) and, hence, the role of negation. This opens up a gap in the transactions that take place in space and time, creating (in)transitivity. The mirror does not “return” the reflection quite on time. The image “gets damaged in shipping,” so to speak. The slight gap opens up a role for echo, resonance, and acousmatics that permeate even non-auditory phenomenon.

Sebald’s method: to play the dead soul who tarries in the landscapes, buildings, and reveries of dying/dead ways of life; to sustain a contamination that binds the subject to the object in a mutual fate of inevitable decay.

The spiral is a 3-D representation of DA, the separated shadow in an afterlife where defect, ∂, creates conditions of perpetual puzzles and trials. In a sense, the field of adjacencies, tuchē, is shadowed by a slightly out-of-synch identical field capable of challenging identity at any point (the “Sosia condition”). The anamorphic condition joins, without mediation, variations on the theme, Hades = “invisible.” The attached-detached themes of virtuality fill out a vocabulary of uncanny encounters, where partial objects, acousmatics, and passwords granting access to forbidden spaces interchange.

The labyrinth spatializes the “time-negating” gapped circle that always returns to the same impasse. The spatial image of time allows the materialization of the defect, ∂, as a puzzled image or space, where the “internal defect,” R₂, may yield a solution, imagined as an escape to an external Real, R₁. With Camillo and Vico, escape is a matter of memory converted into imagination. The future anteriority of R₁ is realized by interpreting a “witty escape” as an obversion that pays off in a literal extimacy: entrapped by the puzzle of R₂, wit (animus), converts it to R₁. Vico: the word for “heaven” and “wedge” (acute=witty) are the same in Latin (cœlum).
We recover natural history by recreating its primary structural conditions. This begins with the extraction and suppression of a feature that, as a coincidental by-product of some other project, is discarded at the edge of the field of travel. The field, a geometric expression of tuchē — affordance, opportunity — will create adjacencies that will distract motion into eddies and back-currents that will eventually amount to maelstroms that expose the sea-bed. Each vortex is powered by over-determination. Its vertigo is self-constructed and durable, a monad that makes detachment impossible and contaminates all levels of scale and identity. Just as over-determination is, in Freud’s sense, a conversion of effects into causes and a consequent reversal of the temporality of causality, allowing one effect to be the result of multiple causes, the method of natural history creates a fractal pattern that contaminates the knower by the known. In Albert Camus’ frightening novel, *The Plague* (1947), the classic device of the ticking clock is put to macabre service to time the point at which the physician investigating the plague will fall victim to infection and lose his rationality. How, he speculates in panic, can he be certain that at any point along this inevitable trajectory, that his thoughts are not already a product of the very disease he hopes to outwit?

Camus’ ticking clock is anamorphosis turned into temporality. The vertical lines connecting the line of intentional action with the sea-bed laid bare by a vortex of natural history, held into tight revolution by over-determination, are points of metalepsis, which belong to both inside and outside and serve as passages from the deepest interior to the most remote external points (Swinburn and the landscape draped with black silk, for example). It will not do to prematurely acclaim such constructs as “poetic devices” within a phenomenology of the sensitive, humanistic imagination willing to violate rules of logical explanation. The sequence of reversing cause and effect, the enunciation that gives rise to a field of contingencies, and the extreme vertigo of metalepsis that automates meaning with passwords giving access to a secret order are a “new science” more rigorous than the old, a protocol more exacting and profound than any laboratory experiment. This exactitude in fact is what links Žižek’s reference to the standard of “the clinic” (resistance to the misapplications of psychoanalysis to the social causes of the left or the naturalisms of the right) to Vico’s choice of “science” to indicate the zenith of humanistic reflection. When Lacan employed mathematical formulae, topological diagrams, and other technical devices, he did not intend simply to mimic science, he was specifying a new destiny for scientific thought as a whole.

Where the idea of science has been perverted into technology, this aspiration has been foreworn. A cynical agreement has put truth into permanent receivership, inaccessible by definition. But, this cynicism was condemned, both by Lacan and by Vico, in remarkably similar ways. Lacan specified a method of halves, where *mi-dire* was not simply the point at which thought fell short of its goal but the construction of a boundary at which the logic of extimacy could be revealed; Vico, in his idea of true speech, not only specified but demonstrated the effects of over-determination, planting fictions within his *Autobiography* that led alert readers into his conspiracy of melancholia. What is “natural” in natural history is the return of subjectivity to its native condition, its origins. For Lacan, this is the *passe*; for Vico it is the “imaginative universals” that produce a “common mental dictionary” spoken by all cultures in all periods of history. What better account could we find in the 18c. of a program for psychoanalysis?
Map 3.26

The tympanum ("drum") signifies the semi-circular or triangular pediment space above portals, often decorated with sculptures that, particularly in religious buildings, analogize the passage into the building’s sacred space with the unfolding of creation, with a particular emphasis on Apocalypse and judgment.

Portal tympanum, Ste. Foye, Conques, Aveyron, France

Portal tympanum, Saint-Macaire, Gironde, France

The semi-circular tympanum provides the opportunity (tuchē) for decoration, but actualization of this affordance have pushed the literal meaning of the tympanum as drum-shape to the expanded function of the tympanum as a vibrating membrane. Once the architectural tympanum asserts a "natural history" in closer proximity to the acoustic functions, over-determination actualizes a fuller range of performative potential. The "negative," limited meaning in effect "makes way" for the positive expanded version.
3.26 / Tympanum

The tympanum of architecture nearly eludes our notice because the “drum” used to describe the space above portals is presumed to refer, simply, to the semi-circular shape that, in architecture, is often filled with narrative content. The circumstantial relationships between the drum as a membrane used to make loud noises and the “acoustic” conditions of passage are simply coincidental. The shape not the function of the tympanum is presumed to be the origin of the designation. Yes, but ... What, we should ask, is lost in this literal account that, by reducing the drum to its shape aspect alone, seems nonetheless to be embarrassed by a surplus of acoustic themes that seem to pay particular homage to the rites of passage, where the portal acts as a site of exception, point of prophecy, and paradigm of true speech. These clusters of attributes combine resonance, the unconscious, and architecture. The combination of physical with spiritual passage seems to call precisely for this resonance, and the literal shape-emphasizing account, the tympanum's official “cultural meaning,” must give way to its very peculiar “natural history,” where over-determination forces overlaps and blurred boundaries, where the momentum of meaning forces short-circuits that spark across the spaces insulated by conventional scholarship. This is in fact what natural history does. It pushes back the settled structures of conventional relationships to reveal a hidden vertiginous void. It creates the condition of mi-dire (represented in a literal way by the half-drum of the tympanum) where conscious conventions are sublated by an unconscious-revelatory content and overwhelmed by the over-determination of prophetic alternative texts.

In the language of over-determination, “half” is equivalent to “double.” Romulus “means” Remus and an eventual murder. The vesica piscis describes the geometry of a hinge function driven by the crisscross logic of the uncanny, where topography and topology continually shuffle the documents of travel across the field of enunciation. It, like the Möbius band, maps the site of exception. The architectural tympanum allows for the recovery of an “archaic” meaning that does not rationally participate in the official account of the element's cultural-historical origins, but, like Sebald's account of silk, the arche works as a compass within the matrix of over-determination. Where accounts mingle stochastically with the more limited functional relationships, time is reversed as the effect becomes the cause, multiplied into myriad sites whose independent beginnings, middles, and ends indicate, without coercion, a common center.

If the enunciating act leaves the automaton-as-accident at the edge of its field of affordances, to assure that the more motion is allowed every freedom, the more effectively it reveals a hidden design. The field is haunted by automaton in its alternative negative guise, universal, totalizing determination. Unable to appear, automaton must be misrecognized within the matrix of opportunities, tuchê. Every choice owes a penny to fate, until the debt adds up to a significant sum. Whoever does the accounting may see how this surcharge is channeled into accounts that accrue funds until a potential is reached, and at the right moment the polarity of the field is reversed; a switch is thrown. The trigger timing is key to the performativity of such sites that, before they are sites of exception, are unexceptional.

It is important here to note the difference between the site of exception and the idea of the “archaic” site as a kind of Paradise Lost where human experience enjoys a pure interaction of archetypes. Sites of exception are independent of historical periods and cultural contexts; but, they are not generatively primary, i.e. places not yet compromised by rationality, instrumentality, or mediation. Indeed, the sites of exception rescue the idea of arche from the idea of the Jungian archetype. While rhetoric constitutes an “archaic” condition of speech that precedes and sets up subsequent rational uses, the arche remain distinct and inaccessible. See Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy, 21.
Why should virtuality’s four types (adjacent, detached, attached, anomalous) be related to a typology of discourse? The answer may lie in the structural basis that, in both, makes enunciation as well as the field of the imaginary subject to a physics of equilibrium. The catenary curve “idealizes” the logic of the arch in a way that the circular arch specifies through the geometry of the half circle. The catenary line achieves equilibrium in each part of its leap, and architects and masons from ancient times have employed the trick of inverting the shape of a suspended chain to achieve through experiment what would be difficult to calculate mathematically. Lacan’s system of four discourses, based on the rotation of four elements within a quadrated field, articulates the same need for equilibrium, but it must convert its 360º logic to 180º to operationalize the actual strategies of enunciation, without which temporality and spatiality would not be afforded their “chiastic” relationships, nor would the rhetorical devices of metalepsis, analepsis, anacoluthon, etc. be able to construct “figure-ground” conditions to put their logics into experiential, material terms.

The architectural catenary vault achieves its equilibrium through a precise relationship of each part to the whole: gravity and the tension required to keep the spring points apart (a—b) is distributed equally throughout the chain which, when inverted, creates a perfect arch.

The word for folly is derived from the word for leaping, revealing the fool’s formula of keeping kings in line by returning their high conceits to low common denominators (in Lacanese, <> was employed by all traditional cultures to counteract the dangers of the evil eye — hence, Freud’s identification of the uncanny in the themes of optics (rivalry, envy) and identity (Sosia condition).

Italo Calvino’s anthology of imaginary short essays, *Invisible Cities*, used an arch design to balance the interests of realism and fantasy in the construction of city descriptions that allowed Marco Polo to “buy some time” with Ghengis Khan. The fractal principle that allows the arch to suspend a heavy keystone above a void echoes the poetic principle of “suspension of disbelief” that allows the beginning of the story to connect to an end that was contained implicitly in the first lines. Successive chapters added and dropped themes to create “programs” for each city that were realized through the peculiarities (singularities) of the cities’ architectures and customs. Calvino articulated the “vertical virtual” (detached, anomalous) as a gravity of addition and subtraction while the “horizontal virtual” created shifts in the single things (“trading,” “eyes,” “names,” etc.), gradually transforming their meanings in the process of new combinations of “fives.”
Archivolts above the flat field of the tympanum arrange narrative elements in their diatonic sequence: the Creation, the Garden of Eden, the murder of Abel, and so on. Stories, like arches, have their appointments with the stones that echo their beginnings with ends and allow them their leaps through the air. Gravity is taunted and possibly defied by the arch, but it is only because of gravity that this fool-play, *sotie* (cf. *sauter*, to leap) — combining folly with acrobatics — can happen. Following the historical sequence by which Einstein replaced his specific theory of Relativity with a General Theory, gravity was integrated into the concept of curvature, so that it was no longer the case that a uniform space was warped by large masses, but the warp was, so to speak, universalized as space itself. Space curved at its root: the archivolt as a trace of this radical warp.

So, what happens to the "air" that, by appearing to be conventionally empty, makes the flight of the arch excite the imagination? If we "know all along" what is going to confound Œdipus, why do we sit through the play? Our allegiance to the theater seat is based on one of the more productive aspects of the Lacanian barred subject. The bar running through the S ($) is not just the shackle of interpellation but a literal line that functions at times like a mirror, projecting a disguised subject in the dark virtual distance beyond and at other times a line between life and death, dreaming and waking, where elements crisscross to set up a field of exceptional encounters.

In the practice of close-up magic, specific spatial zones are subtracted from the audience's perceptual range. Once integrated within temporalized sequences where gestural and verbal cues turn visibility on and off like a floor-lamp, the magician may deposit and retrieve objects into and out of these zones, allowing the audience to perceive "magic" appearances and disappearances. In the case of architecture, the vault takes place in just such a conditioned void. The reasons the stones are solidly supported and obey the laws of physics have not been violated; they have just been temporarily concealed from the users' view. Through architectural cues rather than a magician's words or movements, air has become thin and what crosses it has been credited with flight. Stones regulated by the mason's practical design are allowed an indeterminacy. The unconscious is allowed to play a dialectic game with the unconscious on a field that is not only public but collective: double inscription. The bar of the barred subject is double because it is bi-directional. Every boundary, even just a simple line, divides two outsides by virtue of the small gap it uses to function as a hinge.

The storied archivolts in this case do more than create an opportunity for decoration inside the tympanum. They clear away a void for over-determination, affording the play of conscious and unconscious elements in the minds of those who prepare to pass through below. Their gesture prepares the body for what is essentially a spiritual change: a glance above to the storied space, a glance ahead into a dark void, a pause, then motion forward: the sign of a cross, unintended but therefore more effective, since the sign points towards Golgotha. In the obverse case of Simonides — where the vault actually failed to land at its official destination — we find the corollary Day of Judgment. The stochastic exchange of place for name, a "naming of the field," allows the souls to rest. Time is thus identical to *commotion*.

*Slavoj Žižek*, *How to Read Lacan*.


William Ruskin, *Queen of the Air.*
Map 3.28

The subject’s “disappearance” within the protected zone of the point of view affords a flattened representational screen. Virtuality takes over. Perception, through conventional uses of graphic conventions, accounts in this flat abbreviation the presence-absence of hidden sides (type one virtuality); the attached virtuality of shadows and reflections, which are required to touch their parents and originals; the detached virtuality of dreams, which become “prophetic” if they invade waking space; and the anomalous virtuality associated with the vanishing point at the horizon of the (in)visible. This quadration (double negation) also occurs in other cases where the subject disappears behind the symptoms of neurosis or psychosis; or even in the more universal cases where the subject simply is mis-recognized as it is “misplaced” into a network of symbolic relations. The four virtualities anticipate the conditions of this disappearance in the universal cases because their organization is based on distinctions between subjective and objective, on one hand, and agency and action on the other. That these categories are regulated by the “sites” of discourse should come as no surprise. In each “virtual” zone, an aspect of enunciation is able to find its counterpart in art, literature, religion, and other products of popular culture.

FREUD: Schreber’s paranoia inflicted two types of transformation: (1) a conversion of the action of his love for Flechsig to hate and (2) a switching of the act of love to the act of hate. “Flechsig hates me” thus constructs and crosses two lines that result in four “spaces” that could be regarded as the virtuality of paranoia. Analysis would aim to (3) reveal the “sublation” of the sinthome, Flechsig hates me.”

VISIONALITY: the four types of virtuality also reveal a “subjective-objective” conversion of act and agent. The upper row is a management of objects and subjects that are in contact, the bottom of the subjective and subjective consequences of attachment. When detachment “returns” to subjectivity, the moral message becomes central, as a “sinthome.” In turn, the sinthome becomes the “truth” about an original “concealment.”

CONFIRMATION: In the most famous story about virtuality, the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius reveals itself to be structured by the four “virtualities,” which it exploits directly. Zeuxis’s masterfully painted bowl of fruit fools a bird, but Parrhasius’s painting was a curtain, which appeared to conceal his “real painting.” Flechsig construction is also a symptom (melancholy) turned sinthome (space). Through this connection, we can relate the four virtualities to the four conditions of discourse: (1) objective-subjective, AGENT; (2) objective-other, OTHER; (3) subjective-other, PRODUCTION; and (4) subjective-subjective, TRUTH. The final category both sublates and exposes the primary condition of the “neurosis.”
The subject “dies” in order to stabilize the perceptual field, to flatten it, to make it into a charged surface of enunciation, opened up to a sub-surface through vertiginous vortices of exception. This death is distance, dimensionality, a “stepping back.” By virtue of a gap created and held open, objects have edges, subjects have profiles, life has a quality. The point of these divisions into visible and invisible parts is to insure that the virtual will have a role in creating the imaginary, that the imaginary will in retroaction specify the (symbolic) condition of the subject’s point of view, and that the Real will, through an act of sublime triangulation, both undermine and affirm the subject’s position — as a radical dis-placement.

The division of objects and subjects in the perceptual field is a strategy of diversification. By putting an edge on things, virtuality’s four basic modes lead to four fundamental kinds of stories — which is to say, four means of consolidating individual subjective fantasies into collective, recognizable traditions of thinking about the future and the past as interchangeable, which is to say, as “natural histories.” Contiguous virtuality (inference about the hidden sides of things), attached virtuality (the independent value attributed to reflections and shadows), detached virtuality (contamination, such as of waking reality by the dream), and anomalous virtuality (the sudden appearance of an alien agent that “capsizes” the idea of reality) — these four forms are, in effect, conditions of the subject and of discourse. In the discourses of, respectively, the master/servant, the hysteric, the university, and analysis we see four relationships to fantasy that are the basis for cultural-artistic creations that articulate these modalities as collective “dictionaries” about the human condition.

The correlated creation of subjective distance and the division of objects within the perceptual/enunciative field is symmetrical: the subject’s step back is “terminated” by the point of view, the field and its scenery are terminated by a vanishing point. At the screen that serves as a fulcrum between the two zones, we can imagine a point that marks the limit of visibility — a point which, because it is “attached” to the creation of the diagrammatic arrangement, is the invisible position from which the scene itself “looks back at” the subject: namely, the (Lacanian) gaze. By being both a limit of mastery and the position from which the subject is interpellated by a desire that is permanently and radically alien, this hole in the screen is both in front of and at the back of the visible. And, because it is the means of collapsing the dimensionality by which the subject has safely insulated itself, it is also at/within the position of the point of view — though in a “obverse” relationship that makes it permanently beneath or behind.

From these three strategic sites, the fields and structures we associate with the subject’s construction of reality meets up with the Real, in the role of a subjective limit, an objective limit, and a hinge. By functioning as both a limit and a land-mine, the gaze (think of a permanently negative component of the visible/sensible) works within fantasy to create what might be best understood in the vocabulary of natural history as “buried treasure.” Any such hoard, in Lacanese, amounts to a “treasury of signifiers,” which holds out the promise of infinite meaning (clairvoyance, prophecy, wisdom, etc.) through system — not a template but, rather, a method, whose most intensive and revealing form is the charm, the spell, the curse.

“Invocation,” the name for the reading of the sacred text used to open the religious service, is also an “evocation” — a calling out (from a place that should have remained hidden), a summons from Hades, XXX. Subjects, or even objects, are no longer to be self-contained but, rather, extimate — each participating in the domain of the other and thereby affording the potentiality of work. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 26–27.
It is clear from reading the introduction of Kojève's *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* that Lacan immediately saw the "core concepts" that were lying in Freud's model of subjectivity. These allowed him to relate the emergence of the ego from the id of childhood, focus on the Mirror Stage as a critical moment in the relation of the Imaginary to the Symbolic, and understand how the temporalization of space was significant and evident in cultural production, i.e. art and literature. More important, it must have been evident that the “uncanny” of cultural production signified a fundamental divide based on the negation of negation; and that this divide would also perplex theory and give it its own internal “horizons,” as manifest in Lacan’s own articulation of extimacy and the *mi-dire*. This cross-reading suggests that the Atlas also lead to a Lacan’s Hegelian-Freudian “treasure horde.” The first paragraph of 3.28 is used as a sample.

"The subject “dies” in order to stabilize the perceptual field, to flatten it, to make it into a charged surface of enunciation, opened up to a subsurface through vertiginous vortices of exception. This death is distance, dimensionality, a “stepping back.” By virtue of a gap created and held open, objects have edges, subjects have profiles, life has a quality. The point of these divisions into visible and invisible parts is to insure that the virtual will have a role in creating the imaginary, that the imaginary will in retroaction specify the (symbolic) condition of the subject’s point of view, and that the Real will, through an act of sublime triangulation, both undermine and affirm the subject’s position — as a radical dis-placement.”
3.29 / Estrangement and Glossolalia

The temporalization of the space that transforms animal being charges the point of view as well as the internal and external horizons that reflect this point of view with an ideological potential. In a sense, where things are have to do with what should be done about them. Ideology binds space to time, so that when temporality collapses or is terminated — as in global conditions such as “the end of history” or the individual experience of repetition, impasse, or déjà-vu — spatial conditions are functionally brought into play. In this way, well-known phenomenon of mirroring, fractals, spirals, shadows, etc. — in other words, the complete repertoire of the virtuality wherever conventional connections have been violated — cause ordinary objects to lose their natural, informal quality. They acquire a residual of resistance that puts a part of each object out of reach. Unlike the commodities that, in animal being, may be consumed directly and wholly, such objects become the precise counterparts of Hegelian-Lacanian desire, that is to say, they correspond to the desire of the subject for whom desire has become the “desire of the Other.” It is as if the object had become the target of Zeno’s arrow, or rather the space between the arrow and the target: consumed internally-subjectively rather than externally-objectively because of its relation to desire.

The “partialization” of what we take at first to be ordinary objects subjects them to a mapping process. The partiality of desire that creates a vertiginous collapse of dimensionality operates within a field initiated by enunciation, stabilized by tuchê, opportunity, and destabilized when defect/curvature, à reveals an antipodal objective a, which operates as both natural chance and automaton of the “fate” that reverses causality into a field of over-determination. Sites of exception lead to prophetic glossolalia, a “universal language” that is universal not in terms of corresponding meanings but in the fact that all meaning has been subtracted, leaving only the form of language behind. Can sites of exception be mapped? Do they not appear to be time-less and space-less in ways that resist any mapping procedure?

The collapse of standard dimensionality reveals, through the devices of this collapse (symmetry, etc.) just the reverse: the “treasury of signifiers” that, although they are as meaningless in the conventional sense as are the fake words of glossolalia, signify nothing but signification itself, and reveal signification in terms of its essential nature as negation. The collapse reveals that there are really two fields, one a field of anxiety, another below that is a field of separation. Knowledge involves a “stereognosis” of the two fields, and the map of this takes passage to be, like the definition of the mathematical function, an account of how one gets from one field to the one “below” (or “within”).

The phenomenon of glossolalia is partly explained by the occasions, in dreams, of hearing foreign languages. The dreamer understands the foreign speaker no better than in real life, but the process of meaning is triangulated. So, when the dreamer is surprised that she is able to respond, it is often the case that she is corrected by the foreign speaker, suggesting that language itself is built on the (unknown) desire of the Other, which appears as meaningful even though there is no content. A similar powerful sensation of validity characterizes experiences of déjà-vu, which are charged with authenticity by an Other manifest in the form of a prophetic “voice from the past” — warning, admonishing, etc. but without saying what it is that we must do (che voie?).

William Samarin, Tongues of Men and Angels.
Žižek emphasizes Lacan's explanation of the negative vel: one choice ("I'll keep my money, thank you!") necessitates the loss of the other two categories, life with and without money. The subject "appears" in the gap in the sense that accepting the forced choice recognizes both the restrictions of the subject and the Other ($ and A). Thus the end of psychoanalysis (the acceptance of this forced choice condition, coincides with Hegel's "absolute knowledge."

The extension of the dream allows the father to both confront and avoid the trauma of reality, his son's death. It's "non-meaning" is the avoidance of the forced choice in minimalistic temporal terms. We must allow the conditional conclusion that this is, in essence, the Ø/ß phenomenon that appears in the Mirror Stage as the suture between the imaginary and symbolic aspects of the appearance of the masterful ideal ego. The screen-mirror has allowed the subject to retreat into the shadow of the POV position. As such, it can become a "wandering shade" able to penetrate the virtuality of the scene, which it constructs using the glue of the thin space between frames, the glue that gives them coherence, which is in the dream that which extends sleep and attempts to "round unreason."

Borrowing from the analysis of Florensky's "chiastic" account of dream temporality, the event of the candle falling on to the funeral shroud is, literally, the device of θ, the tuchê of the dream, that has "fallen" on to the (traumatic) reality of waking, namely the death of the son by fever. What preserved the dream, in a last desperate attempt, was the construction of something the father wished to preserve, i.e. the life of his son-as-spectre. What is a spectre, after all, other than an anamorph, a bit of virtuality that has returned, always "out of place," who wishes to tell us something, but that "something" is always unintelligible — in this case made intelligible accidentally by the coincidence of the fire in the next room. The father's forced choice is to recognize the simultaneity of the waking trauma and the appearance of his son-as-spectre in this dream. 

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Map 3.30

We are able to see, in the depths of the term Wunsch, "wish" (desire, a transformation of the ideas of demand and need), not only the (Freudian) basis of all dreams but also, for Lacan, the structure of the Other as a key triangulating component. The Other interpolates and interpellates: (1) it is a construct of the subject (although one with plenty of "natural resources" to fill in the specifications of fantasy) and (2) effective in an "estimate" way, as an interior Other, a "voice of conscience." It is also a geometric procedure made evident from the Mirror Stage, where two virtualities, not one, intersect. In Freud's retold dream, "Father, can't you see I'm burning?," the trauma of the son's death by fever and the event of the shroud catching fire overlap, and often this dream is taken as proof of the "telepathic" ability of dreams to wake the sleeping to attend to important events. But, the overlap reveals a more important fact: that the father and his double, the aged friend, have for a moment overlapped. The past trauma of fever, at the same time, overlaps the emergency of the shroud in flames. The overlap is a margin that is "empty" in the way that Lacan demonstrates in the vel between the subject and the Other, a space that is "neither one, nor the other," a zone of non-meaning (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 211).
3.30 / Can’t You See I’m Burning?

In Freud’s account of the father’s dream of the son who asks why the father does not know he is burning, the symmetries are somewhat evident. The son has died of a fever and later a fire threatens to consume his corpse — a variation on the theme of the interval “between the two deaths,” common to all cultures. Within this symmetry, the father is returned to a traumatic point, that he feels guilty about letting his son die of fever and fears that he had not taken some warning from his son seriously enough. But, the son’s statement is literally true: the father can only smell the smoke, the fire is burning visibly in the next room. Freud notes the over-determination, but wonders if the dream changes its role of preserving sleep to serve as an alarm to wake the father up. But, the dream takes priority in allowing the father to see the son one more time. Its question, “Father, can’t you see I’m burning?” extends sleep — and the son’s life in the dream — a brief moment more. The smoke the sleeping father smells may wake him, but the dream encodes the smoke in the cipher of the trauma of death by fever, the resistant kernel that, amidst the certainties that strive to extend dreaming, will quickly fail — a short-circuit. Žižek must use this example to skip quickly to the issue of whether life or sleeping is more Real (“our ordinary reality enables us to evade an encounter with true trauma”). The question however is, what is the real trauma? Naturally, the guilt of the son’s death seems the best answer, but the doubling of the father, allowing “an elderly friend” to take his place while the Real father sleeps, is a Sosia condition. The father must rest from watching the corpse and an old friend takes his place. The friend and the father function as twins, a contemporary version of the twins who, in ancient times, rotated between the realms of the dead and the living.

Lacan refreshes Freud’s account with a remarkably Vichian insight. The unconscious is not the true (verum) but the certain (certum). When Lacan notes that the limit of Aristotelian tuchē is the monster, we can see the twin structure as the teratology that constitutes the ultimate “repetition machine” needed to keep the sleeper dreaming. And, because identity dysfunction is, for Freud, one of the key components of the uncanny, we might look to the other component, optics, as well. This is not just the Lacanian gaze, present here in the “impossible” presence of the dead son who implores the father to wake but extends the dream a few seconds longer because he returns from the dead to fascinate and horrify the father. This is also the evil eye, delivering its customary message of guilt. This message, “Wake up!” reminds the father of his failing double, the old friend who has fallen asleep, but it does so by invoking the equally twinned events: the burning of fever that killed the son and the burning of the funeral shroud. Over-determination reigns. As Lacan says, “The sentence itself is a firebrand — of itself it brings fire where it falls — and one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind us to the fact that the fire bears on the Unterleg, on the Untertragen (≈souffrance, “pending”), on the real.” The real suspends the true, the trauma, by means of the certain — one moment more. In the waking reality when we attempt to verify the certain dream, much of which we have forgotten, the dream “defends itself.” Freud notes that his patients will, if asked to repeat a dream, will change the wording of certain passages, showing that the dream itself wishes to delay meaning, wishes to hide from the father.

Map 3.31

Eric Santner’s concept of the “site of exception” has particular benefits to the field of enunciation set up through the “efficient cause” of evocation. As a framed domain of affordance, the enunciative field is charged by two simultaneous economies. Centrifugally, discourse expands through strategies to sustain discourse, travel, thought, etc. Centripetally, strategies of closure and completion aim to collapse the dimensionality of the field. Key to this collapse is the construction of “apertures” that open on to treasuries of signifiers — organs without bodies, causes converted into effects — that function as master signifiers capable of (re-)organizing the field through such rhetorical devices as aposiopesis, anacoluthon, and metaephesis. The field of enunciation can help articulate a difficult feature of dreams, namely recollection. In his account of the famous dream, “Father, can’t you see I’m burning?,” Freud points to the thin margin that, even in the face of the emergency in the next room, strives to keep the father asleep — and the son alive — just one moment longer. In subsequent pages, Freud tackles the difficult issue of dream censorship. Consciousness edits dreams to make their raw cipher content intelligible through narrative and predication; where this gives way is evident in the discrepancies that make dreamer’s accounts suitable for consumption by an “Other.” Does this editor’s review not also take pace in this thin margin?

In the reversed time of Ao, fate draws the subject toward an end that is identical to the structure of over-determination, where multiple causes determine single effects. Žižek cites Jameson in noting that this reversal results in the creation of a master signifier capable of ordering particulars, but it is clear that this occurs retroactively. The back-and-forth temporality of life “qualified by death/fate” reflects the connections of ciphers and mechanism in the automaton — that they are engineered to run in either direction. As Vico claimed, imagination and memory — meaning, thought running forward or backward — are the same thing (NS §699). The unusual connection of these to automaton has to do with the unconscious (the o in the expression Ao) and, hence, the workings of resistance.

The dream’s resistance to being dragged into consciousness is understandable resentment of consciousness’s tendency to edit and moralize. The dream’s allegiance to the Id as prophetic: Wo Es war, soll Ich werden (Where the “it/Id” was, “I/ego” shall be). What may happen to the ego is not clear; since the conversion point of the site of exception involves a collapse of the space-time protections that preserve the ego within its networks of symbolic relations. The ego affiliates itself with the POV as a zone of control and instrumental mastery. When the automaton operates its extimacy options, this zone becomes the contained, not container (travel motif: Cyclop’s cave). The subversion of the subject implicit in the Da “labyrinth” complements the suppression of trauma in Ao, but it is clear that the trauma’s permanence owes much to the viability of the code that is the automaton.
3.31 / Treasury of Signifiers, Site of Exception

The old friend wishes to hide a moment longer from the Father, to extend his brief nap and ignore the fire that has ignited the funeral shroud. The two of them sleeping will not do. The point is that someone must watch the corpse, a tradition so old that we forget that a look is required to allow the soul to pass from this world, with its “enticing views of landscapes, people and food” (Sebald, Rings of Saturn, 296). A gaze, a pass, a half-word, a border-crossing. It is time to look into this over-determination in terms of the mathemes of the uncanny, rewritten in the terms of Lacanian discourse. Trauma suspended within daily life, $/a$, nonetheless draws us from many causes to the one effect/defect.

This effect is $/a$, subjectivity that sublates the so-called “object-cause of desire.” Hence, what delays our confrontation with the Real is fantasy, $◊a$. The poinçon involves scale dysfunction: $<>$, hence, extimacy, inside frame. When reality is awake, the spirit moves on through the dream. The theme of twins inverts the cipher of the other twin to travel between the two deaths: $D$. The subject is literally sub-jected: $a/$. $/a$ appears as agent-over-truth in Lacan’s matheme for hysteria. Analysis, $a/S_{2}$, will tell what hysteria’s re-distribution of partial objects is all about, since it conceals the order of signifiers as the truth of desire. The $a/$ expression appears as other-over-production in the matheme for the university, where students are taught to Enjoy! by an Other who does not know what he wants — the “Che vuoi?” which hides desire in its triangle.

Neither Freud, Lacan, or Žižek have taken up the possibility that the father and the old friend are, like the twins Castor and Pollux, functionally one and the same person. The obversity of $A_{D}$ and $D_{A}$ — in effect, their “crisscross” relationship — casts the relationship between the waking world and dreams not in any simplistic division of the true and the certain, where dreams bring forth the truth we cannot face in waking reality, but the reverse: the dream unconscious, meticulous in its preservation of experience, does not readily give up its secrets. It resists, causing the waking dreamer to cross the River Lethe, like a reborn soul passing from heaven to earth. The dream resists, Freud insists, by changing its tune, adjusting its remembered account. The dream-land lying hidden and unknown, the treasury of signifiers ($S_{2}$), is both prolix and undecipherable — glossolalia. It keeps on talking but refuses to say what it means.

Objecting to Saussure’s idea of connecting mental ideas to physical things, Lacan held that signifiers slide past each other in a closed system; they represent subjects to each other. This meaning-project suspends the “communication” function of content; but, the meaning of the subject is itself triangulated by the Other’s desire. Beyond what we think we are saying in communication, there is the phenomenon of double negation, first of content, then of subjectivity. In the former, we have the emptiness of glossolalia (language as pure performance), in the second, we have the gapped circle of repetition driven by desire. The nothing of pure performance coupled with repetition-negation yields a common mental language (New Science, §162). The negation of the subject ($D_{A}$, $a/$) digs up a “buried treasure” of signifiers ($a/S_{2}$). The auditory mode of analysis suggests that the dream, as a self-administered spell, uses acousmatics to unlock this treasure. Fantasy, an estimate exchange between the anxious fugitive, $A_{D}$, and the wandering ghost, $D_{A}$, operates where the gaze (the limit of mastery) takes over — at a site of exception, which we now know to mark on the treasure map as $◊$.

The gap in the circle of desiring is opened by nothingness and held open by the dimensions that sustain fantasy. These latter props are not the standard Cartesian x, y, z; rather, they match up to the experiential space of the subject, so it is accurate to say that they both conform to and confirm the uncanny operations of tuchē and automaton. In the former, adjacency, opportunity, and contagion establish a system of pockets: around-the-corner spaces involving surprise and miniaturized controlled collapses of distance. In the latter, the death narrative is given a fractal space repeating a common pattern at all scales, breaking the hierarchy separating the great and the small (<>).

Violation of identity rules in adjacency space, A, typically involves confrontation of twins or disguised pairs (the father and the old friend in the dream). Stereognosis of the twins (simultaneous portrayal of Heaven and Hell) is portrayed in Asclepius's caduceus of intertwining snakes topped by the (invisible) helmet of Hermes, conductor of the souls of the dead across the Styx. Blood from the dead Medusa, whose gaze could freeze time, yielded differential results: from the left side of her body, a poison; from the right, life-restoring elixir.

(Above) Combining the recto and verso versions of the caduceus and emblem for festina lente defines the field of the vesica piscis, figured famously by Joyce as the means of "goan in" and "goan out" of the Museyunroom, or "place for thought." Boots and hats (feet and heads) combine the idea of the poetic turn (trope, climen, cursus) with the (invisible) head of Metaphysics/Justizia, which, in direct contact with the divine (clairvoyant) arrives at the future anterior point where over-determination is evident from a posterior POV.

(Left) The calling forth of the dead, the primary effective cause of necromantic discourse, creates a field of signifiers (x...x) across which defects (resistances) reveal concealed truths ("that ought to have remained hidden" in the language of the Freudian uncanny). The field is over-determined through the reversal of the cause-effect relationship. The effect becomes the cause, the master signifier (S1) able to order the field through extimacy conversion (metalepsis).
Acousmatics is well known in popular culture as the nonsense formulas that open the doors, caves, mountains, cellars, etc. that conceal secrets and/or treasures (S₂). “Open sesame,” is possibly the best-known phrase of this genre (motif element D1552.2 in Stith Thompson’s *Index* — “Mountain opens to magic formula”). In the story, Ali Baba, like a good Lacanian, overhears the thieves say the magic phrase, which resembles an invocation of the grain sesame. His brother Cassim cannot remember the phrase and confuses it with the name of other grains. Does it refer to the grain? Earlier theories suggested connections to the Kabbalistic word *šem-šamāįm*, “name of heaven.” The Arabic, *iftah ya simsim* (مسمس اي حتفإ), involving the apparent reduplication of the word for “name,” reminds us of Odysseus’s fake name which, given to the ignorant Cyclops, insured his escape from the cave. Like the case of Babel, whose homonym, *balal*, referred to ridiculous speech intended to confuse and confound but whose original meaning in Akkadian was *Bāb-ilim*, “the gate of God,” open sesame combines the ridiculous with infinite. Is this not the same as the “gate” of the dream, celebrated traditionally as double, worked in ivory for false dreams and horn for true? Isn’t the resistance offered by the dream, cited by Freud in cases where dreamers change their stories, the classic means by which the actual refers to the virtual? Or, how one twin responds when the other challenges his identity?

There is a gate, a hinge. There is a word, nonsense. There is a treasure buried inside or below, but we have a key that is itself only a half of a key, a half that needs to be repeated in an act of self-cancellation: *simsim*; name no-name. Sebald remarks that, on the superstitious island of Corsica, the dead are reported to wander about in groups, crowding out the roads, making demands. You can tell the dead from the living, he adds, by the way that the margin of their profile seems to be blurred or torn. Another “self-referential” phrase, *zimzum*, is used by The Zohar to designate the contraction God must make in order to make room for creation (see Harold Bloom, *Kabbalah and Criticism*, 82–83). It is the margin of creaturely, but just a margin, a fuzzy margin. “Just a margin” indicates, as in Florensky’s account of the dream-icon, a “beyond,” a treasury of saints and angels. But, just as Plutarch’s nightingale was an acousmatic “voice and nothing more,” the iconic face is a visual acousmatic: “a face and nothing more,” just as the password, *simsim*, is the contents it promises, the heavenly-infernal hollow mountain. The clay token used by parting friends, the *tessera*, breaks along a crack that is pure (natural) chance, automaton. This guarantees authenticity that, at some future moment (by the time of which an anterior past will have rushed up to meet it), will reunite the two friends. The dream *tessera* will also unite two friends, one of whom has been sleeping, the other who has been minding the coffin but has dozed off. It is up to the dead to return and call the sleeper awake, though the margins of his spectre are rough, frayed, on fire — but, I forgot, Father; the margin is by definition that which you cannot see.

Joyce’s advice on entering and leaving the Willingdone Museyroom (Wellington Museum, now “our mounding’s mass,” adjacent to Ann Livia Plurabelle, ALP/αλπ, the river-hinge, the fuzzy margin): “mind your hats goan in ... mind your boots goan out” — a palindrome entry that reverses the usual advice. Sesame> *jaljala* > "echo" (the sound made by the seeds in the pods of the plant, *Sesamum indicum*.

W. G. Sebald, *Campo Santo*.

James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake*, 8, 10. Joyce’s masterwork, it should be noted, is the ultimate grimoire.
The tracking shot from the bedroom balcony to Alicia’s hand opening to show the key she has taken off Sebastian’s key-ring slows down the margin, showing its transformative powers. The POV on the balcony belongs to a traveling soul embodied by the drifting gaze of the camera, \( D_a \). Alicia and Devlin, the American agents, have their appointment in Sammara, set to the timer of Champagne depletion, and Hitchcock films the over-determination with quick cuts from bottles to trays with glasses to glasses held by hands imploring the waiter to pour out more. Roussel’s procédé specified a similar track from \( D_a \) to \( A_0 \) by drawing the eye through a small oculus — an image on the label of a bottle for example — to dwell within the projected details of the printed scene (the beard on the captain of the ship in the distant lake). As in the case the dream’s resistance to waking disclosure, and like the burning son’s one more moment of life, the scale dysfunction \(<\) of \( D\rightarrow A \) is the reward for \( A\rightarrow A \). Shrink and ye shall know!

**Map 3.33**

The tracking shot from the bedroom balcony to Alicia’s hand opening to show the key she has taken off Sebastian’s key-ring slows down the margin, showing its transformative powers. The POV on the balcony belongs to a traveling soul embodied by the drifting gaze of the camera, \( D_a \). Alicia and Devlin, the American agents, have their appointment in Sammara, set to the timer of Champagne depletion, and Hitchcock films the over-determination with quick cuts from bottles to trays with glasses to glasses held by hands imploring the waiter to pour out more. Roussel’s procédé specified a similar track from \( D_a \) to \( A_0 \) by drawing the eye through a small oculus — an image on the label of a bottle for example — to dwell within the projected details of the printed scene (the beard on the captain of the ship in the distant lake). As in the case the dream’s resistance to waking disclosure, and like the burning son’s one more moment of life, the scale dysfunction \(<\) of \( D\rightarrow A \) is the reward for \( A\rightarrow A \). Shrink and ye shall know!

**Annotating the “magic mountain” motif reveals important role:**

- the function of the bedroom balcony as representing relation of the Nazi conspiracy to the spy operation \( (\beta 1\rightarrow \beta 2) \)
- the role of the delay of Champagne consumption to Sebastian’s discovery of the missing key \( (\alpha) \)
- the wine-cellar as a “treasury of signifiers”
- the role of MacGuffins as “empty signifiers” (glossolalia, \( S_2 \))
- Sebastian discovers the couple outside the cellar, but deduces that his missing key requires him to kill Alicia to save him from being discovered by his Nazi colleagues \( (\alpha\rightarrow S_1) \)
- victim/fictim: Alicia and Devlin work as twins, one inside, the other outside the mansion-as-Hades (cf. “Father, can’t you see I’m burning?”)

**Other Masters’ Houses:**

- The 39 Steps: Master spy’s mansion
- Rebecca: Manderley
- North by Northwest: Townsend Estate
- Psycho: House above the motel
- High and Low (Kurosawa): Gondo’s mansion
- Mon Oncle (Tabi): modernist villa
- Red (Kieslowski): judge’s house
- Citizen Kane (Wells): Xanadu
- Wizard of Oz (Fleming): The Emerald City
- Veronika Voss (Fassbinder): Voss’s mansion

The master’s house provides literal topographies/topologies of mastery, in its complex relationship to the Other and to the gapped circle of desire that borrows the logic of the twins who circulate between the fields of death and life. The theme of the “treasury of signifiers” is key in the emptiness of the set, \( S_2 \), and the role of the password to access this treasury. Patrick Mcgilligan notes that Hitchcock was uncomfortable in such settings, preferring to “peak into the bathroom” (cf. pull back the curtains) to make sure the mansions were real.

The balcony repeats the theme of the literal margin around the projected image — occupied in the movie theater by the audience. Devlin appears at first to be the head of a spectator in a front row. In contrast to Purple Rose of Cairo’s Tom Baxter, Devlin steps in to rather than out of the film image.

![Map 3.33](image-url)
The famous “tracking shot” in Hitchcock’s 1943 film, Notorious, is both a means and an end, both tuchē (an accession of adjacent spaces) and automaton (machine that structures meaning in a cipher-like way). The American agent Devlin attends a party at the Rio di Jañiero mansion of a Nazi spy, Alex Sebastian. His colleague, Alicia Huberman, has married Sebastian in hopes of discovering Nazi operations in Brazil. Alicia has used the party as an opportunity to explore the wine cellar. Earlier, a slip-of-the-tongue reference to Sebastian’s wine collection had cost one of Sebastian’s colleagues his life. The tracking shot (really a “boom” or “crane” shot) begins from the POV of the bedroom balcony above the entry hall. As the camera nears Alicia, her hand opens to reveal that she has managed to slip the wine cellar key off Sebastian’s key-ring. Devlin joins her and asks about the key, but warns her that Sebastian may notice it missing if he needs to send the butler to the cellar if the supply of Champagne runs low. The film, after this realization, shows a sequence of shots of drinking, serving, and ordering Champagne. The traditional beverage of celebration and pleasure has been turned into a time-based poison that leads precisely to Sebastian’s confrontation with the American agents. To explain their presence in the cellar, Alicia fakes a kiss and confesses to being in love with Devlin — lies intended as a diversion but which in fact are true expressions. Sebastian guesses correctly that his wife and Devlin have discovered that the wine bottles contain unprocessed uranium dust to export to Germany.

When Hitchcock was filming Notorious in late 1945 and 1946, the Manhattan project had concluded. The first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. But, in the middle of 1945, Hitchcock and his writer, Ben Hecht, had discussed the use of uranium with Robert Millikan at Cal Tech. Although Millikan had famously doubted that the atom could ever be put to use, for peace or war, uranium still seemed to be the ideal, if doubtful “MacGuffin.” Nonetheless, Hitchcock claimed that FBI agents began following him after his discussions with Millikan. In a sense, Hitchcock “discovered” the A-bomb.

The tracking shot allows us to forget about the subject left in the dark space before the screen: the Master, for whom recognition is everything, Sebastian. The POV transcends its limitations to go beyond the screen. Like Raymond Roussel’s magical procédé, where vision telescopes through impossibly small images into impossibly distant, detailed spaces, the prematurely dead POV subject telescopes to the opening hand. (We have forgotten to ask whose line of sight the theater audience follows in its trip down to the ground-floor.) Sebastian’s precognition of the opening of his “treasury of signifiers,” his hollow magic mountain, is to be opened by a name, Alicia, who has taken his name falsely. The use of Roussel’s procédé has not been recognized, nor the connection between the procédé and the “echo” function of all half-words that serve as passwords (to hollow spaces containing buried treasures). The main technique involved the semantic extimacy of a sentence, interpreted one way to open a story, and in an obverse way to conclude. Alicia begins Notorious by leaving a courtroom where her father, H(über)man, is to be opened by a name, Alicia, who has taken his name falsely. The use of Roussel’s procédé has not been recognized, nor the connection between the procédé and the “echo” function of all half-words that serve as passwords (to hollow spaces containing buried treasures). The main technique involved the semantic extimacy of a sentence, interpreted one way to open a story, and in an obverse way to conclude. Alicia begins Notorious by leaving a courtroom where her father, H(über)man, is being convicted of espionage. She ends by being carried out of the mansion after her exploits in the cellar have been discovered. What led her to the cellar, Aδ-fasion, was a series of over-determinations that drew the Devlin out of the dark margins at the beginning of the film (Dλ), in order to discover the last word.

François Truffaut, Hitchcock.
Raymond Roussel, How I Wrote Certain of My Books; Mark Ford, Raymond Roussel and the Republic of Dreams.
Appendix 1

Categories of Travel

Henry Johnstone’s idea of travel covers more than the literal experiences of travel. Although it sees travel in its “natural history” as the basis for all critical speculation, the travel category reflects the “uncanny” (unheimlich) structure of desire in general. The uncanny is, after all, the “unhomely” — the away-from-home, which can, uncannily, be experience at home without traveling or, in complement, when the alien world of travel feels a bit like home. Travel repeats the main themes of the Freudian uncanny: the double (the internal frame made by the gap) and optical themes (the traveler’s cultivation of “anamorphic” powers of perception, to see, hear, and touch things as only a traveler can). The Jentschian uncanny’s crisscross of the existential conditions of life and death, A₀ and D₀, carry this anamorphosis over into a more elaborate and complex schema of negations. Not only does travel as a whole play out destinies of the Lacanian condition of “between the two deaths,” as katabasis it sets up the dynamic by which civic space was “counterbalanced” by souls of ancestors and founders whose journey in the underworld guaranteed benefits to those living in civic harmony above. The story of negation and the civic requires a middle term: the interchange of sexuation and the relation of fathers to wives but especially daughters.

Summary of the Categories of Travel

Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.’s essay “Odysseus as Traveler: A Categorial Study” describes nine fundamental categories that determine the authenticity or failure of travel. Johnstone’s text is reprinted with permission of the Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University. This summary of categories is presented graphically in Map 2.12 and discussed in commentary 2.12, “Contingent Motion.”

Control and Accumulation work as a complementary pair; Control adjusts the relationship of the viewer to the viewed (an “artifact” of the travel experience) while accumulation is the totality of representational experiences that constitute travel by making it available to memory (Reflection), subject to exposure (Suffering) and failure (Saturation). Control is powered by interpellation (obedience to invisible and unspoken mandates); and interpolation (the drive to complete an “ordered set” of occasions/topoi). The Control/Accumulation dyad is supported and defined by three sub-categories of travel, Suffering, Saturation, and Curiosity. They generate additional “point of view” issues that include Reflection, Solitude, the Personal, and Naiveté.

Saturation: The collapse of the artifact (strategies of adjustment) on to the vector of representation, destroying the distance necessary for representation (detachment of the point of view). Saturation resembles closely the gap, which is not a category of travel but a condition that affects all categories and is the requirement that space be kept open between the intentions (control) of the traveler and the self- and public representations of the travel experience, which become a part of the travel experience at the time they are conceived/constructed.

Suffering: The anxiety of the “interpolation” process, that the travel experience both has an ideal of completion that can be un-met and a possibly strategy that can done in error.
Curiosity: Maintenance of proper alignment of the observer and observed, and their necessary detachment, affords a productive interest, "curiosity," that is the drive behind the project of accumulating travel experiences as representations within a matrix that has a finite goal of completeness. Yet, curiosity has an "anamorphic" feature that resists settling the point of view in a too-fixed position; in this sense it is supported by Naïveté and opposed by the Personal. Curiosity produces a square wave-form that oscillates between Accumulation and Saturation.

Point of View Categories (Reflection, Solitude, the Personal, Naïveté)

Point of View Issues: the matrix of travel experiences is a goal to see everything that opportunity has afforded, without missing any significant element. After this matrix has been completed (cf. the travel photo album) has been completed, however, there is a residual that corresponds to the gap of the travel hieroglyph — a ‘voice’ of the trip itself, which is an element that, though itself un-representable, gives unity and meaning to the matrix of separate experiences.

This set of categories repeats the divided structure of (1) travel representation and (2) the traveler’s side of the travel equation. Reflection and Solitude consider the paradox that the traveler is both alone and with an imaginary (at least) audience. Reflection is the requirement that the traveler be able to give an account (this relates to the ‘voice’ of the travel experience); Solitude includes all aspects of ‘positioning’ the traveler within the travel domain. The Personal and Naïveté work as a pair: the Personal, the need for a guide, also affects positioning, and runs the risk of over-constraining the project of Accumulation. Naïveté is a restraint on positioning strategies, a built-in opportunity for noise, ignorance, and luck. Naïveté and the Personal are opposed in the function of Curiosity. Reflection, which requires an audience, even if an imaginary one, and Solitude, which emphasizes singularity, are opposed in the function of Suffering.

The Transcendent Category (Home)

The case of Home and Away-From-Home are the essence of the obverse. It is a truism that, for travel to function, even at a minimal level, the traveler must to some degree be at home when traveling. Finding this homeliness is, in a nearly literal way, the “uncanny” dimension of travel. It conditions the way in which travel is used as discovery. Conversely, at home, the non-traveler can be unsettled, restless, alienated. This is the (Lacanian) condition of the network of symbolic relationships, and the essence of the castration that constitutes the Freudian “impasse” that terminates analysis, re-interpreted by Lacan as a passe, not in opposition but in obversion to the Freudian paradox of castration. For, just as castration for Lacan was symbolic, primarily the castration of the subject by the signifiers that mis-recognize her, the passe runs parallel to the discovery in travel of the home away from home as a “site of exception,” with its relations to discovery, the voice, prophecy, and memory. In the key evidence of such master travelers as W. G. Sebald, travel is a work of “site construction” situated between the natural history of the “objective subject” and the uncanniness of the “subjective object.”
Some lists or categories refer to existence, some to experience, and some to both. Which kind of a list a philosophy will give depends upon its ultimate presuppositions. One will not list categories of existence unless one supposes that existence is available to be inventoried. Aristotle thought so; he listed categories of existence. Kant, on the other hand, restricted himself to categories of experience, since he supposed that only experience was available. For a thinker like Peirce, for whom existence and experience are equally available, the categories are both categories of existence and categories of experience. So, speaking very generally, realism, idealism, and pragmatism each has its peculiar way of handling categories.

I have suggested that a realist’s list of categories of existence is an inventory. One fundamental difference between such a list and an idealist’s list of categories of experience is that the latter is not an inventory at all. The very project of making an inventory is alien to the ultimate presuppositions of such a philosophy. For experience, unlike existence, does not, according to the idealist, lend itself to inventories. To be sure, there are various sorts of experience — scientific, moral, sexual, aesthetic — but these sorts are not categories in the way in which the sorts of existence — quality, quantity, relation, disposition — are categories. What is categorical in experience, if not its sorts, is the ground of its possibility. Categories are thus homonymous — the word “category” applies to two distinct concepts. And it is easy to see why it has come about that one name should be used for two concepts. If you believe, as Aristotle did, that existence is directly available to the mind, then the first project you must undertake is that of inventorying what is available. If, on the other hand, you believe that existence is not directly available, then your first project is to explain how anything at all over and above Humean ideas and impressions can be directly available. What is it that could forestall the plunge into absolute skepticism? We attempt to stipulate the conditions under which experience is possible. The common idea underlying the two concepts both called “categories” is thus that of the first project we must undertake. Clearly it was the first for both Aristotle and Kant.

A thinker committed to categories of experience in general may also undertake to list categories of various kinds of experience. Just as the categories of experience are conditions under which experience as a whole is possible, so the categories of a particular kind of experience are conditions under which that particular kind of experience is possible. Kant, in stipulating the conditions under which moral experience and aesthetic experience are possible, was in effect listing the categories of moral experience and of aesthetic experience. But the observation I have just made collides with an overwhelming terminological tradition according to which it would be improper to speak of Kant’s categories of moral or aesthetic experience. But travel is an experience that Kant did not write about, at least philosophically; thus we can speak of categories of travel without terminological interference of this sort.

The categories of travel will be conditions of possibility of the experience of travel. But they are not simply conditions; they are grounds. For travel is subject to conditions irrelevant to a categorical analysis. The experience of travel, for example, presupposes consciousness. One does not travel in one’s sleep, except insofar as dreams are a mode of consciousness. But consciousness is not a category of travel, or indeed of anything else. If we thought that consciousness were a category of experience, we would be supposing that consciousness was a ground of the possibility of experience. It is, of course, a necessary condition. But a ground is a peculiar sort of necessary condition. It is a condition constitutive of that of which it is a condition. Thus I would say that Kantian Substance or Causality, for example, is a ground and hence a category of experience because it not only makes experience possible; it enters into its constitution. But consciousness as such, as a wholly diaphanous condition of experience, wholly lacking a nature of its own, could not be constitutive of experience.

A wholly nonspecific condition of travel could not enter into the constitution of travel, but a minimally specific condition could. I am thinking, for example, of motion, which is of course necessary to travel. Motion is constitutive of travel in the following way. It is not only motion under certain conditions that constitutes travel proper, but any spatial translation of a human being would qualify as travel if we permit travel to be improper or degenerate. Thus I would say that the experiences of
the Man Without a Country, who was simply carried about on a ship, exercising no control over his destination, are travel experiences only in a degenerate way. Travel is neither wholly constrained nor wholly aimless motion.

I shall want to use the term "Categories of Travel" to refer only to conditions that must be present for travel proper to occur, even though in their absence a degenerate form of travel can occur. Thus, movement is not a category of travel, even though it is a necessary condition for it and enters into its constitution. For when it is present, travel proper need not occur, but when it is absent no form of travel, even a degenerate one can occur. In general, I would say that if X is a type of experience, then a category of X is (1) a necessary condition for X; (2) constitutive of X; and (3) such that a degenerate form of X can occur even in the absence of the category.

My aims are modest. I have no table of categories to offer. Nor shall I attempt to deduce my categories. My method is empirical; it is based upon my own experience. On this basis, I will present a list of categories of travel that seem to satisfy the stipulations above. I do not know how to show that this list is complete. Perhaps it is not, and my audience will wish to add to it. I do not know that the list of categories I want now to present is not quite the same as the one that appeared in an earlier work of mine on this topic.

That earlier work was based on my own travels. This one arises from a reading of Homer’s Odyssey. Now I do not want to suggest that I think different travels would be governed by different sets of categories. The categories of travel, if there are ny at all, must be universal; they must apply to all travels. The fact that I have elicited from Homer categories somewhat different from those that came to my attention when I reread my own travel journals simply means that my work is unfinished. A synthesis is needed — a synthesis not just of two travels, but of all travels. To accomplish such a synthesis would perhaps be to produce the transcendental deduction that I cannot offer yet.

In order to develop the list of categories of travel that seem most obvious to one reading the Odyssey, I want to make the point that during his long trip from Troy to Ithaca Odysseus is not always a traveler. Indeed, this point is settled within the first two lines of the poem where Odysseus is characterized as a man who has wandered much; the Greek word here, which is cousin to the root of “planet,” the name given to the wandering stars, can only be translated as “wandered.” Wandering is not traveling; it is only a degenerate form of traveling. It is the movement of one who has surrendered control of his movement, either voluntarily, as in the case of the aimless nomad, or involuntarily, as that of one being driven or carted around. Odysseus is not aimless, but during much of his trip he is not in control. The four central books in which his trip is mainly described are traditionally known as "The Great Wanderings."

It is easy to illustrate the wanderings of Odysseus. A man clinging to a ship’s timber and carried by the waves for nine days before being cast up on an island is scarcely traveling. But there is another way, too, in which the role of a traveler sometimes does not fit Odysseus, even though he is not wandering either. Sometimes he is too much in control. Consider his first two ports of call once he has left Troy. The first is Ismarus, on the Thracian mainland. Odysseus arrives here at the mercy of the wind; but once he has landed he sacks the city, killing the men and taking the women as slaves and much property as booty. He is as much a traveler as the tourist sacking the holy citadel of Paris, brutish in intentions and behavior, carrying off as booty salt and pepper shakers shaped like the Eiffel Tower. Odysseus next puts in at the Land of the Lotus-Eaters. Landing, he sends three men to reconnoiter. These men succumb to the amnesiac temptations of the lotus-flower. When they fail to return, Odysseus himself goes to fetch them. Dragging them back to the ships against their will he ties them under the rowing benches and makes a hasty departure from the country. It is remarkable that, although in the whole of the Odyssey, with more than 12,000 lines, there are only twenty-two lines about the Lotus-Eaters, the story is perfectly familiar to most people who know anything at all about the epic. Posterity has not had to be warned twice about the dangers of visiting a foreign country. Amnesia is not the only fate the tourist may be frantic to avoid. He knows all too well about dysentery as well, and the Wimpy’s or MacDonald’s in Mexico City may simply be his self-ordained place under the rower’s bench. In fact he may recoil from any contact at all with the country or its people, and beat as hasty a retreat as possible.

I do not mean to suggest that Odysseus was being unnecessarily skittish. In his case, the danger was real, as of course is also the danger of dysentery among the lettuce-eaters in many countries.
My point is only that Odysseus and the tourist share a syndrome that renders travel impossible, although even those exhibiting the syndrome can perform a degenerate kind of travel.

We see that travel proper is impossible when the moving person exercises either too much control or too little over his movement. He must, then exercise some control, but also be submissive to some extent to the exigencies of his situation. I have just enumerated two of the categories of travel. For convenience I will call them Control and Suffering.

The third episode of the Odyssey illustrates the interplay of Control and Suffering, and makes manifest other categories as well. Odysseus and his men are on an idyllic uninhabited island from which they can see, across the water, the land of the Cyclopes. But they are under no compulsion to go there. Odysseus chooses to go. He wants to go and find out about these men, who they are, whether they are friends of strangers, and their mind is god-fearing. So Odysseus is acting out of curiosity. Curiosity is a third category of travel. Curiosity has received a bad name at the hands of Heidegger, but what Heidegger had in mind was clearly idle curiosity. The best illustration of idle curiosity and its dangers given us in the Odyssey is the temptation to listen to the Sirens. The Sirens are publishers of the Mycenaean Edition of the International Herald Tribune; they know "everything that the Argives and Trojans suffered in Troy"; indeed they know "everything that happens all over the fruitful earth" (12.189-91). Surely they would also supply the latest stock-market quotations if asked. I admit that the modern reader of the Paris edition does not suffer the instant calamity inflicted by the sirens, but he is certainly, for the moment, deflected from his travels.

There is also such a thing as healthy curiosity. One can put the distinction in Heideggerian terms, thus avoiding the charge that in making it one has merely begged the question. Idle curiosity is the voyeurism of the They — the wish to see without being implicated. But healthy curiosity is an aspect of a person's quest for authenticity. It is a seeing that implicates him. It leads him to an enhanced appreciation of possibility. To understand what is possible for others is to deepen one's understanding of what is possible for oneself.

The curiosity of the traveler opens him to the possibilities both of an alien culture and of an alien nature. He learns what man is capable of, and thus what he is capable of. He also learns the range of forms in which the earth can appear to us. There are intimations in the Odyssey of natural wonders almost beyond imagination. In the land of the Laistrogones, for example, "the courses of night and day are close together" (10.86), and in the harbor there is a "white calm" (10.94). Scholars wonder whether Homer was not here describing the Scandinavian fjords, with their remarkably long summer days and their winter ice. A Mediterranean sailor might not have suspected the possibility of either of these conditions.

In the land of the Cyclopes, however, it is primarily a cultural question that absorbs Odysseus' attention. He is interested in the attitudes of the Cyclopes not only toward custom and religion but also in particular toward strangers. Urged by his men to filch a few cheeses and depart quickly from the cave of Polyphemus, Odysseus refuses to go; he wants to see the Cyclops and find out whether the Cyclops would give him the gifts traditionally bestowed upon a stranger. This desire has often been ascribed to acquisitiveness on Odysseus' part. And there is no doubt that Odysseus does want to take salt and pepper shakers back to Ithaca. But in this particular case I wonder whether we might not also attribute the desire to Odysseus' curiosity. He wants to test the Cyclops — to see what might happen. The use of the optative mood in the verb translated "he would give" reinforces the impression that we are witnessing an experiment. This mood of the verb expresses not facts but possibilities.

I do not mean, however, to equate curiosity with experimental psychology. Odysseus is not proposing to manipulate Polyphemus and simply observe his reactions. He is prepared not merely to observe but to enter into active participation in a relationship, in the role, for example, of the receiver of a gift. In undertaken such a role, one must be willing to take what comes. It is only through the active reception of whatever the moment may bring that the traveler, in his curiosity, opens himself to new possibilities.

Of course, what Odysseus let himself in for on this particular occasion was, as he tells us, a sight that "was not to be lovely" (9.230). When Polyphemus returns to the cave he begins devours the men. His guest-gift to Odysseus consists of the promise to eat him last. But clearly it is here the intentions of Odysseus that qualify him as a traveler. Such intentions are never guaranteed to succeed. Travel itself is not guaranteed to succeed.

Odysseus does, of course, extricate himself and his un-eaten men from this situation precisely by
manipulating Polyphemus, by playing a bad philosophical joke on him. In his colossal stupidity, Polyphemus cannot distinguish “nobody” as a name from “nobody” as a pronoun, and thus has nobody to blame after Odysseus has blinded him in his sleep and the other Cyclopes are demanding to know who has injured him. This manipulation illustrates the category of Control. But it is by no means absolute control; for Odysseus has a very narrow and harrowing escape.

The Polyphemus episode illustrates several other categories of travel too. One of these is Accumulation. To explain this category in a somewhat paradoxical way, let me say that one cannot be traveling until one has traveled. Travel must be funded with memories of travel. You are not traveling when you are just starting out. Your trip must have a certain duration, a duration encompassed by memory.

The category of Accumulation is illustrated by Odysseus’ account of the black wine in 9.196-211. This is a heady liquor that seems, as Homer describes it, actually to be a product of distillation — perhaps some sort of blackberry brandy. Odysseus, preparing to visit the cave of Polyphemus, has the hunch that the wine will come in handy, and so takes a goatskin bottle of it with him. But he interrupts his narrative to tell us where the wine came from. During his sacking of Ismarus, he had offered protection to a priest of Apollo, who had in gratitude given him the wine. Here Odysseus is weaving a travel memory into the fabric of his travel. Nor is this by any means an isolated reflection. Throughout the Odyssey, Odysseus and his companions (as long as he has any) are constantly thinking of their past adventures. The verb μιµνήσκω that is used in the poem for “to remember” semantically approaches “to be mindful of”; the travel memories of a traveler enter into all his thoughts and perceptions.

Accumulation helps to explain a further category of travel, namely, Home. For the traveler must be at home in his travels; and one is at home only where a memorial deposit has accumulated. Of course Odysseus’ ultimate home is Ithaca, which he lovingly recalls in addressing King Alcinous at the beginning of his account of his Great Wanderings. But he is also at home away from home; his nostalgia is seldom so great that it prevents him from taking a stance in the place where he is. I do not mean to suggest that Odysseus’ home is his swift black ship. It would be more accurate to identify it with the world. The world supports him as a person’s home supports him. On one occasion at least, the world does not support Odysseus; I shall discuss this occasion when I come to the category of Saturation. Nor do I wish to suggest that Home and Accumulation are identical. One could have Accumulation without achieving Home, as when one’s memories are not supportive. When Odysseus’ men reach Circe’s island, they weep because they remember the Cyclopes and the Laistrogones, the cannibalism of both of which has taken its toll of them (10.198-203). Such memories are certainly not supportive. A prison is perhaps the starkest example of a locus of Accumulation which is not home.

The nostalgia of the homeless person is an example of the telos that can interfere with and even destroy travel. Odysseus’ trip is occasionally saturated by telos; leaving the island of Aeolus, Odysseus himself holds the sheet for nine days in order to assure a speedy return to Ithaca. He has now entirely put aside the role of a traveler. It is not, of course, only the urge to get home that can serve as a destructive telos. Business in a foreign land can easily transform travel into an errand. The man on an errand is as blind to the possibilities of travel as is the one who has given himself over to nostalgia.

The world is seldom wholly supportive. Perhaps the closest Odysseus comes to finding such support is the gift he receives from King Aeolus. Aeolus has confined all the winds except that from the West in a bag carried aboard the ship, and Odysseus is being driven by the West Wind straight to Ithaca. Here is a combination of telos with nearly complete control. But the control is not absolutely complete; Suffering comes into play as, when in sight of the shores of his beloved fatherland, Odysseus falls asleep. His companions thereupon open the bag of winds, and Odysseus’ situation is completely reversed. He is now totally out of control, being driven back to the Aeolian Island. His sudden helplessness completely demoralizes him. He is no longer at home. Odysseus considers whether to throw himself over the side of the ship or to “endure it in silence and still be among the living” (10.52). He covers his face and hides in the hold of the ship. He is undergoing what I call “Saturation.” His situation is too much for him.

Saturation can arise from a catastrophe so violent that it rips away the traveler’s sense of being at home in his travels. But it can also arise in nonviolent ways. Accumulation, I pointed out, requires that a trip be of a certain minimum duration. Saturation, on the other hand, arises from the exceed-
ing of a certain maximum duration. For there may well come a time when any trip ceases to be a travel, simply because it has been too long. One’s eyes are glazed by sight-seeing; one’s bones are weary from constant motion. The feeling of being at home has vanished. Of course one can recover, as Odysseus does when his ships have made their inglorious return to the kingdom of Aeolus. But recovery is not guaranteed.

I regard Saturation as a category of travel because it is a constant possibility for the traveler; his trip is precarious, and could at any moment be threatened or shattered by accident or surfeit. Perhaps it was because Odysseus saw the essential precariousness of his role as a traveler that he refused Calypso’s offer of immortality (5.209). Saturation is always something of a little death.

I want to compare Saturation and Suffering in order to show that both categories are needed. Suffering is relative to lack of control. The sufferer is still traveling, still attempting to increase his control. The challenge is exhilarating. Suffering is necessary because absolute control would transform a travel into an errand. Saturation, on the other hand, is absolute lack of control. The saturated one has lost his travel and his home; he is mere flotsam on the world. Saturation is necessary as a constant possibility of the breakdown of travel.

Odysseus’ suffering is illustrated by his nine days of clinging to the ship’s plank; his saturation by his prostration in the hold of his ship. Surely he is in less physical danger in the latter episode than in the former. The difference is one of location in the world.

Saturation and Accumulation bear an inverse relation to one another. Accumulation is the acquisition of a home, and Saturation is the loss of it. Furthermore, when Saturation comes about not as the result of a catastrophe, it is likely to result from an overextension of the cumulative process. Too much memory — too much dust on the feet or pain from difficult rowing — gluts the perceptual field and causes the eye to glaze over. But of course no one can say in advance how much “too much” will be; the answer to that question depends upon the physical constitution of the traveler. It may seem strange that in a list of categories, the others of which seem to be called for by logical or dialectical considerations, we have one called for by physiology. But to say this is to misrepresent the position of Saturation in categorical space. It is called for in the analysis as a limit below which alone travel is possible. In this respect, Saturation resembles another category much emphasized in recent times, namely, death. As a horizon, death defines an authentic life. For a life can be authentic only when its precariousness is borne in mind. Just as movement without consciousness or precariousness would not be travel, so a life lived without consciousness of the possibility of death would at best be a life at the level of idle curiosity. At the same time, death, like Saturation, is physiological. The main difference between the two is that Saturation is sometimes reversible.

I want to turn to some other categories of travel: Reflection, Solitude, and the Personal. Reflection is a generic term of the account one must be able to give of one’s trip if it is to count as travel. In our day, such an account may take the form of a travel journal or of letters home, of a sketchbook or a set of photographs or slides. None of these products are within the power of Odysseus to produce, he being an illiterate without means of making or taking pictures. His reflection takes the form of his own oral account, especially that in Books 9 through 12. It is important to understand that every leg of Odysseus’ travels from Troy to Phaiacia — i.e., all of the Great Wanderings — is described by Odysseus himself, if not in Books 9 through 12 then elsewhere in the Odyssey. And within his narrative there are episodes in which he is telling parts of his tale. It is obvious that Odysseus himself attaches great importance to reflection in this form. At the banquet of Alcinous, for example, he refuses to repeat the story of Calypso since he feels he has told it perfectly the first time when alone with Alcinous and his wife (12.453-54). It is as if he thinks the event itself could be devalued by a careless narration of it.

Why indeed is reflection essential to the traveler? It sustains his self-consciousness, distinguishing him from the dazed wanderer who could give no account of where he had been. Reflection is necessary if the traveler is to be at home, for he cannot be at home if he does not know where he is. One of the greatest shocks Odysseus and his men face is the realization shortly after they have landed on Circe’s island that they do not know East from West (10.190-92). I do no mean that reflection alone could serve as an instrument of navigation; the reflective traveler can still be lost. Indeed he knows he is lost only if he is reflective. But reflection is just that concern with one’s itinerary in which one cares where one is and what is happening.

Someone may wish at this point to remind me that it may be difficult to distinguish reflections from pseudo-reflections. The latter are illustrated by Odysseus’ lying tales. As Homer says, “He
knew how to say many false things that were similar to true things” (19.203). For example he tells a yarn about an adventure in Egypt that ended in his being sold into slavery (14.199-359). Now it is true that with such stories Odysseus does bamboozle his hearers. But the point of reflection is not to gain anyone’s credence. It is rather to bring into focus for the traveler himself his own travel experiences. If there were in fact no such experiences, then nothing would be brought into focus; the reflection would be vacuous.

Of course travel stories themselves, including the Odyssey, can be regarded as nonveridical reflections, perhaps in the third person rather than the first. What happens, I think, is that reflection itself, in its very role as a category of travel, becomes the object of attention. The travel story serves to remind us of the essential role of travel in human life.

Reflection bears an obvious relationship to Accumulation, but it is not the same. For Reflection and Accumulation are, for one thing, differently related to Home. Home is constituted of memories that accumulate. But we can be at home in these memories without knowing that we have a home. That knowledge stems from an act of thetic consciousness, not just a flow of memories. Travel, as opposed to wandering, is a deliberate undertaking, and we deliberate only insofar as we could later give a reflective account of our decisions.

Solitude is what distinguishes travel from migration. While Odysseus is a traveler, it is clear that, except in rare moments, his men are no more than migrants returning from Troy. It is Odysseus who is making the journey, except when the recalcitrant Eurylochus defies his orders (10.429-38). The companions of Odysseus simply lack the control necessary if their trip is to qualify for travel. That they themselves acknowledge that it is Odysseus alone who is doing the traveling is suggested by their speech prodding him at the end of a year’s sojourn with Circe:

> Now you must be mindful of your native country, if indeed it is fated that you are to be saved and are to return to your well-built home and into your native land (10.472-74).

It is clear that the companions suppose that their own itinerary depends upon that of Odysseus.

Of course, two or more people can travel together, deliberately sharing an itinerary which in different ways satisfies the travel purposes of each. And certainly a group of men on the same ship from Troy to Ithaca might all be traveling. My point is only that each must make the trip for himself, reflecting on it in his own way, acting on the basis of his own curiosity, subject to his own physiology of saturation. In Moby Dick this sort of thing does happen, but on the swift black ship of Odysseus there seems to be only one traveler.

The point I am trying to make when I treat Solitude as a category of travel is almost a tautology. For travel is by its own nature no more shareable than is the ego. Indeed, travel and the ego have much in common. Both vanish in the absence of Reflection; both flourish in circumstances in which neither absolute Control nor absolute Suffering is guaranteed. The Odyssey has sometimes been treated as the story of a man in quest of himself.

I turn to the final category I want to propose, namely, that of the Personal. A traveler needs a guide. If he finds himself in truly strange circumstances, he will not even be able to grasp how strange they are if he is limited to his own interpretive resources. He can at most guess what the strange structures are that he sees, or what the weird rituals are intended to bring about. He needs to have these things explained to him. I think, for example, that if I had visited Pashupatinath Temple in Kathmandu without a guide, I would have missed most of what there was about this shrine that made it truly alien and unique.

Guides provide advice as well as information. They tell us, for example, how to respect the customs of the alien places of worship we enter. Homeric guides, who are usually gods, ordinarily give more advice than information, because it is advice in the face of strange dangers that is primarily needed. Thus in Book 10 of the Odyssey, Odysseus receives advice from two guides. The first is from Hermes, who greets him by saying (10.281-82), “Where are you going, you unhappy wretch, alone through the hilltops, ignorant of the lay of the land?” Hermes proceeds to inform him of the fate of his men at the hands of Circe and advise him on how to deal with her. The second is from the goddess Circe herself, with whom Odysseus has by now come to terms. She breaks the news to him that he must sail to Hades, and in response to his request for a guide, describes in great detail the geography of the place and the character of the inhabitants. She also gives him essential advice on what sacrifices he must make and how to deal with the shades of the dead (10.488-540). It is true
that we think of a guide as accompanying the person he is guiding, as Virgil accompanied Dante through Hell. But there is no reason why the guidance cannot be supplied in advance, provided the one to whom it is supplied can keep it in mind as he proceeds. Indeed, this is precisely the kind of advice we are obtaining when we "read up" on a place in advance of visiting it. The only trouble is that Baedeker, being a book rather than a person, is unacquainted with the peculiar ignorance and blindness on our part that need to be dealt with.

I do not mean to suggest, however, that in the Hades episode all the guidance is given beforehand. The "musty house of Hades" is surely the prototype of the world's great musty museums, like the Natural History Museum in Vienna. It is the Museum of the Dead. As Odysseus passes from exhibit to exhibit, it is the very souls on exhibit who guide him, lecturing him on their origins and destinies as the visitor to a contemporary art museum is lectured on the paintings he sees, through the agency of the audio equipment he has rented and carries with him. In addition, Odysseus has a personal guide during part of his visit to Hades — namely, Tiresias, the blind Theban priest, who explains the behavior of all the other shades (11.146-49).

But there are travel episodes in the Odyssey in which the category of the Personal is at best implicit. No god materializes to guide Odysseus to the cave of Polyphemus. Perhaps we can say that it is Polyphemus himself who, once he appears, is the guide; he personally introduces Odysseus to his own life-style as a dairymen and cannibal. To be mishandled by our guide is not necessarily to be deprived of our travel experience. The con man who fleeces us of our cash in a strange city may still be a bridge to the alien. In any event, it is clear that Odysseus had, at some point, received information about the Cyclopes that he did not learn himself. For he tells us, for example, that each Cyclops "makes the law for his own wives and children, and cares nothing about others" (9.114-15). Yet the only Cyclops he actually visits is a bachelor.

Control, Suffering, Curiosity, Accumulation, Home, Saturation, Reflection, Solitude, the Personal — these are the categories of travel I find most clearly illustrated by the Odyssey. By way of summary, let me review the ways in which these concepts past the tests of categoriality — in particular how in the absence of each one an at most degenerate form of travel is possible.

Let us consider the degenerate travels of the moving person in whose experience the various categories are not operative. The one without Control is a wanderer. If his lack of control is not his fault, then he is simply a prisoner of circumstances, natural or human. But perhaps he simply does not choose to exercise control. Then he is bumming around rather than traveling.

When Suffering is absent, the one making the trip is doing an errand. The only difference between this errand and a trip down the hall to see his boss is that, in order to get to New Delhi or wherever, he has to make arrangements with a travel agent. He might as well never have left home.

The tourist without Curiosity might also never have left home. He is rendered uncomfortable by whatever he sees about him that is strange. His trip is, or is tantamount to, a continuous cruise; by day he is protected by the fellow passengers who surround him; at night, even ashore, he returns to his own bunk in his "floating hotel."

The one without Accumulation has never really been anywhere at all — he not only might as well have stayed home, but did stay home. I once met a lady who had been around the world on the Queen Elizabeth, but could not remember at what ports they had put in. I am sure she did at least enjoy the food on the ship. To be on the move but all the while to have stayed home is degenerate travel in that it is the null travel.

The homeless wanderer might also be found aboard the Queen Elizabeth, and he too might be unable to enumerate the ports. But unlike the one who had never left home, he finds no support anywhere. Like Odysseus in his moment of Saturation, he can only cover his head and weep. He is lost. But being lost is surely a degenerate form of travel.

Yet when Saturation is not a possibility for a person on a trip, that trip too is a degenerate travel. It is the travel of the Flying Dutchman, condemned to perform a movement which, because external, loses the immediacy of the genuine experience of travel.

The unreflective passenger shares much with the one lacking Curiosity or Accumulation. Indeed, Reflection seems closely associated with these other two categories. It is difficult to reflect upon what one does not remember, and there is little temptation to reflect upon what one is not curious about. Yet it does not seem possible to participate in both Curiosity and Accumulation without being especially reflective. Many are the sailors full of bizarre experiences which they are unable to
articulate. I do not think that one would want to say that these men are fully travelers. A traveler should be able to give us some account of his trip.

When someone makes journeys that are not his own, he is a member of a tour or perhaps of a trek, but he is not a traveler. I have already said, however, that physical membership in a group need not destroy one’s Solitude. One can enjoy one’s own Curiosity, Reflection, and Accumulation, exercise one’s own Control, suffer, be at home, face Saturation, in the company of others. But there are clearly dangers in joining a group. Perhaps the greatest is that the standardized narration of the tour guide may replace one’s own Reflection.

But the voyager with no guide at all will probably end up not knowing where he has been. And what he has seen will all seem pretty much the same to him. The differentiation and articulation of travel experience requires the intervention of the Personal. As I have already pointed out, this intervention can occur prior to the experience, in the form of a briefing. When we focus our attention on travels purely through nature, taking in no cultural monuments, we see that it is primarily in the form of such prior briefings that the Personal plays its part. A solitary walker through the woods does not need to be personally introduced to whatever he sees. But if no one had ever taught him to look for the difference between birches and beeches, he might not notice the difference; the trees might seem just to be trees and the rocks rocks. People on errands through the woods, such as hunters, are often surprisingly ignorant of the region they are attempting to penetrate. They would benefit from an appearance by Hermes to accuse them of wandering through the hilltops not knowing the lay of the land.

The list of categories of travel that I have produced is of course to some extent dependent on the particular travel experience from which I gleaned it. Different kinds of travel experience are also possible. One can travel, for example, through relatively unvarying surroundings; e.g., Antarctica, or the Sahara Desert, or outer space. Under such circumstances there may be less for Curiosity to get a purchase on. And the role of Reflection, in the form of a log or of frequent radio reports to Ground Control, will be greatly expanded. Control will have to be more unvarying if the traveler is to avoid getting lost or crashing in flames into the Earth’s atmosphere; Suffering will take the form of a constant battle with cold or heat or weightlessness. It seems quite likely, too, that categories I have not yet thought of would emerge from such experiences.

Again, when travel takes one to regions of objective information — to cathedrals that can be measured, described, and accounted for historically, or, for that matter, to museums such as Hades — there appears a new threat to travel experience, namely, expertise. Expertise is overkill in answering the questions produced by Curiosity. The fact that curiosity can be suffocated by facts points to the need for a categorical term to designate unsuffocated curiosity. Elsewhere I have called this the category of Naïveté, but it does not seem to be much needed in a study of the Odyssey.

And yet, as I insisted earlier, it is not that different travels are governed by different sets of categories. All the categories, whatever they are, are operative in every travel, but some not quite so visibly as the others.

1 This essay was originally published in Categories: A Colloquium, ed. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park PA: Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 1978), pp. 103-120. The volume is a record of papers presented during 1977-78 as a part of a Colloquium on Categories. This essay is reprinted courtesy of the Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University.


3 I have borrowed this image from David Lovekin. See his essay, “Degenerate Travel,” in Essays in Humanity and Technology, pp. 186.

4 Odyssey, 9.174-76, my translation. Henceforth Odyssey references will be given in parentheses.


6 ... καὶ εί μοι ξίνα δοίη (9.229).
Johnstone presents his categories of travel in a narrative sequence. The table given in Map 2.12 and commentary (2.12 Contingent Motion) organize the categories in a minimalistic graphic sense, but clearly more could be said about the internal logic that would more clearly ally the categories with some of Lacan’s ideas about desire and resistance, particularly those relating to negation, travel maintenance, and the evolution of the civic. The civic theme is not evident in the story of a hero away from home. Odysseus is not fighting battles of the state or, indeed, engaged in any international conflict apart from personal fights with locals. In the model of civic twinship (one brother rules above while the other "reigns" in Hades), Odysseus must be the dead twin. His wanderings on earth are a kind of daylight *katabasis*, an encounter with a domesticated form of the fantastic. Like the dream, the characters and sets are from life but the plot is mortuary. How does this version of the Lacanian “between the two deaths” speak to broader issues?

Apart from the general negative condition of simulated death, the deployment of negation may be unclear. It is here more perhaps than any other situation that Lacan’s own experiences as a master negationist offer to shed light. From with the most profound type of Lacanian negation, *extimité*, to the more off-the-rack varieties of (in)transitivity, Borromeo knot topologies, *mi-dire*, and the bars, splits, and crosses that shower across the whole field of psychoanalytic symbols, negation amounts to an inner demon for Lacan, never allowing anything to sit undisturbed for more than a second. In his study of sexuation, for example, there is not only the rule of castration that is maintained by the single exception, the “Primal Father” who does what the sons refuse to allow themselves to do; there is the case of the enigmatic Woman, who defies the rule of castration but in a partial way. The “not-all” type of negation has confounded many commentators, who find it difficult to grasp that “all” women must relate in a “not-all” way to the phallic law.

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<td>∃x · Φx</td>
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Øx is the “rule of castration”; ∃ means “there is at least one”; ∀ means “all”; $ is the barred subject; S(A) is the incomplete or enigmatic/unconscious Other; a is the *objet petit a*, whose effect is that of something desired that is (permanently) absent/missing. The left upper quadrant states the conditions of the phallic law and the exception of the Primal Father. Note: Φx is the law of symbolic castration, the suppression of unlimited sexual freedom. The right upper quadrant is the complex feminine relation to the phallic rule. Lacan and others have clarified this often mis-interpreted paradigm: not-all of woman is subject to the phallic rule; and there is no exception to this.

Lacan’s attraction to negation cannot be separated from his fondness for quadrature. There are four types of discourse, although Lacan says there can be many more. There are the four symbols (S₁, S₂, a, $) that operate within these types. Even with the apparent dominance of threes (Symbolic-Imaginary-Real, denial-reconciliation-foreclosure, neurosis-perversion-psychosis, id-ego-super-ego), it is negation’s fondness for self-reference that seems to win out in the end. Negation not only negates subjects and objects to create subjective objects and objective subjects, it negates itself, generating a new pair of terms from the original set of opposites.
The Hegelian triad of Verneinung, Verleugnung, and Verwerfung contains this double-to-quadruple logic. Foreclosure, Verwerfung, negates renunciation and renunciation negates denial. Within the three is the two and the two can be diagrammed as axes that, like the cardus and decumanus of maps, create four distinct zones.

Lacan’s fundamental diagrams, the L-scheme and variants, are not stable. The R, E, and I schemata appear only once and by 1970 give way to more topological references. Could it be that, like the flat map’s inability to represent the truly curved surface of the globe, logical squares always result in some residue, some error? When Lacan shifts the positions Aristotle assigned to impossibility and contingency, what was he thinking? Did the crisscross of diagonals complicate the “circular” adjacencies? Did the dynamic relations of the Möbius band and overlapping rings of the Borromeo knot relating Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real overtake the static analogies of quadration, which all too quickly resulted in categories and examples?

Travel is, if anything, dynamic. Johnstone’s categories seem to work more as verbs than nouns, and their relations are set up in terms of the loss and recovery of balance, parallel movement, and operational influences. Yet, we can imagine that, in a system that begins as inherently dynamic, some stable reference points are welcomed as essential. The idea of a category offers this minimal assurance, but in converting pure temporal process into a set of permanent, named functions the “spatial positions and relations” of these functions must be able to replicate the dynamics of the whole, even if this dynamics had in the first place made the idea of categories unthinkable.

Because much the same situation applies to the dynamics of the mind and behavior, the same could be said about Lacan constantly tweaking his quadrilateral schemata. The four only imperfectly represented the three, which only imperfectly represented the two, which ultimately were a one, albeit a “Möbius-style” one with a twist that defied charting or description. The confidence with which Algirdas Greimas contrived his semiotic square could be borrowed but not lived. Taking an example from Johnstone’s schema, the primary opposition between Accumulation and Control at first seems clear. Accumulation aims to extend the travel experience, Control seeks to bring about an orderly closure. These conflicting aims generate another set of “forces,” Suffering and Curiosity. Suffering “pushes back” against the attempt to extend travel. Curiosity “resists” Control’s desire for a neat ending. Both resist the original pair of negational terms; they “negate the negations,” so to speak; but their vertical opposition and horizontal differences are complicated by a third force. Suffering is a force that moves centripetally from the world to the subject. Curiosity radiates outward from the subject to the world.
What happens when the diagonal connections negate the negated negations? We have need of a gap to keep open the travel experience when it is subject to external forces that threaten to foreclose it altogether; or internal forces that cease to maintain the energy or curiosity to go on. Like the main categories of the uncanny, A₀ and D₀, the double inscription of terms that seem to negate each other brings out the (in)transitivity that was present in the original terms from the beginning. Just as Life (A) and Death (D) are not just symmetric negations, they give rise to the more accurate opposition, A₀ ⇋ D₀, whose crisscross more directly portrays the “curvature” spatializing A and D.

Redrawing the quadrature of categories suggests that the minimal overlap of “functions” defined by “orthogonal” relationships accommodates the overlapping and retroactive negations that are implicit with groups of terms that are (in)transitive and, thus, impossible to stabilize in a mutually exclusive way. Accumulation and Control are “functionally bonded” in an orthogonal relationship (Γ) that alternatively subordinates one to the other. Similarly, Suffering and Curiosity’s functional Γ balances centrifugal interest with a centripetal friction of distance. This travel arrangement suggests that a “phallic function” may also replace simple logical negation and more accurately account for the (in)transitivity between man and woman, here reconnected to the “natural history” of the internal exile of Greek women in antiquity, a corollary of the conspiracy related to the rule of castration.

The diagonal connecting Control and Suffering avails itself of this logic, revealing an “inner logic” by which Suffering operates as a kind of “centrifugal” control propelling the traveler onward. Equally weird is the means by which Curiosity can seem to radiate allurements from the world to the traveler — weird but not uncommon, as any reader of Goethe’s Italian Travels would attest. The ideal traveler who exploits this reading of negation through the “orthogonal function” (Γ) is the lucky discoverer of the “treasury of signifiers” in sites of exception. To this traveler alone is the miracle visible, the prophecy understandable. I would also argue that this is the key to Odysseus’s ability to challenge and survive the travel environment. The Γ is, for example, the key to escaping the Cyclops’ cave and represented directly in Odysseus’s use of the negational name, Nohbdy. This reformed view of negations is, paradoxically, just as understandable and just as well represented in modern, less mythic, travel accounts and fictional elaborations of travel. Without them, the profound “natural histories” of W. G. Sebald and Bruce Chatwin would make little sense.

The re-drawn squares, using two vector sets that pivot around a central ◊-shaped gap, point to travel’s dependence on the idea of a minimal gap required to maintain travel as a specific form of dimensionality. The travel landscape is not identical to the empirical landscape constitutes its base. This is why actual travelers, with or without Johnstonian pretensions, find maps insufficient. While some dissatisfaction can be blamed on the map illiteracy of the traveler or the inaccuracies or graphic compromises of the printed map, there is something more fundamental that haunts the travel experience. The map, as “already constructed,” conflicts at all times with the map that is being constructed by the travel experience. The “inward” projection of the map from the setting to the subject constantly rubs against the traveler’s “outward” projection of a new map based
on Curiosity and the desire for Accumulation/continuation. The inward pressure of the map as travel guide, which corresponds to the inwardly directed forces of Closure and Suffering, constitute a “nausea,” a “queasiness,” a “travel moiré.”

Converting oppositions (inside/outside, true/false, high/low, etc.) into “functions” (Γ) seems better to accommodate the complex negations that, as in the case of sexuation, involve exceptions. The one exception required to define the masculine is obverted in the case of the feminine, were the not-all of women forbids any exception. In effect, even the rule of exception has an exception that is No Exceptions! The orthogonal function, which is simultaneously a conjunction and a concealment/occultation of one term relative to the other, allows for the creation of a poché, a pocket space, which in empirical terms allows for a real and direct operation of Φ in terms of appearance/visibility and disappearance/invisibility, along with the acoustic transferences: “positive” forms such as enunciation and prophecy; and “negative” forms — énoncé, silence, mythos ("mute"), writing (Vico, Rancière), and the acousmatic voice (Dolar).

The companion diagram of sexuation placed beside the gapped functions of travel (above, right) is a speculative arrangement of the travel categories in relation to the “phallic rule” of symbolic castration. This unusual interpretation may be justified by castration’s role in the termination or continuation of psychoanalysis. Freud considered the negative sense of this as impasse and Lacan emphasized the positive form of the passe. The exception to castration is the famous case of the Primal Father, the “Big Other.” But, as Slavoj Žižek notes, the best example we have of this is not Zeus or Yahweh but The Lady of the troubadours, whose enigmatic silence reinterprets the negative barring of the ‘A’ in S(A) as silence rather than incompleteness. Or, it is possibly more accurate to say that incompleteness allows a certain range of negative options. To be silent may or may not represent unconsciousness, but the effect on the subject is the same. On the opposite side, Φx, Lacan’s “all subjects must obey the law of castration” (∀x·Φx) involves conspiracy, whether or not the x’s are aware of it. The effect is the cause. This is the idiotic symmetry (negation) of the master signifier, and of mastery itself.

To qualify Johnstone’s categories in terms of the complexities of (Lacanian/Hegelian) negations could just have easily worked in reverse — an “empirical” test of negation through the categories of authentic travel. What is needed is a third reference that combines the interests of empirical travel with the logic of negation. Gennie Lemoine has used the concept of multiple types of father to show how negation works within sexuation; her “third term” is Pandora, the “first Greek woman” who, because Greek women were not counted politically or culturally, is a definitive historical instance of the woman: “Woman does not exist.” Pandora was a constructed woman, fashioned from the earth that had been saturated by the semen of Haiphastos, the smithy-god who had been pursuing Athena, who herself was the result of a parthenogenic rather than natural birth.

Lemoine’s argument is drawn from Nicole Loraux’s theory of Athenian origins. Unlike foundation myths that involve arguing twins, one of whom must be killed for kingship to function, she posits that Pandora, as the gods’ means of punishing humans for their theft of divine fire, specifies for future generations the paradox of sexuation that divides men and women not by any empirical or functional difference, but through the pure contradictions of negation and exception. Exception is spatialized, as it is in Lacan’s sexuation rule. All must obey except for one, who must be eliminated through a conspiracy. Freud saw this in the relation of Moses to the Israelites and further examples of the Primal Horde in Totem and Taboo; Lacan distilled the logic but also allowed the general form to specify unexpected examples, such as the (The) Lady of the troubadours.

Lemoine and Loraux are supported not just by the actual historical evidence but by the scholarly difficulty and blindness this evidence imposes. Pandora internalizes a psychotic condition. Her “negation” is the paradox of both good and bad gifts to humankind. But, more fundamentally, she is the effect of the theft of fire, and she transfers this effect to
Greek and other women of antiquity whose duty it was to tend the household fires that were the gateway to Hades, where the family’s manes (later the Lares and Penates) constituted an ultimate, collective super-ego presence. Every family was divided into living and dead components. Relations had to be maintained, channels kept open. Otherwise, Hades as an ultimate treasury of signifiers could short its shipments or reverse the polarity of its benefits.

The family flame was collectivized at the level of the polis. A college of virgins, “wedded to the flame,” were responsible for the luck of the city, dependent on maintaining a perpetual fire. This was the model of the site of exception, where prophecies could be given in exchange for sacrifice. The original “hunger of the gods” for human flesh could be satisfied with animal substitutes. The “banquets of the gods” implied their absence from Olympus, but read in reverse this means that, for humans, it is better to have gods remain within their compound. Zimzum is a secularization of the world that contracts divine meaning but allows for human choice and action. The virginal hearth-tenders, all official priestesses of Hestia, the Roman goddess of the hearth, maintained spatial exceptionalism that was insulated from the household’s domestic space just as the Vestals’ purity insulated Rome’s operational terrain.

Exception was constructed in terms of customs of visibility/invisibility, architectural shielding, personal veils, sequestering, and restrictions of interaction. These controlled centripetal forces that threatened the center from an unpredictable periphery. “Centrifugal,” subject-to-world effects, were also protected/qualified by negation. The semantic substance of prophecy, as is famously recognized, employed its own form of mi-dire: literally half-truths, a projection of events that could not be known “just before” until “just after” (cf. Lacan’s interest in the future anterior tense). Vestals could not appear in public — imposed invisibility. Their costumes made them “not count” as visible figures.

It is as if the (male) twins famous for founding cities concentrated on territorializing a field that would later be managed by women whose position kept to the internalized visible that was a “brightness shining through the dark” (as Blake would later invert as “darkness shining through the brightness,” without changing the meaning).

Pandora is the first Greek woman in the sense that her status as a “constructed” being allows her to exist without being counted. Without too much fuss, one thinks of Olimpia in Hoffman’s story, “The Sandman.” The automaton’s effectiveness is not a result of her approximation of human qualities. She is a “perfect woman,” a flawless converter of Nathaniel’s projections into endearing absences and voids. History chimes to affirm that Greek women are, in fact, perfect examples of the doubly negated Woman. They are not counted as members of the general Greek population, and the famous dramatic works, Alcestis and Lysestrada deal with this issue directly.

Is it really possible to show that Lacanian-Hegelian denial (Verneinung), repudiation (Verleugnung), and foreclosure (Verwerfung) operates in these works? Is it possible to use Johnstone’s categories of travel as translator? The plays are not about travel, to say the least; but space is manipulated to form instances of internal exile; Alcestis involves at least two trips to the underworld. Perhaps the best connection comes by looking at the gap, the overlap between two functional pairs, a gap that avoids foreclosure by assimilating and internalizing foreclosure itself. When Odysseus sails through the Straits of Messina, he wants to sail on but wonders just what the Sirens’ famously alluring song is all about. He balances the interests of centrifugal Curiosity and the perils of centripetal Suffering by localizing Control and Suffering in a radical way: he lashes himself to the mast, S_{CNT} — Suffering tempered with the completion strategy of Control.

In Alcestis, King Admetus is allowed to skip his assigned time to die because he had been kind to Apollo, who had served prison-time as a mortal, disguised as a servant in Admetus’s royal household. (Apollo was being punished for killing the Cyclops, a monster beloved by Zeus.) He is allowed to live if he can find someone to substitute for him,
but his parents and all others he asks refuse. His wife, Alcestis, volunteers her sacrifice, in part, because she “does not count” as a member of the family, but this ambiguous status sets up the subsequent events, and hilarious outcome, of the play.

The travel aspect in Alcestis has not before been noted, nor is it generally warranted except for this limited demonstration. It is the katabasis of Alcestis, her function as a subject “between the two deaths.” Like Castor and Pollux, the paradigm exemplars of civic foundation logic, a substitute, Alcestis, will die in order that a king may live. But, Alcestis is not Admetus’s twin. She is not going to get her turn when Admetus dies. The sacrifice is defective. This is its “Pandora function.” She carries to the underworld her own twinness, her bi-polar status as a woman in a Greek household. She is constructed; not all of her can be contained within the household, and she cannot escape this condition of “internal exile” or “external imprisonment.” She is not at home when home, and never away from home when away. She cannot be either here or there without being there or here.

Herakles visits Admetus at a bad time. Alcestis’s funeral is in process but Admetus doesn’t want to miss his chance of entertaining such a famous guest, so he tells Herakles that the deceased is a “woman of no importance,” a household servant, etc. etc. The audience laughs like crazy at this point because they know just how true this is. Herakles hears this laughter, apparently, and, after he confirms his suspicion that the deceased is really Admetus’s wife, devises a plan to get her back from Hades. His argument is legally astute. Alcestis, can’t either be or not be in Hades because she can’t be or not be anywhere. Herakles decides to enjoy this legal ploy a bit further, by persuading Admetus to break his oath to Alcestis. On her deathbed, he promised not to remarry. Herakles persuades him that this was a foolish, non-binding contract; that he should accept a new bride as a gift from the visiting hero in appreciation for the king’s sumptuous hospitality. The new bride is, of course, the veiled Alcestis. Admetus’s selfishness is compounded by his duplicity. An oath made to a wife cannot count, he reasons, sine a wife cannot herself count as a member of the family. Pandora’s both-here-and-there functionality is used to make the most of Admetus’s glee over his new bride, the veiled ($) Alcestis. The phallic law that could not cover all of her is pulled back, along with the veil.

Admetus’s broken promise was not broken in a vacuum. He himself was an “excepted father,” exempted from the law of mortality (= castration), who needed to be brought back to this law by — so the diagram suggests — a veiled subject, $, who was formally
exiled, S(A), but for whom the small gap discovered by Herakles' legal expertise has afforded her come-back from Hades (katabasis). The dramatic employment of visibility/invisibility and exchange with appearance/disappearance demonstrates just how Alcestis's ubiquity was able to restore the phallic function, Φ, as multi-faceted. Through the logic of negation, the Φ becomes synesthetic, a mediator of issues of visibility, acoustics, spatial location, and temporal event.

We write Alcestis in the silent language of myth by merging conditions of internal exile and external trial (katabasis). This shows how the civic role of the "Pandora function" may relate more generally to the categories of travel, and vice versa. Because negation is fundamentally a motif of exile, the traveler is the excepted master. Odysseus, as hero, of course becomes the expert liar, a king away from home. He enters the feminized space of travel, while his bride Penelope is imprisoned by her bachelors at home. By such cross-gendering, the married couple take on the aspect of the mortal-immortal rotating twins. Alcestis, by virtue of the defective contract with Admetus, is able to break her own contract of exile and to retro-actively realize her status as both-and: wife/stranger, mother/servant, insider/outsider.

Levi Bryant, _The Democracy of Objects_.

Mladen Dolar, _A Voice and Nothing More_.

Johann Wolfgang van Goethe, _Italienische Reise_.

Jacques Lacan, XX, _On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge_.

Ginnie Lemoine, "A Reading of the Formulae of Sexuation: The Woman Does Not Exist."

Nicole Loraux, _The Children of Athena_.

Jacques Ranacière, _The Aesthetic Unconscious_.

Eric Santner, _On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life_.


———, _Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle_.
Appendix 2

Hopscotch

The Atlas has proceeded in an unconventional fashion, limiting presentations to one page each, pairing texts with diagrams and captions, losing themes while adding new ones, failing to summarize methodically, providing no over-view or single synthesis. While a real atlas of maps confidently refers to a real and coherent space, whose contiguities anesthetize any jump or gap in the order of maps, there is no such continuity in the idea of the "obverse," the territory incompletely and imperfectly mapped by the Atlas. Even the child’s game of hopscotch has, for all its jumping, a prescribed sequence. In this appendix, the reader will be advised to take a further step; to leave the minimal order provided and construct new combinations; or even to select essays and maps at random. The precedent for this advice is less the actual game of hopscotch than the methodology of Julio Cortázar's novel, Rayuela (1963), named after the game. Cortázar created 155 short chapter-episodes which the reader could consume in the conventional linear way. In the end pages, however, Cortázar suggested chapter sequences the reader could follow, and suggested that the reader might construct his/her own "novel-inside-a-novel" by choosing chapters at random. Cortázar did not intend to suggest, by this theme-and-variation design, an "ordinary reality" complicated by various "subjective impressions." The initial text order involved switched voices, from first-person to third-person narratives, then to stream-of-consciousness. Parts of the novel were purportedly taken from another novel, as yet unidentified; other chapters were said to have been written by friends.

However modern the author may have believed himself to be, this technique is old. Alternative readings, involving omissions, reversals, skipping around, and even additions to the original text was advised by the famous Catalan mystic, Ramòn Llull (ca. 1232 – ca. 1315), who in his Ars generalis ultima contrived his own hopscotch ideas inspired by the Arabic instrument known as the zairja (Arabic, الزیرة), a mechanical device that scrambled letters, words, and signs (David Link, "Scrambling T-R-U-T-H"). The zairja had been described by Ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddimah as a mechanical instrument belonging to "a branch of the science of letter magic, practiced among the authorities on letter magic ... the technique of finding out answers from questions by means of connections existing between the letters of the expressions used in the question. They imagine that these connections can form the basis for knowing the future happenings they want to know." In other words, the zairja was a kind of reverse computer, not determining future output from unravelling tautologies within the input, but "de-determining" meanings to force the user to actively seek and confront hidden relationships. Llull saw in this necessarily mechanical procedure, a mystical reliability and built it into his combinatorial system of figures rotating within figures.

Although the zairja was revered by Arab mystics and scholars, and although Ramòn Llull’s methods were taught for over two hundred years at the University of Paris and other European schools, today such methods are the precise antithesis of the "clear and distinct reasoning" that modern pedagogy has inherited from Descartes’ analytical methods. Where Cartesianism per se may have waned, its inheritance has been extensive: Positivism, ordinary language theory, the correspondence theory of truth, empiri-
cism, the reductionism of "language and bodies" (Alain Badiou’s terms). The “real world” is the privileged designation of externality, which science strives to explain by limiting the role of subjectivity. Language is cast into the suspect role of an unreliable veil over this reality that must be disciplined by logic and social constraint in order not to cast into doubt its service on behalf of truth. Metaphor, the most unreliable function of language, becomes, alternatively, (1) the historical kernel of subjectivity’s tendency toward delusion, or (2) the resistant residuum of belief that structures the fundamental paradigms of thought, usually set within a geometry of oppositions laid over circular progression — mechanism, organicism, formism, contextualism. Forced to choose between the $R_2$ idea of metaphor as internal defect and the $R_1$ type of an ultimate, enveloping reality, a paradigm principle, Vico saw metaphor as an "imaginative universal" ($universale fantastico$) that combined both the internal and external Reals. By combining internality and externality, Vico provided the first account of human origins to be based on the idea of extimacy. He meant both “imaginative” (the constructive aspect of fantasia rather than the passive perception of imaginare in Italian) and the Imaginary in its most universal (and Lacanian) sense. Like the zairja, the Imaginary was for Vico, as much as it is for Lacan and us, a function based on automaton, a computer “running in reverse,” and it is the point of this appendix both to establish this point and employ it.

The Imaginary runs into trouble in every age but can be recovered by “digging through the trash” of negative examples. The lesson of St. Augustine’s account of his own language instruction is a case in point. Augustine recounts that, as a young child he was taught how to speak by being brought “before his elders,” who pointed to things in the room, naming them each in succession (Confessions, I, 8). Ludwig Wittgenstein draws the following conclusions, providing a manifesto for the ordinary language position: “These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names. — In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands” (Philosophical Investigations, 2). What undermines this account is what Wittgenstein overlooks, the scene where Augustine would have intuited how language works in the first place. By the time the child Augustine gets into the room filled with well-intended elders, he has already learned the basics. The room instruction amounts to vocabulary-building, an initiation to the ideology of the 1:1, “how we call these things” — whose main message is “just who the We are.” This message is: the room, the adults in it, and the action of being led before them. The scene has been set before ideology begins.

Augustine: “When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires” [emphasis mine]. In other words, what Wittgenstein took as clear proof of indicative meaning is, quite evidently, the demonstration of a quite different “natural language,” constructed in terms
of gesture, expression, and setting a scene.

Helen Keller describes this scenery-setting aspect of the Imaginary as the revolutionary moment when her mind was opened to the idea, rather than the particulars, of language. In her own childhood, her teacher, Anne Sullivan, had already taught her the names of many objects, but it was not until she held Helen’s hand under the rushing water coming from a pump while signing the word for water that Helen realized the “miracle” by which the things — and thing-ness in general — came under the charm of being named. It is easy to use this example in a precisely Badiou-ian sense, i.e. to forget all about the sudden presence of what had been there before all along, the element Augustine left out but which Lacan restored fully with his account of the Mirror Stage — the Imaginary as the staging of a scene. In both examples, the child is accompanied by adults. In both, the child finds a new authority (but also castration via the 1:1 assignment of terms) in the enigmatic power of symbolic relationships. But, in Lacan’s example — and present as well in Keller’s if we allow synaesethesia a role — the Imaginary sets the scene. We know very well that children begin to use words long before they know the meanings. They have been able to picture reality, to reconstruct it, to act correctly and enlist the correct responses of others. Before the precise pathways linking specific words to specific things, the scenes have been animated rhetorically and poetically. In short, children prove Pascal’s recommendation that “empty form” precede personal belief: if one gets new converts to Christianity to kneel, bow, and show other forms of obedience; the rest will follow (Pensées, IV, 250; the passage is a striking example of extimacy: “The external must be joined to the internal to obtain anything from God, that is to say, we must kneel, pray with the lips, etc., in order that proud man, who would not submit himself to God, may be now subject to the creature. To expect help from these externals is superstition; to refuse to join them to the internal is pride”). The Imaginary sets the scene for the conventions that establish 1:1 relationships between words and things. It is not the scene itself, but the ability to construct a scene. This difference is critical for any science of the Imaginary. It means that the “maps” theory develops will not be of the resulting spaces or scenes made possible by the Imaginary, but rather diagrams of the mechanics by which such spaces and scenes have become possible. As such, these diagrams are about automation and, hence, the role of time, particularly as it breaks the rules of linear succession and constructs, around a future point, a site of exception that combines the future and the past in an “extimate” present that, as Pascal predicts, avoids objective superstition and subjective pride.

Much could be said at this point about the kind of pre-language instruction the child gets in the Mirror Stage. Through the Imaginary, the child meets the “I,” the ego, that will come to stand (up, literally!) for the “it” that had up until this point guided desire and mediated relations. From this point on, the subject will have a symbolic self and a kernel self that resists symbolization, a thing of a shadow. The “I” will march publicly down the street but the id will have it slip on a banana peel. The two will live in separate spaces, separate times. The indulgent id will attempt, at every opportunity, to embarrass the proper, ingratiating ego, with enigmatic, a-symbolic desires to break the injunctions of the super-ego’s maternal and paternal representatives. At every turn, virtuality of the attached and detached come into play, through the uncanny narratives of shadows and reflections that escape their owners, of dreams that contaminate their dreamer’s waking life with their garbled messages.

The matter at hand, however, is how a critical language might develop to make sense of a subjectivity so divided. Without the Imaginary, the system with only two terms, le
mots et les choses, as Michel Foucault put it, has few alternatives apart from repackag-
ing. Even if new versions distance themselves from Descartes or officially oppose cor-
respondence theory, their own creation of a forced choice reflexively forces them into a
corner. They themselves must accept the strict limits of 1:1 and the ideology it conceals.

Almost all commentators have missed the role of attached virtuality in the Mirror Stage.
The reflection, like the reflection of the unfortunate man facing his mirror image, which
has decided to turn its back on him, in René Magritte’s “Not to Be Reproduced” (La re-
production interdite, 1937), the subject’s reflection appears to possess a mastery the
original subject lacks. The ego lives in the space of contiguous virtuality; the id may
detach and reattach itself at will. This violation of the 1:1 rule of reflections creates, in
retro-action, a body-in-pieces. The “just after” of the image’s apparent mastery creates a
“just before” of failure. The id is working as a scene maker. It clarifies Freud’s famous
statement, “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” (“Where the id, Es/it, was, the ego, Ich/I,
shall be”). In staging terms, the temporal motion of a future coupled with a newly real-
ized past is the basis for a spatiality — an Imaginary — calling for the construction of a
fantasy about the ego that becomes the ego. This scene is the result of the unattached
virtuality of the ego-image, the potential travel that the reflection now, in an uncanny
way, will forever enjoy. “Was” and “shall be” find, for once and for all, their algorithm,
their automation, their zairja.

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Pleas for an ordinary, jargon-free language — justified by the need to explain complex
ideas in a pedagogical setting — lead to the same point: an attempt to capture the scene
of the Imaginary on behalf of ideology. Specifics of this scenery aside, we can recognize
the ambitions of the zairja and Llull’s adaptations of it in Miguel Cervantes’ Don Quix-
ote, the gentleman of La Mancha who sought to free the world from “evil enchanters.”
These enchanters were, of course, none other than the pushy adults in Augustine’s
school-room, who insisted on the adequacy of things and names, the ideal of the 1:1.
We laugh at Don Quixote’s doggedness, his conversion of Dulcinea into a troubadour’s
princess, his instant re-interpretation of ordinary objects as magical ones, his idiotic and
destructive intervention into “events,” such as Master Peter’s puppet show, that conven-
tion has tranquilized as a fictional entertainment but which the knight has taken to be
so Real that he must intervene to correct the flawed presentation. Quixote’s madness
has its logic, which is the basis of its comic effect: it is his resemblance to a machine, a
“mindless” tool for converting the ordinary into the extraordinary, for making the impos-
able happen. The automaton rule has two parts: (1) anything can be brought under its
powers and (2) its transformations are made blindly, without respect to any semblance
or natural or conventional relationships. The former principle is Aristotle’s sense of au-
tomaton as “natural chance.” The second is that of a machine, the automaton as robot.

Why should this adequacy/normalcy, which Quixote strives to destroy, be ideological?
Quixote knew the difference between the barber’s washbasin and the helmet of the hero
Mambrino, but to liberate the latter from the former required a movement of mind that
was fast disappearing, even in 16th Century Spain. With the rise of language linked to
national identity and new social relationships, new political orders required adjustments
to conventions, and new conventions aimed to reduce options. Reducing the magia of
the one to the many, polysemy, to the 1:1 of evil enchanters was not natural, but its
victims were interpellated to say that it was natural, that they spoke in a “natural way,”
in an ordinary manner. “Natural” is always ideological because nature does not exist in
the way we are required to believe. Before there is nature, there is the scene that allows nature to appear as natural. As the comedian Oscar Levant once quipped, "I knew Doris Day before she was a virgin." In effect, ideology knows (in the Biblical sense) nature before it is natural, but then restores its virginity. Nature, as Vico continually taught, is a construct that hides its role. Is this not why Vico directly employed the Imaginary (the two images that famously purport to hide the secrets of The New Science) to demonstrate how the 1:1 is a variable, not a "natural" relation? In effect Vico asks the reader to initiate a mirror action of mind, not just to appreciate mirroring as a theme. Vico may qualify as the first modern proponent of artificial intelligence ("AI") through his claim that the Imaginary was necessarily an automaton. This lesson did not preach relativism via its program of polysemy. Rather, it constructed its own version of a zairja to allow the reader to find, within the reflections and angles proposed by its rays of light and precariously perched subject-objects, a place to write other New Sciences within the "ruins" of the defective one.

Is it not time to say just what this Imaginary is? Shouldn’t there be some account of how the Imaginary takes on the specifications of a machine whose job it is to open and close doors between the “actual” and the “virtual,” in the variety of forms by which these terms realize their cultural incarnations? Do not the “machines” of Camillo, Vico, and Poe — along with the unacknowledged machines imported with every use of chiasmus, defective authorship, uncanny virtuality, and other media that automate meaning — force us to revise the version of automaton that has come down to us through Lacan’s teaching about the symbolic and its insistence on the repetition of satisfaction. Freud’s pleasure principle mandated a return to “the same,” but language divided goal and aim, based on differences between demand (in the symbolic register) and drive (resisting symbolization). Mladen Dolar ("Comedy and Its Double") has qualified this aspect of automaton, suggesting that the circle of return required by the automaton of pleasurable repetition contains a gap, and that this gap is the other form of Aristotle’s causality of chance, tuchē. In these terms, the network of signifiers always contains a built-in discontinuity, what we have identified with the Ø-function that “animates” the series of still frames in the perception of film by constructing, in the mechanically necessary gap, a temporalization of the logic of exception — a "just after" in relation to a "just before."

Loading tuchē within automaton opens the way to show how tuchē, originally the idea of affordance, or “human opportunity,” in Aristotle’s description of it in the Physics, constitutes a dimensional opening within a flow, analogous to Lucretius’s stream of materiality diverted by a swerve, clinamen, that “sets the scene” for reality. But, because reality, as symbolic, cannot directly represent or confront the Real, a fantasy must be constructed. This is not fantasy in the sense of a willful distortion but, rather, a strategy that allows a relationship to the Real in some terms that make it bearable. Because the Imaginary is about the construction of dimensions, such openings that allow the construction of fantasy are haunted by the potentiality of collapse, a negative reversal of the positive steps taken to insure an orderly, ideological relationship between words/symbols and things. Such a collapse was ingeniously staged in a pseudo-historical document created by the Argentine master, Jorge Luis Borges:

In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Genera-
tions, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.

—Suárez Miranda, *Viajes de varones prudentes*, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lerida, 1658

In giving a fictionalized source, which some have taken to be actual, Borges points straightforwardly to the key issue. It is worth noting that Borges combined the practices of a foolish nation with the device of the (intentionally) defective narrator(s) — both Suárez Miranda and himself — engaged specifically to undertake this hoax. In ordinary language terms, we have what looks to be a document from 1658, but on first inspection, any reader with a sense of humor realizes what Borges is “signalizing.” The joke in this case is about what all jokes do: they interpellate the reader in an ideological sense. The joke catches its victims by surprise, it “takes us in.” The trap is set; we enter it voluntarily; and then the punch line springs the catch to capture us. We are made fools of in a double sense, because we have “gone along with” the scheme willingly — we have been automated into it — and it is our complicity as much as the content of the joke that creates the spectacle. We have trapped ourselves.

Is this a special condition, confined to the joke and parody? Borges suggests, in the metaphor of universal mapping, that it’s not. Once the idea of a 1:1 mapping — the proposed itinerary of ordinary language — takes hold, it becomes, like any empirical project, a globalizing, fool-producing desire. Any refusal to take part meets with rhetorical punishment. As in the case of Lacan, the speaker is accused of jargonism. “Why can’t he just say what he means?” In other words, why can’t the speaker create a 1:1 relationship between signifier and signified (despite the fact that the impossibility of doing such is the essence of Lacan’s views of language)? The consequences of such a perfect match are not considered. If language happened to be able to spread, at a 1:1 scale, across the landscapes and objects of experience, it would not be language at all. Where Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that what could not be said was outside the bounds of what one could talk about philosophically (*Philosophical Investigations*, 1953), others, including Wittgenstein on some occasions, have recognized that this gap (for us, a *tuchē* within automaton), which is also to be considered as a kind of surplus, is the only thing worth talking about. In the face of the “unspeakable,” everything becomes philosophical. The issue is this: for humans as specifically “language animals,” silence and the limits of language have specific and intensive value — but the effect is not, simplistically, a loss or termination of meaning. While it is true that language never seems to be able to express “exactly what we mean,” it is equally true that it says — always — more than we intended to say. In both of these opposite cases, silence, termination, and boundary, the essence of automaton and *tuchē*, are critically involved.

Silence, Termination, Boundary: Stagecraft of Automaton and *Tuchē*

Philosophers since Heraklitus and Plato have zoomed in precisely on this silence. They have produced metaphors, dramas, fables, jokes, and analogies. Non-philosophers who have held the view that this edge of meaning holds the keys to truth have turned to ritual, magic, and esoteric methods requiring initiation rather than straight-forward instruction. Before rejecting these as bogus superstition, however, we should reflect on
how such systems were less modes of belief than they were tradition-based practices based on the cumulative expertise of actors and illusionists. As a matter of professional survival, tricks had to be perfectible, reliable, and effective. The hard-working men and women of the magic entertainment industry were not simpletons who literally believed in magic and sought to encourage others to join them in that belief; they were show-business professionals who knew the value of, and multiple forms of, silence, termination, and boundary. Like any tough-minded engineers, they were able to suspend the disbelief of the most apostate audiences. Magic agency was the retail product; at the wholesale level, professionals traded in closely-guarded techniques and knowledge of the reception process. It has been said that the greatest show of antiquity, the Eleusinian Mysteries, played continuously for nearly two thousand years — enforcing a non-disclosure rule for all participants — with only one client "giving away the surprise ending"!

For both the philosopher and the trickster, jargon is essential. Firstly, it keeps the uninitiated amateur at bay. It is a professional language, a short-hand, a kind of reduction of day-to-day events to a sign language known by a few. It is not important that outsiders are puzzled by it; that is the point, to keep the outsiders outside, to keep the inside running efficiently by allowing for critiques, exchanges, and revisions made by the insiders. The jazz musicians who innovated Be-Bop in the 1950s at Minton’s Playhouse on 118th Street, Harlem, kept initiates at bay with a fair-play rule of call and response. Those who missed their cue were instructed through humiliation. Nothing prevents jargon, musical or critical, from achieving great things. The practical considerations for holding an audience’s attention throughout a performance is, per causam, a mirror of the phenomenology of perception at its limits, and the test-to-failure is the basis of all science. Performers create solid effects, often in spite of skepticism or lack of interest in the audience. These are facts that are entirely independent of the audience’s beliefs about what the effects might mean. The use of the zones of the stage, lines of sight, distances, timing, zones etc. is made according to the rules of virtuality, which is to say of effect rather than with abstract measures. Jargon in this case may be about the creation of effects, but its use is entirely practical and functional. If a term does not work, it is abandoned or replaced. If a term works, it is because it is supported by a community of those who use it successfully to achieve expertise. It would be naive to look for "determinative meaning" within such terms (there is no clear definition of Lacan’s objet petit a, for example), but it would be equally naive to regard the effects brought about by means of such terms as anything but transcendental, in that performance involves surprise, discovery, direct encounters with impossibility, and true wonder. No one can deny that these are present concretely and materially, nor should non-practitioners, knowing nothing of their utility, condemn the operating vocabularies involved in their production.

A similar argument can be made for the use of diagrams, particularly where space and time must be discussed from a viewpoint that allows their variability to be taken into account. No less a philosopher than Plato employed diagrams of geometric conditions. The Cave of the Republic, constructing his diagram through the imagery of the text, is the best example, but all of Timeaus could be considered as diagrams arguing on behalf of the diagrammatic. It is clear from Greek intellectual culture that the properties of geometric conditions were not simply tools but generators of philosophical imagination. In ways too complex to cover here, the properties of points, lines, and planes; the ratios and internal patterns of numbers; the model of the pre-Copernican cosmos; and the curious delights of harmony and melody have served not only as allegories but as sources of speculative knowledge about the world. It is clearly the case that mathematic-
ics, geometry, and music — particularly where they were combined in the phenomena of astronomy and astrology — have pushed the imagination forward more than they could ever have held it back. This is perhaps the reason that diagrams — particularly when they fall short of an attempted insight — capture accurately the phenomenon of silence, termination, and boundary. By actively engaging the sagittal dimension between the thinker and the diagram, the graphic representation is able to speak of its own construction and, hence, its relation to the thinker. When diagrams are put into action, as they are in dance, theatrical movement, ritual, and magic demonstrations, it is truly the case that the diagram is “filled out” by its particular destiny; that it is “made true” (Vico’s verum ipsum factum operationalized) in the face of its self-imposed fictions.

The case for restricting critical theory to ordinary language is made typically by those who argue on behalf of students who, it is claimed, need explanations to move smoothly from premises to conclusions, untroubled by inconsistency, poeticity, or performativity. It is necessary to expose this position’s flawed assumptions. All discourse requires two spaces and two times, one in which the speaker and auditor stand, another in which a demonstration may be staged using language’s ability to construct times-within-times, collate discontinuous spaces, and found empires on the most meagre of foundations. As Žižek has described (Interrogating the Real, 11, 102, 142), even — and especially — Descartes’ famous je pense donc je suis needs a space for this to be said as well as a space for this to be shown. Such a staging process is “ordinary” in every sense of the word, given that it is required of any enunciation, in any culture, for any reason, in any terms. Given that this division makes intensive use of complex bounding procedures, and given that the actions within and around these procedures are thoroughly “non-Euclidean” in their ability to turn space inside out and reverse the temporal arrow, enunciation’s doubled space-time makes diagrams not only a valid means of research but perhaps the only reliable way of keeping track of how these two zones are used in different circumstances. The jargon that must inevitably be engaged to keep track of the attempts to get a “perfect picture” of enunciation must adopt to fact that there is no externality to the process of this division made by enunciation. Any technical term survives according to Darwinian principles. Because jargon proclaims its own conventional status, there is no pretense of concealed higher meanings, any essentialism, lying within or beyond terms. They either help to crack open the locks of the everyday or they don’t.

Champions of ordinary language use the double space-time of enunciation to deny its existence. Their theory that language’s 1:1 indicative functions are basic, and that poetic and artistic uses are exceptions, reverse the lesson taught by history, that culture begins with poetry, dance, ritual, and magic. It doesn’t emerge as rational and then develop playful exceptions for the purposes of entertainment or politics. Cassirer seized upon this in his own study of Vico: what is historically first subsequently remains primary, even if it is unrecognized or ciphered into obscurity. The “meta-” role of metaphor (“meta-history,” root metaphors, etc.) can happen only when layers of more “sophisticated” thinking have made the basic logic of metaphor incomprehensible. If metaphor were rational in a logically limited sense, it could not function as a paradigm, i.e. it could not effectively manage silence, termination, and boundary.

Those who tie clear thinking to ordinary language in critical speech deny discourse’s divisions of space-time and exceptionalize the role of automaton and tuchē. This ignores the means by which such divisions operationalize the two forms of chance through strategies of delay. In terms of ordinary language, Vico’s vera narratio, Poe’s “odd evening,” and Camillo’s claim that his theater afforded the remembrance of divine truths are all
scandals to be qualified by the historicity of times that supported such delusions. No one, they argue, could possibly take seriously any claim that performative truth could be more authentic than the logical truths derived through predication. As with the standard procedure of situating the emergence of the Gothic novel beside the French Revolution’s drive for rationality, common superstition is repackaged as fiction once it is unmasked as a false causality. What works is the ideology of the systems that support and defend ordinary language, i.e. the theory that education proceeds by (paid) instruction that treats knowledge as a consumer commodity (Augustine’s room of elders). They play the role of shamans holding back a final secret until final payment has been received, when in fact the final secret is not known or does not exist — at least in the form advertised by the ordinary language view. Truth must be continually postponed, and this postponement is the efficient cause of all formal study within the ideologically constructed educational programs of liberal democracies. Truth must be characterized as wisdom of a “higher order,” the result of patience and vigorous study. Because everything in this theory is made mappable in the aim of a 1:1 relation of signifiers to signifieds (i.e. meaning based on definitions), no “internal effects” of language can be acknowledged apart from syntax, to the extent it agrees with a basic form of Boolean logic, and grammar, to the extent that it can justify its considerable irregularities through convention, custom, and historical change. The stochastic resonance of signifiers, Lacan’s S2 component of the four discourses, is discounted, or attributed to convention. Womb and tomb are no more related than lore and Nevermore. Socrates’ ambiguity on the matter of poeticity in The Cratylus are ignored. Echo (repetition, gap) loses out to Narcissus (1:1).

The ordinary language argument made on behalf of pedagogy holds that teachers should be able to teach in non-esoteric terms. Education in liberal democracies should be instruction through guided discovery, free from hazing by obscurantist professors. Yet, both Vico and Lacan were teachers, and Lacan was a famous one, at that. A list of notable French intellectuals who attended his seminars reads like a “who’s who” of cultural life from 1950–1980: Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Paul Ricoeur, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Philippe Sollers, Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Michel de Certeau, Cornelius Castoriadis, Jean Hyppolite, Roland Barthes, Georges Bataille, Michel Leiris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Roman Jakobsen, among others. As Douglas Sadao Aoki has remarked, quoting Sherry Turkle, “While these thinkers are not all Lacanians, their presence does suggest his significance to contemporary French thought…. Henry Sullivan is only slightly joking when he compares Lacan in 1960s France to the Beatles in Britain.”

Vico, an accomplished teacher all his life but elusive and cunning in his writing, employed at least as many jargon terms as did Lacan. The “common mental dictionary,” the “imaginative universal,” “the ideal eternal history,” “metaphysical points,” the convertability of the true and the made — the list continues. None of these terms have any correlation with reality outside of the framework of The New Science, and I would argue that it is ultimately the autobiographical framework that scales Vico up to a relationship with cosmic melancholy and the genius that this afforded. This Atlas has not addressed this transect in any detail. Readers may find these arguments in Thought and Place: The Architecture of Imagination in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico (1987).

So, how is it that, pedagogically speaking, those with the most jargon and a devotion to the Imaginary in thought, word, and diagram happened to have succeed in becoming famous teachers? Were their students all mindless robots? Many scholars in the United States and Canada seem to think so, ignoring the curious predominance of Lacanian
theory in Europe and South America while qualifying its absence as a case of a commonsense rejection of obscure jargon and topological diagrams. While not all carping about ordinary language has been directed at Lacan, Lacan is clearly the paradigm exemplar, and better known than the perennially obscure Vico. I would venture an answer based on a return to the ancient example, coincidentally employed by Lacan to explore a not unrelated point, the story of Zeuxis and Parrhasius. The case is reviewed in detail in Map and Essay 2.31, but the point is that Zeuxis’s attempt at 1:1 mapping of the bowl of fruit to the mural is a perfect extension of Borges’ account of the obsession cartographers. Parrhasius, one can easily see, is an accomplished teacher out to ridicule the ordinary-language idea that all art is representational. How can it be said that Parrhasius used jargon and diagrams? He didn’t. Rather, his painted curtain, as a paradigm case of silence, termination, and boundary, requires our use of jargon and diagrams to say just what happened when the judges discovered their foolish error. Parrhasius’s presentation is the reverse of Augustine’s scene of language instruction. Instead of elders instructing the child, the “child” confounded the elders. Once the trap was sprung; the judges had to admit their own complicity in constructing the doubled space-time of enunciation. They had, in effect, judged the judging. The 1:1 in this case was a matter of recursion, of the judges discovering what they themselves had put into the illusion, reversed to create de- rather than il- lusion. Both the type of knowledge and the pedagogical method involve obversion. The idiocy of 1:1 jargon-free representation was mocked and dismissed.

The direct use of comedy in the Zeuxis-Parrhasius story adds something to this story. It is about performance, and performativity. It is about experience, where the role of mastery shifts from the demonstrating field (Zeuxis’s “perfect painting”) to the constructing strategies (Parrhasius’s trick). In fact, it is about how mastery is necessarily trumped in the experience of the joke as revelation. One is tempted to take the standard view of comedy, that it casts its victims as “human, all too human”; that, whatever our failings, there is something to laugh about. This commonsense materialism has been debunked by Alenka Zupančič’s bunker-busting critique (The Odd One In, 43–54) of the unusual theological arguments of Nathan M. Scott (“The Bias of Comedy and the Narrow Escape into Faith”). Scott takes a surprising reverse attitude toward modern literature. He claims that, in proposing “existential” and “spiritual” dimensions of material reality, writers such as Sartre and Virginia Woolfe nurture a belief in a transcendental and unattainable Essential, leaving materiality hollow and nauseating in its inability to lead to this beyond. Scott sees materiality not something we should be dissatisfied with, but the key to Christ’s existence not just as the son of God but as God in human, contingent form. In accepting Christ, we accept materiality — its imperfection, its ordinariness, its constraints. Scott makes the key comparison that comedy is driven by the same “gross materiality” as Christianity. Because Christ is God incarnate, and not just a religious genius or hero, Jesus is, as Zupančič wittily paraphrases, “the God that has slipped on the banana peel. Incarnation is comedy and comedy always involves incarnation.” By getting rid of materiality’s spiritual mystery — the (negative) essentialism that, for instance, haunted Sartre’s Roquentin in La nausée — Scott accomplishes the paradoxical. Zupančič notes, again with targeted wit, that he drags comedy down to the level of mere religion! Comedy “falls back to its most boring and reductive definition … about accepting the fact that we are only human, with all the flaws and weaknesses that this implies.”

This is not the comedy of Parrhasius. The quick flip of realization brought about by discovering that the curtain was actually a painting reveals, rather than a good-natured
guffaw from the judges who realize “they are human, all too human,” the discovery of what is essential for the understanding of comedy: that the human being as such “interests comedy at the very point where the human coincides with the inhuman; where the inhuman ‘falls’ into the human (into man), where the infinite falls into the finite, where the Essence falls into appearance and the Necessary into the contingent” (Zupančič, 49–50). Lacan’s most famous jargon term, the indefinable objet petit a, is about the point where this happens. It is the “impossible-Real” — another jargon term in that it shows not that the Real is some “impossible” thing that cannot ever happen, but that the Real is “the impossible that happens.” This is not a definition, it is “the (unrepresentable) thing itself.”

Clearly, we are beyond the capabilities of ordinary language’s 1:1 mapping of things by words; and beyond the pedagogical situation of a teacher explaining things in lesson form with recourse to some version of Lacan’s or Vico’s mi-dire. This is where the imaginary comes in. It is the third of the three terms (Symbolic, Imaginary, Real) that Lacan described using the diagram of the Borromeo knot. It would be hard to dispense with this visual aid, since it combines the paradox of the Möbius strip with the subtle idea of two things being held together by a “negatively present” (absent/invisible/acousmatic/anamorphic) third. Just as the two sides of the Möbius band are “held together” by the experience of them as different but the paradoxical knowledge that they are both the same, the Imaginary is the material idea that accommodates both conditions within a single spectacle. The Borromeo knot is a real-world example that anyone can construct mentally or with a pencil. As a diagram, it is itself a case of the imaginary and as such, makes the case for an Atlas of diagrams as an inventory of the Imaginary. The correspondences between signifiers and things, languages and bodies, is the main business of our networks of symbolic relations, but in a fractal sense, signifiers and things are “horizontally” related in the contrast between the Symbolic, as discourse, and the Real, as thing. These function as “two sides,” whose relation constitutes a kind of third dimension in human experience, something beside the 1:1 (attempted) correlation of ordinary language. The Imaginary structures this third dimension between the two “sides” of experience, but it is not a link that suggests resolution or synthesis. Rather, it is a means of preserving the materiality of the paradoxical co-presence of the resistance of the Real to any symbolic representation whatsoever on one hand and, on the other, of signification’s continual attempts to domesticate this resistance. The Imaginary cannot signify contradiction, but it can “signalize” it, and the diagram is a means for doing this.

“Signifying chains” (another Lacanian jargon term) stretch out at right angles to the signifier’s pretended vertical plan-map mastery of things. They constitute each language’s spiritual motifs and potentialities. Without signifying chains, there would be no fantasies that allow us to postpone, avoid, or misconstrue the “impossible actuality” of the Real. There would be no spirituality, neither any materiality. There would be, in short, nothing to laugh about. Materiality would be just an “all there is,” a humiliating mortality that we must all accept with a shrug and a chuckle. The Real’s modality is trauma, if we may understand that term in all its variety, stretching from catastrophe to Satori. However, without the Imaginary constructions that make the Real minimally bearable: a gap, collapse of dimensions, or the motif of adjacent opposite spaces, materiality would have no way to allow the human to coincide with the inhuman, the infinite to “fall into the
finite.” In short, the Imaginary, which includes constructions of actual situations as well as short-hand graphics, is how materiality becomes both the Nemeses of transcendence as well as the basis of radical spirituality.

Because we can see this clearly in phenomena associated with the uncanny, it is possible and even necessary at this point to refer to the role of virtuality in relation to the imaginary, particularly in the sense that the imaginary is the modality of fantasy, what allows humans interpellated by language and culture to endure to some degree, or even to confront, the trauma of the Real. Zupančič describes this role, which I more than she identifies with the imaginary, as a staging of comedy’s implicit “Möbius band” condition. At each point of the Möbius band there are clearly two sides and two edges. Yet, as we imagine ourselves to be an ant crawling further along the surface, we quickly discover that there is only one side and one edge. We do not endure this paradox, Zupančič notes, as one would discover “the missing link in a chain.” The missing-ness of the Möbius band is built in to its structure. We do not dispel a mystery, we just step forward into it. In the same way, materiality does not offer us a means of relaxing into our flawed human nature, it reveals a permanent, un-repairable hole through which our attempts at being comfortable with finitude fail. “Not only are we not infinite,” Zupančič concludes; “we are not even finite” (53).

Virtuality, particularly in the “attached” and “unattached” modes that go beyond the Positivists’ modality of the “unseen side” inferentially added to the visible sides expand the “illicit” (and, hence, uncanny) missing-ness of the Möbius band. The virtuality of unattached and attached, of intrusions and partial objects, reveals the action of the third dimension of “failed finitude.” Moreover, these virtualities are not simply visual. They are common in literature, art, poetry, and the other arts; they link the traditions that have managed these enterprises as performative (Map 2.31). The Imaginary is operationalized by uncanny virtuality. It allows the Real’s “impossibilities” to happen on a regular, predictable basis, and it is the diagram that attempts to parse its logic.

At the level of the performative, secrecy is essential. Jargon must serve the double function of (1) providing the practical instruction that allows communities of professionals to share traditions and innovations and (2) keeping amateurs at bay. And, what better way to preserve professional secrets than with diagrams that require jargon to understand and employ?

Ordinary language, the opiate of the audience so to speak, is thus linked to the inner resources of language as a basis of performative (rather than indicative) meanings by means of the Real, and by this we have the Borromeo knot of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real — or, in terms that is intended to draw immediate fire, jargon (arbitrary designations), diagrams (to show relationships), and the performative linkages connecting them. What’s so funny about this? That is to say, how does comedy constitute a materialism that maintains its spirituality, through strategies of resistance and ill-fit, the basis not of Scott’s “just us folks” incarnation of God but a medium by which “the infinite falls into the finite”? To see the error of Zeuxis and the entrapment suffered by the judges, the keys of silence, termination, and boundary point in the same direction: the overlap between home and away-from-home, in short, the uncanny of unheimlich (“un-home-ly”) movement that, the further away it goes, the closer it returns to its origin, and vice versa of the third dimension. In the virtuality of attachment and detachment (and the
extreme cases of detachment, anomalous virtuality), we leave the illusory materiality of contiguous spaces and require a "hopscotch" mentality able to relate an "any" with "every."

Uncanny Motion Requires an Atlas

An atlas is a book for getting around, a grimoire is a book useful for creating spells. A combination of the two therefore must be about charmed movement. Three useful models come to mind: Odysseus’s travels after the fall of Troy, with which we might fold in The Aeneid as a parallel story; Bruce Chatwin’s book, Songlines; and W. G. Sebald’s “walking novels,” The Rings of Saturn, Vertigo, and Austerlitz. There are many more examples that could have been mentioned — Robert Byron’s The Road to Oxonia (1937), Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities (travel reports from Marco Polo to Kublai Khan), Samuel Clemmens’ Life on the Mississippi and other books, the fantastic stories about Prester John, Anton Checkov’s The Island of Sakhalin (1895), Chatwin’s In Patagonia (1977), Joseph Conrad’s Congo Diary (1890) or The Heart of Darkness (1899) … the list is enormous, choices are belated and arbitrary.

In an important sense, the close bond between reading and travel makes almost every narrative a travel book, and James Joyce’s Ulysses comes as close as one might desire to a close coordination between narrative motion and physical places. Other books, such as Lawrence Durrell’s Alexandria Quartet, take separate transects through a single exotic site, demonstrating that travel is sometimes most simply accomplished by a change of one’s mental outlook. Not all travel books are really about the charm that rounds Odysseus’s or Stephen Dedalus’s experiences; not all roundings of experience involve actual travel. But, the close relation between the atlas and grimoire affords a seemingly arbitrary focus on travel that achieves a certain shape related to thought, and that thought affords the transfer of control from the writer to the reader, grimoire style.

Both travel and atlases aim to uncover “treasuries of signifiers,” but the glossolalia (Atlas, 3.29) associated with these are entirely in the reader’s camp. Meaning is temporized. The writer passes on to the reader an incomplete experience, a mi-dire, that requires actualization through imagination. In the Atlas of the Obverse, a limit was imposed: single-page essays accompanied by a page of illustrations (“maps”). The strategy fell short of creating crisp aphorisms, but (hopefully) arguments were clipped off before they had a chance to be more convincing. This timing was intended to set up sense that the book was not completely finished, that pages had been lost. The sometimes abrupt jump-cuts make the text analogous to the frames of a film that have been frozen into stills, as in Chris Marker’s 1962 futuristic film, La Jetée, which coincidentally is about using dreams to effect time travel.

The characters of La Jetée are trapped underground in the aftermath of World War Three. The readers of the Atlas have less to worry about, but their restriction of motion produces a similar adaptive response. La Jetée literally means “the pier,” but jeter is to toss or throw. The reader must leap over topics, time periods, philosophies. The dream-like sensations that such leaping generates come at the cost imposed by all dreams: resistance to being captured by consciousness. As with all cultures and times, jumping has been, pun intended, “made light of” by relating it to the play of clowns and children. The ancient fool’s leaping, which led to the term sotie (“jump”) to describe the farce associated with such slapstick, stuck with the trade, requiring clowns also to be acrobats. Enid Welsford, in her book, The Fool, notes that pratfalls and cartwheels had a magic origin in
the belief that the true fool was able to levitate and even fly long distances, possibly by virtue of the fact that “he didn’t know any better.” Hopscotch has, also, been a strategy of completion. From its early, ancient days this has afforded it cosmic pretensions. Applied to literary projects, these have tended to include theology as well. The goal here is to regard both cosmology and theology as workday components of any good theory of reading and see how they can be approached on a practical level.

At the level of the text, The Atlas itself becomes a site of exception, but what does this mean? It may be useful to return to the subject of prophecy and prophets specifically. The tradition specifies a cluster of signifiers: hermaphroditism, blindness, tendency to speak in riddles, etc. A prophet’s truth is not like a prediction of likelihood. A bet on the future is nothing more than an extension of current conditions as trends coinciding in the future. A prophet’s truth is a singularity. It is something that is known when it happens, but the logic of its happening is apparent only after, and is generated as a “before” that arrives at the event simultaneously. The truth of such an “impossible temporality” is nonetheless familiar, for it is the same crisp chiasmus of time that makes dreams real and unreal at the same time. It is our sense that, although the odds are against it, dreams must contain some warning, some truth about the past, some code.

This combination of reality and unreality is the basis of the Cassandra myth. Here we find the matrix of prophecy put in terms that speak to themes lying far beyond the original story. Cassandra, the daughter of King Priam and Queen Hecuba of Troy, and sister to the famed Helen, was said to have fallen asleep in the temple of Apollo. While asleep, the temple snakes licked her ears so clean that she was able to hear the language of animals and foretell the future. Apollo had fallen in love with her, since she was just as beautiful as her twin, Helen. But, she did not return his love; and Apollo took revenge by cursing her prophecies. Although she would unfailingly tell the truth, no one would believe her. It is important to take the details of this story seriously, and to pay particular attention to the role of belief/disbelief.

Belief is an estimate, a concept based on trust in absence of certainty. We believe what we do not know for sure. Prophecy is presented in a condition of poverty. No one has any logical basis for believing it. And, even when the prophecy is taken seriously, it rarely makes sense. The events it predicts will be exceptions to the rule. They could not have been foreseen except through the radical time-jumping abilities of the prophet.

The Pitch Drop Experiment (Map 2.01, Map 3.16) shows that, in the case of exception, science and theology merge. In John Mainstone’s comment, “I don’t become aware of what was going on just before the drop until after the drop occurs,” the key is awareness. Nothing has changed physically. The drop is tautologically contained within the circumstances of the pitch’s viscosity. Awareness, however, alters the Real of the experiment. It literally converts the experiment into a site of exception, and the future anterior structure of the Imaginary charges it with its potentiality. It is not the case that there is the event and, afterward, a response to that event. The event becomes performative once awareness has de-re- and con-structured it. The Imaginary gives access to the Real.

In prophecy/hopscotch terms, thought is transformed by the temporality of the futurity required by truth. The most radical (mis)reading of Cassandra’s situation requires us to think that the “nobody” in the expression, “nobody will believe you,” is set up for the exceptional but actual “Mr. or Ms. Nohbdy,” who uses negation to re-frame situations,
like Odysseus when he gives that name to the Cyclops in order to insure his escape. A Nobody might well believe a Cassandra, for their mutually negated/cursed condition creates a bond of trust. Jean Genet uses this bond to animate the scene in his 1946 novel, Miracle of the Rose, where the inmates of the Fontevrault Prison witness the close-up magic of the prisoner Charlot as he materializes a rose from nothingness. Like all close-up magic acts, the effect is ruined by any iota of a belief in magic. The truth of miracles requires an absolute skepticism.

This might or might not be a useful way to approach prophecy, but the theme of double negation can be found all along. The truth of prophecy is not the same as logical truth, a truth based on conditions of logic and exclusion. This is the truth that binds the victims of the Cretan paradox, “All Cretans are liars.” If the Cretan tells the truth, he must be lying; and if he is a liar, then he must be telling the truth. In truth, so to speak, we are victims of this logic even when the Cretan claims that all Cretans tell the truth. The gap between enunciating and énoncé will have this kind of truth spinning all by itself. In contrast, the truth of prophecy is a truth of experience, encounter. It is known when it is present, but before — the very moment before — seems to be impossible. It is, as Vico put it (New Science, §345), a truth of the body rather than mind. Such truth cannot be represented; it resists all representation. This is why, perhaps, that inside the dream the absence of resistance creates such a positive effect, as in dreams of flying, where the thing that strikes the dreamer especially is that flying seems so normal. Resistance is a part of the experience of the miracle. Because dreams resist being remembered and told, they are all the more significant. Because miracles seem impossible, they are in fact miracles. They signify, but they tenaciously hold back what they most mean to say. Impossibility — pure negation — finds a voice, an acousmatic voice.

In this sense, belief is out of place in the truth of prophecy. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that prophetic truth is only for non-believers — those who do not confuse the two kinds of truth, the “circumstantial/conditional” truth of logic and the confrontational truth of prophets, whose “sites of exception” convert spatiality to temporality. When Lacan recovered the truth about the master’s subservience to his slave as he listened to Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel, he saw that the truth of mastery itself was its failure, its self-limitation; that the failure of mastery was servitude, but that servitude stood a chance to gain Absolute Knowledge in the process. The master’s belief was a kind of static conundrum, an “idiotic symmetry” buying time but resisting change from the internal contradiction created by his willingness to risk death in order to be recognized as a master. This is a topological version of the famous forced choice of “your money or your life.” The servant’s suspension of belief, his skepticism, broke the stalemate of this forced choice and, as a result, allowed history to happen. The stasis of the master’s idiotic situation could be overcome through actions and transformations of nature through technē. Belief is opposed to this project; it finds it “unbelievable” that the servant should outshine the master. At some point, belief’s opposition to the project of truth becomes known and is worked into the drama that will end in the perfection of the body able to receive truth. Belief will become the butt of the joke Truth plays against it, as in the Zeuxis-Parrhasius story, where the judges have already decided what they believe before they face double negation in the form of a painted curtain.

Prophecy is the condition of natural history, the clearing in the forest is the “site of exception” where prophecy is encountered. The Cassandra condition is the banishment of belief, the humiliation of the master in the project of the slave to gain absolute knowledge. If belief is nothing less than the master signifier as an enthymeme, a “saying,”
then knowledge from prophecy is a “hearing.” Cassandra is the dreamer of dreams, in cipher form, that "no one believes" because resistance is the key. Resistance is the double screen, the gap, minimally held open, an “altar” related to the anamorphic/stereognostic condition by which snakes (nature) speak back and the servant (Cassandra as rejected, a Virgo standing in the astrological belt between the scales of Justice and the Nemean Lion) brings to nature a history, a metaphysics, through prophecy. There are other stories that precede this story. Cassandra has her ears licked by two serpents. “Ears licked clean by serpents” is a common theme in antiquity. The effect is that the human can hear animals speak and can interpret nature as if it were an open book, as in Galileo's essay Il Saggiatore (1623): "La filosofia è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continuamente ei sta aperto innanzi agli occhi (io dico l'universo), ma non si può intendere, se prima non s'impara a intender la lingua, e conocer i caratteri ne’ quali è scritto.”

How are these caratteri written? The two serpents entwine the caduceus, used by Mithras and Hermes to cross boundaries, charm adversaries, and summon spirits. Why two? Asklepius, whose twinned serpents are still displayed today on the auto license plates of his descendents, extracted blood from the left and right sides of the slain Medusa. Blood from the left side could kill; from the right, it could restore life. Python, conquered by Apollo, was set up as a basis of divination at his shrine at Delphi. Apollo follows the pattern of the hero, who must conquer the monster or answer the monster’s question. Karl Kerényi argues that the serpent was originally double, just as the riddle has a double sense, and just as the primal serpent, the Uroboros, swallows its tail to demonstrate its two-in-one capabilities.

Cassandra, the virgin, Virgo, ergo the opposition of the serpent — also known in the form of the Nemean Lion slain by Herakles — to sown fields: sātī. Apollo is called away from Olympus, just as he is dis-placed from the row of planetary gods to the row above called “The Banquet” in Camillo’s Theatro of universal memory; and just as he is shown dining with Mithras in a tablet that seems to depict the literal components of the first clearings in which sown fields encircled an altar. The Banquet is the hearth, the hearth is commemorated by the Omphalos at Delphi, a shape that has been identified as the traditional rake of ashes to preserve the family fire through the night-time. The hearth, presided over by the women of the household serving as priestesses of Hestia, was the mouth of the manes — later the Lares and Penates — the ancestral dead who, in return for a portion of the family’s daily fare, would return good advice. The controversy over the management of this important religious ritual in ancient Greece is preserved in Euripides’ (farcical) play, Alcestis. Many classicists who have judged Alcestis to be a tragedy have missed the point of its absurdity, brought to a boil in the final scene when King Admetus must face up to his own duplicity. Women had an ambiguous status in the ancient Greek household. They were not fully a part of the family. Their duty to the spirits of the dead were transferred in marriage, from the father’s gods to the husband’s. To avoid the scandal of defection, the bride had to be depicted as abducted against her will. Hence, the custom of carrying the bride across the threshold of the newlyweds’ home — still in practice today — indicated that the bride was, for the sake of appearances, unwilling. Marriage, as the enactment of extimation, at the same time demonstrated the logic binding together prophecy, the hearth as a primary site of exception, and the relation of the altar (the first hearth) to the expulsion of the serpent, god of the forest.

Agriculture supplants the hunting economy of the forest, and thus it is the natural medium for the transfer of power from the hunters — the masters — and the servants tied
to the fields. Even when agriculture was dominant as an economy, masters retained their traditional rights of the hunt and owned the game of the forests forbidden to the servants/serfs. So, it is the master who must suffer an *impasse*, a castration by the symbols of his position. Could this be the real basis for the master's insistence on belief, on religious practices that, based on symbols, enforce the idiotic symmetry that is the forced choice of political power? Such questions are taken up into Lacan’s idea of four fundamental types of discourse, where masters and mastery are configured, along with knowledge, subjectivity, and desire, on a game-board of agency, the Other, production, and truth.

The truth of psychoanalysis is the truth of Cassandra: “not to be believed” (but, rather, and more effectively, to be experienced directly, “through the body”). Without a doubt, this body is the double, the challenge of identity, concealed in the fable of Icarus and his cousin Perdix. One loses the battle between fire and water; the other dies falling through air but is given a second life, Dα, as long as it flies in short hops, staying close to earth. Dreams of flying are estimations of the sensations of the lungs, air in the body exchanged for a body in the air; but the key point is that flying seems so natural in the dream. The trauma of extimité is sublimated so as not to wake the dreamer. The dreamer may dream while awake. This is Endymion, “kissed” by Diana; and this is the story of the day’s Apollo-sun, eclipsed by Diana-moon. Predicting these heavenly pivot points (α) and their durations (∂) was the goal of calendars created by every culture: an ultimate natural history, built around failures not just of masters but mastery itself.

The master’s *impasse* is concealed by the irrationality of ideology contained in the master signifier, the “enthymemic” idiocy that requires the audience to recognize the king, with or without new clothes. The symbolic order sustains itself through sheer redundancy; but it is over-determination that trumps simple redundancy by inverting the order of time and causality: one effect produced by many causes, the order of the dream, *chez* Florensky. The appointment in Samarra, Αο, is the formula of all stories, but stories cannot be told without their own pivot point, the point of view that is sometimes directly embodied by a narrator, who is almost always defective in some way, to allow for a doubling of the screen that allows for the beginning, middle, and end of diachronic representation. Into this *poché* space glides a descendent of Cassandra, Jeff Jefferies, who will not be believed when he says that his neighbor with an marital condition obverse to his own (Thorwald’s wife is an invalid; Jefferies is an invalid to his non-wife, Lisa) has committed murder. The wife’s soul-cause seems to be taken up by a literal Perdix, whose broken leg keeps him close to the ground but whose gliding wheel-chair gives him a sense of flying. Indeed, his eye does fly out of the window, literally in the opening pan, delivering a moral judgment on the marriages or failures of the marriage tradition he sees around him: the bachelor composer, Miss Lonelyhearts, the childless couple, the dancer with the absent husband, the single sculptress. The virtual space of Jeff’s extimité into the courtyard is obverse: he sees out of and into “rear windows,” not the presentational frames his neighbors would wish to set their fantasy selves. The virtuality of Thorwald’s apartment is orthogonal, however. Jefferies line of view intersects it at a right angle, allowing him to see the spaces of production side by side with the spaces of consumption. The virtuality of attached things coming unattached (the purse and wedding ring from their owner, Anna Thorwald) are held in counterpoise to the detached virtuality of Anna’s avenging soul, which will inhabit Jeff until his job is done.
Jeff’s discourse is hysterical. His barred subjectivity, $, is the agency of the action that moves the story from the unchanging temporality of the master (Thorwald) to a natural history that leads to Golgotha, a confrontation. Jeff’s hysteria suppresses and conceals his desire, $/α$. The master, Thorwald, however, is concealing knowledge in the form of a series of related signifiers, $S_1/S_2$. When he takes the ring out of the purse (Jeff spies this through his long lens), the vignette of the telephoto lens matches the circular jewelry to a ‘T’, the T of the orthogonal angle-of-view that allows penetration into this series of signifiers. Jeff, whose POV role resembles nothing so much as the interval “between the two deaths,” will solve the crime, but at the expense of Thorwald’s own experiment in extimacy as he T’s into Jeff’s apartment by walking around the block. Just as there are two snakes to every site of exception, there are two symmetrical “break-ins” needed to finish this morality tale. The left and right-hand versions of the urban courtyard, Jeff-Lisa and Lars-Anna, must correct the marriage dysfunction that has been brought on by (as we are instructed by Hitchcock’s references to the heat wave that has induced the populace to uncurtain their private interiors) ... the weather.

The interval of this particular eclipse, where Jeff has heard the crime in his sleep and sought to remember the dream through themes of resistance constructed optically, in his comparison of “anamorphic” zinnias growing backwards, comes remarkably close to Endymion’s, particularly when Lisa arrives and kisses him awake from a nap. Her face eclipses the entire screen; when she introduces herself mockingly to the awakened boyfriend, she turns on a light to match each of her three names — a triple goddess. The kiss gives Jeff the power of prophecy, an ability to dream while awake, and be awake when dreaming. This is the formula of the unconscious, which records automatically and communicates through the resistance of ciphers and puzzles. If it is true that miracles happen, then they happen everyday, at every scale, in the sites of exception that are laid like land-mines in the run of experience.

It has been the approach of this Atlas to operationalize this run in terms of affordance, tuchē, and the land-mines in terms of the vortices of automata — vectors that, like Lacan’s system of fundamental discourses, split things in two until the point is made that the atom is the split. The boundary’s raw material is the gap, which must be maintained through a minimal dimensionality and can even be preserved by negating it, by leaping over it (as Remus was to discover). Such an approach is not at all original, since its “proofs” are derived by collating in a methodologically loose, polythetic way the strange coincidences of examples from wildly separate sources. That Vico’s dipintura in The New Science should duplicate the graphic logic and even some literal features found in a stone relief depicting Mithras with Apollo, or that Perseus’s slaying of Medussa should say anything at all about Giulio Camillo’s memory theater, is preposterous. If so, the connections would amount to either a tedious conspiracy theory or a miracle of synchronicity, what Vico would call an “ideal eternal history,” capable of automating human affairs at all scales, in all climes, at whatever point in linear time, moving inside and outside literal time and space to consolidate specific sites as “treasuries of signifiers,” over-determined and prophetic.

If such sites exist, and evidence seems to suggest that they do, then hopscotch is the only means of traveling from one to the other. Their very nature, as truth, demands such travel. Here, the theme of charmed travel must take over in a way that authenticates travel as an idea — a means in fact of keeping ideas in motion — and confirms charm itself as the physics of this motion.
As a book, the Atlas is a kind of anomalous virtuality that, because of the maps it contains, requires that the user regard it as a grimoire, whose “cosmograms” lead to a “buried treasure” — which is to say that an atlas, constructed out of desire, guides that desire by deforming the natural space and time of the environment, transforming it into a set of “sites of exception” whose treasures become acousmatic: treasuries of signifiers rather than jewels (although the logic of the jewel will transform these signifiers into ciphers that sparkle without saying anything). Thus, the stupidity (bêtise) of the glossolalia of the site of exception promises to structure itself as pure structure, to be a place of resonance, stochastic and otherwise, where over-determination will turn time backwards, so that the “time just before” will be known only at the instant of encounter, that the voice to be heard when the drop falls will be the “minimum element of ventriloquism” that inscribes the Other into the most private and singular of experiences.

The Atlas defines, like nothing else can, the obversity of the final, anomalous, type of virtuality; it assigns this type to prophecy, and the Truth of Vico’s verum ipsum factum. More, it employs the devices of the uncanny: the optics whose secrets Vico came close to giving away in his dipintura, so close to the Mithras bas relief and Rosicrucian interpolations; and the identity-in-nothingness that comes with exile from the network of symbolic relations. Joyce’s multiple names for Vico in Finnegans Wake confirms this in a personal way. Vico was the non-entity he fictionalized in his Autobiography. Joyce elaborated: HCE, “Here Comes Everybody,” Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker (to clean the ears of those who would hear nature’s acousmatics), Finn MacCool, and, literally, thousands more synonyms. If Vico is the animus of Finnegans Wake, ALP, Anna Livia Plurabelle is the anima — receptacle, womb, resonant chamber; hinge, gap, void. Vico borrowed these terms from Stoicism to confirm the patrimony of Mannerism, which celebrated the wedge-like function of ingenium, wit. Etymology, in the style Vico employed in his work, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, played into his hands. The Latin words for wedge and heaven were the same (cœlum). The azure of heaven, above the clouds that covered earth and human doubt, error, and deception, was the blue of truth. The Romans knew as much as required all oaths to be taken under open, blue sky, just as the Senate roof itself provided a perpetual, clear contact with the divine. Justizia’s head appears to be missing in ancient icons of her; in truth it is invisible from our position below, and the proof of this is that invisibility is exchanged as it often is with blindness, and in later, less radical images, Justice is shown blindfolded — a detail we take to mean that Justice is impartial.

The wedge of wit is the acute angle, literally. It is the oblique view, the ∂-shift in the point of view that tells us if we are looking at a full, 3-D space or just a stage prop. The ∂ need not always be a simple physical movement. It can be the stylized rolling of Jef-feries in his wheelchair, as he selects modalities of visibility. However, the orthogonal view opens up the anamorphy, the radical shift that, as in the Holbein portrait of the Ambassadors, opens up a hidden Real — an antipodal α, a heart of darkness and locus of buried treasure. At least that was the subtle sub-text of Eratosthenes’ experiment with the gnomon’s shadow in Alexandria on the day that the sun shone directly down
the well at Syene. This is the Atlas’s “straight story,” a clearly scientific experiment, that nonetheless gets the vector relationship of $\partial$ and $\alpha$ completely correct. With anomalous virtuality, we catch nature off-guard; our timing is slightly off, however, and our discovery is pitched within the interval, $\varnothing$, where knowledge of the just-before is evident only through retro-action.

Hopscotch takes place as a result of such experiments in continuity. Where the POV moves gradually, the scene adjusts in direct measure; more POV movement, more scenic shift. Discontinuity happens when depth opens up in a different direction, when some detail forces a recalculation or opens of a chasm, a labyrinth of hidden chambers. This is the environmental counterpart to the act of wit, and heroes of all ages have tested their skills against such puzzle places. It is quite obvious that the acute angle of the hero’s wit is also a property of the world that calls for it, that $\partial$ and $\alpha$ are the twins whose separation at birth and faked independence will give rise to a *comédie humaine*.

The hopscotch method is bound to be erratic and uncanny, both in its effects and its seeming disregard of intentionality. Any project of restoring the unconscious, not just as a subject of study but as a means of study, is likely to make use of the very same tricks that regulate the everyday relationships between waking reality and the dreams and fantasies that alternatively ground and undermine it. Because the imagery of “ground” and “undermine” both point to earth, and because earth in humoristic terms is the melancholy combination of cold and dry, we can take this as a serious clue about the historic evolution of the hopscotch method. Indeed, thinkers as ancient as Aristotle have asked the same question, and in much the same terms. In his *Problema XXX.1*, Aristotle asks why it is that genius and insanity go hand-in-hand. This combination of opposites was not simply subjective. The cosmos itself contained folds and twists, crossovers and flips. Lacan’s summary action, *extimité*, combines idiocies of identity and scale into the materialistic terms of impossible motion. When static cases of contradictory categories is operationalized as melancholy movement, the motif of the wandering hero and the classic descent themes of the *katabasis* come into focus as emblems of extimity. Although the crisscross logic of the uncanny is hard to explain in rational terms, the over-determination of its material examples provide an ample laboratory, a treasury of signifiers in the scholarly sense, where madness and method combine.

Adaptation of a phenomenon as a method of study engages the issue of contamination. Without the independence of the observer’s point of view, how can data be valid? This criteria conceals an action that has already preceded this consideration: that a true phenomenon will have already conditioned and determined the process of objective observation, including the fantasy by which the observer believes in the objectivity of his/her study. The “reports” of science will always be fictions framed by this prior, superseding act of framing. For the language animal, as Lacan called humans, the only alternative is psychosis, a refusal to recognize the terms of language and the symbolic. Recognition is not acceptance; thus Hegel specifies that skepticism is one of the steps the Slave takes on the path toward Absolute Knowledge. Radical skepticism is, as Francisco Sanches claimed in his *Quod Nihil Scitur (That Nothing Is Known*, 1581), not the self-contradicting knowledge of “one true thing” — that we can never know anything for certain except the fact that we know nothing. The key is to remain one step ahead of this conclusion, and the hopscotch method takes this point literally. It constructs a future (“imagination”) that is simultaneously a past (“memory”) — Lacan’s future anterior for scholars, so to speak — where the facts, certain and particular, become truth. Vico re-
rlected this for the material evidence of culture and history ("philology"); he used it as a predictive device for the future of thought itself ("philosophy") in his utopian projection of a future anterior for a (perpetually) New Science.

Vico was clear about one thing: this would be a science created in the transformation of the reader into a writer; this transformation would be proved by the bodily sensation of a divine pleasure, as the reader comprehended the identity between his/her own thinking and the cosmos, world, objects and subjects in the world — down to the nano-scale of actions and thoughts. Vico could rightfully claim to be the inventor of ideas that would later watermark the works of Poe, Hegel, Freud, Joyce, Lacan, and others who, combining phenomenal with experimental extimacy to create knowledge in a future, prophetic moment, would create knowledge that resisted, like its subject, all attempts to be captioned and explained: *mi-dire*.

*The Atlas* has operationalized *mi-dire* spatially, through diagrams. It has used the vocabulary of the map, the fourth wall, planetary curvature, orthogonal vectors, anamorphosis, double frames, screens, hinges, arches, dreams of flying, force fields, vortices, mountains of choice, labyrinths, and the iconic face. What is left? Clearly, such writing is only half. Reading, which must be configured as divination, remains, and the difference that separates running an errand from authentic travel must be applied to the elevation of reading to "Reading" (the upper case 'R' signalizes the Real) in the Vichian sense. Although any such new science will always be new in the sense that its combination of imagination and memory is pitched in the future anterior, the reading-to-Reading formula is ancient. It is the basis of the idea of the grimoire, but in less occult circumstances it has amounted to a strategy of literary criticism turned into meditation leading to revelation. With paradigm exemplars as notable as Llull and Cervantes, there can be no side-lining of the idea of the grimoire as constructed unconscious, or the primacy of collective memory over individual recollection.

Similarly, Llull’s and Cervantes’ methods were recognized and revived by poetic minds of the first order. However the project of a material unconscious was given a distinctive turn by each artist, the physics remained the same, allowing for a remarkable consistency at the level of the Imaginary. Poe’s “odd evening” could have been enjoyed equally by Mallarmé, Poe, Roussel, Joyce, Borges, or Cortázar. At the same time, critical theory has, like Endymion, been allowed to think it was awake when in fact it was being embraced by Diana. Neither the consciousness of the reader or critic has been required for the effective construction and operation of the unconscious as a silent cipher. The unconscious is, after all, unconscious. But, the question could be asked of how so many separate projects to create a material unconscious, in so many prominent works, could have escaped general notice? Poe had acquired a good Classical education in between his gambling and drinking projects. Vico was intimately familiar with almost all of the available texts of antiquity. Most writers until the 1940s were obliged to learn “some Latin, less Greek.” Liberal education used to mean that one could "know without knowing" the art of chiasmus directly through the rhythms of works constructed by chiasmus masters, Petronius, Ovid, Apuleius, Virgil, Homer. The antiquity of the clear example of chiasmus of Simonides, the reputed inventor of artificial memory — and the subsequent ignorance and silence on this example by generations of critics — set a pattern. Even when, as in the case of Roussel’s *Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres* (*How I Wrote Certain of my Books*, 1935), an author gives an explicit account of the constructed unconscious, its implications are not understood. Richard Kopley was the first to identify
Poe's own clever purloining of the story of "The Purloined Letter," but, despite the carpet-bomb attention given to Poe's works, there has been little interest in ciphering or chiasmus, and Kopley himself did not attach Poe's chiasmus to anamorphosis, acousmatics, or the idea of a textual unconscious.

Certainly, the use of texts as grimoires, with conscious appreciation of the implications, was generally widespread in antiquity, but the trick was to spot the large-scale projects and see how literary chiasmus might have been derived from magical chiasmus. No "true believer" could have noticed, let alone adopted, such techniques. It took real skeptics like Ovid, steeped in corruption as well as high learning, to understand that magic worked only for non-believers. One could say that miracles happen only for atheists. When Vico set up *The New Science* as a labyrinth, he literally intended the book to be able to connect to the divine, as the moment in the future when time turns around to face the past coming toward it. Vico saw this futurity not at the edge of history but in the middle. As Eric Santner puts it, the sites of exception where prophetic consciousness breaks the spell of instrumentality are not at the apocalyptic end of time but the center of it, in the midst of the flow of it, so to speak: *exception is the flow*. Vico's project was radical not because it was new (it wasn't) but because it continued to resist recognition. No Vico scholar has taken seriously Vico's direct admission in the passages of paragraph 345. The typical gloss consigns Vico's directions for magical reading to the current traditions of erudition, which work through predication and association. Rather than experience the effects, scholars prefer to discuss motives, authority, and relationships. The miracle is that generations of intelligent followers continue to ignore what an author has made obvious and explained in detail.

Practitioners of *mi-dire*, however, follow standard procedures. They set their traps and move on. Their work will be effective with or without audiences' conscious recognition or approval. In many ways, *mi-dire*-ists survive as viruses that silently inhabit their hosts, directing them to behaviors that will benefit the parasites primarily. The host's conscious knowledge of the parasite is not only not desirable, it is to be avoided at all costs. If Vico, Poe, Camillo, and their fellow hopscotchers are any indication, discovery does not threaten the security of the secret. Generations of scholars have poured over their works without taking seriously what their authors have directly confessed. The lesson of "The Purloined Letter" is: if you want to hide something, don't bother; the more you expose it the less it will be noticed. Miracles will happen, but no one will bother to look up. Thus, the *Atlas* recommends that the reader cultivate an attitude of indifference, akin to the pocket space created by the purloined letter. Enthusiastic agreement can be as destructive as skeptical rejection. The intended reader will be engaged in a parallel project. The need for proof can never be satisfied; this is the definition of Purgatory.
Itineraries

Each proposed hopscotch itinerary begins with a statement of a theme, topic, or question. After this, a random cast is made through the Atlas to select, blindly, short passages, which are combined with selected reference passages (numbers of sections are listed) to produce two residues, images resulting from the clash of fragments. An "anamorph" combines the two, suggesting that the contrasting points of view may provide the third leg of an exceptional triangle. This method may be repeated by the reader, using the examples below as an operational template. The intention is to borrow, from the method by which psychoanalysis is deemed to be complete, the idea of estrangement. The solitary inquirer must cast off an idea, subjecting it to the least likely chances of confirmation, and examine the coincidences by which the idea retains a minimal reference.

1: The (Acousmatic) Voice

Location is key to the voice, and the voice is key to location, in the sense that dis-placement opens up meanings that indicate the role of the frame, the external Real (R₁) and the internal (defective) Real, R₂. The index lists the nearly 70 mentions of the term, but it is more productive to think of the ways in which the acousmatic is related to the field in which a faint signal is amplified by background noise to the point where it becomes audible, but in an uncanny way that preserves its lack of determinative location.

Random cast: 2.02, 2.01, 3.22, 3.03, A2 (248), 3.31m

**Image 1: the clown caduceus**

One snake is the predicator (Γ), the other the predicated (Γ): "I am the father of three sons!" — I am the son of three fathers!" The (chiastic) switch of the operator (dark-light beer versus a light-dark beer) grants passage across the most difficult of boundaries, which is why the clown functions to guard the pocket of invisibility between showing and watching (Morris Dancers, Abingdon, Oxfordshire).

**Image 2: the map of exception**

Maps promise adjacency, directly within a field or postponed, at the neutral boundaries of the quadrated edges. To say that the uncanny lies at the center of Lacan’s project is to promise adjacency to the surrounding field as well as coherence inside the newly defined middle. But, because the edge was formerly the center, the point is itself one of extimacy (Dolar).

**ANAMORPH: THE MAP AND THE CADUCEUS**

The map is over the land; the signifier is over the signified. Perched in the flight of dreams, anxiety allows the 1:1 project; the fool flies. The caduceus has wings, or rather it has one wing that flaps from one side (predicating) to the other (predicated). Without anxiety, this flapping commits the audience to laughter, and its mirth attends the arrangement of angels within an auditorium for the reception of the acousmatic voice.
2: Fools in Flight

Enid Welsford (*The Fool*) recounts the tradition connecting fools and flying. This goes beyond mere levitation, which is a part of the ancient practice of sacred folly, to include long transports through the air — undoubtedly one of the reasons for the link between fool-play and acrobatics (*F. sottie*, a fool play; *sauter*, to leap). Foolish flying was captured with high irony in Voltaire’s *Micromégas* (1752) — the name Voltaire itself echoes this theme in “volt” or “vault” — whose giant hero is able to leap across the cosmos. Calvino picks up this trait for his *Cosmicomics* characters, for whom distance between the earth and moon is no obstacle.

Random cast: 2.08, 2.29, 2.12; Linked: 1.04, 2.29m, 1.05, 1.09, 2.17, 2.25, 3.04, 1.24, 3.19, A2 (247)

**Image 1: suspense**

Magical flying involves no physical effort to overcome gravity. Cyrano’s (Edmond Rostand, *Cyrano de Bergerac*, 1898) explanation of how he got to the moon (his ruse for delaying Count de Guiche to allow Roxanne to marry Christian). The “real life” Cyrano was in fact the author of *The Other World: Society and Government of the Moon*, a coincidence of the highest order. Cyrano suspends de Guiche’s mission, but his method is the model of all suspense: charm, which in storytelling freezes the subject in a state of suspended (de-) animation.

**Image 2: body inverse**

Rostand’s play preserves intact the logic of the troubadour’s love for The Lady, with the object of reducing the flesh-and-blood lover, Christian, to the thinnest of proxies. In this regard, the ruse of delay with its account of effortless travel has central significance. The moon can be reached not because its great distance can be overcome, but because the moon “has been there all the time,” centrally.

**ANAMORPH: BODY OF AIR**

Dreams of flying connect to this rapid liquidation of distance in the element of anxiety, which is absent. The fool is ignorant of worry, and “hence” can fly. With anxiety (alienation based on futurity), the subject is immobilized. When futurity is related to future anteriority, travel becomes gnostic, a search for “sites of exception” (Sebald, Chatwin, Johnstone). The problem of problematic/gnostic travel is identical to that of breathing in tantric Yoga. Translated into music, the issue of floating is transposed into the pause of the phrase, which becomes a means of signalizing. Silence in music and speech converts to the gesture, the visible sign. “Think of the ways in which the acousmatic is related to the field in which a faint signal is amplified by background noise to the point where it becomes audible, but in an uncanny way that preserves its lack of determinative location” (Itinerary 1).

3: Comedy in General

Alenka Zupančič and Mladen Dolar have restored comedy to its central place in psychoanalysis and culture. Can comedy’s “boundary language” extend these gains to include the site of exception as a topology for the “comic exception”? Does comedy not reach to the heart of extimacy’s logic, by combining psychoanalysis with theology? Is this also a chance to “replace” Santner’s example of Rosenzweig with Florensky’s dream and face logics? ”Prelest,” the illusory turn, supplies the missing component in a diagram that combines the “caduceus” with the “array.” Dreams → flying → wings → comic "hole" in the Symbolic →
Imaginary. Vico’s *dipintura* “flaps its wings” (works in reflection; alternates its strategies of predication) to create the *tuchē* of options constructed as a labyrinth within the repetitive folds of *The New Science*.

Random cast: 1.06m, 3.04, 1.32m, 3.12; Linked: 2.29m, 3.00 (144), 3.05, 3.09, 1.27m, 1.27, 1.29m, 1.29, 2.05m, 2.06m, 2.13m, 2.19m, 2.20m, 2.32m, 3.16m

**Image 1: talking to dead people**

In its abject materiality, comedy addresses the singularity of the exception in order to yield a voice, stochastically/acousmatically contained within structure. The game of Morra: “know your opponent” (Poe’s advice). Translation: one side of the lambda of chiasmus “knows” the other, that is, it is the living twin who consults the twin doing time in Hades (Castor and Pollux). This is the basis of all foundation rites.

**Image 2: the password is “placement”**

The mason splits a stone to reveal a clean face, but hides one face from the other to avoid a “stupid symmetry” (false conclusion). The desired conclusion is “delayed” by concealment. Occultation (Spencer-Brown) means that identity is delayed by a radically internal element (A → A/b/A) that becomes the basis for repetition, hence desire, hence the construction of fantasy “in order to confront the Real.”

**ANAMORPH: MASONIC RITES**

The unconscious of the world, due to the estimation of the subject and contraction (occultation/disguise) of referential meaning, leaves behind two historically consistent residues: the pattern of fable in the tracery of constellations of stars; and the belief that the night sky has been rotated into view from a position where dreamers were awake in daylight (consciousness). The night view is converted architecturally into the secret chamber, the treasury of signifiers, where rituals take place. The salons and libraries of the Neoplatonists preferred ceilings depicting astrological signs and myths, often in positions that allowed the reading of the founder’s astrological chart, bringing together the idea of the “house” in cosmic and local terms. Fritz Saxl discovered such a schema, suspected by Aby Warburg, in the Villa Farnesina, built by Agostino Chigi in the early 16c. (Margherita Fiorello and Anton Grigoryev, “The Astrological ceiling of Villa Farnesina in Rome,” Italian Astrological Association, CIDA, October 2006). Fiorello and Grigoryev’s reading returns to the theme of melancholy (Saturn) given a quarter-turn by love (Venus): love and death combine. Chigi died one year after marrying his Venetian mistress, Francesca Ordeaschi, reputed to be the model for Raphael’s *La Fornarina* (*The Baker*). Comedy “talks to the dead” through the medium of diagrams. The password is “placement.” One half (the theme of twins/doubles) knows the other, but only in terms of cipher/silence that switch the terms of predication.

**4: Singularity**

The Lacanian “unary trait” is, in the official account, a matter of counting. Like a sorites in reverse, the first count is unaffected by subsequent counting sequences. This idea is embedded in both of George Spencer-Brown’s axioms: two “calls” reduce to (“can be substituted by) one call, the first call. Two crosses are equivalent to no cross. Yet, when the surface upon which these markers operate as frames/boundaries, the axioms are reversed. The cross and cross again results in a remainder, and the implication for predication
is the same as that for the rhetorical figure of "reversed antinomasia" — the name that becomes the quality and is transferable to other identities. Where the Lacanian idea of counting is the basis of one the Freudian forms of identity, described by Alenka Župančič’s through the idea of character in comedy — i.e. his/her compulsive attachment to a single person, place, or thing. Antinomasia, the identification of a subject with/by a trait, or especially the reversal of this, the creation of a trait from the individual, is the basis of the Vichian "imaginative universal," because it allows predication to flip between universal and particular, and this flip is the destabilizing force behind the clown’s mechanical obsession with some detail that restructures reality.

Linked: 1.25m, 2.05m, 2.25m, 3.19m, 2.07m, 2.16m

**Image 1: the chicken suit**

In *The Gold Rush*, Chaplin plays a prospector, stranded in a remote cabin in the snowy the Chilkoot Pass of Sierra Nevada without food. His partner, Big Jim (Mack Swain), begins to fantasize that Chaplin is actually a large, edible chicken. Chaplin somehow is able to comprehend this imaginary transformation and immediately reacts to this *einziger Zug*, this singular trait that has converted the cabin into a zone charged by hunter-and-prey logic. Chaplin "unconsciously" complies with the fantasy’s enigmatic demands; the fantasy turns out to belong to him, more than Big Jim, because it is uncanny complicity that fuels the action. He becomes the "perfect chicken"; everything he does becomes “chicken-like.”

**Image 2: sometimes the bear eats you**

The obversion of predication alternates between a lack of anxiety (cf. the sensation of floating in dreams) and focused, intense anxiety, as in the case of the chicken scene in *The Gold Rush*. Adjusting the comparison forces the consideration of how anxiety can materialize itself as gravity. Anxiety results from the repetition of the impasse that arises from the incommensurability of desire and the drive. Desire is able to operate entirely within the range of the Symbolic. The drive, in contrast, resists symbolization. Desire acts as momentum, the drive acts as a centripetal force, a gravity, that returns the symbolic articulation of desire, demand, to its origin point. This is the *einziger Zug*, the obsessional repetition that has offered comedy so many of its shticks.

**ANAMORPH: MERGER OF THE TWO FORMS OF Ø**

In the most direct Lacanian terms, Chaplin has, by occupying the cabin with the super-ego representative Big Jim, given up something, namely his bios. He becomes zoë, pure life, the *homo sacer* of Agamben who may be slaughtered with impunity, just like any chicken. Is this not simultaneously the symbolic castration that occurs with any subject who, obeying the law of anxiety, combines the two functions of the phallus — (1) the symbolic-imaginary castration that allows the subject to be included within the network of symbolic relationships and (2) the function of the “phallus-organ,” as Jacques-Alain Miller calls it (*Lacanian Ink*, 26). This seems paradoxical; isn’t the whole point of castration to get bios in return for the sacrifice of Ø? The merger of the two functions, symbolic castration with the idea of the phallus-organ — a case of psychoanalytic anamorphosis — shows comedy’s function in its creation of automata that return the subject to its unary trait. The gap of the drive is the drive, the organ; and organs as we know are "whatever mediates between an inside and an outside." The extreme condition of the “natural” need, hunger, has capsized the drive. It has been pushed to reveal its obverse.
The anamorphosis of this condition is revealed by the history of the filming of this scene. The cinematographer, Roland Totheroh, had to create the illusion of Chaplin's transformation into a chicken “in the camera,” matching one scene with Chaplin to its dissolve with the chicken-suited Chaplin standing in the same position. The true anamorphosis recreates Big Jim’s illusion. When Chaplin returns to his human form, he continues to gesture and move like a chicken — or so the audience perceives, once it has been led to use this einziger Zug. Chaplin the clown becomes edible, a homo sacer — as are, in essence, all clowns.

Anxiety appears and disappears in the scene. The phallus, which is at heart “only” appearance and disappearance, merges with its function in the Ø/β function as the invisible glue holding two still frames together while affording the illusion of movement. Anxiety’s absence in Florensky’s “false enlightenment” of prelest is a matter of predication. The “array of saints and angels” is, as Richard Bernheimer cleverly noted, is the obverted form of the audience who occupies the fourth wall in the cinematic set-up. We witness the transformation of man to chicken as a Greek chorus, standing around a “site of exception.” Like the sudden realization, in Nights of Cabiria (Federico Fellini, 1957) that the newly-wed Cabiria has been led to the seaside resort not to celebrate a honeymoon but to be murdered by her greedy new husband, we become complicit in this loss of bios by participating (under the condition of remaining silent, in the auditorium) as witnesses.

The -Ø’s optical function, we should not forget, is the objet petit a — the gaze, the blind spot from which the image returns the look of the audience. This anxiety point, the channel by which the image interpellates the viewer ideologically, balances out the feeling of floating that sustains the "saints and angels" in their celestial array.

5: The Structure of Identity

Marivaux’s plays insisted on structure as the test of truth. The playwright frequently lectured his public on the idea that the mask was more real than any substance behind the mask, because it revealed itself through process and play. The Game of Love and Chance, Le jeu d’amour et du hazard (1730) is a paradigm case (Alenka Zupančič, The Odd Man In, 104–107). Dorante and Sylvia are engaged to be married, but both have doubts about the suitability of their future mate. At the same time Sylvia hatches a scheme to disguise her maidservant, Lisette, to meet Dorante in her place, Dorante comes up with the same scheme for his manservant Harlequin. Only Sylvia’s father Orgon and her brother Mario know the whole story. The symmetry of the trick maintains the boundary separating masters from servants, and like many 18c. dramas that ran romances downstairs to parallel ones upstairs, the logic is one of synchronicity: “If I can fall in love by proxy, as ‘not myself’, then it is possible to fall in love for real.”

Linked: 1.06, 2.16, 2.17m, 2.28, 3.02, 3.03m, 3.09, 3.11m, A1 (226), A2 (243)

Image 1: the Möbius effect

Servants and masters form a logical square, but Marivaux’s mirror plot twists the two sides so that the former upper and lower sides now cross. Truth is delayed through the device of “fidelity” (the servant’s allegiance to the master and cooperation in the farcical
experiment). The matter of truth is embodied by the father (legal legitimacy) and the brother (who is traditionally responsible for the honor of the sister). Against this authoritarian presence, a game of chance is loosened to determine the fate of the absent noble couple whose proxies engage a kind of wild randomness.

**Image 2:** “All chance, direction which thou canst not see ...”

All nature is but art: the two meanings of automaton — chance and over-determined machine — combine in *Le jeu*. Marivaux personally suffered from the downside of chance, nature without art. He lost his savings in the Mississippi scandal of 1720. His daughter, lacking a dowery, became a nun. Worse still, for an intellectual in the Eighteenth Century, he was an enemy of Voltaire. Nonetheless, he was the inventor of a species of glossolalia that rivals Turing’s talking machine, “marivaudage” — the lively banter, typically spurred by erotic situations, where characters reveal “more in them than they themselves had been aware.” The hysterical wanderer in search of a site of exception was not far from his mind. In combination with Marivaux’s interest in Homer (he championed the case of Antoine Houdar de la Motte, who had popularized a reworked version of *The Iliad* in 1714), in 1737 Marivaux published a book, one of whose three titles was *Le Don Quichotte moderne*.

**ANAMORPH:** wages/wager

This indirect ploy sets up the double test by which love is proved through its refusal to be contained within a transitive affirmation. This was not an unusual insight. Did not Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 (“Let me not to the marriage of true minds / admit impediments”). After a series of improbable statements about love (that it never alters, bends, or is shaken, etc.) the clincher comes with the introduction of the double negative. “If this be error and upon me proved, / I never writ, nor no man ever loved.” The reader realizes in retrospect that love, too, operates in retrospect.

Marivaux’s historic, intellectual, and personal proximity to Vico (both were choleric and melancholic; both were interested in Homer; both invented “thinking machines”) is indicated by his fidelity to the idea that the highest human relationship, love, could arise from that which was most detached from reason, intentionality, values, and affinities. The einziger Zug, the unary trait, is an excess, a tell, a thread to the past. It connects the Ø that stands out — and, in this matter, the main aspect of architecture as that which is erected upon a ground — with the -ø, ruin, which fails at its attempt to return completely to its material basis — permanently missing object of desire. The final remainder, the small distance between the final at-rest position of the fall and the absolutely bottom, which William Empson cleverly related to the dog. If the dog represents the lowest aspect of human character, then “humanity is still tolerable” (William Empson, *The Structure of Complex Words*, 168). It is possibly for this reason — by which the dog is to the human what the ruin is to architecture — that some cultures require a dog to be present at death (*sagdid*), to allow the soul to escape. This traditional guardian of boundaries, who cannot speak but is thought to be able to smile, tries to tell us something.

Note: The predominance of comedy and clown themes in these examples of the hopscotch method is indicative of the generally comic aspect of *The Atlas* as a functioning grimoire. Like Dante’s *Divina Comedia*, where questions of structure dominate, the historical reference to comedy is inevitable. Only in comedy do issues of identity, scale, obversion, twists, flips, and double crosses aspire to the level of theology. The site of exception is a comic site.
This list of references hovers between service as a list of citations and a canon of recommended readings. Some well known works given in the text, with limited publication information, are not listed. This list is designed to assist the reader who would wish to know how to know more.


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