

## Jacques Lacan: Signification and Representation

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Jacques Lacan applies Sigmund Freud's dream analysis to the structuring of the unconscious in linguistic terms in the "Rome Discourse" of 1953, "The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis." He announces: "Take up the work of Freud again at the *Traumdeutung* [*Interpretation of Dreams*] to remind yourself that the dream has the structure of a sentence or, rather, to stick to the letter of the work, of a rebus," or in other words, "it has the structure of a form of writing, of which the child's dream represents the primordial ideography and which, in the adult, reproduces the simultaneously phonetic and symbolic use of signifying elements, which can also be found in the hieroglyphics of ancient Egypt and in the characters still used in China" (*The Language of the Self*, p. 30).<sup>1</sup> The symbolic function of the signifying elements is of less importance than the linguistic mechanisms with which the dream is written, the phonetic elements.

The phonetic elements constitute the role of the Symbolic in the unconscious, as opposed to the Imaginary, but of course depend on the role of the Imaginary. "But even this is no more than the deciphering of the instrument. The important part begins with the translation of the text, the important part which Freud tells us is given in the [verbal] elaboration of the dream," which is a function of conscious reason, "in other words, in its rhetoric. Ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repetition, apposition—these are the syntactical displacements," along with "metaphor, catachresis, antonomasis, allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche—these are the semantic condensations in which Freud teaches us to read the intentions—ostentatious or demonstrative, dissimulating or persuasive, retaliatory or seductive—out of which the subject modulates his oniric discourse" (p. 31). Several of these linguistic mechanisms operate in the formation of dream images. In that these are the mechanisms which allow the subject to moderate the dream discourse, they are not mechanisms of the dream itself, but rather the conscious reading of the dream.

Ellipsis involves the omission of a word in a syntax without altering the signification; a pleonasm is the use of more words than are necessary for the signification; a syllepsis is the use of a word in a syntax which agrees with

one word in the syntax grammatically but not another; an apposition is the placing of a word in a sentence to explain another word; a catachresis is the incorrect use of a word; an antonomasis is the use of a title instead of a name. These are the primary condensations and displacements, along with metaphor and metonymy, which are active in both language and dream construction. They can all be used as strategies in architectural composition. Syllepsis can be found in the overlay of grids, for example, where a grid which is rotated or shifted might correspond to one underlying grid in a certain way but not to another. Such an overlaying can result in the creation of a transformational relation; the syllepsis can act as the *point de capiton* in the signifying chain, or the point at which the overlay of the grids reveals an underlying conceptual structure, as it does in language.

An apposition would be one element of a grid or scheme which is designed to correspond to another grid or scheme, as in a previous site condition; the apposition may be the doubling of an element, a self-repetition which reveals the repression of another element, as in metaphor. A catachresis would be that element in a grid or scheme which is purposefully out of place, as often happens in the dream; the catachresis reveals the self-enclosure of the signifying system of the language, and the production of nonsense, as in metonymy. An antonomasis would be the substitution of a type-form for a form in the architectural composition, to stage the dialectic between the metaphysic of the architecture and the *signifiante* in which it is engaged, the dialectic between the Symbolic and the Imaginary.

The coexistence of phonetic and symbolic elements in the writing of the dream is the coexistence of the Imaginary and Symbolic, and the coexistence of the mnemonic residue of the visual perception and the mnemonic residue of the auditory perception, the traces interwoven into the language of the unconscious. The visual residue is the “thing presentation” (*Sachvorstellung*, or *Dingvorstellung*), and the auditory residue is the “word presentation” (*Wortvorstellung*) in the formation of the dream image, which is described by Freud as the transition from the latent content to the visual image of the dream in a “concern for representability” (*Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*), as described by Lacan in “The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 160).<sup>2</sup> The coexistence of the *Sachvorstellung* and the *Wortvorstellung* in the *Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*, in the writing of the dream, is a “double inscription” (*Niederschrift*) which involves condensation and displacement, and which corresponds to the coexistence of conscious and repressed or unconscious images which may occur in the pre-

conscious, in the memory of the dream, and which constitutes the structure of conscious language in the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy in particular. The *Niederschrift* is the quality of the hieroglyph, the simultaneity of the word and the image, which would be impossible to comprehend by someone within the framework of modern linguistic usage. While the writing of the dream can be seen in terms of a linguistic structure, such a writing exceeds the possibility of modern language and communication. In the Symbolic of Lacan, a representation can be a cathexis (*Besetzung*) of an image and a word, while in the Imaginary a presentation can only be an image.

It is this dialectical synthesis which only architecture can achieve, the dialectic between reason and what is other to reason which occurs within reason itself. Such a dialectical synthesis is the synthesis of subjective and objective spirit in absolute spirit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. As subjective spirit (the virtual) becomes objective spirit (the real), subjective spirit comes to be seen as reality, the inner being of the world which “assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself—it is externality (otherness), and exists for self” (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 86).<sup>3</sup> The real in architecture, the surface aspect, is always seen as the objective form of the virtual, the deep aspect, and the expectation of representation in the Symbolic. As objective form, the real in architecture, the object, is then seen as externality or otherness in relation to the subject, enacting the subject/object dialectic. As externality or otherness, though, the object retains its relation to the idea.

Subjective spirit is implicit in its nature as self-contained (*an sich*); it does not exist in the object, and does not exhibit the qualities of the object in reason, of differentiation in the particular, until the initial doubling of itself as otherness or externality, as in the primordial dehiscence of thought alienating itself from its own being, the primordial dehiscence of the subject between the Imaginary and the Symbolic in the mirror stage, which permanently alienates the subject from itself. Such a dehiscence is enacted in architecture between the virtual and the real. Subjective spirit becomes objective spirit, but as objective spirit it is immediately negated. Thought becomes self-reflected in the object which is the product of its doubling, as all objects are given to reason in perception, in the Symbolic. Reason itself, the virtual, is the objective self-reflection of thought, thought in self-consciousness, resulting from the primordial dehiscence, the self-alienation of thought in the phenomenal world.

Spirit becomes self-conscious through perception, or picture-thinking, as in the recognition by the subject of itself in the mirror stage. Perception consists of moments of thought “appearing as completely independent sides which are externally connected with each other” (*Phenomenology* 765), differentiation in reason. Perception becomes the middle term between the virtual and the real, between the universal in thought and the particular in the object. As such perception is the doubling of the self-consciousness of thought, the “consciousness of passing into otherness” (767). The negation of thought in the phenomenal through perception, the negation of the virtual in the real, is the dialectical synthesis of the virtual and the real, the absolute spirit of Hegel. Absolute spirit is “the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in itself in essence; i.e. simple essence is absolute difference from itself, or its pure othering of itself” (769). As the subject enters into the Symbolic, into language, it is negated in the self-doubling of its reason. In architecture, the synthesis of the virtual and the real which can only take place in the mind, is the negation of the virtual in the real in absolute otherness and externality. The negation of the virtual in the real can only take place in the virtual. Through the doubling and self-negation of thought, and its re-absorption of its negation into itself, the subject is elided. Such negation in architecture is as the *chôra*, the place which cannot be a place, because it only exists as the self-negation of the idea of place, the self-negation of the subject.

Lacan compares the distortion (*Enstellung*) described by Freud in dream work (*Traumarbeit*), to the *glissement* in signification, the sliding of the signified under the signifier in the course of the signifying chain. In the gap between what is perceived and what is represented in the dream as the mnemonic residue of perception, a direct connection is lost in the process of distortion, as the connection is lost between the signifier and the signified in language. Freud’s dream condensation (*Verdichtung*) is compared to the combination of signifiers in metaphor. Displacement (*Verschiebung*) is compared to the transfer of signification in metonymy, where the correspondence between signifier and signified is maintained, but shifted, and rendered nonsensical.

The only difference between the mechanisms in language and the mechanisms in the dream work is the difference between the intentions of communication and the consideration of representability (*Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*), which is also a mechanism of communication, which combines both word presentation and thing presentation in conscious discourse. The elision of the signified, in the connection between signifier and signifier, in both the dream and conscious discourse, creates absence in language, in

representation, by forcing the signifier to refer back to the previous signifier. In doing so, it represents the subject, and the *point de capiton* is arrived at, in the anticipation of the subject in the signifying chain. It is that which produces desire in language, which is the desire of the Other, in the attempt to regain the absence, to relocate the subject.

The absence of the subject in language follows the objectification of the ideal ego in the insertion of the subject in language following mirror stage identification. The subject “becomes objectified in the dialectic of the identification with the other” (*The Language of the Self*, p. 45), according to Lacan, as spirit does for Hegel in objective spirit. The subject becomes a function of the universal, of concept in language, as it does for Hegel in the movement from the particular to the universal. The ideal ego prior to language becomes inaccessible to the subject in language. The relation between the subject in language, the Symbolic, and the ideal ego, the Imaginary, is an asymptotic one. The “wall of language” becomes a barrier to the self-identification of the subject, as it is to the realization of the subject for Hegel, the synthesis of the dialectic in absolute spirit.

The subject is doubled and self-alienated in the Symbolic of Lacan, as the subject is doubled and self-alienated in reason in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The premise of the doubling of the subject in language is the dialectic of self-consciousness, the elision of the particular in the universal, but in the insertion in the Other the Lacanian subject is decentered from consciousness, that in which the subject identifies itself in the *cogito*. In the Symbolic the self-identification of the subject is defined by *méconnaissance* rather than consciousness. The Symbolic is “an order which can only be ex-centric in relation to any bringing to realization of the consciousness-of-self,”<sup>4</sup> according to Lacan. The dialectic of consciousness itself becomes other to the subject as it is defined in the Symbolic, which precludes the possibility of a dialectical synthesis, a totality, however much it may be presented in the *Phenomenology* as containing its own negation. The subject can only be seen as divided.

For Hegel the division or alienation of the subject is synonymous with its formation. It is through the alienation (*Entfremdung*) of reason to itself that the subject discovers itself in its own dehiscence. In the Hegelian subject, existence (being-for-self) is set against nothingness (being-in-itself), which is not present in existence, or reality as given by language, as the being-in-itself of the Lacanian subject is not present in language. Being-in-itself, subjective spirit, is synthesized into the dialectic of reason, and in that way it becomes

other to itself as fragmented being, as in the dialectical synthesis of the real and virtual in architecture. As reason returns to itself from the other in the dialectic, it discovers itself simultaneously as “absolute negativity” and “infinite self-affirmation,” as described by Hegel in the *Philosophy of Mind* (§ 381).<sup>5</sup> Reason is the perpetual self-affirmation of absolute negativity, the perpetuation of the externality of language in relation to the subject, or the externality of architectural form, the otherness of the subject in relation to the Symbolic.

In the *Phenomenology*, the “absolute certitude of self changes therefore immediately for it as consciousness into a dying echo, in the objectivity of its being-for-itself; but the world thus created is its *discourse* which it has heard similarly non-immediately and whose echo keeps on coming back to it...”<sup>6</sup> The echo is subjective spirit, which can be seen as the unconscious, the absence which is present in the discourse, in language. Discourse, objective spirit, is seen as something which is always already in relation to the subject, which is other to it. The subject is present in discourse only as a non-presence; consciousness is only given by that which is other to it, which becomes the unconscious in the science of the letter. In the *Rome Discourse*, Lacan observes: “I identify myself in Language, but only by losing myself in it like an object,” the being-for-self of objective spirit. “What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming” (*The Language of the Self*, p. 63). Memory (perception) cannot establish presence in language. The present perfect of the subject, as a completion, is impossible in language. The subject is objectified in language as that which is in the process of becoming but has not yet become, which is nothing, non-being, as the signifier represents the subject to the next signifier in the chain of signification. The presence of the subject in language is presence as motion in the paradox of Zeno, the gap between the positions of the objects, as the gap between the signifiers, which always defines a particular place as it is translated into a universal concept, reason in language.

Freud translates the self-negation of reason in Hegel as a symptom of unconscious repression. In the essay “Negation” of 1925, the “content of a repressed presentation or thought can thus make its way through to consciousness on the condition that it lets itself be negated. The *Verneinung*,” denial, “is a way to take cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a ‘lifting and conserving’ of the repression, but not for all that an ac-

ceptance of what is repressed.”<sup>7</sup> The Freudian unconscious is thus seen as being present in the Hegelian dialectic, in the form of repression as a symptom of self-negation, which is given by the insertion of the subject in the Symbolic, and the loss of the other to reason, the unconscious, in the objectification of reason, and the loss of the Imaginary subject in the totality of the Other.

The Symbolic becomes primary because it makes the ordering of reality possible in the entrance of the subject into language. An example of this is the *Fort! Da!* game described by Freud, the gone/here game enacted by the infant to compensate for the temporary departure of the mother. Freud explains in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, “the interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was related to the child’s great cultural achievement—the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach” (p. 14).<sup>8</sup> In the game, language, the ordering of reality in the Symbolic, becomes a substitution for the instinctual displeasure which the infant feels at the departure of its mother, as well as the instinctual joy which the infant feels upon her return, or the anticipation of that joy. The departure of the mother is enacted in anticipation of the return in order to simulate the instinctual feeling in language. As soon as the linguistic game is constructed, the infant becomes a subject of the game, and the linguistic construction replaces the actual relation with the mother. Both the infant and the mother are defined as subjects by the Other, by the network of relations which connect them and determine them in language, the ordering of reality. Language assumes a primacy over perception, and the word becomes more important than the *imago* as the anchoring point of the subject.

The unconscious, then, is defined by Lacan as “that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 49 [“The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis”]). As the subject becomes redefined to itself in relation to the Other, in the Symbolic, it loses its definition of itself in relation to itself in the Imaginary. The absence of the subject, the absence in language, is perpetually recreated in language, as in the *Fort! Da!* game of the infant, in which is inscribed the trace of presence, the Imaginary presence, in the Symbolic, the “world of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will come to be ar-

ranged” (p. 65). The archetypal form of Plato, for example, the construction of a metaphysical language, is the recreation of such a reality, the transposition of a language which is already inscribed with the deceptive totality of a system which insures being. As in the metaphysic, “through that which becomes embodied only by being the trace of a nothingness and whose support cannot thereafter be impaired, the concept, saving the duration of what passes by,” as in Zeno’s paradox, “engenders the thing.”

The Platonic archetypal form is the trace of a nothingness, the absence in perception as given by the construction of perception in reason, in the entrance into the Symbolic. “It is the world of words that creates the world of things,” for Lacan, in the concept, in the process of perception, and in the structuring of the unconscious as given by the dream. The thing is given by concept as an “everlasting possession” (Thucydides), as an archetype, thus the metaphysical structure of reason. “Man speaks, then, but it is because the symbol has made him man,” even prior to his birth. As the subject is both an absence in language and an always already presence in that absence, so the subject is an always already presence in history. As the subject is determined by language, so the subject is determined by history. In *Reason in History*, Hegel defined the subject in history as an “antithesis to the natural world” (III).<sup>9</sup> History, like the subject, begins its purpose as the realization of spirit, being-in-itself (*an sich*), the unconscious. History is the process of making conscious the unconscious, the transition from subjective to objective spirit.

Historical events are seen as mechanisms toward bringing the unconscious to consciousness, in conscious reason; history is the stage on which are acted out the events of the constructed reality of mind (language in the Symbolic) in its self-alienation from nature and from its other, the unconscious, in objective spirit. The individual will is seen as the product of a culture, as the particular is a product of the universal, the thing is a product of the word. The individual historical subject can only act in relation to its position in history and the Other: “The individual does not invent his own content; he is what he is by acting out the universal as his own content” (III.2.b), that is to say, the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. Any action which contributes to the course of the historical development of a culture on the part of an individual is a consequence of that individual interpreting and carrying out the universal will of the culture, the concept of the culture, in particular events. This is especially true in artistic activity; a work of art only has resonance in so far as it reflects the universal will of the culture in the course of history.

Language in the Symbolic of Lacan is defined by the Other, which is the “intersubjectivity of the ‘we’ that it assumes” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 86). The subject enters language only in relationship to the other, in order to be recognized by the other. “What constitutes me as subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the other, I utter what was only in view of what will be [the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming].” The subject is only present in language in anticipation of a response from the other. “In order to find him, I call him by a name that he must assume or refuse in order to reply to me. I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object.” In the same way, the subject identifies itself in history, in response to the anticipation of the Other, and loses itself in it like an object. In history, Hegel argues in *Reason in History*, the individual subject must sacrifice itself to the universal; it must sacrifice its *Moralität*, intrinsic morality (the concept derived from the anticipation of the other), to its *Sittlichkeit*, extrinsic morality (the rules of the anticipation of the other). *Moralität* is the retention of the presence of the unconscious in reason, the being-in-itself of subjective spirit. *Sittlichkeit* is the being-for-self of objective spirit, the doubling of reason in the Other; it is the definition of the subject as constituted by the Other and by history. The subject overcomes its absence, its non-being in history, as in language, by converting itself into an object at the disposal of the other, as an agent of language, and as an object at the disposal of the Other, as an agent of history.

The Hegelian *Moralität* corresponds to the ideal ego of Lacan, the subject as seen by itself as prior to the Other, though mediated by the other, while the *Sittlichkeit* corresponds to the Symbolic, the “I” (*je*) of the subject’s discourse, the subject as seen by itself as it is inserted into language. The distinction between the Symbolic, the I (*je*), and the Imaginary ego, the me (*moi*), is the distinction between reason and instinct, interpersonal relations and natural relations, the conscious and unconscious, from Freud, who wrote “*Das Ich und das Es* in order to maintain this fundamental distinction between the true subject of the unconscious and the ego as constituted in its nucleus by a series of alienating identifications” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 128), as Lacan describes. The cycle of alienating identifications which constitutes the ego in language is impossible to break, as the ego of the unconscious is inaccessible. The principle of objectification which determines the unbreakable cycle is the principle of *méconnaissance*, misrecognition. When the subject speaks, it is always of something which is other to the subject and which

is inaccessible to the subject in any form of consciousness or self-consciousness, that it, the unconscious.

The identity of the subject cannot be found within the “infinity of reflection that the mirage of consciousness consists of” (p. 134). Ego identity is an indefinite play of reflections between mirrors in which the speaking subject is trapped without access to the “supposed progress of interiority” in which the subject sees itself constituted in *méconnaissance*. The self-alienation of reason in objective spirit precludes access to the subjective spirit of the subject prior to reason. The subject becomes that which is defined by Georges Bataille in “The Pineal Eye” as enclosed in the “degrading chains of logic” (*Visions of Excess*, p. 80),<sup>10</sup> or in “closed systems assigned to life by reasonable conceptions” (p. 128),<sup>11</sup> as described in “The Notion of Expenditure.” For Bataille, the subject is defined in the struggle with the Symbolic, the inescapable signifying structure of human thought. In such a struggle, “being is ‘ungraspable’—it is only grasped in error,”<sup>12</sup> as in *méconnaissance*. The subject is defined by the mirror reflections in which it is trapped, which define to it the relationship between the self and the other as one of simulacrum, as in architecture, the reflection of a reflection with nothing being reflected, which is the *chôra* in language as trace or *point de capiton*, the point of escape from the play of mirror reflections, which is a myth.

The subject is as the subject in the allegory of the cave in Plato’s *Republic*, if the cave is taken as representative of the self. The subject is a prisoner in the self as given by language, as the prisoners in the cave in the *Republic* are unable to see “anything of themselves or their fellows except the shadows thrown by the fire on the wall of the cave opposite them” (515).<sup>13</sup> The shadows on the wall of the cave are the others, or collectively the Other, and the fire is the unconscious. The fire is separated from the cave by a curtain wall built along a road, which is “like a screen at puppet shows between the operator and their audience” (514). The curtain wall is the wall of language, through which the unconscious is filtered. “The realm revealed by sight,” perception in language, “corresponds to the prison” (517) in which the subject is caught, in the play of reflections, “and the light of the fire in the prison to the power of the sun,” the unconscious. For Plato, “the ascent into the upper world and the sight of the objects there,” on the other side of the curtain wall, that is, on the other side of language, is “the upward progress of the mind into the intelligible region,” an understanding of the self outside of perception and language, in the unconscious, as it is for Lacan in the Imaginary, pure form identification prior to language.

In the constitution of the Symbolic, the Imaginary ego disintegrates, and the Symbolic shields the subject from that disintegration. The objects of the Imaginary are the objects structured by perception, as in the shadows on the wall of the cave. For Bataille the Imaginary entails a homogeneous representation of perceived reality wherein existence is a “neatly defined itinerary from one practical sign to another” (*Visions of Excess*, p. 82), and “acts undertaken with some rational end are only servile responses to a necessity” (p. 231), in the Imaginary ego and conscious reason. Lacan explains, “it is thus that the functions of mastery which we incorrectly call the synthesizing functions of the ego, establish on the basis of a libidinal alienation,” the alienation of the Imaginary ego, “the development that follows from it, namely, what I once called the paranoiac principle of human knowledge, according to which its objects are subjected to a law of imaginary reduplication, evoking the homologation of an endless series of notaries...” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 138), as in the anticipation of representation in architecture.

The Symbolic is predicated on a relation to the other which is mutually self-sustaining and mutually exclusive of Imaginary identification. The Imaginary self is thus delimited in the necessity of the other, and the necessity of the Other, as a homogeneous and functionary self, in the relation between the notary of the profession to the other notary, and the notary to the client. “But for me,” writes Lacan, “the decisive signification of the alienation that constitutes the *Urbild* of the ego appears in the relation of exclusion that then structures the dual relation of ego to ego.” The Imaginary ego is reaffirmed by the other, in its functionalism, and can never be predicated on anything other than a relation to the other, the other notary in the profession, as in the objective spirit of Hegel, which establishes the self as other, as that which is not the other, in an irresoluble dialectic, which mirrors the structure of reason in which the Symbolic is established.

It is Bataille’s desire to escape the cycle of functionalism created by the Imaginary ego in the Other, to search for something in life which is other to it. As he writes in *Eroticism, Death and Sensuality*, “there is in nature and there subsists in man a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can never be anything but partially reduced to order. We are generally unable to grasp it. Indeed it is by definition that which can never be grasped, but we are conscious of being in its power: the universe that bears us along answers no purpose that reason defines” (p. 40).<sup>14</sup> For Lacan the movement is the movement of the unconscious, which exceeds the bounds of conscious reason, which is unable to be grasped, that is exterior to the universe of the

Symbolic, the universe of language, a universe which cannot answer to its own premise, because it is only a partial reality.

For Bataille, in “The Notion of Expenditure,” “human life cannot in any way be limited to the closed systems assigned to it by reasonable conceptions. The immense travail of recklessness, discharge, and upheaval that constitutes life could be expressed by stating that life starts only with the deficit of these systems” (*Visions of Excess*, p. 128). Human life cannot be limited by conscious reason; the discharge and upheaval within the systems of reason are the manifestations of the unconscious in conscious thought, and manifestations of the Imaginary *imago*, the primordial self prior to language, which is made present in the deficit of the systems of reason, in the absences, gaps, scotomata, and *méconnaissance* that reveal the limitations of reason. In “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” Bataille endorses “acts undertaken in pursuit of seductive images of chance,” which are “the only ones that respond to the need to live like a flame” (p. 231). The seductive images of chance are the Imaginary *imago*, that which exceeds reason in the unconscious. Bataille seeks, as described in “The Pineal Eye,” a transgression of the “degrading chains of logic” (p. 80) of conscious thought which constitute the Imaginary ego; he seeks “a new laceration within a lacerated nature,” access to the Imaginary in the unconscious.

For Lacan, the self-identification of the subject, and perhaps a transgression of the Imaginary order, begins when the subject “recognizes and therefore distinguishes his action in each of these two registers,” the Imaginary and Symbolic, “if he is to know why he intervenes, at what moment the opportunity presents itself and how to seize it” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 140). This is accomplished in the understanding of the relation between the subject and the other, in distinction from the relation between the subject and the Other, that is, language. “The prime condition for this is that he should be thoroughly imbued with the radical difference between the Other to which his speech must be addressed, and that second other who is the individual that he sees before him, and from whom and by means of whom the first speaks to him in the discourse that he holds before him.” Such recognition would enable the subject to accomplish the “annulling of his own resistance when he is the other with a small *o*,” and then “he will be able to be he to whom this discourse is addressed.”

This is not an easy task, because, as has been seen, the relation of the subject to the other is determined by the relation of the subject to the Other, and the Imaginary identification that the subject might have with the other

has been subsumed by the Symbolic identification with the Other, which has objectified the Imaginary identification into a dialectical product of reason. Thus “the imaginary shaping of the subject by desires more or less fixed or regressed in their relation to the object is too inadequate and partial to provide the key to it” (p. 141). As Freud established the extent to which linguistic discourse determines unconscious activity, the structure of the Other has already played a role in the primordial constitution of the Imaginary ego, as seen in the original conflict of the mirror stage, between gestalt object identification, the *imago*, and the fragmentation of experience.

The Other is “the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks to him who hears, that which is said by the one being already the reply,” the function of the subject in language as always already objectified in the anticipation of signification, but the Other extends into the subject beyond language itself, in the constitution of the subject as it enters into language. Imaginary desire, the primordial ego, is embedded in “a signifier that has been taken possession of by repression,” as manifest in the desire for recognition. The relation between the subject and the other is dictated by the relation between the subject and the Other in so far as the linguistic mechanisms of repression, displacement and distortion, are operative both in the unconscious and in conscious discourse. The unconscious appears in conscious discourse through the primary repression of language, which is also a mechanism of unconscious activity, as shown in the analysis of dreams. As the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, the relation between the subject and the other, on both the Symbolic and Imaginary level, is a relation determined by the Other, despite what might be given by the mirage of consciousness in perception. A transgression of the Other would be useless without an understanding of how the other is constituted by the Other, and how the Imaginary *imago* is transformed in the mirror stage.

The primordial ego which is formed prior to the mirror stage is based on an object identification which is not interceded by a relation to the self as object, a relation which is formed during the mirror stage and which is in conflict with the fragmentary experiences of primary object identification, and which influences the Symbolic in the entrance of the subject into language. The ideal ego is the secondary Imaginary ego, and it serves as a link between the Imaginary *imago* and the Symbolic. The retention of the gestalt ideal ego in the subject is a form of resistance to the primary Imaginary ego, of object identification prior to the intercession of the subject, and the resistance is sustained by the subject’s relation to the other, which makes the differentia-

tion between the relation of the subject to the other and the Other more difficult. As the ideal ego becomes a function of the Other, the primary Imaginary ego becomes inaccessible to conscious thought.

As a link between the Imaginary and Symbolic, the ideal ego is both a permanence and totality, and a fragmentation and ambiguity, in the self-identity of the subject—a dialectic staged in architecture. The ideal ego is as reinforced by the gaze or regard of the other in perception as it is by enunciation of the subject by the other, in the anticipation of presence. The self-perception of the subject as image in relation to the other is thus as illusory as the self-perception of the subject as name in relation to the other. The subject is objectified and elided in anticipation of the gaze in the same way that the subject is elided in the signifying chain of language. The participation of the subject as an image or body in the Other is the same as the participation of the subject as a name in the Other, as perception is a product of language.

Both the gaze and the voice, primordial object identification and auditory perception, as mnemonic residues, are present in the primary Imaginary ego, pre-mirror stage experience, as fragmentary objects. They can surface in dreams, hallucinations, or linguistic mishaps—ellipsis, pleonasm, syllepsis apposition, catachresis, antonomasis—which reveal the unconscious, and which threaten the mirage of the totality of the ideal ego. The basis of the Symbolic is the *méconnaissance* which leads it to mistake itself for a totality in relation to the fragmentary primordial ego. The subject “who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the statement, is no more than such an object” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 315), fragmentary and nonrepresentational. The repression of the subject is thus given by both its definition in the Other and the false identity fixations of the ideal ego. The ideal ego is both a constituent of the Other, as the mirror stage experience influences the development of language, and in rivalry with the Other, as a pre-linguistic Imaginary construct. It is nevertheless subject to the relation to the other, in the anticipation of recognition and signification, thus the problematic situation of the subject in the desire to transgress the Other.

Language is the source of *méconnaissance*, in the community of symbols into which the subject is inserted. In its participation in the Other, the ego misrecognizes its own unconscious, but it is the unconscious which constitutes the ego, the Imaginary function. The subject is excentric to the ego, to its own mechanisms of thinking, and does not know what it is. It is impossible for the subject to know itself, given the dichotomy of the Imaginary and Symbolic. The knowledge on the part of the subject of its unconscious is re-

placed by the illusions of consciousness, the mirage of the *cogito*, the thinking subject. The subject decenters itself in its commitment to language; science and technology are manifestations of the mechanisms of language, symbolic structures, into which the subject inserts itself, and through which the subject loses itself. Language itself is as a machine in that it detaches itself from the subject, and objectifies the subject in its detachment. In language, in its objectification, the subject is fragmented and disconnected, but the ego of the subject retains the virtual and alienated unity given by the gestalt image of the ideal ego in the mirror stage. The subject is divided in language, and further divided by the relation between language and the object, between the Other and the other.

The ego is in the beginning an Imaginary function, but is then objectified as a Symbolic function in the entrance of the subject into language. The Imaginary ego reinforces itself in the image of the other, while the Symbolic reinforces itself in the fragmentary and dispersed structure of language. The subject in language is a “body in pieces” (*Seminar II*, p. 54),<sup>15</sup> as a product of the linguistic structure of perception, and the linguistic structure of the unconscious. The body image of the Symbolic, and the body image of the primordial Imaginary ego, prior to the mirror stage, are in contrast to the body image of the ideal ego of the Imaginary, a unified body which is reinforced in the dream. The dream contains the dialectic of the Imaginary and Symbolic. The body of the other appears in the dream to reinforce the unified body image of the ideal ego of the subject, but the unified body is inserted into a fragmented structure which reflects the structure of language, the structure of the Other. The dream is an “imaginary iridescence” (p. 57) of shifting changes, interplays of forms, varieties of viewpoints, condensations and displacements, which fragments the unified possibility of experience as language fragments the body (the ideal ego) of the subject.

The fragmentation of the ideal ego occurs in decomposition in architecture, wherein architecture is experienced as shifting changes, interplays of forms, varieties of viewpoints, condensations and displacements. The architecture can be read almost as a dream, as an imaginary iridescence, a composition which corresponds to a fragmented and distorted form of logic which is the product of the intersection of the Imaginary and Symbolic, the vestiges of Imaginary object identification floating in the undecipherable matrix of the Symbolic, in the unconscious which is unavailable to conscious thought.

The vestiges of Imaginary object identification are seen as prior conditions in relation to a conceptual matrix in decomposition in architecture. The

intersection between the prior conditions and the conceptual matrix guarantee the impossibility of a unified subject or a stable state of perception, as conscious thought is interrupted and disturbed by the ineffable presence of the inaccessible unconscious, causing instability and vacillation, as in the dream. The composition in architecture can exceed conscious reason in perception, as the dream exceeds conscious reason in perception, in the layers of linguistic matrices combined with the fragments of object identification in sense experience. The architecture enacts the unconscious as the ineffable and inaccessible in rational thought, the mystery of the universe within the human subject, which makes it impossible for the subject to be other than divided and self-alienated. In the inaccessibility of conscious reason to the unconscious, there is no possibility of the origin of reason or the subject. The unconscious prevents conscious reason from knowing itself, as given by the imaginary iridescence of the dream, and the disruptions in language caused by the unconscious in conscious discourse.

The unconscious is thus “always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject,” between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, as Lacan describes in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (p. 28).<sup>16</sup> If the unconscious is structured like a language, then its structuring is one of discontinuity, impediment, vacillation, a “strange temporality” (p. 25). It has been seen how the vacillation in the split of the subject is manifest in metaphor and metonymy in language, in the relation between the signifier and the signified, the subject and the other. The unconscious is seen as a primordial “cut” in thought. The function of the unconscious is “in profound, initial, inaugural, relation with the function of the concept of the *Unbegriff*—or *Begriff* [idea] of the original *Un*, namely, the cut” (p. 43), which is the *archê* of the bar between the signifier and the signified, and the *point de capiton* in language. The function of the subject is predicated on the cut, the split, which manifests itself in a temporal “pulsation” in language, as the subject is elided and then re-emerges from underneath the bar between the signifier and the signified. Language can only establish the possibility of the presence of the subject temporarily, and thus the temporality of the unconscious is a pulsative one, in the coming and going of the illusion of consciousness.

The dialectic of the ego and the Other, the circuit in which the subject becomes a link, is the dialectic of the ego and the unconscious. The subject can only experience itself in the Other, in the unconscious, as in pieces, decomposed. The perception-consciousness system is itself fragmented, and unknowable in its entirety to the subject which is divided in the Symbolic.

As the subject reaffirms its ideal ego in the other, in the Imaginary function of the ego, it has consciousness, but the consciousness is only a reflection, the product of the play of reflections given by perception, as in the allegory of the cave of Plato. The consciousness of the subject is only the consciousness of the other. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness as it becomes objectified in the Other, as objective spirit becomes subjective spirit for Hegel, but as such consciousness only sees itself as the consciousness of the other. Consciousness cannot see itself; the subject cannot identify itself in language—it is only present to itself as an absence. “This is what gives you the illusion that consciousness is transparent to itself [the *cogito*],” Lacan writes. “We aren’t present, in the reflection; to see the reflection, we are in the consciousness of the other” (*Seminar II*, p. 112).

This is illustrated in the painting *Las Meninas* of Diego Velazquez from the seventeenth century. The viewer of the painting is in the place of the subject of the painting, which is the king and queen of Spain, whose portrait is being painted by the painter, off to the left. The painting presents the process of the royal portrait being painted from the point of view of the sitters. A reflection of the king and queen is visible in a mirror on a wall in the background. When the viewer of the painting, the subject, enters the painting, it takes the place of the sitters, the other, but the reflection of the subject is not visible in the mirror. To see the reflection, the subject must assume the consciousness of the sitters, the other, whose reflection is in the mirror. The subject, the viewer, is only present as an absence, and the consciousness of the subject, the *cogito*, is only given by the consciousness of the other.

The subject must constitute its ideal ego, its Imaginary self, in the Other, which would be the perspectival construction of the painting. The subject cannot see itself from the ideal ego of the Imaginary body image of itself, the reflection of the other, because it is separated by the wall of language, because “it is in the space of the Other that he sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space” (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 144), the mirror in the painting, the vanishing point in perspectival construction. The place of the Other from which the subject sees itself is also the point from which the subject speaks in language, and it is the place of the unconscious, which determines the subject in language as a construct of the Other. The dream, as the road to the unconscious, takes the subject along in its search for its place in the Other. In every place that the subject looks, it perceives the image of its body as the ideal ego formed in the mirror stage.

Because the image of the unified body can only be perceived in the other, it is only perceived from the outside, from the ex-centric subject. "Because of this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow of his own ego" (*Seminar II*, p. 166). The ideal unity of the subject which is unattainable is evoked at every moment of perception. The object identification that the subject experiences, and the identification with the other, can never satisfy the subject faced with its own absence and dehiscence in such an ego identification. The subject is irreducibly separated from the objects of perception, from the world which it perceives, because it cannot find itself there, as in architecture, though its dehiscence is contained in the object. The Imaginary is always mediated by the Symbolic, and "it is in the nature of desire to be radically torn." The momentary, ephemeral experiences of perception alienate the subject from itself; the shadows on the wall of the cave reinforce the subject as prisoner in the cave.

The object can only be perceived in unity with the subject from without, temporarily, and this alienation causes disarray and fragmentation in the subject. Perception can only be sustained "within a zone of nomination" (p. 169). The name has no relationship to the "spatial distinctiveness of the object," the Imaginary object identification, but rather to its temporal dimension in perception, in the representability of architecture. The object, while it is "at one instant constituted as a semblance of the human subject, a double of himself" in a reflection, it "nonetheless has a certain permanence of appearance over time," as given by the insertion of the object in perception, and the insertion of the subject in the Symbolic. Perception is not possible without naming, without language; such is the relation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic.

The self-perception of the subject is one of unsatisfied desire. When the subject sees itself as a unity in the other, in the Imaginary, the world becomes fragmented, alienated, decomposed. When the subject sees the world (the Other) as a unity, in the Symbolic, it is the subject which becomes fragmented and alienated. Such an oscillation in perception is manifest in the dream. The subject is either in one place, in the Imaginary, or in several places, in the Symbolic. If the subject is in several places in the Symbolic, it is in the form of multiple ideal egos which reinforce the Imaginary. The perceived object or the other occurs in the dream as the body of the subject itself in the ideal ego, as a reflection of the subject, a mirror image, which is not present. The image in the dream is thus a simulacrum, a copy of an original

which does not exist, as in a *chôra*, a place which is not a place. The reflection of the subject also occurs in conscious perception; it is present in every act of perception. In perception, the subject is not aware of that which it perceives as its own reflection, while in the dream it becomes apparent, because the ideal ego, a product of conscious experience, is not as present in the dream. As a result, in the dream the subject becomes aware of its isolation and alienation from the world which it perceives, as it is reproduced in the mnemonic residues.

The isolation and alienation that the subject feels in relation to the world which it perceives is alleviated through the intervention of the Symbolic, to which the dream leads the subject. The alienation of the subject is absolved in its conscious rationality, in the universality, the all-encompassing reality system, of language. But it is in that conscious rationality that the subject disappears, becomes “no more than a pawn” (p. 168), is objectified in the signifying chain of language, and becomes determined by language, by the Other, which is the discourse of the unconscious. “The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject” (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 207). The result is “the temporal pulsation in which is established that which is the characteristic of the departure of the unconscious as such—the closing.” Time, alteration, mathematics, are the mechanisms of conscious thought in the repression of the unconscious. The unconscious is something which perpetually opens and closes within the mechanisms of conscious thought. It is never present as other than an absence, a trace, in the gap between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, in which the subject is “born divided” (p. 199).

The subject becomes the network of signifiers in language, which is the dream. The subject finds itself in the layers of images in dreams in which the network of signifiers is played out. The optical model of the dream, in the intersection of the Imaginary and Symbolic, consists of “a number of layers, permeable to something analogous to light whose refraction changes from layer to layer. This is the locus where the affair of the subject of the unconscious is played out” (p. 45). This something analogous to light is as an inner light, as it were, a reflection of the perceived light of the ideal ego in the Imaginary, in the mnemonic residue of perception, the construction of which forms the Imaginary subject in relation to the Symbolic.

The inner light which is perceived is that which is other than given by reason in perception, or the Symbolic, or the ego ideal, but the primordial ego of the Imaginary, the ideal ego. Hegel defines the inner light as that which is shapeless and formless, thus that which is given by something other than sense-certainty, perception or consciousness, that which does not correspond to the mnemonic residues of perception. In the *Phenomenology*, light as shapelessness is “the pure, all-embracing and all-pervading essential light of sunrise, which pervades itself in its formless substantiality” (686). The genesis of the being-for-self of spirit, objective spirit, or reason, consists of “torrents of light,” while the return into the being-in-itself of spirit from the moments of its existence, the manifestation in particulars, as given by perception, as in the return to the primordial Imaginary from the temporal Symbolic, consists of “streams of fire destructive of structured form,” that which is given by language.

Lacan describes the layers of the optical model of the dream through which the matrix of the Symbolic is filtered, in the form of the subject, and through which the inner light of the primordial ego is refracted, as an “immense display, a special specter, situated between perception and consciousness” (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 45). The optical model of the dream is located between the mnemonic residues of perception which produce the dream on the Imaginary level, and the Symbolic matrix which produces the subject in consciousness, or conscious reason. The Other is situated in the interval that separates perception and consciousness, in the *chôra* of the intersection, and it is there that the subject is constituted, in the layered apparition of the intersection of the Imaginary and Symbolic, which in rhetorical terms is the in-between, the locus of the trace.

The separation between perception and consciousness is necessary in order for the *Wahrnehmungszeichen*, the traces of perception, to become mnemonic residues, to pass into memory. The traces must be effaced in perception, in the temporal and particular mechanisms of objective experience, and must be constituted simultaneously in the “signifying synchrony” (p. 46), the universal concept, or consciousness. The passage from perception to consciousness is the passage from the particular to the universal, which begins in perception, in the particular of the mnemonic residue. In the *Phenomenology* of Hegel, perception already “takes what is present to it as a universal” (111); consciousness is already implicated in perception. It is the mnemonic residue which differentiates consciousness from perception, which is the discovery of Freud in the analysis of dreams, and which renders consciousness as al-

iated from the constitution of the subject. The passage from the particular to the universal, from the diachronic to the synchronic, which occurs for Hegel in perception itself, occurs for Freud in the passage from perception to consciousness, from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, in which is found the constitution of the subject.

The *Wahrnehmungszeichen* are immediately transformed into a signifying synchrony in that they immediately become signifiers. The layers between perception and consciousness are the layers in which the traces of perception enter the Symbolic as signifiers, and the Imaginary ego of the subject is objectified as the Symbolic. The permeation through the layers thus entails a dialectical process of fragmentation and dispersal combined with unification and coalescence, in the two-way interaction between the Imaginary and Symbolic, between image and word. Such a dialectical interaction is present in language, in metaphor. “What we have here are those functions of contrast and similitude so essential in the constitution of metaphor, which is introduced by a diachrony” (The *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 46), and which incorporates both condensation and displacement, as in the dream work. The mechanisms of language reveal the same interstice between perception and consciousness in which the constitution of the subject is to be found.

The definition of the subject between perception and consciousness, as between the Imaginary and Symbolic, is one of rupture and discontinuity in the lacuna which is present in language, in “the gap itself that constitutes awakening” (p. 57). That which passes in the gap between perception and consciousness is as that which passes in the gaps in the *glissement* of the signifying chain in language, what Lacan calls the gaze, the visual equivalent of the *glissement* between the Imaginary and the Symbolic. “In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it—that is what we call the gaze” (p. 73). The gaze is the presence of absence in perception, the presence of the absence of the subject in perception, as the anchoring point is in signification, and the point at which the subject is defined in relation to the unconscious. The relation of the subject to the Other is “entirely produced in a process of gap” (p. 206) in both perception and language, in both the Imaginary and Symbolic, and in particular in the intersection between them, as they are always interrelated.

The images in the dream, the transposition of the mnemic residue of perception, are the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen* described by Freud, which is not a representative representative (*le représentant représentatif*) according to Lacan (p. 60), but “that which takes place of the representation (*le tenant-lieu de la représentation*)” between perception and consciousness, the gap in which the subject is constituted. The *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is located in the “schema of the original mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enable us to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other” (p. 218), in the signifying chain, the product of which is the elision, the aphanisis of the subject. The subject is divided because as soon as it appears in the signifying chain, as represented by a signifier, it disappears, in the same way that the mnemic residue of perception disappears when it is inserted into the signifying chain of the dream and is replaced by the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*. The *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is as the pronoun in language, that which replaces the absent subject in the Symbolic, thus the divided subject.

The *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is as the binary signifier in the metaphor, which in the process of condensation and displacement produces signification by substituting the name of one thing for something else, and an idea is formed in the combination of two names. In the *glissement* the signified is transferred from one signifier to another, in what is called *signifying substitution* in the binary signifier. The idea, the subject, is produced in the gap between signifiers, at the *point de capiton*, the intersection of the Imaginary and Symbolic vectors in the L-schema, in the retroactive anticipation of presence. At the anchoring point, “sense emerges from non-sense” (*Écrits, A Selection*, p. 158).

As the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is the binary signifier in the metaphoric process of condensation and displacement in the formation of the dream, as that which takes the place of the representation, it is the supersession (*Urverdrängung*) of the signifier in condensation, between the Imaginary and Symbolic, which creates the point of attraction (*Anziehung*), the *point de capiton*, through which the unconscious is momentarily revealed, and which creates repression in the *Unterdrückung* of the signifier, which is the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*. It is that which occurs in the gap between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, between perception and consciousness, which is repressed, in the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* which is that which takes the place of the representation, in the *glissement* which occurs in the in-between, and the in-between which occurs in the *glissement*, in the intersection of the Im-

aginary and Symbolic. Signification occurs in the *Vorstellung* (Hegel's picture-thinking), while the *Repräsentativ* occurs in the Imaginary.

The Imaginary exists in the intersubjective relation, in the ideal ego through which the subject identifies itself in relation to the other, based on the gestalt image attained in the mirror stage. The Imaginary also exists in perception and consciousness, outside of the Other which constitutes the subject in the unconscious, in the ideal ego and the mechanisms of thought. The ego is a product of the relation with the other, the necessity of intersubjectivity. The subject is discordant in its inability to identify itself as the image reflected by the other in relation to its own disappearance in language, which preserves the existence of the other to the subject. The ego, the mechanism of thought, is itself an object which appears in the world of objects. Consciousness, the self-identity of the subject with its ego, is defined as a tension between the ego which has been alienated from the subject in its experience in language, and in the impossibility of its relation to the other, and the perception on the part of the subject which is external to ego, the primordial object identification prior to the mirror stage, a "pure *percipi*," seizing or receiving (*Seminar II*, p. 177). In primordial object identification, "the subject would be strictly identical to this perception if there weren't this *ego* which...makes it emerge from out of its very perception in a relationship of tension. Under certain conditions, this imaginary relation itself reaches its own limit, and the *ego* fades away, dissipates, becomes disorganized, dissolves" (pp. 177–178).

For Lacan the subject is always fragmented in the relation between the *percipi*, primordial object identification, and language. The gap between the *percipi* and language, between the particular and universal, between the signifier and the signified, between the Imaginary and Symbolic, is defined as *desire*. Desire is the product of the impossibility of the Imaginary in the Symbolic, the splitting of the subject between identification with the other and identification in the Other, the splitting in which the unconscious is formed, in the repression of desire as misrecognition, *méconnaissance*, which is the only recourse of the subject. The splitting occurs in the processes of language, in metaphor and metonymy, as the impossible representation of what the subject cannot know as itself; as Lacan writes in *Écrits*, "it is the concrete incidence of the signifier in the submission of need to demand which, by repressing desire into the position of the misrecognized, gives the unconscious its order."<sup>17</sup> Desire is maintained by language, as is the dehiscence of the subject, and the possibility of the unconscious, and "it is the nature of desire to be radically torn."<sup>18</sup>

1. Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self, The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis*, trans. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 30.
2. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits, A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).
3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Arnold Vincent Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
4. Jacques Lacan, *Actes*, p. 206, quoted in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self*, Translator's Notes, No. 131, p. 140.
5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace, from *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, in *Hegel: Selections*, ed. Jacob Loewenberg (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929).
6. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes)*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1948, p. 462; II, p. 189), quoted in Anthony Wilden, *Lacan and the Discourse of the Other*, in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self*, p. 289.
7. Sigmund Freud, "Negation," *Standard Edition XIX*, p. 239, quoted in Anthony Wilden, *Lacan and the Discourse of the Other*, in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self*, p. 285.
8. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Standard Edition*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).
9. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Reason in History, A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, trans. Robert Hartman (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953 [1837]).
10. Georges Bataille, "The Pineal Eye," in *Visions of Excess, Selected Writings* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 80.
11. Georges Bataille, "The Notion of Expenditure," in *Visions of Excess*, p. 128.
12. Quoted in Jean-Louis Baudry, "Bataille and Science: An Introduction to Inner Experience," in *On Bataille, Critical Essays*, ed. Leslie Boldt-Irons (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 276.
13. Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1955).
14. Georges Bataille, *Eroticism, Death and Sensuality* (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1986), p. 40.
15. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954–1955*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
16. Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).
17. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits*, p. 709, quoted in Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London: Verso, 1987), p. 82.
18. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II*, p. 166.